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Abst ract  
 
This thesis at tempts to ident ify a part icular epistemological stance as a 
t rans-historical generic feature of the Brit ish novel, seeking theoret ical 
commonalit ies across readings of four novelist ic texts.  Drawing upon 
convent ional cr it ical reliance on realism  as a definit ive feature of the novel, 
chapter one exam ines the dialect ical interplay of empir icism  and 
scept icism  in the intellectual climate and public discourse of eighteenth-
century Britain as an influence on realist ic literary modes and proposes 
that  the novel as a genre is preoccupied with problems of epistemology.  
Chapter two considers Jane Barker’s Galesia t r ilogy as an example of 
novelist ic engagement  with a common theme in the empir icism / scept icism  
dialect ic:  the epistemological complicat ions entailed by individual 
subject ivity.  Barker’s themat ic emphases on uncertainty, mult iplicity, and 
fallenness coincide with a generically ent renched, and thus novelist ic, 
or ientat ion toward open-endedness and unfinalizabilit y, as art iculated in 
the work of Mikhail Bakht in.  Chapter three associates realism  with 
m imesis, a figure whose tendency toward duplicity and reversibilit y align it  
with Jacques Derr ida’s concept  of pharm akon.  Mimesis-as-pharm akon is 
considered in the context  of Tobias Smollet t ’s The Adventures of Roderick 
Random .   Chapter four shifts cr it ical focus to contemporary fict ion - -  
Mart in Am is’s Money:  A Suicide Note - -  and exam ines how postmodernist  
literary techniques, part icular ly the metafict ional inclusion of an author 
figure, reiterate the novelist ic port rayal and exemplif icat ion of 
epistemological provisionality that  underlies eighteenth-century texts.  
Chapter five, with analysis of I an McEwan’s Saturday  and reference to the 
philosophy of I r is Murdoch, suggests that  the problems of knowledge 
entailed by situated individual subject ivity, as represented by the novel, 
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pr ivilege a corresponding ethical posture of deference and openness to the 
other.  I n an afterword, these ethical implicat ions are extended to suggest  
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The substance of this thesis is wide- ranging and somewhat  eclect ic, and so 
a remark on methodology is due.  My aim  is not  to provide a complete 
image of the novel, a task bet ter suited to a character from Borges, but  
rather to assemble a diverse collect ion of proposit ions about  the novel in 
Britain and its contexts and to seek out  connect ions, influences, and 
resemblances within that  collect ion. 1
This presumpt ion of the novel’s self- ident ity has also guided the 
select ion of the fict ional texts that  come under analysis here as examples 
of novels.  I f these fict ions are novels, they should be amenable to the 
applicat ion of the theoret ical and descript ive frameworks that  have been 
created with novels in m ind.  There is consequent ly a degree of 
arbit rar iness in the select ion of novels to be analyzed - -  any novel, to the 
extent  that  it  is a novel, should do.  Nevertheless, the lim ited length of the 
thesis, not  to ment ion the lim ited research capacity of a lone 
postgraduate, requires a small sam ple of texts, and so the diversity of 
  The underlying assumpt ion of such a 
project  is that  the various historians, theoret icians, and philosophers 
whose work cont r ibutes to the study are all considering more or less the 
same thing.  I n other words, this thesis begins with a double leap of faith, 
presupposing that  ‘the novel’ exists, and that  when people talk about  the 
novel, they are discussing either a coherent  ent ity or at  least  
complementary, overlapping concepts.  These proposit ions are by no 
means certain, and to interrogate them is a worthy goal.  Here, however, 
the existence and potent ial self- ident ity of the novel will be axiomat ic. 
                                          
1
 I t  is beyond the rem it  of this study to take into account  the t radit ions of 
Cont inental novels, which involve dist inct  but  not  altogether independent  




such a sample is it s pr incipal st rength.  As such, the four novels 
considered here are dist inct  from  each other both in technique and 
historical context .  All of them resist , to some extent , definit ions of the 
novel drawn from a nineteenth-century Realist  template.  A host ile cr it ic 
could excommunicate them all:  the first  is st r ict ly not  a single text  at  all;  
the second could be considered a European-style picaresque;  the third is 
an unrealist ic assemblage of postmodernist  wordplay;  and the fourth, with 
its spare characterizat ion and genre- fict ion plot , is an overgrown short  
story.  However, precisely because of the pressures they exert  on 
prescript ive definit ions, these texts provide useful instant iat ions of the 
novel, or - -  as I  will resort  to writ ing many t imes in the com ing pages in 
order to dissociate genre from form  - -  the ‘novelist ic’ mode. 2
This is why I  have made the decision to overlook the nineteenth-
century novel.  The fict ions I  have selected funct ion as out liers, helping to 
establish the perimeter of the novelist ic field, as it  were, in a way that  an 
indisputably prototypical novel m ight  not .  This is not  to claim  that  
nineteenth-century fict ion is irrelevant  to the theorizat ion of the novel, 
quite the cont rary.  The majority of the cr it ical and theoret ical materials on 
the novel that  support  this thesis rely, whether explicit ly or implicit ly, on 
nineteenth-century models.  I n this thesis, therefore, I  am  interested in 
how well those concept ions of the novel m ight  be applied beyond their 
prototypical foundat ions.  Again, to the extent  that  the fict ions under 
considerat ion are novels, such theorizat ions should apply.  The emphases 
and cont inuit ies that  ar ise in the course of this applicat ion are the focus of 
the thesis. 
 
The secondary sources are themselves a diverse collect ion, but  
their diversity is not  intended to suggest  seam less integrat ion.  No single 
                                          
2
 Further comment  on the inst rumentality of these fict ions to the overall 
aims of the thesis can be found in the opening paragraphs of the 
respect ive chapters. 
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field of academ ic endeavour is host  to t ranquil unanim ity, and to make 
leaps between them as I  do - -  sampling, for example, literary historicism , 
post -st ructuralism , and ethical philosophy - -  is undeniably to take 
libert ies.  However, the aim  of my eclect icism  is not  to reconst ruct  these 
approaches, to contest  them, to pit  one against  another, or even to claim  
to reconcile them.  I nstead I  at tempt  to sketch a sort  of cross-sect ion of 
statements that  can be made about  the novel, const rained by a concern 
with generic ident ity and its epistemological consequences, and to 
ext rapolate from this disparate composite a flexible generalizat ion.  As in 
the select ion of literary sources, this method explores connect ions within 
variety rather than at tempt ing comprehensiveness, with the object ive of 
plausibilit y rather than certainty. 
I n sum, the method of this thesis is to seek out  the entailments of 
a proposit ion:  if we assume that  the novel as it  has been theorized is 
‘real’,  what  m ight  it s presence reveal about  the way humans understand 
experience (or perhaps experience understanding)?  I  hope, therefore, to 
make some small cont r ibut ion to the ongoing dialogue about  what  the 
novel is, and in doing so perhaps also to make a gesture toward the 






A real genre:  I dent ify ing the novel 
 
As syntheses of prescript ion and descript ion, definit ions tend toward 
circular ity.  Such certainly is the case with definit ions of the novel, which 
arise from the characterist ics of the very texts they classify.  To posit  
generic t raits requires t racing the commonalit ies between part icular 
novels, and so defining the novel begins only after some provisional 
drawing of boundaries is already in effect .  ( I ndeed, using the definite 
art icle - -  ‘the novel’ - -  already bet rays such presumpt ion.)   The result  is a 
pervasive sense that  novels are always slight ly beyond the scope of full 
delineat ion.  The Oxford Dict ionary of Literary Term s, for example, 
int roduces its ent ry for ‘novel’ with more qualificat ion than definit ion:  a 
novel is ‘nearly always an extended fict ional prose narrat ive, although 
some novels are very short , some are non- fict ional, some have been 
writ ten in verse, and some do not  even tell a story’. 1
While difficult  to contest , such an inclusive formal designat ion, 
laden with caveats, allows a very broad swath of imaginat ive literature 
( two more problemat ic terms)  to fall into the category of novel.  However, 
by addressing the historical development  of the genre, one may confront  




                                          
1
 Chris Baldick, ‘Novel’,  in The Oxford Dict ionary of Literary Term s,  3 rd edn 
(Oxford:  Oxford University, 2008) .  Marthe Robert  discusses the problem 
of defining the novel with reference to dict ionaries as well as cr it icism ;  see 
‘From Origins of the Novel’,  in Theory of the Novel:  A Historical Approach,  
ed. by Michael McKeon (Balt imore, MD:  Johns Hopkins University, 2000) , 
pp. 57-69. 
  This is the approach of I an Wat t  in his now canonical 
exam inat ion of early English novels, The Rise of the Novel.   Wat t  works to 
2
 Another note on term inology:  for the purposes of this study, novels - -  or 
‘the novel’ - -  will be considered to const itute a ‘genre’. 
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place the eighteenth-century English novel into its cultural context .  He 
notes the burgeoning of the m iddle class in this era and an at tendant  shift  
in their lifestyles toward greater literacy and leisure t ime.  Wat t  writes that  
this amounts to a ‘change in the cent re of gravity of the reading public’ 
that , though checked to some degree by barr iers of educat ion, economy, 
and class, was in the eighteenth century broader and more interested than 
ever before in the sort  of experience novel- reading offered. 3  Furthermore, 
Wat t  notes that  as the st imulus for literary product ion shifted from 
pat ronage to the more enterprising tastes of booksellers, the novel’s 
‘copious part icularity of descript ion and explanat ion’ made it  an at t ract ive 
commodity, both to authors and to ent repreneurs. 4
Perhaps more interest ing from a theoret ical standpoint  is the 
congruence Wat t  finds between the early novel and the increasing 
rat ionalism  and empir icism  of European thought  in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.  The work of Descartes and Locke, writes Wat t , 
init iated a st rain of ‘philosophical realism ’ that  provided the cultural and 
intellectual background against  which novels began to take shape:  
 
 
The general temper of philosophical realism  has been crit ical, ant i-
t radit ional and innovat ing;  it s method has been the study of the 
part iculars of experience by the individual invest igator, who, ideally 
at  least , is free from the body of past  assumpt ions and t radit ional 
beliefs;  and it  has given a peculiar importance to semant ics, to the 




                                          
3
 I an Wat t , The Rise of the Novel:  Studies in Defoe, Richardson and 
Fielding (London:  Pim lico, 1957) , p. 48.  Unless otherwise specified, 
references to Wat t  pertain to this text . 
4
 Wat t , p. 56. 
5
 Wat t , p. 12.  
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(The concerns of philosophical realism  will com e under considerat ion again 
later in this chapter.)   What  is crucial to Wat t ’s discussion is that  this 
intellectual current  manifests itself in a literary counterpart  - -  the ‘formal 
realism ’ typical of the novel.  Formal realism  is an individual and 
part icularized ‘circumstant ial view of life’ aim ing for ‘a full and authent ic 
report  of human experience’. 6  Wat t  points out  the penchant  in earlier 
forms of prose fict ion to ident ify characters with romant ically exot ic or 
blatant ly typological labels, like Bunyan’s Apollyon and Christ ian.  By the 
eighteenth century, this pract ice had changed to favour ordinary proper 
names like Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe.  Nam ing characters this way 
indicates ‘that  they were to be regarded as part icular indiv iduals in the 
contemporary social environment ’. 7  The set t ings in which these more 
part icularized characters moved also reflected a sim ilar t rend.  Wat t  writes 
that  novels port ray t ime with an organizing temporality more at tuned to 
historicity and causality than the concept ion of t ime underlying earlier 
fict ion. 8  Space, too, becomes part icularized in novelist ic fict ion;  Wat t  cites 
Defoe’s ‘solidity of set t ing’, Richardson’s descript ive detail,  and Henry 
Fielding’s topographical accuracy. 9
I n his penult imate chapter, Wat t  makes a brief but  significant  
ment ion of two subcategories of formal realism , different iat ing between 
‘realism  of presentat ion’ and ‘realism  of assessment ’.  I n the former, 
typified for Wat t  by Richardson’s Clarissa,  ‘we shall be wholly immersed in 
the reality of the characters and their act ions’;  in the lat ter, for which Wat t  
  Emphasis on the part icular ar ises 
within various literary t radit ions, but  it  is in eighteenth-century England, 
especially in the work of Defoe and Richardson, that  Wat t  sees it  become a 
stance consistent  enough to ident ify the novel as a genre. 
                                          
6
 Wat t , p. 32. 
7
 Wat t , pp. 18-19. 
8
 Wat t , pp. 21-25. 
9
 Wat t , pp. 26-27. 
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praises Fielding’s Tom  Jones,  the reader encounters ‘a responsible wisdom 
about  human affairs’. 10  I n an art icle published just  over a decade after 
The Rise of the Novel,  Wat t  explains that  considerat ions of length led him  
to om it  a great  deal of his discussion on realism  of assessment , which 
originally was to serve as a counterpart  to the material exact itude of 
realism  of presentat ion. 11  I n The Rise of the Novel as it  stands, realism  of 
presentat ion takes precedence as a feature of the novel;  it  is this t rope 
which is ‘t ypical of the novel genre as a whole’. 12
Watt  defines the novel by its characterist ic process - -  building an 
‘air  of total authent icity’ - -  and as such, the ident ity of the novel hinges on 
an effect , something that  it  does.
  However, the inclusion, 
even as something of an auxiliary, of the more nebulous realism  of 
assessment  allows for a much more porously bounded genre than much of 
Wat t ’s analysis implies.  I f a kind of sagacious insight  into the human 
condit ion may const itute a species of literary realism , then Wat t ’s formal 
realism  is not  necessarily the painstaking reportage of the m inut iae of 
set t ing and character, but  rather an ethos of faith to the reality of 
subject ive experience, both social and individual. 
13
  I n Wat t ’s view, ‘the novel’s realism  
does not  reside in the kind of life it  presents but  in the way it  presents 
it ’. 14
                                          
10
 Wat t , p. 288.  C.S. Lewis makes a sim ilar, and roughly contemporary, 
dist inct ion between realism  of presentat ion, ‘the art  of br inging something 
close to us, making it  palpable and vivid, by sharply observed or sharply 
imagined detail’,  and realism  of content , the state of being ‘probable or 
“ t rue to life” ’;  see An Experim ent  in Crit icism  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University, 1961;  repr. 1965) , pp. 57, 59. 
  Locat ing a specifically novelist ic class of realism  not  in textual 
features but  in the impressions they may produce has important  
consequences.  I t  makes the designat ion ‘novel’ into an interpret ive 
judgment  about  the holist ic effect  of a given text , a qualitat ive and 
11
 I an Wat t , ‘Serious Reflect ions on The Rise of the Novel’,  Novel,  1.3 
(1968) , 205-218 (p. 207) . 
12
 Wat t , p. 294. 
13
 Wat t , p. 32. 
14
 Wat t , p. 11. 
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hermeneut ic evaluat ion rather than a quant itat ive tally of part icular 
concepts, t ropes, or idioms.  The desire to faithfully port ray reality m ight  
manifest  in a met iculous representat ion of material detail - -  Wat t ’s realism  
of presentat ion - -  but  this is only one art ist ic outcome of such at tempted 
faithfulness.  That  is to say, realism  in general, which is ult imately an 
intent ional or interpret ive category, should not  be equated unilaterally 
with Realism , which is a more rest r ict ive category of art ist ic techniques.  
Wat t  sees the potent ial for such a fallacy, and more than once he 
dist inguishes the formal realism  that  typifies the novel from  its 
concent rated expression in nineteenth-century Realism  and Naturalism .  I n 
Wat t ’s view, the formal realism  of the novel is not  lim ited to one part icular 
art ist ic movement , and resides ‘as much in Joyce as in Zola’. 15
So although the Modernism  of the twent ieth century relies upon 
different  methods than those of a quintessent ially Realist  narrat ive, it  
nevertheless may culm inate in a formally realist ic, and by extension 
novelist ic, result .   Wat t ’s account  of the novel’s ‘r ise’ is, in essence, a 
ret rospect ive considerat ion of the rise of realism  as a cent ral aesthet ic in 
Brit ish prose fict ion.  I t  has proven to be a product ive cr it ical landmark 
against  which subsequent  generic discussions of the novel or ientate 
themselves.  Just  a few years after The Rise of the Novel,  Wayne C. Booth 
writes in The Rhetoric of Fict ion of ‘realisms’, and he parallels Wat t ’s 
realism  of presentat ion and assessment  with a fourfold subdivision of his 
own:  realism  of ‘subject  mat ter’;  ‘st ructure’;  ‘narrat ive technique’;  and 
‘purpose or funct ion or effect ’.
 
16
  The last  of these four encompasses the 
work of those authors ‘for whom realism  is a means to other ends’, 
presumably overlapping with Wat t ’s realism  of assessment . 17
                                          
15
 Wat t , p. 32. 
  Also like 
16
 Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fict ion,  2nd edn (Chicago, I L:  University 
of Chicago, 1983) , pp. 55-57.  
17
 Booth, p. 57. 
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Wat t , Booth invokes Modernism  as an example of how authors reach 
reality by diverse routes.  The result  is a ‘mass of conflict ing claims [ …]  
clustering about  the term  “ reality” ’. 18  Though he acknowledges that  Wat t  
does not  equate realism  with art ist ic superior ity, Booth warns that  cr it ical 
reliance upon a single general cr iter ion can become inadvertent ly totalizing 
and prescript ive.  He voices a popular opinion when he contends that  ‘I an 
Wat t ’s all-pervasive assumpt ion is that  “ realism  of presentat ion”  is a good 
thing in itself’,  not ing specifically Wat t ’s apparent  distaste for Fielding’s 
narratorial intervent ions in Tom  Jones and Joseph Andrews. 19
Margaret  Anne Doody, in The True Story of the Novel, expands the 
sense implied by Booth - -  that  is, that  too st r ict  an adherence to generic 
definit ions leads to arbit rary cr it ical rest r ict ion - -  into an organizing cr it ical 
pr inciple in its own r ight .  She asserts in her preface that  ‘the concept  of 
“Romance”  as dist inct  from  “Novel”  has outworn its usefulness, and that  at  
it s most  useful it  created lim itat ions and encouraged blind spots’.
  Booth seeks 
to resist  the dogmat ism  that  m ight  creep into a theorizat ion of genre, and 
consequent ly he avoids any overt  statements of definit ion, allowing the 
novel to stand as an unformulated prototype of prose fict ion in general. 
20
  For 
Doody, a novel is simply ‘forty or more pages’ of prose fict ion.  To further 
broaden the field she adds, ‘I f anybody has called a work a novel at  any 
t ime, that  is sufficient ’. 21  Consistent  with such an expansive view, she 
dism isses realism  as a generic marker;  it  ‘has often prevented Brit ish and 
American crit ics from taking a good square look at  the Novel’. 22
                                          
18
 Booth, p. 55. 
  More than 
just  an unfortunate narrowing of focus, the reliance upon realism  of 
19
 Booth, p. 41. 
20
 Margaret  Anne Doody, The True Story of the Novel (London:  Fontana, 
1998) , p. xvii.  
21
 Doody, p. 10.  John Richet t i remarks in a review that  in Doody’s 
reckoning a novel is ‘any work she decides to call a novel’;  The Am erican 
Historical Review , 103.1 (1998)  137-138 (p. 137) . 
22
 Doody, p. 15. 
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presentat ion as a mark of art ist ic merit  - -  a pract ice Doody calls 
Prescript ive Realism  - -  is tantamount  to a conspiracy of ignorance.  I t  was 
‘invented by the English as an efficient  excuse for shedding the t radit ion’ 
of ancient  Mediterranean narrat ives. 23  Realism  is a ‘t r ick’, a mask for 
imperialism , m isogyny, and ethnocent r ism .  I n Doody’s view it  is a prop 
for ‘assert ing a manifest  dest iny to govern and exploit  other peoples’, and 
the theory of a ‘r ise of the novel’ is integral to this scheme. 24
At  this point  it  should be st ipulated that  in The Rise of the Novel 
Wat t  does indeed dist inguish between Realism  as an art ist ic movement  
and a more general realism  as a novelist ic feature;  however, he does so 
without  great  emphasis.  This makes possible a reading of Wat t  as 
dogmat ically and teleologically at tached to realism  of presentat ion, an 
interpretat ion that  from Booth onward has aroused varying degrees of 
scorn among Wat t ’s contemporaries and successors.  Yet  such a dist inct ion 
is of only marginal importance to Wat t ’s overall agenda;  he need only 
define novelist ic realism  to the extent  that  it s connect ions to the wider 
contexts of literary product ion and to modern understandings of the genre 
become clear.  For Doody, whose own crit ical project  calls for a vir tually 
universal scope, such a dist inct ion is indispensable, and thus it  receives 
due emphasis.  St ill,  in spite of her drast ic revision of what  const itutes the 
novel and her vigorous dist rust  of prescript ive definit ions, Doody 
nevertheless sees in her own concept ion of the genre some of the same 
qualit ies that  make it  a worthwhile subject  for Wat t . 
 
Novels, even in Doody’s wide- ranging purview, are the literary 
medium of part icularity.  Doody writes that  ancient  prose fict ion ‘comes 
into being and flourishes during a period - -  an extended period - -  of self-
                                          
23
 Doody, p. 288. 
24
 Doody, p. 293. 
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consciousness and of value for the individual’. 25  Not  unlike the fict ion of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the ancient  Mediterranean novel 
as conceived by Doody reflects the shift ing consciousness of the culture 
that  nourishes it .   She explains this in st r ik ingly Wat t ian terms:  ‘Ancient  
novelists, like modern ones, are skilled in exhibit ing the psychological 
background of a part icular character emerging in a part icular instance’. 26  
The characters of novels have depth and individuality;  they inhabit  r ichly 
described set t ings;  they may speak vernacular, ‘socially marked speech’. 27
Doody is not  so much seeking a redefinit ion of the novel as a 
limbering up of ossified classificat ions that  will allow the genre to embrace 
what  she sees as its disregarded const ituents.  This is why she cannot  
perm it  the works she considers to languish under the unwieldy mant le of 
‘extended prose fict ion’.  Designat ing them as novels is an interpret ive act , 
one which discovers in them t raits - -  novelist ic t raits - -  that  sustain 
Doody’s thesis:  the novel is an assert ion of human individuality, diversity, 
and desire in the face of the oppressive, homogenizing pressures of what  
she calls the ‘Civic’.
  
Such an elevat ion of part icular ity reveals these ancient  fict ions’ kinship 
with the modern novel, a connect ion Doody underscores with frequent  
allusions to canonical novelists. 
28
                                          
25
 Doody, p. 24. 
  Furthermore, that  this open and t ransgressive class 
26
 Doody, p. 131. 
27
 Doody, p. 132. 
28
 Doody refers throughout  her text  to a t rans-historical ‘sense of the 
civic’,  which emphasizes public, polit ical involvement  and cit izenship, but  
also tends toward hierarchy, consolidat ion of power, and the subjugat ion 
of women, the poor, and marginal groups (pp. 226-232, 278) .  She begins 
using the init ial capital - -  i.e. the ‘Civic’ - -  later in her study (p. 466) .  
Following the example of reviewer James Grantham Turner, one could 
categorize the Civic together with ‘the At t ic, the classical, the imperial, the 
masculine, the didact ic, the epic, the [ prescript ively]  realist ’ and in 
opposit ion to a counterpart  grouping, the ‘Alexandrian, polymorphous, 
individual fostering, rule bending, goddess nurturing’ associat ions of the 
novelist ic;  Modern Philology , 96.3 (1999)  364-370 (p. 365) . 
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of literary art  has endured for m illennia is evidence for, and a source of, it s 
utopian resiliency:  
 
The Novel always does look to the future.  Rooted in a deep past  it  
may be, so it  can withstand the winds of taste and fashion - -  
including icy blasts of disapproval - -  but  it  always looks towards 
possibilit y, towards fulfillment  when (and where)  what  is now 
grudging and meager may be full and generous.  The Novel is the 
‘enemy’ of the Civic because it  is always imagining what  the Civic 
m ight  come to be.  Thus it  urges society on, impat ient  of order, 




For Doody, novelist ic figures provide a mythic, almost  myst ical sustenance 
to vital aspects of human life that  otherwise m ight  wither in hegemony, 
xenophobia, and inhibit ion.  This is possible, she suggests, because novels 
t read the boundary between public and private, real and imaginary, 
blurr ing the lines that  would separate polit ical, social, and individual life. 
I n this respect , Doody aligns with Wat t .  As much as the ‘r ise’ that  
Wat t  envisions m ight  obscure broader t radit ions of fict ion, it  nevertheless 
sheds light  upon a dynam ic interplay between literary art  and the 
cont ingent , chaot ic world of historical reality.  I f formal realism  has served 
to open up, in Wat t ’s words, ‘the problemat ic nature of the relat ion 
between the individual and his environment ’, then, however rest r ict ive 
Wat t ’s methods (and pronouns)  m ight  be, his work is not  necessarily at  
odds with Doody’s. 30
                                          
29
 Doody, p. 471. 
  Even Doody concedes that  the novel is realist ic ‘in 
the sense that  it  deals with the tough experience of liv ing and throws 
30




Treat ing a subject ive and variable term  like realism  as the decisive 
characterist ic of a literary genre is as inadequate an act  of definit ion as 
singling out  a few heavily qualified formal features.  To declare a text  as 
realist ically inform ing on human experience is an interpret ive, not  a 
definit ive, statement .  And yet  the goals and methods of the novel 
unavoidably involve some approach to the world of lived experience, the 
subject ive here-and-now, as a means to t ruth (or at  least  to the sort  of 
relevance and raison d'êt re that  any intelligible text  pragmat ically implies) .  
Erich Auerbach connects the novel to this kind of realist ic authent icity in 
his extensive study Mim esis.   His account  in the following passage is 
amenable to any of the preceding views on the novel as a genre uniquely 
entangled with the real:  
  The commonality between these two vast ly different  
cr it ical studies offers up the possibilit y that  the novel, on whatever scale 
one chooses to view it , adumbrates its ident ity in its very resistance to 
definit ion.  More than any one technique of the many it  m ight  employ, the 
novel is the genre of authent icity and faithfulness to human experience, of 
variabilit y and openness, and of com ing closer to the reader and the 
reader’s world.  As such, any account  of the novel must  deal with realism , 
however incomplete that  feature m ight  be as a condit ion of the genre, and 
even if the term  itself,  as Doody claims, smacks of an aggressive, 
Anglocent r ic present ism . 
 
The serious t reatment  of everyday reality, the r ise of more 
extensive and socially inferior human groups to the posit ion of 
subject  mat ter for problemat ic-existent ial representat ion, on the 
one hand;  on the other, the embedding of random persons and 
events in the general course of contemporary history, the fluid 
                                          
31
 Doody, p. 478. 
11 
 
historical background - -  these, we believe, are the foundat ions of 
modern realism , and it  is natural that  the broad and elast ic form  of 
the novel should increasingly impose itself for a rendering 
comprising so many elements. 32
 
 
I f the novel resists definit ion, then its realism , so integral to 
concept ions of the novel, must  be considered a site of that  resistance.  
Henceforward the word ‘realism ’, when used without  qualificat ion or 
capitalizat ion, will designate the concept  in a very broad sense, broad 
enough to be common to the disparate concept ions of the novel under 
review thus far.  Pam Morris lays a foundat ion:  ‘literary realism  [ is]  any 
writ ing that  is based upon an implicit  or explicit  assumpt ion that  it  is 
possible to communicate about  a reality beyond the writ ing’. 33
That  the component  terms of this definit ion are so gelat inous is an 
unavoidable concession to the flexibilit y and breadth of realism  as a 
generic marker of the novel.  Such laxity notwithstanding, as a cr it ical 
schema this concept ion of realism  is sufficient  to focus at tent ion on 
novelist ic fict ion as praxis, as act ivity rather than artefact , and so to raise 
the sort  of quest ions that  ought  to at tend the study of a process:  what  is it  
doing, how does it  do it ,  and what  are the possible consequences?  As an 
  This 
statement  may be narrowed slight ly with a layer of valuat ion:  realism  is 
furthermore the creat ive or interpret ive technique of deriving a work’s 
validity from its faithfulness to such a reality, however these concepts 
m ight  be conceived.  I t  is not  a formal textual feature, but  rather an 
act ive, interpret ive, creat ive mode based on certain supposit ions, and the 
concurrent  predisposit ion to draw text  and world closer together. 
                                          
32
 Erich Auerbach, Mim esis:  The Representat ion of Reality in Western 
Literature, t rans. by Willard R. Trask (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University, 
1953;  repr. 2003) , p. 491.  Mimesis itself,  an even more inclusive concept  
than realism , is discussed further in chapter three. 
33
 Pam Morris, Realism  (London:  Rout ledge, 2003) , p. 6. 
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at tempt  at  drawing boundaries, this definit ion sketches the most  vague of 
silhouet tes, but  as an at tempt  at  drawing open a portal, it  suffices.  I f 
realism , broadly conceived as it  must  be, can stand as a generic feature of 
the novel, it  is in this capacity serving as a way in to the novel too. 
J. Paul Hunter’s study, Before Novels,  illust rates the complicated 
significance of realism  in the theorizat ion of novels.  Hunter provides a list  
of ten ‘features that  [ …]  characterize the species’, which consistent ly 
inclines to a realist ic engagement  with the realm  of human experience.  
Characterist ics like ‘contemporaneity’,  ‘credibilit y and probabilit y ’,  and 
‘fam iliar ity ’ align quite comfortably with a theory of the novel drawn from 
Wat t ’s formal realism . 34  However, like Booth and Doody, Hunter cr it icizes 
an over- reliance on narrowly conceived realism  as the definit ive feature of 
novelist ic discourse.  The shortcom ing of this approach, according to 
Hunter, is that  it  so readily enlists realism  as a normat ive standard, ‘so 
that  novels tend to be judged qualitat ively on the degree or amount  of 
realism  to be found in each, as if more is bet ter ’. 35
I n a chapter colourfully subt it led ‘The Crit ical Tyranny of Formal 
Definit ion’, Hunter discusses novelist ic features that  challenge the 
prescript ive, realism -cent red concept ion of the novel.  As an auxiliary to 
his list  of ten convent ionally novelist ic features of fict ion, he adds nine 
more features that  have received insufficient  cr it ical at tent ion ‘because 
their presence in novels upsets formal generic not ions’, blurr ing the 
boundaries between novels and other forms of discourse.
 
36
                                          
34
 J. Paul Hunter, Before Novels:  The Cultural Contexts of Eighteenth-
Century English Fict ion (New York:  W. W. Norton and Company, 1992) , p. 
23.  Lennard J. Davis sim ilar ly furnishes a list  of nine ways in which the 
novel can be dist inguished from the romance;  see Factual Fict ions:  The 
Origins of the English Novel (New York:  Columbia University, 1983) , p. 40. 
  I n Hunter’s 
view, features like didact icism , confessional exhibit ionism , a fascinat ion 
with social taboo, and an omnivorous and inclusive approach to genre are 
35
 Hunter, p. 32. 
36
 Hunter, p. 30. 
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‘blatant  and ubiquitous’, as much a part  of the novel as is it s self-
conscious realism .  Such affronts to formal categorizat ion are to be found 
not  only in early English novels;  they can crop up, ‘although somet imes 
disguised or metamorphosed, in novels of other t imes and cultures’ as 
well. 37
This is not  to claim  that  Hunter at tempts an ahistorical account  of 
the novel.  However, whereas Doody seeks to expand the temporal range 
of cr it ical categorizat ions of the novel, Hunter points out  the permeabilit y 
of the genre itself,  even when const rained to a canon of modern, realist ic 
prose fict ion.  His list  of nine overlooked features of the novel challenges a 
formulaic approach to genre not  by cont radict ing more convent ional 
definit ions, but  by dilut ing them, expanding the scope of common 
novelist ic features to include characterist ics of other forms. 
  They are thus bound to the genre, not  to any one era of 
product ion. 
To take one example, an exam inat ion of didact icism  underscores 
not  the inadequacy of realism  as a novelist ic feature, but  rather the 
inadequacy of a too-narrow concept ion of realism  as such.  Texts model 
reality in two ways:  they copy the world, and they shape it  as they do so.  
The overt ly didact ic spir it  of the various forms of popular eighteenth-
century print  media places special emphasis on this lat ter capacity.  With 
‘moralist ic, lapel-gripping techniques’, didact ic texts of the t ime address 
the reader intensely and authoritat ively, seeking a direct  and personal 
influence upon their audience. 38
                                          
37
 I bid. 
  Compared to these unabashedly 
exhortatory texts, the inst ruct ive underpinnings of what  are now called 
novels could manifest  with more delicacy - -  Hunter cites the ironies of 
Fielding and Sterne - -  but  even explicit  didact icism  was not  out  of place in 
the novel.  Hunter points out  that  ‘in most  eighteenth-century novelists - -  
38
 Hunter, p. 226. 
14 
  
Defoe and Haywood, Smollet t  and Lennox, Godwin and I nchbald - -  direct  
comment  with plainly stated conclusions is alm ost  as frequent  as any 
forward mot ion of the novel’s story’. 39
A depict ion is an example, and if the realist ic detail of a narrat ive 
purports to describe the world as it  is, so too does the cumulat ive effect  of 
such descript ion offer it self as a prototype from which to ext rapolate far-
reaching conclusions.  What  Wat t  calls realism  of assessment  is in essence 
a form  of latent  didact icism  - -  it  has something to teach - -  and Hunter’s 
survey of the popular didact ic writ ing current  in the eighteenth century 
shows that  this is a formal feature that  was fam iliar and highly valued in 
the t ime when more convent ional types of realism  were beginning to 
dist inguish the novel.  Hunter sees novelist ic didact icism  as a challenge to 
the readers and theorists of today;  however, it  poses no threat  to a 
concept ion of the novel as a realist ic genre.  Although the prim  
int rusiveness of didact icism  m ight  appear to be anything but  realist ic, it  
shares with convent ional realism  the presupposit ion of reflexivity between 
text  and world.  Certainly a reader, whether born in 1680 or 1980, could 
legit imately praise a novel for offering new insights into the nature of the 
real world.  As Hunter writes, ‘The novel today st ill pays homage to 
t ranscendental views of human life and emblemat ic ways of thinking’.
 
40
As befits a genre so entangled with the not ion of the real, Hunter’s 
invest igat ion of these contexts elevates journalism  to a posit ion of great  
  
Perhaps contemporary tastes cannot  abide preachy or proclamatory 
novelists;  however, the not ion that  fict ion is somehow edifying remains 
robust .  Hence the peculiar realism  of the novel varies because it  springs 
from a diverse and inclusive background of ext ra-generic techniques and a 
wide range of cultural pract ices. 
                                          
39
 Hunter, p. 232. 
40
 Hunter, p. 229. 
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influence in the format ion of the novel.  I ndeed, it  should not  be 
overlooked that  some of the earliest  texts to bear the name ‘novel’ are in 
fact  pr inted news ballads. 41  I n the late seventeenth century, news - -  as 
the ‘nearly instant  replay of human experience’ that  pr int  technology made 
possible - -  becomes increasingly significant  as an outgrowth of England’s 
‘fixat ion on contemporaneity, part  of it s larger interest  in discovery, 
enlightenment , and novelty’. 42
According to Hunter, a hunger for news merges two disparate social 
energies:  ‘intellectual curiosity and a desire to be au courant ’.
  The unconvent ional novelist ic features 
Hunter discusses are commonplace in the broadsheets, periodicals, 
pamphlets, and sundry paraliterary ephemera that  circulated in, and drew 
their substance from, the garrulous coffeehouse culture that  flourished in 
the early eighteenth century.  I n turn, this thriving journalist ic act ivity 
helped to tailor the expectat ions of the writers and readers who would 
come to sustain the novel.  
43
  I n a 
‘culture of now’, the present  demands analysis and discussion;  ‘the st ress 
on contemporaneity accelerated and intensified the public sense that  the 
present  t imes were all that  mat tered’. 44
                                          
41
 Davis, pp. 45-46.  Davis also considers the discourse of news to be a 
major format ive factor in the development  of the novel;  see especially pp. 
42-101. 
  Moreover, if it  is imperat ive to 
understand current  affairs, then the newness of the news is most  
compelling when coupled with vivid and evocat ive reportage.  The goal is 
to reveal and make real that  which m ight  otherwise elude considerat ion.  
Reviewing specimens of news writ ing from the final years of the 
seventeenth century, Hunter notes that , ‘The sense of filling in the details, 
helping to write the full history of the t imes and ult imately of reality it self,  
is prom inent  in most  of these t it les, however hurr ied on by sensat ionalism  
42
 Hunter, p. 167. 
43
 I bid. 
44
 Hunter, p. 177. 
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or commercial greed’.  These writ ings are pervaded by the not ion that  
‘nothing could be known without  a full account  of events:  that  was where 
meaning lay’. 45
 
  There is a st r ik ing sim ilar ity here to the ‘full and authent ic 
report  of human experience’ Wat t  sees as the ambit ion of formal, 
novelist ic realism .  I t  seems a sound conclusion to propose, as does 
Hunter, a link between the underlying ethos of journalist ic narrat ives and 
the aims of the novels that  follow closely on their heels:  
Telling the story of what  life is like now and helping to explain how 
it  got  that  way - -  the literary job that  novelists defined for 
themselves - -  could hardly have come about  without  such a fr iendly 
everyday context , and an important  aspect  of what  the novel came 
to do is a palpable result  of the journalist ic agenda. 46
 
 
Michael McKeon, in The Origins of the English Novel, 1600-1740,  
f inds in the journalist ic writ ing that  preceded early Brit ish novels not  just  a 
force that  tailored the expectat ions of readers and writers, but  rather a 
model of the larger cultural current  that  would give conceptual form  to the 
novel it self.   From the end of the seventeenth century, news writ ing 
begins to solidify as a ‘dist inct  discursive ent ity ’. 47
                                          
45
 Hunter, p. 185. 
  I n cont radist inct ion to 
the recent ly typologized romance, which seemed only to speak about  its 
own vanished historical moment , news writ ing becomes the place for 
object ive t ruth, ‘exploit ing especially the techniques of authent icat ion by 
firsthand and documentary witness that  have developed during the late 
46
 Hunter, p. 194. 
47
 Michael McKeon, The Origins of the English Novel 1600-1740 (Balt imore, 
MD:  Johns Hopkins University, 2002) , p. 47. 
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medieval and early modern periods’. 48
Also like Hunter, McKeon observes the resultant  elevat ion of the 
new to a posit ion of importance in public discourse, bolstered by 
increasingly pronounced claims to empir ical t ruth.  Such pursuit  of 
reproducible, quant itat ive t ruth-value is a react ion against  the negat ive 
example of medieval romances, which establish their authent icity not  
through exhaust ive empir icism  but  with the paratact ic implicat ion of ‘an 
invisible principle, rhetorical or theological, the intuit ion of whose 
authoritat ive workings is necessary to render complete that  which only 
appears part ial’.
  This aligns neat ly with the interest  
in novel and immediate news observed by Hunter. 
49
  McKeon goes on, however, to point  out  a simultaneous 
and opposed at t itude arising from the same contexts:  in the content ious 
revolut ionary atmosphere of the m id-1600s, ‘the experience of comparing 
highly part isan and divergent  “ t rue accounts”  of the same events induced 
a considerable skept icism  regarding the ostentat ious claim s to historicity 
which had already become quite convent ional’. 50
What  results is a discursive pract ice in which tales of remarkable 
events must  defend themselves;  writers increasingly insist  upon their 
texts’ historicity, so much so in fact  that  ‘the old claim  that  a story is 
“ st range but  t rue”  subt ly modulates into something more like the 
  So the object ive 
presence of pr int  media endorses empir ical approaches to recording the 
data of experience while at  the same t ime allowing the cr it ical scrut iny of 
those selfsame data. 
                                          
48
 McKeon, pp. 46-47. 
49
 McKeon, p. 38;  Davis r ight ly caut ions that  ‘the not ion that  all 
cont inuit ies are either a react ion to or an influence of another form  is 
simplist ic and all-encompassing’ (p. 44) .  However, McKeon’s dialect ical 
schema does not  necessarily disregard the nuance and complicat ion of the 
interface between the medieval romance and the novel - -  indeed, it  can be 
a useful means of approaching this very subject . 
50
 McKeon, p. 47. 
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paradoxical formula “st range, therefore t rue” ’. 51  Naturally, such credulity 
invites cr it icism , and by the first  decades of the seventeenth century, 
uneasiness about  the honesty of news writers was universal enough to 
surface themat ically in the plays of Shakespeare and Jonson. 52  The 
interplay of these two ant ithet ical at t itudes meant  that  novelty was at  
once the mark of immediacy and relevance as well as the telltale sign of 
superfluity and falsehood.  As a generic marker, the word ‘novel’ carr ied 
the same ambivalence as news writ ing’s narrat ion of novelt ies.  I n addit ion 
to printed news accounts, other prose forms - -  t ranslat ions of Boccaccio, 
for example - -  had since the sixteenth century carr ied the designat ion 
‘novel’ as well. 53
The irresolvable content ion brought  up by t ruth-claims in printed 
news typifies the larger dialect ical exchange between what  McKeon terms 
naive empir icism  and ext reme scept icism ;  a dialect ic the effects of which 
extend well beyond news discourse:  
 
 
The pat tern marks the climax of the early modern revolut ion in 
narrat ive epistemology, and it  is of fundamental importance in the 
origins of the English novel:  the naive empir icism  of the claim  to 
historicity purports to document  the authent ic t ruth;  the ext reme 




Naive empir icism  responds with suspicion to the idealism  of medieval 
romance, but  in doing so it  invites the interrogat ion of it s own approach by 
                                          
51
 I bid. 
52
 McKeon cites Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale and Jonson’s The Staple 
of News in part icular (p. 48) . 
53
 Davis, p. 46;  see also ‘novel’ in the Oxford English Dict ionary . 
54
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a more intense degree of the same kind of doubt . 55
 
  However, the 
components of this pat tern are not  discrete or mutually exclusive.  I n fact , 
both derive from the scept ical desire for falsifiabilit y in allegedly t rue 
narrat ives, a demand that  the t ruth of a narrat ive be sufficient ly quant ified 
through the documentary power of the printed word.  For McKeon, the 
result ing at tent ion to the difficulty and importance of conveying t ruth in 
narrat ive form  is nothing less than revolut ionary:  
When we speak of an epistemological ‘revolut ion’ in early modern 
England, we point  to a categorical instabilit y so acute that  the 
condit ion of conceptual fluidity and process which characterizes all 




Debate over the means and possibilit y of mediat ing t ruth about  the 
world, whether material or spir itual, falls into this dialect ical cycle as much 
in printed news as it  does in the publicat ions of the Royal Society or 
arguments between philosophers, religious figures, and secularists.  The 
diverse groups part icipat ing in this culture-wide cont roversy embark on a 
‘progression of skept ical thought  from posit iv ist ic object ivity to solipsist ic 
subject ivity ’,  which they follow through to various stages.  The result  is a 
‘proliferat ion of epistemological reversals’ which, rather than arr iv ing at  
some final coherence, instead perpetuates the dialect ic tension from which 
it  ar ises. 57
                                          
55
 McKeon, p. 50. 
  I n print  journalism , the reversals inherent  in this ongoing 
epistemological tension t ranslate to a disbelieving sense of duplicitous 
novelty, in which newness suggests both revelat ion and fabricat ion.  The 
‘st range, therefore t rue’ topos is a further expression of this same 
56
 McKeon, p. 87. 
57
 McKeon, pp. 87-88. 
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impasse;  it  reveals that , without  the precondit ion of some uncrit ical 
willingness to believe, the mechanisms of empir ical documentat ion in text  
operate as lit t le more than rhetorical flourishes.  Somewhere in the 
ostensibly universal object ivity of empir icism  persists a latent  deferral to 
individual subject ivity. 
Print  journalism  therefore exemplifies a threefold consequence of 
the dialect ic between naive empir icism  and ext reme scept icism .  First , the 
reflexiv ity and inconclusiveness of the dialect ic foster a fluidity of t ruth-
value, in which markers of empir ical authent icity serve also as grounds for 
falsificat ion.  I n order to move beyond this otherwise immobilizing 
uncertainty, some ext ra factor must  resist  the cycle of reflexive doubt  by 
t ranscending it .   I n seventeenth-century news narrat ives this comes in the 
form  of the credulous readerly desire for wonder and exot icism  that  allows 
accounts of the st range to seem t rue by vir tue of their very st rangeness.  
I n other contexts this desire takes other forms, but  the empir ical project  
always correlates with a grasping past  boundaries, whether as the 
compulsion for discovery or as the nagging disbelief that  any discovery 
m ight  offer authent ic t ruth.  The final consequence of the dialect ic 
between naive empir icism  and ext reme scept icism  stems direct ly from this 
thirst  for t ranscendence and wonder:  a turn from empir ical object iv ity to 
the psychological subject ivity of the individual as authent icator.  A would-
be empir ical text  must  in one way or another appeal to the belief of the 
reader, and it  is precisely this paradoxical necessity which perpetuates the 
dialect ic by allowing ext reme scept icism  a foothold for doubt .  I n various 
permutat ions these effects can be seen to at tend narrat ive forms that  seek 
to empir ically document  the t ruth, and they profoundly impact  the 
development  of the novel in Br itain. 
Reviewing the way narrat ives laid claim  to t ruth in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries illum inates the influence of empir icism  on literate 
21 
 
culture at  large.  I n light  of this connect ion, one indicated both by literary 
historians like Wat t  and by the narrat ives themselves, such a review 
warrants some remarks on the philosophy of empir icism .  As McKeon has 
shown, the turmoil of the m id-seventeenth century in England lent  it self to 
scept ical doubt . 58  Gary Remer proposes that  Thomas Hobbes, react ing to 
the polit ical climate of his t ime, was spurred to turn away from a 
humanist , rhetorical epistemology, seeking ‘the certainty of scient ific 
knowledge’:  ‘Hobbes’s experience with civil war led him  to conclude that , if 
chaos was to be avoided, knowledge had to be based on unequivocal 
foundat ions’. 59
 
  Pursuing such foundat ions in the opening chapter of 
Leviathan, Hobbes finds the senses to be the source of all human thought , 
and this leads him  to the obstacle faced in one way or another by all 
empir icism :  at tent iveness to the object ive world, when scrut inised, reveals 
itself to be instead at tent iveness to the perceiving subject .  For Hobbes 
this inescapable mediator takes the form  of what  he calls ‘fancy’:  
And though at  some certain distance the real and very object  seem 
invested with the fancy it  begets in us, yet  st ill the object  is one 
thing, the image or fancy is another.  So that  sense in all cases, is 
nothing else but  or iginal fancy, caused (as I  have said)  by the 
pressure, that  is, by the mot ion, of external things upon our eyes, 
ears, and other organs thereunto ordained. 60
 
 
Between the human sensorium and the world there remains always a gap, 
and this gap, situated as it  is at  such a fundamental stage in human 
understanding, taints human endeavours with subject ive uncertainty. 
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 McKeon, p. 47;  see above. 
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 Gary Remer, ‘Hobbes, the Rhetorical Tradit ion, and Tolerat ion’, The 
Review of Polit ics,  54.1 (1992) , 5-33 (pp. 5, 7) . 
60
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Hobbes’s theory of government  at tempts to m inim ize the danger of 
this epistem ic flaw, grant ing to arbit rary authority a provisional certainty, 
since t rue certainty is unat tainable.  The implicat ions of this flaw for t ruth 
in language - -  and, by extension, in narrat ive - -  are especially rest r ict ive:  
 
No discourse whatsoever can end in absolute knowledge of fact , 
past  or to come.  For as for the knowledge of fact , it  is or iginally 
sense, and ever after, memory.  And for the knowledge of 
consequence, which I  have said before is called science, it  is not  
absolute, but  condit ional. 61
 
 
For Hobbes, language cont r ibutes to knowledge only when derived from 
clear ly delineated definit ions and convent ions.  Thus, even when it  
succeeds, language speaks only about  the quality of it s own arbit rary 
prem ises;  science reveals ‘the consequences of names’. 62
This apparent  inconsistency seems, even in the eyes of modern 
Hobbes scholars, to be something of a paradox.  John Danford notes that  
Hobbes ‘never sat isfactorily resolves’ the disjunct ion of definit ions and 
t ruth.
  Seeking to 
grasp the object ive a prior i,  Hobbes is forced to make a concession to 
subject ivity, to arbit rar iness. 
63
  Joel Leshen indicates a related lapse:  Hobbes t reats concepts, 
‘acts of reason’, as if they ‘[ reflect ]  the t rue nature of the universe’. 64
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 Hobbes, p. 35 [ I .v ii.3] . 
  I n 
the words of Victoria Silver, ‘The source of all t rue statement  and the 
cr iter ion of self-evidence in Leviathan is it s own term inology’;  the ant i-
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 Hobbes, p. 25 [ I .v.17] . 
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rhetorical Hobbes in fact  relies upon rhetorical effects. 65
After Hobbes, other philosophers of the Brit ish Enlightenment  deal 
different ly with the problems of subject ivity that  lie at  the heart  of 
empir ical understanding;  however, the gap between world and m ind 
always raises the spect re of epistem ic confusion.
  I t  is interest ing 
to note how readily cr it ics of Hobbes’s epistemological subject ivity em ploy 
the arguments of ext reme scept icism , in which, inevitably, empir ical 
pract ice proves insufficient ly empir ical.  
66
  John Locke for 
example, after reject ing the Cartesian not ion of innate ideas, finds 
experience and reflect ion to be ‘the Fountains of Knowledge, from whence 
all the I deas we have, or can naturally have, do spring’. 67  Thus, it  follows 
that  knowledge is ‘nothing but  the percept ion of the connexion and 
agreement , or disagreement  and repugnancy of any of our I deas’. 68  
Certainty is therefore confined to what  Locke calls intuit ive and 
demonst rat ive knowledge - -  two forms of conceptual coherence that  bear 
no connect ion to the exterior, material world. 69
 
  Locke sets these out  as 
the exclusive domain of certain knowledge:  
These two, (viz.)  I ntuit ion and Demonst rat ion, are the degrees of 
our Knowledge;  whatever comes short  of one of these, with what  
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assurance soever embraced, is but  Faith, or Opinion, but  not  
Knowledge, at  least  in all general Truths. 
 
However, this scept ical conclusion makes Locke uneasy.  He immediately 
appends a comprom ise, one which explains his preceding concent rat ion 
only on ‘general Truths’:  
 
There is, indeed, another Percept ion of the Mind, employ’d about  
the part icular existence of finite Beings without  us;  which going 
beyond bare probabilit y, and yet  not  reaching perfect ly to either of 




This third- rate understanding is what  Locke refers to as sensit ive 
knowledge - -  t rust  in the sensory apprehension of one’s surroundings.  
Locke supports this proposit ion with an appeal to his reader’s own 
common sense, point ing out  the obvious difference between, for example, 
seeing the sun in the dayt ime and recalling its image at  night . 71  This is a 
concession to subject ivity both in philosophical content  and in rhetorical 
form .  Ult imately, it  shifts standards of knowledge about  the world away 
from certainty and into the realm  of probabilit y and judgement . 72
Locke’s sensit ive knowledge is a step away from pure 
representat ionalism , but  it  is not  enough to sat isfy Bishop George 
Berkeley, for whom any materialism , however qualified, equates ult imately 
with unacceptable atheism .
 
73
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readership, Berkeley proposes that  the existence of mat ter can never be 
verified, and so may as well be rejected:  
 
I n short , if there were external bodies, it  is impossible we should 
ever come to know it ;  and if there were not , we m ight  have the 
very same reasons to think there were that  we have now. 74
 
 
For Berkeley, the redundancy of the quest ion of mat ter’s existence is 
important  because belief in an autonomous material world requires some 
kind of mediat ion between ontological reality and the realm  of 
phenomena, and this gap, this veil of percept ion, sustains scept icism .  He 
explains:  
 
So long as men thought  that  real things subsisted without  the 
m ind, and that  their knowledge was only so far forth real as it  was 
conformable to real things, it  follows, they could not  be certain that  
they had any real knowledge at  all. 75
 
 
I n this passage, Berkeley succinct ly locates at  least  one source of the 
nagging doubt  that  perpetuates the dialect ic between naive empir icism  
and ext reme scept icism .  And although the idealism  he supplies as remedy 
may be less than unassailable, it  is an inst ruct ive example of the t roubling 
metaphysical quest ions raised by empir icism ’s epistemological postures. 
As cont roversy about  the value of news writ ing in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries demonst rates, problems of epistemology were 
relevant  and urgent  well beyond the confines of philosophy.  When the 
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problemat ic mediat ion of t ruth takes the form  of narrat ive rather than 
sensory percept ion, the same profound quest ions persist  upon a different  
scale.  I n addit ion to journalist ic narrat ive, other popular pr int  media of 
the same t ime confront  these issues as well.   These sub-genres make up a 
complex and energet ic preoccupat ion with t ruth, authent icity, and 
knowledge, which, for all it s diversity, nevertheless takes on the st ructure 
and the consequences of the dialect ic ident ified by McKeon. 
I n its concern with issues of object ivity and percept ion, the 
scient ific revolut ion’s empir icist  pursuit  of ‘natural history’ or ‘natural 
philosophy’ conforms to this kind of oscillat ion.  According to McKeon, 
Francis Bacon’s New At lant is and the work of the Royal Society typify the 
movement ’s ‘opt im ist ic faith’ in the senses’ power to comprehend 
experience, which is tempered by ‘a wary skept icism  of the evidence of the 
senses and its mediat ing capacity’. 76  I f a text  is to reveal t ruth with any 
degree of object ivity, it  must  somehow employ authent icat ing devices that  
support  the factuality of whatever novelty it  relates.  The difficulty 
confronted in empir icist  narrat ives, however, is that  document ing wonders 
in narrat ive requires something uncomfortably sim ilar to a romance 
m iracle tale.  After all,  the prom ise of scient ific invest igat ion was to revise, 
perhaps refute, what  had been accepted t ruth to the ancients, but  if 
authority is no longer authoritat ive, the novelty of discovery assumes the 
same equivocal status as the novelty of news. 77
 
  Thomas Sprat , in his 
1667 history of the Royal Society, is careful to point  out  that  accounts of 
marvels ought  not  to be discounted simply because they are marvellous:  
I t  is certain that  many things, which now seem m iraculous, would 
not  be so, if once we come to be fully acquainted with their 
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composit ions, and operat ions. And it  is also as t rue, that  there are 
many Qualit ies, and Figures, and powers of things that  break the 
common Laws, and t ransgress the standing Rules of Nature. 78
 
 
Yet  this quickly leads natural history to the same dilemm a encountered by 
the quest ionable t ruth-value of pr inted news:  t ruth may be as incredible 
as falsehood.  How m ight  the natural historian maintain the requisite 
accuracy?  Sprat ’s remedy is st r ik ingly subject ive.  He admonishes his 
readers only to read and record as amazing those events that  are, in 
actual fact , amazing:  
 
I t  is not  therefore an ext ravagance, to observe such product ions, 
[ as]  are indeed adm irable in themselves, if at  the same t ime we do 
not  st r ive to make those appear to be adm irable, that  are 
groundless, and false. 79
 
 
And although Sprat  adds that  experimentat ion can help to corroborate 
incredible phenomena with ‘real, and impart ial Trials’,  the empir icism  he 
describes nevertheless relies on an intuit ive sense of probabilit y and the 
good faith of it s pract it ioners. 80  Morr is presents the problem in stark 
terms when she writes that  ‘empir icism  is based upon a logical 
cont radict ion that  eventually underm ines the not ion of t ruth upon which 
object ive scient ific knowledge rests’. 81
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intellect , and so cannot  indisputably put  to rest  the doubts of ext reme 
scept icism . 
The Society’s accounts of faraway places receive the same 
t reatment  as do those of amazing occurrences.  Travel narrat ives were 
composed like journals, and any ret rospect ive narrat ion they m ight  require 
was to be carr ied out  in as unobt rusive a manner as possible, so that  the 
t ruth of the relat ion would manifest  ‘precisely because it  is firsthand and 
immediate’. 82  Faced with the impossibilit y of confirm ing object ivity in text , 
t ravel narrat ives must  at test  to this factuality with an unembellished 
rhetorical style and the conspicuous absence of any unifying themat ic 
agenda.  Like descript ions of marvels, the t ravel narrat ive relies upon what  
McKeon calls ‘the self- reflexive insistence on its own documentary candor, 
as well as on the historicity of the narrat ive it  t ransparent ly mediates’. 83
Though perhaps winning a more object ive solidity than the 
comparable claims of ‘st range, therefore t rue’ journalism , the Royal 
Society’s method of substant iat ion in t ravel narrat ives remains vulnerable 
to the same scept ical at tacks as do broadsheets.  I ndeed, the relat iv ity of 
t ravel narrat ives in general, ‘one of whose cardinal convent ions is to 
expect  the unexpected,’ means that  the most  whimsical flights of fancy 
demand lit t le more than to be prefaced by an avowal of t ruth, so that  a 





  Henry Stubbe points out  this weakness in his 1670 crit icism  of 
the Royal Society’s methods:  
That  there are more parts of the world discovered and sailed unto 
then in Aristot les t ime, I  grant .  But  what  certainty shall we have of 
Narrat ives picked up from negligent , or un-accurate Merchants and 
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Seamen?  What  judgement  have these men of no reading, whereby 
to rect ify or enlarge their Enquir ies?85
 
 
The ext reme scept ical cr it ique drives naive empir icism  ult imately to a 
paradoxical subject ivity. 
Another of these epistemological reversals takes shape within 
Protestant  thought  and its relat ion to the empir icist  problem of the 
mediat ion of t ruth.  I t  is easy to foresee that  religious belief, devoted as it  
is to an immaterial world, should employ materialist  pract ices above all as 
a means to a spir itual end;  it s careful at tent ion to the everyday world and 
its sensory apprehension is ult imately driven by a desire for t ranscendence 
- -  epiphany, conversion, and salvat ion - -  made possible through 
conscient iously refined methods of mediat ion.  An empir ical turn entails, in 
religion as elsewhere, a heightened interest  in historicity and documentary 
evidence.  I t  lays the groundwork not  only for the Protestant  advocacy of 
reading and literacy, but  also for bibliolat ry and literalism :  
 
Reject ing what  they took to be the corrupt ing idols of Roman 
Catholic devot ion, the Reformers embraced instead what  Bacon 
called ‘the ideas of the divine,’ the language of Scripture.  The 
parallel with the Baconian program is not  advent it ious.  The 
reliance of Protestant  thought  on the figurat ive language of the 
Bible as the one t rue sense and ‘literal’ Word of God is profoundly 
analogous to the new philosophical argument  that  in nature’s book 
was to be found the register and signature of divine intent .  
Contemporaries certainly understood that  the exeget ical 
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commitment  to ‘one sense of the Scripture, the literal sense,’ was 
informed by a commitment  to the evidence of the senses. 86
 
 
As in natural history, the interplay between naive empir icism  and ext reme 
scept icism  in biblical literalism  makes for a cont radictory double status.  
An empir ically inflected at tachment  to the let ter of scripture, mot ivated by 
the desire to bet ter mediate its t ruths, can provoke resistance among 
those who find that  the kind of t ranscendent  t ruth they seek is no longer 
mediated at  all.   The cont rarian response is therefore to turn from text  as 
mediator of spir itual t ruth in favour of individual revelat ion.  William  Dell 
lends unintended emphasis to the dialect ical nature of this cont roversy 
when, in decrying bibliolat ry in his 1653 ‘The Trial of Spir it s’,  he declares 
outwardly object ive literalism  to be, in fact , deeply flawed by idiosyncrat ic 
subject ivity:  
 
They who preach the outward let ter of the word, though never so 
t ruly, without  the Spir it ,  do [ …]  under the outward let ter of the 
word, preach their own m ind, and not  Christ ’s m ind;  and do make 
all the scriptures serve their own turns, even their own worldly 
ends and advantages, and nothing else. 87
 
 
Furthermore, invest ing the Bible with authority by cast ing it  as a 
historical document  entails sim ilar reversals;  such a tact ic ‘simultaneously 
celebrated it  by the highest  standards and opened it  to the most  damaging 
of assaults’. 88
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history, it  must  be subject  to all the shortcom ings of any historical 
account .  I t  may be biased, incomplete, adulterated, or simply 
m isunderstood;  it  becomes mere hearsay in text .  I n turn, this ext reme 
scept ical response lends itself to a diversity of religious agendas.  Mist rust  
of the textual mediat ion of t ruth may be invoked, for instance, to declare 
the precedence of individual intuit ive revelat ion as easily as it  may be used 
to assert  the vital importance of a Roman Catholic pr iesthood. 89  I n any 
event , what  was intended as ‘a sophist icated weapon against  atheism ’ 
proves its ut ilit y as ‘it s supremely powerful ally ’. 90
I n conjunct ion with this tendency toward paradox and circularity, 
the emphasis on t ranscendence in the pious conscript ion of naive 
empir icism  informs upon the larger process of which it  is a part .  True to 
its dialect ical genesis, the empir icism  that  seeks to correct  the deficiencies 
of romance idealism  retains something of the very m indset  it  seems to 
resist .  As much as scept icism  drives belief away from the m iracles of 
medieval romance and their claims upon the imaginat ion, there remains in 
the culture of empir icism  an underlying desire for the inexplicable wonders 
and myst ical unifying pat terns of romance metaphysics.  That  such a 
preoccupat ion inheres in Christ ian applicat ions of naive empir icism  may 
seem quite natural, but  McKeon remarks that  the Baconian scient ific 
method itself integrates the longstanding not ion of the material world as 
  Just  as in the case of 
news journalism , the devices of empir ical authent icat ion init iate a 
dialect ical oscillat ion that  can encompass two ant ithet ical at t itudes;  
religious empir icism  invites both literalist  enthusiasm and freethinking 
atheism .  Here can be seen, as in other at tempts to narrat ivize empir ical 
authent icat ion, reversibilit y and its at tendant  shift  toward subject ivity as 
integral components of the empir icism / scept icism  dialect ic. 
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‘God’s other book’;  this presupposit ion ‘perm its Bacon to retain the not ion 
of the universe as a great  sign system, and to conceive of the scient ist  as 
one who reads in material reality the cont ingent  signifiers of God’s great  
signifieds’. 91
Hunter writes that , in seventeenth-century journalism , the older 
exeget ical t radit ion of t reat ing major events as indicat ive of God’s plan for 
mankind (or at  least  for England)  shifted to a more individualized and 
subject ive scale.
  The Baconian project  of ‘natural history’, as an expression of 
early modern empir icism , bet rays a pervasive faith that  the mundane 
harbours heretofore unrecognized wonders, which are all the more 
wonderful for their verifiable realness, and for their eventual cont r ibut ion 
to a unifying, t ranscendent  understanding. 
92
  Rather than wars or natural disasters, the humble and 
immediate events of a single human life could reflect  the nature of the 
world.  What  persisted through this alterat ion of scale was the sense that  
experience was interpretable, meaningful beyond its outward 
manifestat ion.  And as, in Scriptural exegesis, an inward and individual 
turn sought  to surpass the shortcom ings of literalist  reading, so too did 
there arise a sim ilar sense that  a more t rue understanding of the world 
itself could be achieved through individual means.  I n a Protestant  
religious context , personal reflect ion upon lived experiences could be a 
means to salvat ion.  As Hunter explains, ‘the light  of the individual 
consciousness brought  results superior to those of any cont rolled, 
communal, or handed-down method, and [ …]  individual j udgement  was 
finally the only route to understanding’. 93
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t reat ing the collect ion of material data as a means of cult ivat ing individual 
revelat ion. 
I f the divine order of the world is believed to manifest  in its 
mundane details, then it  follows that  a desire for individual spir itual 
epiphany should focus at tent ion on the everyday.  With diary-keeping and 
reflect ive writ ten meditat ions, Puritans and those they influenced 
developed this convict ion in painstaking personal writ ing, in a method 
(which Hunter cannot  resist  likening to New Crit icism)  that  required no 
formal t raining, only ‘close observat ion - -  a close reading - -  of even the 
smallest  and most  t r iv ial things encountered in daily life’. 94  I n such a 
pract ice, it  is the recording and reviewing, under hermeneut ic pressure, of 
the commonplace that  draws forth profound t ruths.  The ambit ion of the 
spir itual autobiographer was ‘an accumulat ion of discont inuous historical 
facts which, with the grace of God, would generate its own chastening and 
countervailing order’. 95
Not  unlike Bacon’s scient ific method, this reflexive approach aims 
to glean wisdom from experience, accumulat ing scores of observat ions in 
the hope of their cont r ibut ing to some larger, unitary t ruth.  But  in the 
case of spir itual autobiography, this t ruth is authent icated not  in spite of, 
but  because of, it s individual subject ivity.  Hunter observes that  the 
diar ist ’s assiduous self- reflect ions ‘sought  to extend the realm  of fact  and 
the mode of realism  into areas characterized by uncertainty or m ind-
neut ral fam iliar ity ’.
  This is significant  because it  deploys an empir ical 
emphasis on documented historicit y as a means to subject ive immediacy.  
I n other words, the meaningfulness of the narrat ive was a funct ion of it s 
faithfulness to material reality - -  it s realism . 
96
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relevance to literary form  that  underlies other contemporaneous 
empir ically- inflected narrat ive forms as well - -  journalism , scient ific and 
t ravel writ ing, and religious narrat ive among them. 
Dist inct  from  Realism  as a st r ict ly conceived literary technique, 
realism  in this sense is effect ively the conceptual posture that  prose which 
r ichly evokes the experient ial world can accurately represent  the real, and 
that  this rendering is not  only interest ing for its own sake, but  also useful 
as a gauge of broader circumstances and a cipher of deeper t ruths.  From 
a literary perspect ive this species of realism  is a conceptual antecedent  to 
novelist ic realism , for it  aspires to achieve not  only a faithful textual 
relat ion of the phenomenal world, but  also a means to a more 
comprehensive understanding of general t ruths and underlying ontological 
pat terns.  Meanwhile, it  relies ( reluctant ly, in the case of scient ific writ ing, 
but  less so in other forms)  on a concession to subject ive part icular ity to 
at tain this goal.  
As McKeon points out , this st ruggle between quant itat ive and 
qualitat ive authent icity - -  between the impossibilit y of an exhaust ive 
completeness of detail and a more at tainable (but  less defensible)  
sufficiency of detail - -  begins to pose the sort  of quest ions that  later, more 
concertedly literary, realism  will seek to answer:  
 
Once the claim  to historicity is systemat ically acknowledged to be 
not  an absolute but  a relat ive claim , once writers and readers are 
obliged to address themselves ser iously to the quest ion of how 
much documentat ion, what  sort  of detail,  is needed to sat isfy the 
demands of ‘t rue history,’ compet ing theories of ‘realism ’ in the 
modern sense of the term  are firm ly in the ascendant . 97
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McKeon is quick to add, however, that  before such a turn to the aesthet ic 
can take place, ‘True history must  cease to find its just ificat ion in the 
mediat ion of “other”  t ruths, whether spir itual or moral’. 98
What  unites the several popular forms of narrat ive exam ined to this 
point  is that , to whatever extent  they m ight  celebrate individual agency in 
the observat ion of the world, it  is ult imately the world, exist ing 
independent ly and prior to the observer, which they seek to apprehend.  
They unanimously resist  intent ional fabricat ions of the imaginat ion as 
obstacles to this approach.  Whether religious or secular, empir icist  




I n fact  it  is of some interest  to note the surprising alliance between 
the Protestant  and the empir ical dist rust  of t radit ional modes of 
mediat ion, which for a while threw up a joint  bulwark against  the 
inexorable validat ion of human creat ivity in early modern culture. 99
 
 
To adm it  creat ivity into this process, one that  otherwise pursues a 
posit iv ist ic quest  after absolute t ruths, fundamentally alters its substance.  
I t  is a shift  from  the realism  of empir ical narrat ive, which ult imately must  
be factual to be funct ional, to fict ional realism , which need not  be. 
However, in terms of praxis, perhaps a shift  in emphasis from the real to 
the realist ic is not  a great  leap.  Persistent  appeals to subject ive 
verificat ion - -  whether in histories, ‘st range, therefore t rue’ news stories, 
or the austere rhetoric of Royal Society t ravel narrat ives - -  demonst rate 
that  when empir ical certainty hovers out  of reach, the semblance of 
t ruthfulness will f ill the vacuum. 
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Robert  Mayer, t racing changes in the discourse of history, affirms a 
late seventeenth-  and early eighteenth-century host ilit y toward ‘biased or 
credulous historians’, but  also toward ‘the “scient ific”  methods of the 
ant iquarians’, who could be accused of compiling mere ‘compendia of 
most ly useless facts’.  Mayer cont inues:  
 
Fict ion was not  the poor relat ion of history, tolerated but  always 
depreciated;  it  was simply one of the means used by writers of 
history who embraced the Baconian dictum that  all forms of 
knowledge should be ‘for the benefit  and use of life’ as a literal 
statement  of historiography’s end. 100
 
 
Barbara Shapiro provides a corresponding example, describing the 
reorientat ion of t ravel writ ing from fact  to fict ion as an easy progression:  
 
Fact -oriented t ravel reports, surveys, and descript ions became so 
fam iliar that  literary men began to create fict ional mat ters of fact  in 




The possibilit y of ‘f ict ional mat ters of fact ’ is not  as much of a paradox as 
it  m ight  seem if the subject ive determ inat ion of ut ilit y is considered to be 
a form  of validat ion as relevant  as documentary proof. 
The ambiguity of the term  ‘invent ion’ is it self an apt  emblem for the 
indist inct  front ier between the factual and the fict ional.  I n the eighteenth 
century, ‘invent ion’ was a more ambiguous term  than it  is in modern 
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usage.  Johnson’s Dict ionary  offers as synonyms the words ‘Fict ion’, 
‘Discovery’, ‘Excogitat ion’, and even ‘Forgery’. 102  Mult iple senses of the 
word seem salient  in comments which appear in a 1710 issue of Addison 
and Steele’s Tat ler .  Point ing out  that  t ravel narrat ives afford ‘the writer an 
opportunity of showing his parts, without  any danger of being exam ined or 
cont radicted’, the art icle claims that  in describing his adventures, ‘Sir John 
Mandeville has dist inguished himself by the copiousness of his invent ion, 
and greatness of his genius’. 103  The works of Mandeville, along with those 
of Ferdinand Mendez Pinto, are said to provoke ‘as much astonishment  as 
the t ravels of Ulysses in Homer, or of the Red-Cross Knight  in Spenser.  All 
is enchanted ground, and fairy land’. 104
 
  The allusions to epic and 
romance, especially as they follow a direct  reference to the impossibilit y of 
any fact -checking, indicate that  it  is well-wrought  fict ion that  receives the 
praise here.  However, when the art icle ment ions some unpublished 
writ ings of ‘these two em inent  authors’, the apparent  celebrat ion of 
Mandeville and Pinto’s creat ivity in fict ion suddenly reverses, emphasizing 
their reliabilit y as reporters of fact :  
Were they not  so well at tested, [ these manuscripts]  would appear 
altogether improbable.  I  am  apt  to think, the ingenious authors did 
not  publish them with the rest  of their works, lest  they should pass 
for fict ions and fables:  a caut ion not  unnecessary, when the 
reputat ion of their veracity was not  yet  established in the world. 105
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 Samuel Johnson, A Dict ionary of the English Language,  2 vols (London:  
W. St rahan et  al. ,  1755) , I .  See also Oxford English Dict ionary . 
103
 Joseph Addison, ‘No. 254. Thursday, November 23. 1710.’,  in The 
Tat ler  (Glasgow:  Robert  Urie, 1754) , pp. 220-224 (p. 220) . 
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 Addison, p. 221. 
105
 I bid. 
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I nvent ion is obviously desirable, but  whether it  is more praiseworthy when 
uncovering the empir ical world or const ruct ing an imaginat ive world is not  
so st raight forward.  Dist inguishing between engrossing facts and well-
wrought  fict ions is part  of the pract ice of reading seem ingly real 
narrat ives, but , as the dialect ic of scept icism  makes plain, it  cannot  be 
carr ied to a conclusive end.  Sooner or later, then, evaluat ion must  be 
waived and the business of reading cont inued.  Pragmat ism  dictates that  
validat ion cannot  fully or finally eclipse the appeal of effect ive invent ion. 
Writers of prose fict ion in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries also seem at tuned to the ambiguity of invent ion.  They confront  
problems of narrat ive t ruth in ways that  engage direct ly with the dialect ic 
effects already under discussion.  The front  mat ter of their books is full of 
st r ident  t ruth-claims, and yet  those claims are consistent ly complicated by 
the stories which follow them. 106
I n the dedicat ion to Lord Mait land that  precedes Oroonoko, 
published in 1688, Aphra Behn assures her pat ron that  her narrat ive ‘is a 
t rue story’, however incredible it  m ight  appear:  
  Taken collect ively, these quasi-cr it ical 
texts document  the efforts of writers who are consciously developing 
theories of realism  and fict ion, shaping the convent ions of what  would 
become the novel. 
 
I f there be any thing that  seems Romant ick, I  beseech your 
Lordship to consider, these Count r ies do, in all things, so far differ 
from  ours, that  they produce unconceivable Wonders;  at  least , they 
appear so to us, because New and St range.  What  I  have ment ion’d 
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 Some of these works are discussed below;  for a list  of others, see 
Mayer, p. 3. 
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Behn direct ly assures her readership, too, that  the ‘History’ she relates has 
‘enough of Reality to support  it , and to render it  divert ing, without  the 
addit ion of I nvent ion’. 108  I nterest ingly, after such prom ises, Oroonoko is 
frequent ly dr iven by idealized love, m iraculous coincidence, exot ic 
set t ings, and the t it le character’s superhuman virtue and st rength.  Most  
st r ik ing of all about  Behn’s t ruth-claims, in light  of the narrat ive’s enduring 
‘Romant ick’ int r igues, is that  the tale is not  only purported to be t rue, but  
to be ‘divert ing’ precisely because of it s t ruth.  I t  is, in Davis’s phrase, ‘a 
double discourse based on cont radictory assert ions’. 109  Of course 
declar ing that  all the amazing events described in Oroonoko are real is, in 
a literal sense, a lie.  But  far more important  than the literal sense is the 
literary sense:  Behn’s avowal of t ruth is a device to heighten narrat ive 
effect , and it  is that  effect  which lays claim  to a kind of t ruth.  I ts blend of 
two modes of authent icat ion offers an instance of what  Paul Goring refers 
to as a ‘generic st ruggle’. 110
Whereas Oroonoko is subt it led A True History , the t it le page of 
William  Congreve’s 1692 narrat ive I ncognita declares it  to be a novel.  
Although I ncognita does not  fall neat ly into this category by modern 
standards, Congreve’s preface supplies a prescient  discussion of the novel 
as a genre dist inguishable from romance by vir tue of it s realism .  Unlike 
Behn, he makes no claim  to t ruth, only to believabilit y:  
  The tension between text  and paratext  
reveals that  the condit ion of veracity in narrat ive has slipped away from a 
solid epistemological category and become a rhetorical st rategy. 
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 Aphra Behn, Oroonoko:  Or, The Royal Slave. A True History  (London:  
William  Canning, 1688) , front  mat ter. 
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 Behn, pp. 1-2. 
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Novels are of a more fam iliar nature [ than romances] ;  Come near 
us, and represent  to us I nt r igues in pract ice, delight  us with 
Accidents and odd Events, but  not  such as are wholly unusual or 
unpresidented, such which not  being so distant  from  our Belief 
br ing also the pleasure nearer us. 111
 
 
Congreve makes explicit  what  Behn implies:  being t rue to life is more 
important  to the reader’s experience than being t rue.  This comes in the 
form  of an approach to the reader, both in represent ing events that  are 
less ‘distant  from our belief’ and, as Brean Hammond and Shaun Regan 
point  out , in a ‘flexible, approachable tone’, creat ing the novelist ic effect  of 
‘a reader who is in league with the narrator’. 112
There is another cr it ical facet  to Congreve’s preface.  I n lieu of the 
‘m iraculous Cont ingencies’ of romance, he aims to ‘im itate Dram at ick 
Writ ing, namely, in the Design, Contexture and Result  of the Plot ’.
 
113
The prefatory address ‘To the Reader’ in the 1705 novel The Secret  
History of Queen Zarah provides relat ively detailed pract ical advice for 
writers of fict ion, advocat ing realism  in set t ing, characterizat ion, dialogue, 
  To 
support  realism , which he casts as the hallmark of an innovat ive genre, he 
enlists a composit ional elem ent  from an older, and thoroughly canonical, 
literary mode.  The novel, as conceived in the preface to I ncognita, is not  
simply a new, more realist ic, type of fict ional narrat ive;  it  is an adapt ive, 
flexible genre, responding to and drawing upon literary precedent . 
                                          
111
 William  Congreve, I ncognita:  or, Love and Duty Reconcil’d. A Novel 
(London:  Peter Buck, 1691/ 1692) , front  mat ter;  reprinted in I oan 
Williams, ed. Novel and Rom ance 1700-1800:  A Docum entary Record 
(London:  Rout ledge & Kegan Paul, 1970) , pp. 27-28 (p. 27) .  See also 
Goring, pp. 95-96. 
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 Brean Hammond and Shaun Regan, Making the Novel:  Fict ion and 
Society in Britain, 1660-1789 (Basingstoke:  Palgrave Macm illan, 2006) , 
pp. 30-31. 
113
 Congreve, front  mat ter;  Williams, p. 28. 
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and plot . 114
 
  The author points out  that , compared to purely factual 
accounts, realist ic fict ion requires of the author a more met iculous 
at tent ion to the principles that  govern real life, ‘For there are Truths that  
are not  always probable’:  
He that  writes a True History ought  to place the Accidents as they 
Naturally happen [ …]  because he is not  obliged to answer for their 
Probabilit y;  but  he that  composes a History to his Fancy, gives his 
Heroes what  Characters he pleases, and places the Accidents as he 
thinks fit ,  without  believing he shall be cont radicted by other 




Probabilit y for the author of the preface means adhering not  only to what  
is physically possible, but  also to what  is morally acceptable, ‘For example, 
‘t is an allowed Truth in the Roman History that  Nero put  his mother to 
Death, but  ‘t is a Thing against  all Reason and Probabilit y ’. 116
                                          
114
 This novel, along with it s preface, is commonly at t r ibuted to Delariv ier 
Manley.  John L. Sut ton Jr has shown, however, that  the preface to Queen 
Zarah is in fact  a direct  t ranslat ion (by Manley, Sut ton believes)  of an 
essay composed in French by Morvan de Bellegarde, published in the 1702 
volume Let t res Curieuses de Lit térature et  de Morale.   This essay, in turn, 
derives from an earlier  text , the 1683 Sent imens sur les Let t res et  sur 
l’Histoire by a writer known as the sieur du Plaisir .  J. A. Downie proposes, 
with considerable evidence, that  Manley had no part  in the narrat ive at  all.   
See John L. Sut ton Jr, ‘The Source of Mrs. Manley’s Preface to Queen 
Zarah ’,  Modern Philology ,  82.2, (1984) , 167-172;  and J. A. Downie, ‘What  
if Delariv ier Manley Did Not  Write The Secret  History of Queen Zarah?’, 
The Library , 5.3 (2004)  247-264. 
  To borrow 
Congreve’s phrase, the fict ion theorized by the preface to Queen Zarah 
seeks to ‘come near’ readers by appealing to their propriety as well as 
their scept icism , encouraging them to engage more direct ly with the 
115
 Delarivier Manley [ at t r ib.] ,  The Secret  History, of Queen Zarah, and the 
Zarazians;  Being a Looking-Glass for ____ _______ in the Kingdom  of 
Albigion. (Albigion [ London] :  [ n.pub.] , 1705) , front  mat ter;  reprinted in 
Williams, pp. 33-39 (p. 34) . 
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 Manley [ at t r ib.] ,  front  mat ter;  Williams, p. 34. 
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characters, so that  ‘all the World will f ind themselves represented’. 117  The 
sort  of writ ing described here is different  from that  composed by a 
historian of fact , and it  requires different  techniques of product ion and 
recept ion. 118
I n 1719, Daniel Defoe’s The Life and St range Surprizing Adventures 
of Robinson Crusoe was published.  The t it le page at t r ibutes authorship to 
Crusoe himself and supplies a long biographical subt it le, making a t ruth 
claim  sim ilar to Behn’s in regard to Oroonoko.   However, the preface 
t reats the issue of t ruth more obscurely:  
  The ideal readers of this kind of fict ion need not  believe the 
narrat ive, but  they should at  least  find themselves willing to believe, and 
so the writer must  be carefully at tuned to their expectat ions.  The preface 
to Queen Zarah gives an account  of literary convent ions in flux, adapt ing 
to accommodate a new genre and discover its funct ion. 
 
The Editor believes the thing to be a just  History of Fact ;  neither is 
there any Appearance of Fict ion in it :  And however thinks, because 
all such things are dispatch’d, that  the I mprovement  of it ,  as well 




Michael Shinagel glosses this to mean ‘that  such works are read cursorily, 
and, therefore, it  mat ters lit t le to the entertainment  or inst ruct ion of the 
reader if the story be t ruth or fict ion’. 120
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 Manley [ at t r ib.] ,  front  mat ter;  and Williams, p. 36. 
  Thus, as in the theory of fict ion 
presented in the preface to Queen Zarah,  what  mat ters is ult imately not  
118
 Davis suggests that  the apparent  ‘paradox’ of moralist ic probabilit y in 
the preface to Queen Zarah in fact  reveals two ‘cont radictory types of 
verisim ilitude’, t ied to respect ive ‘types or variet ies of t ruth’ (p. 111) .  
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 Daniel Defoe, ‘The Preface.’, in The Life and St range Surprizing 
Adventures of Robinson Crusoe, Of York, Mariner [ …]  (London:  W. Taylor, 
1719) , front  mat ter.  Reprinted in Williams, p. 56. 
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 Daniel Defoe, Robinson Crusoe, ed. by Michael Shinagel,  2nd edn (New 
York:  W. W. Norton & Company, 1994) , p. 3. 
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the t ruth of a narrat ive but  it s realism , its potent ial to impact  - -  and 
thereby to improve - -  the reader. 
Charles Gildon at tacks Robinson Crusoe and its sequel in a 
pamphlet  published in the same year.  Gildon seems mot ivated in part  by 
a personal resentment  toward Defoe;  he begins with a sat ir ical dialogue in 
which Defoe’s characters revenge themselves upon their ‘father’ by force-
feeding him  pages from his own books unt il he soils himself. 121  St ill,  
Gildon’s more reasoned object ions hinge upon a concept ion of moral 
probabilit y sim ilar to that  in the preface to Queen Zarah.   However, unlike 
the prefator of Queen Zarah,  Gildon does not  go so far as to t rust  readers 
of fict ion to see through rhetorical t ruth-claims and adopt  a new recept ive 
posture.  He imagines that  readers will approach this new form  of fict ion 
as they do a much older form  - -  biblical parables - -  and so he presumes 
fict ion to have a powerfully direct  didact ic influence.  Gildon believes, for 
example, that  it  is ‘against  a publick Good’ to port ray an econom ic and 
m ilitary necessity like seafaring as perilous or unpleasant , because it  
m ight  ‘deter all People from going to Sea’. 122  He worr ies, too, that  
depict ing young Crusoe’s disregard for his father’s advice as a defiance 
severe enough to provoke Provident ial storms promotes a filial obedience 
so draconian that  to enforce it  ‘would in effect  be to make the Children of 
Freemen absolute Slaves’. 123
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 Charles Gildon, The Life and St range Surprizing Adventures of Mr. D- - -  
de F- - , of London, Hosier  (London:  J. Roberts, 1719) , pp. v-xviii.  
  Alongside this hyper-allegor ical reading, 
Gildon also finds innumerable details of Defoe’s narrat ive to be 
unacceptably improbable:  Crusoe is too irrat ional and comes too easily 
into money;  Xury’s English is too good and Crusoe’s Arabic too poor;  it  is 
unlikely that  Crusoe could measure wave crests as accurately as he 
claims;  and it  is impossible that  a man could fit  any biscuits into the 
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 Gildon, pp. 2, 3;  excerpted in Williams, pp. 57, 58. 
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 Gildon, p. 4;  Williams, p. 58. 
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pockets of his breeches. 124
Gildon’s indignity appears to be somewhat  at  odds with itself,  
however, for he insists both that  Robinson Crusoe is too absurd to be 
believed and that  it  is a dangerously ant i-pat r iot ic and irreligious model for 
behaviour.  Much of Gildon’s apparent  confusion, though, is not  his own.  
I n effect , he is carrying out  a reduct io ad absurdum  of the tenets of moral 
probabilit y - -  any text ’s claims to be both allegorically and factually sound 
could likewise dissolve under a host ile gaze.  The paradox in Gildon’s 
pamphlet  is a symptom of the mutable literary convent ions of his 
contemporaries. 
  For Gildon, Crusoe is a collect ion of 
irresponsible lies. 
Consequent ly, Defoe’s remarks at  the beginning of his third volume 
on Crusoe can do lit t le more than restate Gildon’s cent ral complaint  from  a 
more defensive posture.  I ndeed, assum ing the guise of a liv ing, factual 
Crusoe, Defoe accuses his det ractors of the ident ical cr ime of which he 
claims innocence - -  moral laxity and factual inaccuracy:  
 
I  Robinson Crusoe being at  this t ime in perfect  and sound Mind and 
Memory, Thanks be to God therefore;  do hereby declare, their 
Object ion is an I nvent ion scandalous in Design, and false in Fact ;  




The precariousness of both men’s content ions, and the ease with which 
their rat ionale can underm ine the very conclusions it  advances, reveals 
more than the irrat ionality of these writers’ mutual ant ipathy.  The 
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substance of Gildon and Defoe’s quarrel is the precarious epistem ic status 
of novelist ic fict ion itself.   Neither of these authors is certain how to 
determ ine the value or the quality of t ruth in novelist ic fict ion, and the fact  
that  their arguments m irror each other shows that  a final value judgement  
can only be approximated with a rhetorical, aesthet ic, or baldly emot ional 
appeal. 126
To conceive, after McKeon, of the dynam ism of early novelist ic 
fict ion as dialect ical is useful, because it  circumvents the reduct ive 
teleology that  haunts the organizing conceits of evolut ion, refinement , and 
progression in literary form .  I nstead, it  lends emphasis to the equivocal 
consequences of empir icism  for narrat ive accounts of realit y:  reversibilit y 
and a move toward t ranscending the condit ions of object ivity.  I t  teases 
out  the connect ion between broad cultural alterat ions in understanding 
and the development  of novelist ic fict ion:  
  This quandary is another instance of the epistemological 
uncertainty underlying discourses of fact  more generally.  I t  reveals the 
fam iliar consequences of the dialect ic interplay between naive empir icism  
and ext reme scept icism :  the means of establishing t ruth-value fall into 
obscurity, and the result  is a final appeal to the subject . 
 
This model of conflict  defines the terms in which the crucial 
‘quest ions of t ruth’ are debated in the Restorat ion and the early 
eighteenth century, and the epistemological boundaries within 
which ‘the novel’ as we know it  coalesces during that  period. 127
 
 
I f realism  is to be considered a generic marker of novelist ic prose, then 
the dialect ical relat ion between naive empir icism  and ext reme scept icism  -
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-  and its variable consequences - -  must  be bound up in the ident ity of the 
novel as a genre. 
Furthermore, since realism  inevitably plays on problemat ic and 
indeterm inate not ions of knowledge, this concept ion of the novel 
highlights, along with social, econom ic, and religious influences, the 
empir ico-philosophical undercurrent  of the novel as essent ial to its 
ident ity.  The above review of novelist ic paratexts reveals that  writers in 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were consciously 
dealing with these issues, if not  from  a cr it ical stance, then certainly from 
a pract ical one.  I t  therefore follows that  eighteenth-century novelist ic 
fict ion should demonst rate provisional st rategies to account  for problems 
of empir icism  and epistemology, and so should reward cr it ical inquiry 





‘Discoveries of our own I gnorance’:  Jane Barker’s Galesia fict ions 
 
As the preceding chapter demonstrates, eighteenth-century writers and 
modern literary historians ascribe the novel’s generic ident ity to its 
deployment  of some kind of fict ional realism .  While in no t ime has such a 
definit ion been complete or unanimous, it  is a dom inant  enough 
convent ion that  it s implicat ions merit  considerat ion.  Realism  is a literary 
feature that  responds to and reformulates problems of veracity, 
authent icity, and knowledge.  Whether considered historically in the 
context  of related textual pract ices or theoret ically as an enlargement  of 
the quest ions raised by empir icist  philosophy and scient ific scholarship, 
the novel’s realism  denotes a concom itant  or ientat ion toward 
epistemology.  However, the mechanisms and implicat ions of this 
entailment  remain somewhat  obscure.  The inquiry that  follows will 
therefore explore how these two realms of intellectual and cultural act ivity 
interact  within specific literary texts - -  Jane Barker’s Galesia t r ilogy:  Love 
I nt r igues:  Or, The History of the Am ours of Bosvil and Galesia (1713) , A 
Patch-Work Screen for the Ladies (1723) , and The Lining of the Patch-
Work Screen (1726) . 
Barker wrote at  a t ime when Brit ish culture at  large was concerned 
with human understanding of the world and, by extension, with the power 
of text , especially pr int , to demonst rate and convey such understanding.  
As an educated Briton born in the seventeenth century, Barker would have 
felt  the influence of these concerns.  She stands out , though, because she 
used the terms of the culture-wide epistemological debate of her t ime to 
art iculate her own unique ident ity against  the reigning assumpt ions of the 
larger populat ion. 
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She was a Catholic and a Jacobite, and her works bear out  these 
convict ions with the polem ical, defensive individualism  of one who 
perceives a world going awry. 1  I n the descript ion of Kathryn R. King, 
when ‘read in relat ion to their own polit ical moment , these narrat ives 
emerge as complex elegiac responses to the declining fortunes of the 
exiled Stuarts and their followers in England’. 2  Barker’s intellectual self-
determ inat ion and crit ical insight  on issues of gender also make her of 
special interest  to fem inist  cr it ics, whose work has, according to Sarah 
Prescot t  in a review of Wilson’s edit ion of the Galesia fict ions, ‘recent ly 
revived’ Barker as a focus of academ ic interest . 3   I ndeed, Marilyn L. 
Williamson and Josephine Donovan cast  Barker herself as an early 
fem inist . 4
                                          
1
 Toni Bowers calls Barker ‘One of the most  dyed- in- the-wool and 
unequivocal of Jacobites’, and claims her poet ry adds complexity and 
nuance to modern concept ions of Jacobite ident ity;  ‘Jacobite Difference 
and the Poet ry of Jane Barker’,  ELH,  64.4 (1997) , 857-869 (p. 860) . 
  But  what  makes Barker’s work part icularly relevant  to a 
discussion of the novel is the way in which her principles shaped her 
2
 Kathryn R. King, Jane Barker, Exile:  A Literary Career, 1675-1725 
(Oxford:  Clarendon, 2000)  p. 147.  Unless otherwise noted, subsequent  
citat ions of King refer to this text . 
3
 Sarah Prescot t , ‘Resolv’d to Espouse a Book’, Tim es Literary Supplem ent ,  
9 January 1998, p. 21. 
4
 Williamson, while not  explicit ly labelling Barker a ‘fem inist ’,  clearly places 
her in this category in Raising Their Voices:  Brit ish Wom en Writers, 1650-
1750 (Det roit ,  MI :  Wayne State University, 1990) ;  see for example pp. 15, 
104-107, 244-251.  Donovan does employ the label, clar ify ing her posit ion 
with a definit ion:  ‘By fem inism  I  mean affirmat ion of female agency and 
subject ivity;  recognit ion of pat terns of dom inat ion and abuse of women by 
men;  and, most  important ly, the percept ion of women as a class that  has 
common interests’;  Wom en and the Rise of the Novel, 1405-1726,  p. ix.  
See also Josephine Donovan, ‘Women and the Framed-Novelle:  A Tradit ion 
of Their Own’, Signs, 22.4 (1997)  947-980 (p. 947) .  Audrey Bilger writes 
of Barker’s A Patch-Work Screen that  it  offers ‘one of the earliest  examples 
of a female, if not  fem inist , aesthet ics’;  see ‘“A History Reduc’d into 
Patches” :  Patchwork and the Woman Novelist ’, in Quilt  Culture:  Tracing 
the Pat tern, ed. by Cheryl B. Torsney and Judy Elsley (Columbia, MO:  
University of Missouri, 1994) , pp. 18-32 (p. 32) .  Sim ilar ly, Ros Ballaster 
links Barker to the ‘fem inist  philosophy of Mary Astell’;  see Seduct ive 
Form s:  Wom en’s Am atory Fict ion from  1684 to 1740 (Oxford:  Clarendon, 
1992) , p. 33.  King, while taking account  of these prom inent  themes in her 
readings of Barker, also caut ions against  the reduct ive distort ions r isked 
by ‘fem inocent r ic paradigms’ of cr it icism  (p. 233) ;  see also pp. 18-23, 
218.   
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prose.  With an interest  in assert ing beliefs both staunchly t radit ional and 
highly - -  even dangerously - -  cont roversial, Barker, whom King dubs 
‘Janus Barker’,  crafted texts that  at tempt  to encompass both conservat ism  
and revolut ion, t radit ion and innovat ion. 5
Barker’s literary work was not  very commercially successful, and 
unt il recent ly the cr it ical consensus was that  her works were lit t le more 
than uninspired Jacobite propaganda and moralist ic finger-wagging.
  Furthermore, and significant ly 
for her status as novelist , Barker seeks to map the impact  of such 
cont rast ing impulses upon the elusive and shift ing ground of subject ive 
individual experience. 
6
                                          
5
 King, p. 181. 
  I t  is 
t rue that  Barker’s sense of moral rect itude is almost  constant ly on display 
in her texts, and her literary ambit ion m ight  at  t imes seem to exceed her 
abilit y, but  what  is art ist ically flawed is not  necessarily insignificant .  I t  is 
often precisely in Barker’s stylist ic lapses where the theoret ical currents 
animat ing her work become most  visible.  Her work holds a marginal 
(some would insist  ‘marginalized’)  place in the convent ional literary canon;  
however, considering the historical situat ion from which they spring, and 
the formal and generic experimentat ion they perform , Barker’s fict ions 
have a great  deal to say about  the characterist ics and capacit ies of 
6
 King, p. 7.  John J. Richet t i finds an ‘aggressive moralizing tone’ in 
Barker’s work, labelling her novels ‘pious polem ics’;  see Popular Fict ion 
Before Richardson:  Narrat ive Pat terns 1700-1739 (Oxford:  Clarendon, 
1969) , pp. 231, 239.  James Grantham Turner, considering Barker’s 
Exilius,  refers to her as a ‘severe moralist ’ in his essay ‘The Erot ics of the 
Novel’,  in A Com panion to the Eighteenth-Century English Novel and 
Culture, ed. by Paula R. Backscheider and Catherine I ngrassia (Oxford:  
Blackwell,  2005) , pp. 214-234 (p. 222) .  Jerry C. Beasley discerns in 
Barker’s fict ions lit t le more than a ‘sober didact ic purpose’;  see ‘Polit ics 
and Moral I dealism :  The Achievement  of Some Early Women Novelists’, in 
Fet ter’d or Free?:  Brit ish Wom en Novelists, 1670-1815,  ed. by Mary Anne 
Schofield and Cecilia Macheski (Athens, OH:  Ohio University, 1986) , pp. 
216-236 (p. 229) .  Bridget  G. MacCarthy, in her history of female writers, 
devotes a single amusingly irr itable paragraph to Barker, in which she 
announces that  Barker’s ‘heroines are all r ighteous, mat ter-of- fact  pr igs’, 
and her writ ing ‘not  in the least  or iginal’;  The Fem ale Pen:  Wom en 
Writers, Their Cont r ibut ion to the English Novel, 1621-1744 (Oxford:  Cork 
University, 1944) , p. 252. 
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realist ic - -  and hence novelist ic - -  prose fict ion.  Somet imes, as Barker 
herself certainly believed, a view from the periphery has much to offer. 
Barker’s prose works are commonly referred to as novels;  however, 
in spite of the boldface declarat ion ‘a NOVEL’ on its t it le page, Barker’s 
first  published fict ion, Love I nt r igues,  bears stylist ic and themat ic echoes 
of the romance7.   Richet t i calls it  ‘a short  caut ionary or exemplary tale of 
the kind popular since the seventeenth century’. 8  I n terms of plot , Love 
I nt r igues shares much with the amatory fict ion of writers like Aphra Behn -
-  it  is essent ially the tale of an innocent  young woman placed in peril by a 
man’s amorous advances. 9  Josephine Donovan notes the sim ilar ity of one 
pivotal scene to what  she calls ‘the Violenta novella’,  a tale, recurr ing in 
various forms since the Middle Ages, and later in the work of Manley and 
Haywood, in which a woman takes bloody revenge upon a suitor who 
wrongs her. 10
However, though it  shows the influence of romance and amatory 
formulae, Barker’s text  complicates their convent ions.  Kathryn King writes 
that  Love I nt r igues ‘bears an interest ingly ironic relat ion’ to women’s 
amatory fict ion and that  it  ‘possesses an immediacy and psychological 
realism  seldom felt  in the narrat ives of Behn, Manley, and Haywood’.
 
11
                                          
7
 Of course Barker’s (or bookseller Edmund Curll’s)  choice of the term  
‘novel’ should not  be const rued as a cr it ical declarat ion of the genre under 
discussion here.  The label is accurate enough in the contemporaneous 
sense documented by Johnson’s Dict ionary  a few decades later:  ‘a small 
tale, generally of love’;  A Dict ionary of the English Language,  2 vols 
(London:  W. St rahan et  al. ,  1755) , I I .   See also Paula R. Backscheider and 
John J. Richet t i,  eds, Popular Fict ion by Wom en, 1660-1730:  an Anthology  
(Oxford:  Clarendon, 1996) , p. xi.  
  A 
sem i-autobiographical persona, Galesia is the story’s teller and cent ral 
character, and in both roles she is dynam ic and self-conscious, too self-
8
 Richet t i,  p. 230. 
9
 Williamson, p. 245;  see also King, pp. 190-191. 
10
 Donovan, Wom en and the Rise of the Novel,  pp. 95, 103, 107, 164. 
11
 King, p. 190. 
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aware and unpredictable to be a two-dimensional romance type. 12  As the 
young protagonist  of the tale, Galesia is both proud and self-cr it ical;  her 
st ruggles to comprehend her own mot ives and the errat ic behaviour of 
Bosvil,  her cruelly irresolute suitor and cousin, cont r ibute to the narrat ive’s 
sustained fascinat ion with subject ive interior ity.  As the narrator, speaking 
long after the events of the plot , Galesia’s ret rospect ion provides 
addit ional facets to her character.  Referr ing to this ironizing complexity, 
Donovan claims that  the ‘realist  t radit ion in English women’s prose’, which 
she t races from the m iddle of the seventeenth century, ‘culm inated in the 
works of Jane Barker’. 13  Even the otherwise unimpressed Richet t i 
concedes to ‘an at t ract ive psychological ver isim ilitude’ in Galesia. 14
Galesia’s emot ional turmoil is the obvious point  of overlap for these 
elem ents.  The episode in which Barker seems to rework the Violenta tale 
elaborates considerably upon Galesia’s tumultuous feelings, so that  this 
convent ional romance scenario in fact  highlights the most  novelist ic 
aspects of Love I nt r igues.   I n this passage, Galesia, after concealing her 
anger with Bosvil in her father’s presence, explodes into murderous wrath 
when she is left  to herself:  
  Tit le 
page declarat ions notwithstanding, this widely cited psychological 
part icularity is the most  conspicuous invitat ion to t reat  the text  as 
novelist ic, to read it  with a cr it ical emphasis on the interrelat ion of 
psychological realism  and epistemology.
 
 
                                          
12
 Jean B. Kern, remarking on Barker’s ‘intense port rayal of pent -up 
emot ion’, writes that  ‘the words of Galesia have the authent ic r ing of 
autobiography’;  see ‘The Old Maid, or “To Grow Old, and Be Poor, and 
Laughed at ” ’,  in Fet ter’d or Free?:  Brit ish Wom en Novelists, 1670-1815,  
ed. by Mary Anne Schofield and Cecilia Macheski (Athens, OH:  Ohio 
University, 1986) , pp. 201-214 (p. 205) . 
13
 Donovan, Wom en and the Rise of the Novel,  p. 79. 
14
 Richet t i,  p. 231. 
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I  cannot  tell you what  I  suffer 'd when I  was alone;  Rage and 
Madness seiz'd me, Revenge and Malice was all I  thought  upon;  
inspir 'd by an evil Genius, I  resolv'd his Death, and pleas'd myself 
in the Fancy of a barbarous Revenge, and delighted myself to think 
I  saw his Blood pour out  of his false Heart .  I n order to accomplish 
this detestable Freak, I  snatch'd up a Steel Rapier, which stood in 
the Hall,  and walk'd away towards the Place of his Abode, saying to 
myself, The false Bosvil shall disquiet  me no more, nor any other of 
my Sex;  in him  I  will end his Race;  no more of them shall come to 
disturb or affront  Womankind. 15
 
 
Recounted by a more est ranged narrator, Galesia’s anger could easily 
dim inish into a caricature of fem inine hysteria - -  a sm irking account  of the 
‘woman scorned’.  I nstead, the episode is related by Galesia herself,  
direct ly quot ing her own enraged speech, and when the tormented Galesia 
seizes a weapon her thirst  for revenge is possessed of a self-aware, 
gendered agency.  Bosvil is not  only a threat  to her own happiness;  he 
represents an ent ire ‘Race’ of men who prey upon women.  Galesia’s sense 
of persecut ion announces both her subject ive individuality and her 
conscious categorical ident ificat ion with the standpoint  of disempowered 
women in general. 16
                                          
15
 Jane Barker, The Galesia Trilogy and Selected Manuscript  Poem s of Jane 
Barker ,  ed. by Carol Shiner Wilson (New York:  Oxford University, 1997) , 
p. 31.  Subsequent  references to this edit ion of Barker’s fict ions will 
appear in the text .  Wilson’s text  of Love I nt r igues is based on the revised 
text  first  published in The Entertaining Novels of Mrs. Jane Barker ,  2 vols 
(London:  A. Bet tesworth and E. Curll,  1719) , I I .   The earliest  published 
version of the text , which King notes was probably ‘never intended for 
public consumpt ion’ (p. 185) , contains vir tually the same passage, except  
that  it  port rays the rapier as imaginary.  See Barker, Love I nt r igues:  Or, 
The History of the Am ours of Bosvil and Galesia, as Related to Lucasia, in 
St . Germ ains Garden. A Novel (London:  E. Curll,  1713) , p. 43;  reprinted in 
Backscheider and Richet t i,  pp. 82-111, (p. 100) . 
  The int imate narrat ive point  of view offers a st r ik ing 
16
 Donovan, with reference to Hegel, Marx, and Lukács, provides further 
discussion of standpoint  theory as it  relates to early modern women’s 
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rendering of Galesia’s experience as an autonomous individual grappling 
with cultural expectat ions. 
The alternat ive perspect ive offered by the older Galesia’s frank 
descript ion is sim ilar ly involved.  As she evokes the interior complexit ies 
and cont radict ions of her youth, the narrat ing Galesia must  be 
correspondingly dynamic.  She sympathizes, of course, but  not  without  
censure, and t ime and experience create a reflect ive tone that  allows her 
coolly to interpose poet ic meditat ions and didact ic commentary.  These 
interject ions foster an ironic distance that , once established, complicates 
the text ’s melodramat ic tendencies, even where no explicit  commentary 
appears.  As the passage excerpted above cont inues, Galesia’s ‘Rage and 
Madness’ give way to self-aggrandizement  verging on the r idiculous:  
 
This only Son shall die by the Hands of me an only Daughter;  and 
however the World may call it  Cruelty, or Barbarity, I  am sure our 
Sex will have Reason to thank me, and keep an annual Fest ival, in 
which a Crim inal so foul is taken out  of their Way.  The Example, 
perhaps, may deter others, and secure many from the Wrongs of 
such false Traytors, and I  be magnify 'd in future Times.  For it  was 
for r idding the World of Monsters that  Hercules was made so great  
a Hero, and George a Saint ;  then sure I  shall be rank'd in the 
Catalogue of Heroines, for such a Service done to my Sex;  for 
certainly, the Deserts of Arabia never produc'd so form idable a 
Monster as this unaccountable Bosvil.  (p. 31)  
 
Galesia’s anger and self-pity have become an inadvertent  mock-heroic.  I t  
should not  be overlooked here that  the sense of having been wronged not  
                                                                                                            
writ ing in Wom en and the Rise of the Novel,  pp. 14-15.  See also ‘Women 
and the Rise of the Novel:  A Fem inist -Marxist  Theory’, Signs:  Journal of 
Wom en in Culture and Society , 16.3 (1991) , 441-462, (pp. 445-451) . 
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only as an individual but  also as a woman, which a few lines before was a 
visible mark of her conscious subject ivity, is what  leads the teenaged 
Galesia to indulgent  self-aggrandizement .  The narrator voices her own 
scept icism  in a coda:  
 
Behold what  Sophisms one can find to just ify any At tempt , tho’ 
never so mad or desperate;  and even affront , if not  quite reverse 
the Laws of Nature:  That  if the Feebleness of our Hands did not  
moderate the Fury of our Heads, Women somet imes would exceed 
the fiercest  Savages, especially when affronted in their Amours;  
which brings into my Mind a Verse or two on such an Occasion. 
 
A slighted Wom an, oft  a Fury grows, 
And, for Revenge, quits her bapt ism al Vows, 
Becom es a Witch, and does a Fiend espouse. (pp. 31-32)  
 
The ‘woman scorned’ axiom has shown itself after all - -  and in rhymed 
iambic pentameter, no less, as if to provide in form  as well as content  an 
ironic counterpoint  to the disorder of young Galesia’s emot ional state.  As 
Jane Spencer writes, the narrator’s at t r ibut ion of the cr isis to female 
weakness ‘undercuts the former Galesia’s heroic stance and ranks her 
rather with the r idiculed cast -off m ist resses of Restorat ion comedy who fail 
in their at tempts to at tack their ex- lovers’. 17
                                          
17
 Jane Spencer, ‘Creat ing the Woman Writer:  The Autobiographical Works 
of Jane Barker’,  Tulsa Studies in Wom en’s Literature,  2.2 (1983) , 165-181, 
(p. 171) . 
  Thus, Barker’s variable 
narrat ive voice challenges both the literary convent ions of romance and 
the social convent ions of gender, but  then proceeds to deflate those 
challenges with an appeal to the very norms she has interrogated. 
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Yet  all is not  so neat ly set t led.  Pat r icia M. Spacks has noted that  
eighteenth-century ‘female novelists, upholding the established system, 
find images and act ions to express profound ambivalence’. 18
The two principal voices of the episode act  to some extent  as 
archetypes of youth and experience;  however, the young Galesia is m ore 
than just  an unsophist icated child in need of correct ion.  Though prone to 
flights of anger and fancy, she is nevertheless intelligent  and outstandingly 
determ ined.  True, short ly after her fit  of anger she pens maudlin poet ry 
and tearfully wishes for death, but  then she also takes to managing her 
father’s business affairs with the authority of ‘the great  Turk over his 
Subjects’ and reads extensively on medicine, all while maintaining the 
presence of m ind to carry out  a vengeful prank on Bosvil (pp. 35-38) .  
Galesia is m ore remarkable for her abilit y than her instabilit y.  More 
important ly, even when Galesia’s behaviour is at  it s most  bathet ic, the 
cause of her out rage is never made r idiculous.  Bosvil’s act ions are 
unquest ionably dishonourable.  To whatever extent  Galesia’s volat ilit y 
  I n this case, 
the narrator’s curt  aphorism  seems conspicuously glib after a scene of 
such intensity.  As Spencer’s comment  implies, the cr it ique of Galesia’s 
desperat ion seems to rely on a relat ively formulaic sexism , something 
perhaps more representat ive of Galesia’s anxiet ies than of her own 
opinion.  Sim ilar ly, the accompanying admonit ion in verse lacks the 
immediacy of the act ion which precedes it .   I nset  and italicized, quoted 
from memory, it  is an orphan commentary piped in from beyond the 
frame.  The degree of irony or authority Barker (or Galesia)  invests in the 
poet ic fragment  is uncertain.  Though presented as if in summary, it  does 
lit t le to resolve the tensions developed in the preceding lines, serving 
instead only to add another voice to the dialogue. 
                                          
18
 Pat r icia Meyer Spacks, I m agining a Self:  Autobiography and Novel in 




m ight  deserve reproach, Bosvil’s own inconsistency is presented as more 
fully contempt ible.  I t  is more public, and therefore more dangerous to 
others, and it  is impossible to adequately explain.  Although Galesia’s vow 
to renounce the marriage market , ‘to espouse a Book, and spend my Days 
in Study’, is repeatedly characterized as an act  of impetuous pride, it  
appears to be a reasonable at tempt  at  self-preservat ion (p. 15) . 
At  one point , Barker indicates that  Bosvil m ight  have another side 
of the tale to tell.   An unnamed ‘Confidant ’ tells Galesia that  Bosvil does 
indeed love her, and that  he has stayed away only because, in Galesia’s 
paraphrase, ‘all my Conduct  had been with Caut ion and Circumspect ion, 
quite different  from Passion or Tenderness’ (p. 45) .  Galesia cannot  
disprove the claim , but  neither can she ignore her doubts:  
 
How far this was sincere or pretended, I  know not , but  I  rather 
think he set  it  up as a Screen to his own Falsehood;  for the 
meerest  Dunce in the School of Love could not  but  spell Affect ion in 
all these three Years Transact ions. (p. 45)  
 
Galesia’s adm ission, ‘I  know not ’, is ever present  in Barker’s texts, and it  
draws at tent ion to the interpret ive st ress taking shape in this passage.  
Galesia, faced with a st ranger’s second-hand just ificat ion of Bosvil’s 
conduct , must  weigh it  against  her own est imat ion of his abilit y to ‘spell 
Affect ion’ in her previous act ions.  Forced to judge at  such a remove from 
the situat ion, Galesia opts for the most  conservat ive response:  cont inued 
inact ion. 
The elder Galesia, though often disapproving, never quite achieves 
the wise judicial status that  her ironic tone implies.  Her reflect ive tone 
effect ively underm ines the younger Galesia’s tendency toward self-
indulgent  dramat izing, but  when, after the ‘Violenta’ episode, she supplies 
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lit t le more than a rhymed plat itude as a proverbial t ruth, she signals her 
own equal frust rat ion.  After Bosvil’s maddening inscrutabilit y and her 
brave st ruggle to maintain propriety, it  seems unlikely that  Galesia - -  at  
either age - -  could be sat isfied with such a pat  cliché.  The formal and 
typographical separateness of the poet ic fragment  compounds the 
distance of it s voice from Galesia’s actual circumstances.  What  seems at  
first  glance to be a dism issal of Galesia’s anger is in fact  a token of the 
inapplicabilit y of shallow stereotypes, and is, in Spencer’s phrase, ‘an 
implicit  cr it icism  of the convent ions governing women’. 19
When the elder Galesia speaks in her own voice, she claim s no 
more insight  than her younger self into Bosvil’s mot ives or the response 
his behaviour requires.  I n the fram ing fict ion she confesses to her 
interlocutor, Lucasia, ‘how far I  may stand just ify ’d or condemn’d in your 
Thoughts I  know not ’, and adds, ‘I  believe wiser Heads than m ine wou’d 
have been puzled in so difficult  a Case’ (p. 46) .  Further, the posit ion from 
which she speaks, that  of a learned, financially independent  spinster, 
vindicates the younger Galesia’s withdrawal into scholarship, however 
prideful her mot ives.  I n all the intervening years that  separate Galesia’s 
two voices, no bet ter opt ion than isolated autonomy has presented itself 
for dealing with the decept ion and double standards of amorous 
entanglements.  Neither narrator nor protagonist  can determ ine exact ly 
what  to make of the tale, and the blurry boundary between Galesia and 
Barker implies that  the author herself withholds final judgement . 
  The fragment , 
the voice of convent ion, responds to Galesia’s very part icular problem 
quite uselessly with assured and simplist ic generality.  Convent ional 
wisdom has lit t le to offer. 
                                          
19
 Spencer, p. 171. 
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Consequent ly, the text  ends without  resolut ion, refusing the 
standard binary of seduct ion versus marriage. 20
 
  I n the final pages, 
Galesia touts pious fatalism  as the only appropriate st rategy for young 
women, as if her own self-sufficiency has in fact  been meek compliance 
with the ‘Hand of Providence’ all along (pp. 46-47) .  St ill,  like her deflat ion 
of the younger Galesia’s violent  anger, this moralizing dénouement  can 
only part ially redact  the ideological stance offered by the narrat ion that  
comes before it .   Barker’s tonal ambiguity places the narrator’s praise of 
passivity in uncertain relat ion to her coexist ing denunciat ion of the social 
order that  demands such passivity.  Kathryn R. King sees a socially cr it ical 
stance imbedded in this ambivalence:  
The effect  of Barker’s subversive narrat ive - -  and in this instance 
that  overworked adject ive seems about  r ight  - -  is to expose 
fem inine modesty and prudence as forms of self-suppression as 
likely to breed shame and hum iliat ion as to ensure personal 
happiness and a well-ordered household. 21
 
 
Just  as the narrator’s overt  cr it icism  of Galesia’s feverish emot ions 
adumbrates a deeper condemnat ion of Bosvil’s callousness, so too does 
this withdrawal from prescribed social roles place implicit  blame on the 
demands of society itself.   I f the convent ions of gender relat ions are so 
absurd as to allow a man like Bosvil to behave as he does, then the 
convent ions themselves cannot  be observed safely.  The only opt ion 
remaining is to withdraw altogether in an at tempt  to maintain ‘Vertue’ in 
the face of irresolvable ambiguity (p. 47) .  Yet  such a withdrawal is purely 
                                          
20
 Spencer, p. 169. 
21
 King, p. 192. 
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react ive;  it  is a st rategy for defence, not  success.  As a result ,  Galesia is 
never fully sat isfied that  she has made the r ight  decision. 
Galesia’s final ret reat , whatever its ideological cast , is an act  of 
incomprehension.  As King points out , this is subversive because it  reveals 
the inefficacy of socially prescribed gender relat ions.  Even when a young 
woman does everything she ought  to do, she cannot  be assured of her 
safety and happiness.  St ill more potent ially subversive is the uncertainty 
of that  ‘ought ’.  I t  is not  only the indeterm inate outcome of her choices 
that  worr ies Galesia, but  the hazy propriety of those choices themselves.  
The repressive potent ial of fem inine codes of behaviour is the occasion of 
Galesia’s quandary, but  it s substance is the opacity of individual 
experience in general.  Galesia seeks to make a moral choice, but  finds no 
moral certaint ies to confirm  her decision.  I n spite of her intelligence, 
determ inat ion, high social standing, and st rong grasp of cultural mores, 
she cannot  make fully informed choices.  Her final appeal to providence 
shows that  she could never determ ine the t ruth of her circumstances, and 
it  implies that  any individual in a sim ilar posit ion would face such 
inevitable uncertainty. 
Barker thus establishes Galesia’s part icular ity of character by 
rendering the dual subject ivity of her experience.  First , she is a thinking, 
perceiving subject  rather than a passive object  of narrat ion;  she behaves 
idiosyncrat ically, not  according to type, and this unpredictabilit y results 
from her self-aware and self-cr it ical encounter with the events of her life.  
Correlat ing with this is a second, related, type of subject ivity, stemming 
from Galesia’s posit ion as a single individual:  her understanding is 
confined to the finite scope of her own experience.  Each of these 
subject ivit ies informs the other, so that  Galesia’s st ruggle to live vir tuously 
involves a lifelong awareness of the inadequacy of her knowledge.  This is 
t rue of the younger as well as the elder Galesia;  both are characterized by 
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int rospect ion into the uncertainty of their condit ion.  Galesia, like any 
human subject , must  live by guesswork, and even ret rospect ively she 
cannot  be sure she has made the best  choices. 
The interpolated quotat ions in Love I nt r igues cont r ibute to the 
sense that  Galesia’s point  of view is informed by, but  dist inct  from , a 
mult itude of possible views available to her.  Some are clearly inadequate, 
even when derived from verses Galesia at t r ibutes to her own hand, as in 
the case of the verse commentary concluding the Violenta scene (p. 32;  
see above) .  Other poet ic self-quotat ions serve to detail internal 
psychological processes like decisions, thoughts, and dreams (pp. 14, 17, 
20, 25-26, 32, 40-41) .  I n addit ion to verses writ ten ostensibly by Galesia, 
the narrat ive is punctuated by quotat ions from Abraham Cowley and Ovid 
(pp. 29, 45;  p. 36) , as well as lyr ics from an anonymous popular song (p. 
30) .  Even the fickle Bosvil appears as a quoted source - -  Barker includes 
the text  of a let ter he sends to Galesia (p. 34) .  These quotat ions are 
placed against  a backdrop of allusion and intertextuality that , along with 
frequent  use of ‘proverbs’ and classical mythology, direct ly references 
Roger Bacon (p. 12) ;  Francis Bacon (p. 14) ;  Katherine Philips (pp. 14-15) ;  
Sappho (p. 15) ;  Aesop (pp. 16, 20-21, 37) ;  the book of Ecclesiastes (p. 
34) ;  William  Harvey (p. 37) ;  John Wilmot , earl of Rochester (p. 39) ;  
Lucret ius (p. 40) ;  and Chaucer (or perhaps Boccaccio, p. 45) .  Galesia is 
influenced by these external points of view, even part ly const ituted by 
them, and yet  she remains one among many, the boundedness of her 
subject ivity emphasized by the variety of it s cont rast ing background. 
The realism  of Love I nt r igues derives from Barker’s interest  in the 
psychological life of her heroine.  Such an emphasis on the inward makes 
possible a concent rat ion on problems of understanding as they impinge 
upon the experiences of a single individual, set  against  a backdrop of 
various and variable alternat ives.  I ndeed, it  demands such a 
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concent rat ion, because a defining feature of subjecthood is such a dist inct , 
situated access to knowledge.  Part  of creat ing realist ic characters is 
therefore to depict  them as dependent  upon, that  is, as subject  to, their 
own finite experience of the world around them.  Galesia can be called 
realist ic because her part icular ity - -  with its at tendant  epistem ic cr ises - -  
is a fundamental aspect  of her characterizat ion. 
The preceding chapter posits that  literary realism  is in some way 
engaged with epistemology.  Barker’s Love I nt r igues provides an example 
of how a specific realist ic technique - -  port raying psychological 
part icularity of character - -  const itutes a depict ion of subject ivity, which 
entails a specific set  of epistemological difficult ies.  I n this respect , 
polit ical, fem inist , and autobiographical readings of the text  align, because 
the content  of these interpretat ions maps effect ively onto the most  basic 
dilemma exemplified by the text , that  of the self-aware subject  at tempt ing 
to comprehend a world that  defies full comprehension.  Furthermore, 
Barker’s part ial reliance upon ext ra- textual references to develop this 
subject ivity is significant .  I t  indicates that  one potent ial feature of a 
psychologically realist ic text  is the salience of a character’s point  of view 
as set  off against  mult iple other possibilit ies.  Considered alongside the 
variabilit y of Galesia and the discursive st ructure of the narrat ive frame, 
Love I nt r igues can be said to be pervaded by an aesthet ic of 
epistemologically-charged mult iplicity of voice. 
Labelling features of Barker’s work ‘realist ic’ is somewhat  
anachronist ic, but  it  is nonetheless useful because it  highlights the way in 
which a literary preoccupat ion with problems of knowledge invites a 
characterist ically novelist ic technique - -  establishing a character as a 
part icularized individual.  The aesthet ic of mult iplicity which Barker 
employs to achieve this subject ivity thus merits further considerat ion, not  
least  because it  is an effect  she uses much more self-consciously than her 
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overlapping, and more cr it ically remarked, realism .  I n Love I nt r igues 
mult iplicity of voice is prom inent ;  in the lat ter two Galesia fict ions it  
becomes altogether the dom inant  organizing and aesthet ic st rategy.  The 
relevance of this mult iplicity to the generic ident ity of the novel at  large 
derives from its epistemological underpinnings as a rendering of individual 
subject ivity.  I n other words, to carry on the proposit ion of the preceding 
chapter, if the novel is a genre of extended prose fict ion shaped by 
epistemological problems, then exam ining the const ruct ion of subject ivity 
via mult iplicity in prose fict ion can help solidify an understanding of the 
capacity and ident ity of the novel. 
The work of twent ieth-century cr it ic Mikhail Bakht in contends that  
an irreducible mult iplicit y of languages - -  heteroglossia - -  is the essent ial 
mode of the novel.  I n the essay ‘Discourse in the Novel’,  he defines the 
novel as ‘a diversity of social speech types (somet imes even diversity of 
languages)  and a diversity of individual voices, art ist ically organized’. 22  I n 
other words, the novel’s language diversity may assume the form  of the 
languages of nat ions, of social or professional groups, and of the specific 
idiolects of individuals.  I n Bakht in’s term inology, any of these can be 
considered a voice, because all of them must  originate from a part icular 
context  - -  a certain ideological posit ion.  As Caryl Emerson writes, Bakht in 
conceives of each voice as ‘a “ semant ic posit ion” , a point  of view on the 
world[ ; ]  it  is one personality or ient ing itself among other personalit ies 
within a lim ited field’. 23
Analogous to the kind of subject ive part icularit y highlighted by 
psychological realism , novelist ic heteroglossia situates the individual voice 
dialogically - -  as one among many in an ongoing dialogue, shaped by its 
 
                                          
22
 Mikhail M. Bakht in, The Dialogic Im aginat ion, ed. by Michael Holquist , 
t rans. by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist  (Aust in, TX:  University of 
Texas, 1981) , p. 262. 
23
 Mikhail M. Bakht in, Problem s of Dostoevsky’s Poet ics,  ed. and t rans. by 
Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis, MN:  University of Minnesota, 1984) , p. xxxvi. 
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constant  interact ion with others at  mult iple, overlapping scales.  For 
Bakht in, such an ‘internal st rat ificat ion’ of language ‘is the indispensable 
prerequisite for the novel as a genre’. 24  This does not  mean, however, 
that  the novel holds a monopoly on heteroglossia.  Any ut terance includes 
an element  of mult iplicity, since language must  st raddle individual impulse 
and mass convent ion in order to funct ion.  I f they are to be intelligible, 
one’s words cannot  be exclusively one’s own.  The ut terance is always, 
according to Bakht in, ‘a cont radict ion- r idden, tension- filled unity of two 
embat t led tendencies in the life of language’, what  he calls ‘cent r ifugal’ 
and ‘cent r ipetal’ impulses. 25
The novel is the genre of heteroglossia, then, not  because it  is 
heteroglossia’s sole domain, but  because in the novel ‘speech diversity and 
language st rat ificat ion [ …]  serve as the basis for style’.
 
26
  Heteroglossia is 
essent ial to the novel, whereas in other literary genres it  is incidental or 
even det r imental. 27
                                          
24
 Bakht in, The Dialogic Im aginat ion, p. 263;  see also p. 300. 
  Like realism  in the discussion above, it  is a definit ive, 
though not  exclusive, feature of the novel.  Moreover, and in another 
parallel with realism  as a novelist ic feature, heteroglossia helps to frame 
the epistemological implicat ions of a mult iply perceived, mult iply 
understood world.  Bakht in claims that  epic and novel are respect ively 
mot ivated by ‘memory’ and ‘knowledge’.  Whereas the epic draws from a 
‘valorized’, ‘absolute’, and monolithic concept ion of the past , ‘the novel, by 
cont rast , is determ ined by experience, knowledge, and pract ice ( the 
future) . ’  Hence Bakht in’s declarat ion, ‘When the novel becomes the 
25
 Bakht in, The Dialogic Im aginat ion, p. 272. 
26
 Bakht in, The Dialogic Im aginat ion, p. 315. 
27
 Stylist ically heteroglot  poet ry, claims Bakht in, would be in ‘a prosaic key 
[ …,]  turning the poet  into a writer of prose’ (The Dialogic I m aginat ion,  p. 
285) .  The term  ‘poet ry’ here serves an abst ract  taxonom ic purpose;  
short ly after this remark, Bakht in grants in a footnote that  ‘in concrete 
examples of poet ic works it  is possible to find features fundamental to 
prose, and numerous hybrids of generic types exist ’ (The Dialogic 
I m aginat ion,  p. 287) .  
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dom inant  genre, epistemology becomes the dom inant  discipline’. 28  The 
crit ical vocabulary set  forth by Bakht in is therefore a pract ical tool for 
cont inuing explorat ion of the interrelatedness of problems of knowledge 
and literary technique in the Galesia fict ions. 29
As has already been ment ioned, after Love I nt r igues, Barker 
published two more narrat ives organized around the experiences of 
Galesia:  A Patch-Work Screen for the Ladies in 1723 and The Lining of the 
Patch-Work Screen in 1726.  As their t it les indicate, these texts are 
framed narrat ives incorporat ing such heterogeneous ‘patches’ as short  
tales, poems, song lyr ics, essays, and recipes.  King describes Barker’s 
patchwork approach as a means for br inging together textual forms and 
accounts of subject ive experience that  would normally rem ain obscure:  
 
 
[ Barker]  uses a technique which m ight  be compared to collage and 
assemblage - -  a patching together of scraps of inherited forms so 
as to accommodate within the confines of a single female-cent red 
narrat ive kinds of experience t radit ionally excluded from popular 




Such a st ructure shows Barker’s interest  in further cult ivat ing the aesthet ic 
of mult iplicity that  dist inguishes Love I nt r igues.   A Patch-Work Screen 
begins with a prefatory note in which Barker port rays the patchwork as a 
conflat ion of women’s intellectual and domest ic product ivity, set t ing out  ‘to 
                                          
28
 Bakht in, The Dialogic Im aginat ion, p. 15. 
29
 For a brief considerat ion of Bakht in’s relevance to the study of the early 
Brit ish novel, see Brean Hammond and Shaun Regan, Making the Novel:  
Fict ion and Society in Britain, 1660-1789 (Basingstoke:  Palgrave 
Macm illan, 2006) , pp. 18-22.  While Hammond and Regan do not  detect  a 
high degree of Bakht inian dialogism  in eighteenth-century novels, they do 
apply ‘Bakht in’s rubric of “novelizat ion” ’ to the ‘alter ing standards of 
plausibilit y ’ in the fict ion of the t ime (p. 22) . 
30
 King, pp. 194-195. 
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say something in Favour of Patch-Work, the bet ter to recommend it  to my 
Female Readers, as well in their Discourse, as their Needle-Work’ (p. 51) . 
Cecilia Macheski explains the significance of needlework as an 
emblem of the common experiences of eighteenth-century women.  I t  was 
an act ivity that  was exclusively fem ale, but  pract ised in one form  or 
another by women of every social rank:  
 
From the spinners and silk winders who worked in Spitalfields for 
as lit t le as three shillings a week to wealthy women and their 
servants who employed idle hours embroider ing silk flowers on 




Expanding upon this commonality, Barker represents patchwork as a 
fem inine model for unity at  the religious, polit ical, social, and even atom ic 
level:  
 
Whenever one sees a Set  of Ladies together, their Sent iments are 
as different ly m ix’d as the Patches in their Work:  To wit , Whigs and 
Tories, High-Church and Low-Church, Jacobites and William ites, 
and many more Dist inct ions, which they divide and sub-divide, ‘t ill 
at  last  they make this Dis-union meet  in an harmonious Tea-Table 
Entertainment .  This puts me in m ind of what  I  have heard some 
Philosophers assert , about  the Clashing of Atoms, which at  last  
united to compose this glor ious Fabrick of the Universe. (p. 52)  
                                          
31
 Cecilia Macheski, ‘Penelope’s Daughters:  I mages of Needlework in 
Eighteenth-Century Literature’, in Fet ter’d or Free?:  Brit ish Wom en 
Novelists, 1670-1815,  ed. by Mary Anne Schofield and Cecilia Macheski 
(Athens, OH:  Ohio University, 1986) , pp. 85-100 (p. 86) .  See also 
Kathryn R. King, ‘Of Needles and Pens and Women’s Work’, Tulsa Studies 




Barker furthermore posit ions her literary patchwork as an alternat ive to 
the linear ‘Histories at  Large’ of Defoe. 32  Returning to her text ile mot if,  
she goes on to present  patchwork as an improvement  upon the older and 
more tedious fashion of ‘the working of Point , and curious Embroidery’ (p. 
54) .  Audrey Bilger sees in this extended metaphor a reject ion of the 
romance in favour of the novel, for ‘whereas the “higher”  genres, like 
elaborate embroidery, deal with lofty themes and fantast ic events, the 
novel, like patchwork, takes its cues from daily life’.   I n Bilger’s reading, 
Barker is claim ing ‘that  the novel, which concerns itself with life’s ordinary 
details, is a favorable genre for women’. 33  King, however, finds an 
‘ambiguously rueful tone’ in the patchwork-as-writ ing metaphor, revealing 
what  m ight  be ‘nostalgia at  lost  delicacy’ along with enthusiasm for new 
freedoms. 34
For Donovan, Barker’s preface to A Patch-Work Screen places her 
work in ironic cont radist inct ion to the pat r iarchal, elevated register of the 
  Bilger’s interpretat ion that  Barker is celebrat ing the novel in 
part icular is complicated further by Barker’s opposit ional reference to the 
works of Defoe, not  to ment ion her unabashed use of the fantast ic in both 
of the patchwork fict ions.  Nevertheless, Bilger makes a valid observat ion 
of the way Barker poses the patchwork as a creat ive technique grounded 
in diverse but  commonplace female experience, and with apparent  
aspirat ions to a utopian universalism . 
                                          
32
 Barker specifically ment ions three of Defoe’s works:  Robinson Crusoe,  
Moll Flanders,  and Colonel Jack (p. 51) .  As Donovan points out , Barker’s 
comment  indicates her at tent iveness to the style of her literary 
contemporaries (Wom en and the Rise of the Novel,  p. 55) .  King provides 
a useful rem inder that , ‘except  for Robinson Crusoe,  Defoe’s authorship of 
these narrat ives was unknown at  this t ime’, reinforcing the not ion that  
Barker is in this instance crit iquing a style rather than an author (p. 197) . 
33
 Bilger, p. 24. 
34
 King, ‘Of Needles and Pens and Women’s Work’, p. 82. 
67 
 
epic, what  Bakht in deemed to be ‘the word of the fathers’. 35  Of 
patchwork, Donovan writes, ‘Not  only is such a creat ion quintessent ially 
women’s work;  it  also exhibits the “unofficial,”  random, folk character that  
Bakht in saw as essent ial to the novel’s dialogic discourse’. 36
 
  Carol Shiner 
Wilson, in her int roduct ion to the Galesia t r ilogy, describes a sim ilar 
capacity when she commends ‘Barker’s manipulat ion of the female 
quot idian, women’s sewn work, as an art ist ic and polit ical vehicle worthy 
to explore the complexit ies of human experience’ (p. xxxix) .  Wilson, like 
Bilger, reads this image of patchwork as represent ing a utopian ‘work in 
progress’:  
The women in Barker’s preface are more reasonable than men.  
Rather than creat ing conflict , they t ry to create communit ies that  
st r ive for harmony, taking the disparate patches of bit ter ly 
opposit ional polit ics and religion of the day - -  Whigs, Tories, 
Jacobites, William ites, and so forth - -  and sewing them together to 
‘compose this glor ious Fabrick of the Universe’. (p. xl)  
 
Though she does not  use the phrase, Wilson’s descript ion of Barker’s 
patchwork aesthet ic - -  open-ended, collect ive, occupied with everyday 
experience - -  is an apt  characterizat ion of the novelist ic ‘zone of contact ’ 
proposed by Bakht in. 
I n Bakht in’s view, the novel is situated in ‘liv ing contact  with 
unfinished, st ill-evolv ing contemporary reality ’. 37
                                          
35
 Donovan, ‘Women and the Rise of the Novel’,  p. 452;  Bakht in, The 
Dialogic Imaginat ion, p. 342. 
  The conversat ional 
36
 Donovan, ‘Women and the Rise of the Novel’,  p. 453. 
37
 This novelist ic t rait  finds expression at  the level of language - -  Bakht in 
at t r ibutes to it  ‘a certain semant ic openendedness’ - -  but  derives 
ult imately from generic status:  ‘The novel is the only developing genre and 
therefore it  reflects more deeply, more essent ially, more sensit ively and 
rapidly, reality it self in the process of it s unfolding’ (p. 7) . 
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dynam ic Barker seems to ascribe to her patchwork style is a key to her 
fict ions’ novelist ic status because it  situates her fict ion squarely in this 
zone of contact .  Compounded within the ‘everydayness’ of a tea- table 
conversat ion is both the prosaic normalcy of a commonplace event  and the 
collect ive, amendable condit ion of something contemplated informally.  A 
casual conversat ion does not  conclude with a gavel st r ike;  no m inutes are 
taken.  Any consensus is potent ially open for future revision and 
interpretat ion.  An everyday event , after all,  is likely to happen again, and 
harmony need not  compel unanim ity anyway.  Novelist ic fict ion, nudged 
by realism  into the realm  of the here-and-now, of domest icity and material 
detail,  takes on the same unofficial status and is exposed to the same 
at tendant  epistemological provisionality as Barker’s emblemat ic tea- table 
discourse.  The everydayness of the novelist ic zone of contact  with life is, 
for Bakht in, a mark of the novel’s difference from older, more ossified 
genres like epic, and it  illust rates the clear overlap between realism  and 
heteroglossia, as well as their common epistemological consequences. 
One such consequence is that  ‘the novel has a new and quite 
specific problemat icalness:  characterist ic for it  is an eternal re- thinking 
and re-evaluat ing’. 38
                                          
38
 Bakht in, The Dialogic Im aginat ion, p. 31. 
  The interpret ive uncertainty suffered by Galesia in 
Love I nt r igues thus has its textual, hermeneut ic equivalent :  no reading 
can be authoritat ive when the text  it self,  discursive and informal, disallows 
the finality of an official explanat ion.  For example King, responding to 
Wilson, proposes a deeper level of irony in Barker’s vision of ‘an 
harmonious Tea-Table Entertainment ’ that  complicates it s recept ion as a 
scene of am icable diversity.  King notes that  the polit ical fact ions listed by 
Barker would, at  the t ime of publicat ion, ‘point  away from the present  to 
the recent  past ’,  to a t ime before ‘the Whig ascendance of 1714, which 
saw the proscript ion of the Tories from office and renewed suppression of 
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both Catholics and Jacobites’. 39  She finds it  significant  that  the women at  
Barker’s tea- table have learned to harmonize their diverse ideologies in a 
domest ic context , where they reproduce ‘the tensions and divisions of the 
supposedly masculine public world’. 40
 
  The scene thus sat ir izes the 
contemporaneously ascendant  not ion that  pr ivate and public are 
diamet r ically opposed - -  that  domest icity, and hence fem ininity, compels 
polit ical disempowerment :  
The scene m ight , then, be said to represent  an oblique (and 
jaundiced)  glance at  the newly fashionable definit ions of fem ininity 
that  drained women of their polit ical ident it ies while relegat ing 
them to cosy protected spaces invoked by metonym ic tea- tables. 41
 
 
I n this light , the harmony Barker envisions is not  so much utopian as it  is 
defensive - -  cooperat ion under duress - -  and the fact  that  the women’s 
polit ical ideas are somewhat  dated hints at  the intellectual impoverishment  
that  follows from their enforced isolat ion from public discourse. 
King’s suggest ion raises the addit ional quest ion of whether the 
segregated women of the tea- table actually have managed to preserve 
their ideological or ientat ion at  all.   Sealed off from  the public realm , their 
polit ical and religious loyalt ies can have no bearing on the world beyond 
the home.  They are decorat ive opinions, fodder for idle conversat ion.  
When Barker writes, ‘at  last  they make this Dis-union meet ’,  the word 
‘meet ’ can be taken as either verb or adject ive.  Do the women make their 
disunion join together or do they instead make it  appropriate, acceptable?  
I t  is uncertain whether these allegor ical women have achieved unity in 
diversity, or tame propriety - -  or perhaps some hybrid of the two.  As a 
                                          
39
 King, p. 201. 
40
 King, p. 202. 
41
 I bid. 
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text  of the novelist ic here-and-now, the tea- table scene allows for 
interpret ive uncertainty because of the uncertainty of it s historical 
moment .  I f the novel, as Bakht in claims, ‘comes into contact  with the 
spontaneity of the inconclusive present ’, then it  supports a correlat ive type 
of interpretat ion that  is both spontaneous and inconclusive. 42
As she does with the Violenta episode in Love I nt r igues, Barker 
presents a subject  in such a way that  more than one perspect ive, and thus 
more than one degree of ironic distance, is available.  The tea- table is 
emblemat ic of the patchwork aesthet ic.  Barker integrates perspect ives 
within the fict ional const ruct  of the text  ( in this case a women’s social 
gathering)  in a manner that  allows a mult iplicity of perspect ives ( in this 
case social, polit ical, and literary-generic stances)  to co-m ingle in an 
interpret ive cloud around the narrat ive.  The result  is that  the text  cannot  
be ent irely assim ilated to the posit ion of one of it s voices.  Any one 
orientat ion is insufficient  to characterize the whole composite, because its 
character arises through the interact ion of mult iple viewpoints. 
  I n this 
respect , immediacy precludes finality. 
Spacks describes this capacity of novelist ic prose to speak to more 
than one purpose, and t ies it  to the port rayal of subject ive experience:  
 
Even in its more amateurish manifestat ions, it  seems, the novel 
can contain and express through its pat terns of act ion complexit ies 
of feeling that  it  nowhere direct ly acknowledges:  complexit ies, 
indeed, often cont radicted by its explicit ,  moralist ic statements. 43
 
 
Barker’s literary skill notwithstanding, her fragmented perspect ive cannot  
comfortably be dism issed as the incidental ambiguity of an inexpert  writer.  
                                          
42
 Bakht in, The Dialogic Im aginat ion, p. 27. 
43
 Spacks, Imagining a Self,  p. 63. 
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Rather, this effect  is a sustained aesthet ic and theoret ical mot if that  
dom inates the Galesia t r ilogy, especially the patchwork fict ions, from  start  
to finish.  I t  is also a creat ive model that  is conducive to the Bakht inian 
st rat ificat ion and ‘refract ion’ of voice that  marks novelist ic discourse. 44
Barker’s patchworks are st rat ified most  obviously at  the level of 
narrat ive st ructure.  They are, as ment ioned previously, framework 
narrat ives which t ie together various sub-narrat ives and fragments, 
literary and non- literary alike.  But  the patchwork fict ions are not  simply 
digressive;  they are deeply and recursively mult iple.  They create frames 
within frames, often at  so many removes and with such hazy boundaries 
that  it  becomes difficult  for the reader to disentangle the overlapping 
degrees of quotat ion.  I ndeed, such disentanglement  is not  only difficult ;  it  
is for the most  part  unnecessary.  Like the intertextuality of Love 
I nt r igues,  the patchwork aesthet ic of Barker’s later fict ions serves more to 
create a texture of allusion and heteroglossia than to establish a complex 
interweaving of sub-plots. 
 
A Patch-Work Screen,  for example, begins with the preface quoted 
above, which Barker addresses direct ly to the reader and signs with her 
own name.  Yet  it  serves not  just  as an int roduct ion of the patchwork 
aesthet ic, but  also as a fram ing fict ion to the text  that  follows.  I n addit ion 
to the tea- table metaphor, it  contains other digressive, and rather crypt ic, 
allegor ical material, included in which is a remark on a meet ing between 
                                          
44
 Bakht in, The Dialogic Im aginat ion, pp. 299-300.  Donovan claims that  
Bakht in’s theory of novelist ic dialogism  is weakened by his inat tent ion to 
the ‘framed-novelle’,  which she considers to be a separate genre that  is, 
because of it s st ructure, more amenable to dialogism  and subversiveness 
than the novel proper.  However, Donovan’s argument , while valid, 
downplays the fact  that , as she herself writes, ‘Bakht in’s concept  of the 
dialogic is [ …]  more themat ic than st ructural’ (Wom en and the Rise of the 
Novel,  p. 31;  see also p. 139) .  Since st ructural dialogism  can be assumed 
typically to cont r ibute to themat ic dialogism , the former may be 
considered one means of achieving the lat ter.  I t  is this assumpt ion that  
allows the present  study to apply Bakht in’s theory - -  and indeed to class 
Barker’s framework narrat ives as novelist ic in the first  place. 
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the narrat ing ‘Jane Barker’ persona and Galesia.  This, explains Barker, is 
how she ‘came to know all this story of her [ i.e. Galesia’s]  Patch-Work’ 
(pp. 53-54) .  The text  thus contains a story of it s own dialect ical creat ion, 
which is essent ially an exchange between two project ions of the same 
person. 
Where one ends and the other begins is indefinite;  Barker suggests 
as much when, after inform ing her reader that  Galesia and company are 
st ill at  work on a sequel, she closes her allegor ical preface with a very 
worldly request :  ‘But  I  will inquire against  the next  Edit ion:  therefore, be 
sure to buy these Patches up quickly, if you intend to know the Secret ’ (p. 
54) .  These are the words of the narrator, ‘Jane Barker’,  who will seek out  
another meet ing with Galesia to discover the sequel to A Patch-Work 
Screen.   They are also the words of Galesia, who alone could know that  
the forthcom ing sequel will disclose a ‘Secret ’.  Finally, the exhortat ion to 
buy comes from another, much more material, Jane Barker - -  a 
septuagenarian woman seated at  her writ ing table, hoping to earn an 
income from her pen.  So before the narrat ive begins, it  is already founded 
in a blur of manifold genre and voice. 
Within this outermost  frame, in which a part ly fict ionalized ‘Jane 
Barker’ narrates, are situated the two most  prom inent  fram ing devices of 
A Patch-Work Screen.   I n the first , Galesia undertakes a coach journey 
from London.  The passengers entertain each other with stories, and 
somet imes stories within stories, of cr ime and decept ion.  I n this many-
voiced context , the inset  tales are themselves advanced dialogically, with 
digressions and asides, and with comments from either Galesia or the 
narrator.  When all the passengers but  Galesia disembark, her coach 
begins racing against  another, with the result  that  Galesia’s vehicle 
crashes into a r iver.  No explanat ion for this impromptu compet it ion is 
given;  the narrator provides only an idle conjecture and a textual shrug:  
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‘Whether the Bounty of the Passengers had over- filled the Heads of the 
Coach men, or what  other Freak, is unknown’ (p. 71) .  Beyond its rather 
t ransparent  ut ilit y as a plot  device, the coach accident  signals an 
important  element  of Barker’s patchwork technique:  events occur in 
paratact ic succession with no overt  indicat ion of their relat ion - -  either to 
each other or to any overarching theme.  At  the narrat ive level the result  
is, in the words of Spacks, ‘an almost  incoherent  melange of happenings 
related to one another only by the often peripheral involvement  of the 
heroine’. 45  Donovan sees in this technique a source of heteroglossia that  
is less prom inent  in more r igidly st ructured novels, a tension between 
‘cohesion and eclect icism  (or what  Bakht in calls “ cent r ipetal”  and 
“cent r ifugal”  forces) ’. 46
The accident  is Barker’s means of conveying Galesia to the house 
of an unnamed ‘Lady’, in which she finds the t itular screen and the 
conversat ions that  comprise the second main fram ing device, which 
organizes the rest  of the book.  The screen itself is a piece of furniture in a 
room decorated throughout  with patchworks of ‘r ich Silks, and Silver and 
Gold Brocades’.  At  the urging of her hostess, Galesia decorates this 
screen with texts from her collect ion, ‘Pieces of Romances, Poems, Love-
Let ters, and the like’, in lieu of fabric pieces (pp. 73, 74) .  These swatches 
make up some of the material in the screen sequence, but  much of the 
text  is narrated by Galesia, with significant  cont r ibut ions from the ‘Jane 
Barker’ persona and other frame characters.  The screen framework is 
further divided into four ‘leaves’, which are somewhat  haphazardly 
subdivided in turn by t it les and headings, so that  it  is often unclear 
  Events occur incidentally, without  implying a clear 
st ructure or narrat ive purpose. 
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 Spacks, Imagining a Self,  p. 66. 
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 Donovan, Wom en and the Rise of the Novel,  p. 55;  see also Bakht in, 
The Dialogic I m aginat ion,  p. 272.  Donovan devotes a chapter of her study 
to possibilit y that  parataxis in general and the ‘framed-novelle’ in 
part icular are fem inine, potent ially subversive, modes (pp. 129-143) . 
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whether a given passage represents spoken dialogue or a writ ten patch for 
the screen or, since Barker’s characters often read aloud, both. 
I n both secondary frames - -  coach and screen - -  the narrat ive 
dut ies are dispersed am ong speakers who occupy disparate t imes and 
places.  For example, the fifth tale told in the coach, concerning the clever 
use of disguises in a ‘Transact ion’ between a pair of unfortunate lovers, is 
related by a young woman who seems to have witnessed it  all with 
omniscient  discernment .  She even reads out  copies of the lovers’ let ters, 
which she happens to have carr ied along.  The tale is thus narrated at  four 
degrees of quotat ion:  the narrat ing persona first  int roduced in the preface 
relates Galesia’s account  of the young lady’s account  of a cavalier and his 
love’s account  of themselves. 47
Later, amongst  the tales in the screen framework, Galesia relates 
events from her own past , punctuat ing her narrat ive with poems and other 
intertextual asides.  She is occasionally interrupted by the narrator of the 
exterior frame, but  is usually left  to supply her own commentary and 
digressions on the stories of other characters.  Galesia narrates some of 
these inset  tales in the first  person, assum ing the voice of her subject , as 
in the unt it led tale of a nurse’s forced marriage and again in ‘The Story of 
Belinda’ (pp. 119, 129) .  By cont rast , the inset  ‘History of Lysander’ is told 
in detached, omniscient  third person (p. 134) .  Given that  the whole of the 
text  is purportedly t ranscribed from memory after Galesia retells it  to the 
  The result  is a rather blurry chorus of 
voices sounding from various narrat ive removes. 
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 One could add a fifth, intertextual level of quotat ion if,  as Donovan 
believes, this tale is ‘a retake of the Portuguese Let ters’ f irst  published in 
French in 1669 by Claude Barbin (Wom en and the Rise of the Novel,  p. 
55) .  The resemblance in this case does not  extend much beyond the basic 
prem ise of a nun corresponding with her lover;  however, Donovan’s 
hypothesis acquires a bit  more plausibilit y when Barker later references 
the ‘let ters’ direct ly in The Lining of the Patch-Work Screen.   See The 
Galesia Trilogy , pp. 222-223. 
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‘Jane Barker’ persona, A Patch-Work Screen seems to be a patchwork of 
vent r iloquized impersonat ions. 
Galesia relates another of her sub-narrat ives, the story of her being 
courted by the rakish Mr. Bellair , in the third person as well,  but  in this 
instance she relies on dialogue to carry the plot .  Much of this material is 
set  off with quotat ion marks, yet  is for the most  part  phrased as indirect ly 
reported speech.  When Galesia’s father approves of a proposed match 
between his daughter and Bellair , his speech is st rangely disembodied at  
first , shift ing into direct  discourse well after the quotat ion marks indicate:  
 
My Father making him  a grateful Acknowledgment , told him , ‘He 
wou’d propose it  to my Mother and me;  and added, That  his 
Daughter having been always dut iful and tenderly observant , he 
resolv’d to be indulgent , and impose nothing cont rary to her 
I nclinat ions.  Her Mother also, cont inu’d he, has been a Person of 
that  Prudence and Vertue, that  I  should not  render the Just ice due 
to her Merit ,  if I  did any thing of this kind, without  her 
Approbat ion’. 48
 
 (p. 102)  
I f this kind of indist inct  delineat ion of speakers is an error, it  is an 
omnipresent  one for Barker.  Some spoken dialogue, like the above, is 
punctuated with speech marks;  some is italicized;  most  is marked only by 
at t r ibut ions or syntact ic subordinat ion.  Of course, eighteenth-century 
convent ions for represent ing speech in text  were far from standardized, 
and publisher Edmund Curll certainly had prior it ies other than assiduous 
editor ial policy.  However, while it  is perhaps not  a deliberate st rategy for 
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 I n the 1723 edit ion, the ident ical punctuat ion appears, along with a 
column of double quotat ion marks in the left -hand margin beside lines of 
dialogue, further emphasizing their spoken quality;  Barker, A Patch-Work 
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encoding an ironic subtext , it s near ubiquity indicates that  it  is a feature of 
Barker’s style with which she was comfortable.  I n a text  that  so 
consistent ly highlights vocal mult iplicity, the peculiar diffract ion of Barker’s 
dialogue should not  be casually dism issed. 
Cit ing the passage quoted above, Donovan writes that  Galesia’s 
dual role as listener and reporter, as demonstrated by Barker’s use of 
indirect  speech, lends a Bakht inian ironic detachment  to her father’s 
words, ‘And so the literal word of the fathers [ …]  is undercut  or rendered 
problemat ic’. 49  Galesia believes that  Bellair  is too roguish to marry, and 
that  ‘often those Beau Rakes, have the Cunning and Assurance to make 
Parents on both sides, Steps to their Childrens Disgrace’ (p. 103) .  
Donovan’s interpretat ion (and Galesia’s m isgiving)  has the support  of the 
plot ;  within a few paragraphs Bellair  has commit ted highway robbery as a 
‘Frolick’ and been executed (p. 104) .  How could a hint  of irony not  creep 
in as Galesia recounts her father’s words, so earnest  and yet  so wrong?  
Context  highlights how ent renched the man is in his own views;  it  
object ifies his words and reveals what  Bakht in terms their ‘brute 
materialit y ’. 50
Beyond whatever ironic content  it  m ight  disclose, Barker’s apparent  
imprecision in designat ing speech is also aesthet ically consistent  with her 
compound fram ing st ructure.  I n its overlapping frameworks, the text  
emanates from a variety of sources and in a variety of narrat ive modes;  
the voices of the characters themselves reinforce this heterogeneous 
profusion on a smaller scale.  I n The Lining of the Patch-Work Screen,  
Barker cont inues to use the reverberat ions of telling and re- telling as a 
  Galesia’s father’s views are dialogized by the very fact  that  
Galesia reports them.  No explicit  editor ializing is necessary when a lit t le 
inconsistency in pronouns indicates Galesia’s alternat ive perspect ive. 
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 Bakht in, The Dialogic Im aginat ion, p. 340. 
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st ructural (or rather an ant i-st ructural)  device.  The framed tales of The 
Lining are longer than the ‘patches’ of her previous book - -  in her 
prefatory note, Barker calls the text  a ‘Pane-work’ - -  and are for the most  
part  delivered to Galesia by other characters, who usually claim  to be 
repeat ing the tales of st ill other characters at  second hand (p. 177) . 
I n ‘The History of Dorinda’, for example, the narrat ive act ion is 
related to Galesia by an unnamed gent leman fr iend who assumes the first -
person voice of Dorinda and yet  makes occasional asides in his own voice.  
When Dorinda’s young son enters the plot , his tale is set  off by a separate 
t it le, ‘The Story of Young Jack Mechant ’,  but  the gent leman cont inues to 
narrate, now speaking as the young Jack.  This leads to an inset  tale - -  a 
sub-sub-narrat ive? - -  in which a gir l shares her story with Jack.  Like A 
Patch-Work Screen,  The Lining is framed in its int roduct ion as the words of 
Galesia passed on to the authorial persona, which means that  part  of this 
text  filters through no less than five layers of quotat ion:  the gir l speaks to 
Jack;  Jack speaks to the gent leman;  the gent leman speaks to Galesia;  
Galesia speaks to ‘Jane Barker’;  and ‘Jane Barker’ speaks to the reader.  
As in the marriage arrangement  scene excerpted above, much of the text  
emanates from a st r ik ingly overdeterm ined provenance.  Any single 
ut terance, as it  appears on the page, can be read as the words of - -  and in 
the voice of - -  several characters with several different  ideological 
inflect ions. 
Determ ining who speaks these mat ryoshka-doll lines is 
unnecessary for the reader’s comprehension of the plot , but  their mult i-
located, choral quality is impossible to ignore.  As a component  of Barker’s 
literary patchwork, the vague assignat ion of speech and narrat ive dut ies 
reiterates the unifying themes of indeterm inate mult iplicity. 51
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 The impressionist ic sense of ideological mult iplicity produced by Barker’s 
frames-within- frames may have a cognit ive basis.  Lisa Zunshine cites a 
  I t  is at  one 
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level a formally realist ic rendering of social interact ion, depict ing what  
Bakht in calls ‘conversat ional hurly-burly’,  in which ‘everything often fuses 
into one big “he says...you say...I  say...” ’. 52  At  another level, it  
establishes the mult ivalent , variously grasped phenomenal world that  
encloses such a social reality.  Since reported speech is ‘always subject  to 
semant ic changes’, the mult iple speaking voices of Barker’s text  are a sign 
of mutually influent ial plurality. 53
The inset  texts of A Patch-Work Screen,  some of which make up 
the ‘patches’ proper, evoke this same impressionist ic sense of mult iplicity.  
Most  represent  Galesia’s poet ic react ions to her experiences.  I n this way 
they provide a sort  of window to Galesia’s youth, more immediate and yet  
more formal.  The narrat ing Galesia who sits with her hostess, presumably 
reading the poems aloud, distances herself from  the young poet  who 
composed them.  Comment ing on her landscape poem ‘The Grove’, she 
suspects that  to her hostess it  ‘must  needs be as insipid as a Breakfast  of 
Water-gruel’ (p. 79) .  The sequel to this poem is ‘The Rivulet ’,  which 
Galesia int roduces as an at tempt  at  a Pindaric ode.  She remarks that  she 
chose the form  ‘I  suppose, out  of Curiosity;  for I  neither love to read nor 
hear that  kind of Verse’ (pp. 79-80) .  Galesia’s self-deprecat ion has a 
  That  this plural st ructure is, in fact , built  
in to the narrat ive form  itself is further evidence for the patchwork 
aesthet ic’s status as a reflect ion of epistemological as well as social 
condit ions.  For the patchwork fict ions’ aesthet ic const itut ion, who speaks 
is less important  than the impression that  many people speak through and 
over each other’s voices. 
                                                                                                            
recent  study indicat ing ‘people have marked difficult ies processing stories 
that  involve m ind- reading above the fourth level’.   I n other words, a 
reader confronted with more than four layers of embedded intent ionality in 
a narrat ive cannot  be expected to t rack each layer;  Why We Read Fict ion:  
Theory of Mind and the Novel (Columbus, OH:  Ohio State University, 
2006) , p. 27. 
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 Bakht in, The Dialogic Im aginat ion, p. 338. 
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split t ing effect  on the voice of her texts-within- the- text .  She disapproves 
of them on art ist ic terms, indicat ing that  she is of a different  m ind on such 
themes than she once was.  She also points out  that  the poems’ styles are 
an affectat ion, a youthful experiment  with poet ic form .  So as she voices 
the poems, Galesia is quot ing her younger self, but  that  younger Galesia is 
herself making a quotat ion of a sort , im itat ing other stylist ic models, 
taking on the voices of others. 
I ndeed, though Barker frequent ly uses Galesia’s writ ing as a 
characterizat ion device, the verse that  appears throughout  the patchworks 
always discloses some degree of distance from its author.  Galesia is keen 
to poet icize any concept .  For instance, ‘A Receipt  for French Soup’, a 
‘Prophesy’ foreseeing the financial debacle of the South Sea Bubble, and a 
bit ter lament  ‘On the Follies of Human-Life’ all appear within just  a few 
pages (pp. 151-154) .  Galesia also writes let ters, records a dream, and 
composes a ballad, all in verse.  As an enthusiast ic literary experimenter, 
Galesia writes in a variety of modes, on subjects both high and low.  This 
adds some complexity to her character, and it  also complicates the 
relat ion between Galesia’s inner, psychological life and the textual 
artefacts it  produces.  I f Galesia can assume such a variety of authorial 
voices, then none can be regarded as the ‘real’ Galesia.  By depict ing 
Galesia ‘t rying on’ different  stylist ic and generic voices, Barker provides 
more than one perspect ive on her heroine, which both enriches and blurs 
her character.  More voices mean more interpret ive possibilit ies but  less 
ground for confirmat ion or denial. 
At  the root  of Barker’s omnivorous use of genre, and underlying its 
capacity to complicate Galesia as a character, is a parodic sense of generic 
form ’s relat ion to the world it  evokes.  Bakht in describes the way ‘the 




The novel parodies other genres (precisely in their role as genres) ;  
it  exposes the convent ionality of their forms and their language;  it  
squeezes out  some genres and incorporates others into its own 
peculiar st ructure, reformulat ing and re-accentuat ing them. 54
 
 
Galesia’s verses on everything from bereavement  to cookery have a 
parodic effect  not  in that  they seek to make either their form  or content  
r idiculous ( though there are burlesque overtones in some poems) , but  
rather in that  they at test  to the art ificialit y of form  in general.  The poems 
are object ified by the narrat ive act ion that  frames them. 55  They are quite 
literally objects that  Galesia pulls from her t runk, reads, and crit iques.  As 
the frame narrat ive makes clear by its very presence, Galesia is separate 
from these pieces;  she cannot  be reduced to a composite of the speakers 
of her poems.  And yet  those speakers certainly play their part  in 
developing her listener’s (and reader’s)  concept ion of her ident ity.  Bakht in 
claims that  classical parody ‘shows that  a given st raight forward generic 
word - -  epic or t ragic - -  is one-sided, bounded, incapable of exhaust ing 
the object ’. 56
I n her ‘patches’, Galesia modulates her poet ic voice according to 
her intended audience.  Some poems, like the aforement ioned landscape, 
take on a declamatory posture, impersonal and im itat ive of a classical 
literary mode.  But  often, Galesia’s taste for literary experimentat ion leads 
to poems with a roving, compound register.  ‘Anatomy’, for example, is 
int roduced in classicist  terms but  soon moves to a more hybrid register.  
  The effect  in this case is sim ilar;  both Galesia and the world 
she inhabits are indicated only part ially and inexact ly by the generic 
languages she adopts. 
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Galesia tells her hostess that  she was inspired by Ovid to poet icize what  
she had learned of medical science, and in a preamble ent it led ‘An 
I nvocat ion of her Muse’ she alludes to Apollo’s pat ronage of both medicine 
and poet ry (pp. 85-86) .  Once ‘Anatomy’ is underway, classical literary 
figures and biblical allusions feature alongside domest ic imagery and the 
names - -  as well as the voices - -  of medical pioneers.  The physicians 
Thomas Willis and William  Harvey play the part  of Dante’s Virgil,  leading 
the speaker through a vast  anatom ical model of the body in which poet ic 
licence alternates with precision in a Lat inate hybrid.  Here the t r io tour 
the digest ive t ract :  
 
We viewed the Kitchen call’d Vent r iculus;  
Then pass’d we through the Space call’d Pylorus;  
And to the Dining-Room we came at  last , 
Where the Lacteans take their sweet  Repast . (pp. 87-88)  
 
Galesia is keen to display the intellectual maturity that  develops as she 
proceeds in her studies, yet  she is careful to do so in such a way that  it  
never eclipses her hum ilit y.  Though self-educated, she is well read, and 
comfortable enough with her knowledge to at tempt  some literary 
innovat ion, even to speak in the voices of medical masters.  However, she 
does not  do so without  qualificat ion, cit ing classical inspirat ion and in fact  
apologizing for presum ing to learn at  all.  
When she first  encounters Willis and Harvey she is in the m idst  of 
expounding on women’s preordained ignorance by cit ing the biblical Fall:  
‘And ‘cause our Sex precipitated first ,/  To Pains, and I gnorance we since 
are curs’d’ (p. 87) .  Only after the men ‘bid’ her to follow them does 
Galesia obedient ly break off her sermon.  Congruent  with this 
juxtaposit ion of apt itude and deference is Galesia’s sense of wonder as she 
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discovers a new field of knowledge.  ‘Bless me! ’ she exclaims at  one point , 
‘what  Rarit ies are here! ’ (p. 88) .  The speaker of the poem narrates ( for 
the poem is a narrat ive, too)  as a thoroughly educated poet , an eager 
pupil,  and yet  also a conscient iously self-effacing woman.  I n the fram ing 
fict ion, Galesia reads ‘Anatomy’ aloud to her hostess as an 
autobiographical anecdote, and one imagines it  to be a st renuous 
performance.  She must  act ively modulate her own voice not  only to 
accommodate the other speaking characters in the poem, but  also to 
communicate the almost  cont radictory modes which together characterize 
the speaker herself.  
With an air of textbook r igour, Barker (or Galesia)  also supplies 
footnotes to the poem, most  in abbreviated medical Lat in.  Thus, m ingling 
with the emphat ic display of art , science, pr ide, and hum ilit y is an implicit  
aspirat ion to professionalism .  Through the course of the poem, the 
speaker changes from a recept ive witness to a cont r ibut ing part icipant  - -  
her interact ion with her guides becomes more dialogic.  King reads this 
change as ‘a decisive t ransformat ion in the speaker-student ’s relat ion to 
male pedagogical authority’,  not ing the way her language becomes ‘more 
expansive, metaphorical, even a bit  whimsical’ and inclines toward using 
the pronoun ‘we’ in place of the init ial,  more reverent  binary of ‘they’ and 
‘me’. 57  I n addit ion to reinforcing Galesia’s subjecthood, this display of 
intellectual agency draws at tent ion to the dialogic, consensus-driven 
aspect  of scient ific understanding.  The medical guides who at tend Galesia 
in her tour are chronological successors, so, as King observes, the poem 
rehearses ‘the displacement  of the Galenic “ancients”  by the scient ific 
“moderns” ’. 58
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  She further suggests that  an inconsistency in the poem ’s 
medical model - -  a port rayal of liver funct ion that  would have been 
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obviously outdated to Barker’s educated contemporaries - -  ‘may represent  
a st rategy for dramat izing the st ruggle to accommodate new scient ific 
findings to older conceptual models belonging to the classical Galenic 
t radit ion’. 59  King supports this hypothesis with evidence from the poem ’s 
editor ial history and Barker’s otherwise solid understanding of 
contemporary medicine.  Although, as King adm its, ‘this possibilit y 
assumes a more subt le and art ist ically deliberat ive Barker than most  
cr it ics would now grant ’,  it  is a concept ion of scient ific convent ion that  
meshes well with Barker’s corresponding port rayal of individual 
understanding as a dialogic and many- layered composite. 60
Galesia’s intellectual and emot ional being appear to enact  a sim ilar 
st ruggle of mutual influence in the poem.  This becomes most  clear when, 
in the closing lines, Richard Lower, another em inent  physician but  also a 
distant  relat ion of Barker’s, laments the death of the speaker’s brother:  
 
 
But  ah, alas!   So short  was his Life’s Date, 
As makes us since, almost , our Pract ice hate;  
Since we cou’d find out  nought  in all our Art , 
That  cou’d prolong the Mot ion of his Heart . (p. 90)  
 
Though it  comes at  the end of the poem, this personal, emot ional turn 
places the preceding material in a new light .  The poem was writ ten, 
Galesia says, after poring over medical texts owned by her recent ly dead 
brother, and when the culm inat ion of ‘Anatomy’ laments that  very death, 
the preceding fanciful imagery, intellectual confidence, and budding 
professionalism  seem in hindsight  to signify a more private subtext  - -  
Galesia’s st ruggle with grief.  Lower voices what  Galesia had been feeling 
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all along.  This turn is inst rumental in the larger narrat ive as a means of 
establishing Galesia’s int imacy with her hostess.  I t  is also an extension of 
Galesia’s (as both the literal and literary speaker of the poem)  apologet ic 
self-deprecat ion.  Whatever confidence or vir tuosity she displays can be 
at t r ibuted to her underlying emot ional state, and thereby made to conform  
to the culturally imposed st r ictures of fem inine tenderness.  And yet  these 
st r ictures are simultaneously challenged, for the confidence remains, and 
the display of intellectual accomplishment  remains, and the emot ional turn 
itself comes in the voice of Lower, not  that  of the speaker. 
Of course the sadness in the lines spoken by Lower is Galesia’s too;  
she affirms as much to the Lady immediately after finishing the poem (p. 
90) .  However, deliver ing the poem ’s final lines in quotat ion allows for 
some distance between the emot ional undercurrent  they adm it  and the 
already established scholarly and imaginat ive work such emot ion appears 
to have inspired.  The Galesia of the poem never ment ions her feelings 
about  her brother’s death.  When she reacts to the anatomist ’s dream-
world she tours, her react ion is a calculated artefact  of the poem:  
intellectual engagement , at  first  caut ious and then increasingly assured.  
But  Galesia the poet  has scripted Lower’s words, and as she reads aloud 
she speaks them as well - -  his ‘alas! ’ is doubly hers.  To the extent  that  
the poet -Galesia’s authorial voice invests the voice of the speaker-Galesia, 
the lat ter ’s enthusiasm encodes the former’s filial love and grief.  I n other 
words, two dist inct  voices inflect  Galesia’s words.  I n a single ut terance 
are the voices of an increasingly self-assured scholar of medicine and a 
bereaved sister seeking comfort  in pursuing her late brother’s interests. 
This is a more fraught  overlap than the speaker’s juxtaposed 
confidence and caut ion, which, though superficially at  odds, interact  to 
temper rather than cont radict  each other.  But  for Galesia’s words to 
embody both that  tempered confidence as well as filial gr ief is a more 
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complicated feat .  As a testament  of her love for her brother, Galesia 
cont inues the educat ion he had provided her while alive.  She immerses 
herself in his textbooks as a way to feel closer to him .  Had he been a 
student  of finance, say, or ast ronomy, then these subjects would have 
drawn her in with equal force.  However, if Galesia is to be considered a 
gifted healer in her own r ight , as she clear ly expects, the subject  it self 
cannot  be merely incidental.  Science must  have its own appeal.  
Through almost  the ent irety of the poem, Galesia’s sense of 
wonder, her poet icizing at tent ions to the anatom ical scenes before her, 
are not  an emot ional support  in her t ime of loss;  instead they are 
expressions of her intellectual apt itude and professional potent ial.  When 
Lower interjects his emot ional aside, and when Galesia acknowledges her 
grief outside the boundaries of the poem, that  emot ional tenor inflects the 
words of Galesia in the poem without  her (as poet ic speaker)  actually 
revealing her grief.  I n Bakht inian term inology, this is ‘double-voiced and 
internally dialogized’ discourse:  
 
I t  serves two speakers at  the same t ime and expresses 
simultaneously two different  intent ions:  the direct  intent ion of the 




The listening hostess, along with the reader, is offered a cross-sect ion of 
Galesia’s mot ivat ions in which both selfless grief and assert ive opt im ism 
can appear without  clashing, because they inflect  independent  voices that  
speak in synchrony.  This is a feature not  of the poem, but  of the 
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novelist ic scene in which the poem is voiced - -  not  in ‘Anatomy’, but  in the 
contextualized reading of ‘Anatomy’ depicted by the narrat ive.  Though 
speaker and author are voices of the same character, they advance two 
dist inct  purposes in the selfsame ut terances. 
The mult iplicity Barker invests in the language of ‘Anatomy’ can 
therefore be seen to draw upon the potent ial interact ion between various 
voices, voices that  interact  with their contexts by subdividing and 
mult iply ing.  The substance of this type of text  lies not  only in the summed 
content  of all of it s voices, but  also in the interst it ial tensions that  ar ise 
between them, in which one ut terance can run counter to another without  
negat ing it .   This need not  come in the form  of conflict  or challenge;  one 
voice can respond to another simply by vir tue of it s difference.  The voice 
of Lower in ‘Anatomy’ is a case in point , supplying the possibilit y of other 
inflect ions, other layers in the voice to which it  responds. 
The words Galesia supplies for her imagined version of Lower 
compound the heteroglossia of ‘Anatomy’ not  by amount ing to another 
dist inct  voice, but  rather by further revealing the voice of Galesia to be 
manifold, a patchwork of differ ing purposes.  This is a recurr ing 
mechanism throughout  the Galesia tales.  Scenes like the Violenta episode 
and the tea- table conversat ion, discussed above, also develop in this way.  
Through the interact ion of their const ituent  voices in a medial space, these 
scenes reveal one ut terance to harbour more than one intent ion, and so 
each voice signifies by vir tue of it s context , by vir tue of being a voice 
among voices.  I n Barker’s fict ion and Galesia’s poet ry, meaning arises 
dialogically. 
A great  deal of Galesia’s psychological realism  stems from her 
explicit  consciousness of the part ial,  ad hoc, and context -dependent  state 
of her own understanding.  Figurat ively and literally, she is cont inually 
at tempt ing to read her own language in order to tease out  clues to the 
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reality of her self and her surroundings.  So the ident ity, the part icularity 
of Galesia is dialogic, because she is part ly const ituted against  a 
‘dialogizing background’, interact ing with others, and always in progress, 
always subject  to change. 62
Many of Galesia’s ‘patches’ project  a sim ilar background of variety 
by direct ly addressing others.  A number of them are fragments of a 
correspondence with an unnamed ‘Kinsman’ and another male fr iend, both 
students at  Cambridge (p. 92) .  Re-presented as they are to Galesia’s 
interlocutor, to the authorial narrator, and to the reader, these let ters in 
verse are a sort  of sanct ioned eavesdropping.  At  each of these removes, 
different  contexts colour the already hybrid voice of ladylike propriety and 
subversive irony Galesia broadcasts to her Cambridge fr iends, and the 
at t itude of each respect ive recipient  informs the messages’ meaning 
different ly.  This state of affairs foregrounds a characterist ic of real-world 




  Essent ially, this is the 
result  of every ut terance, every word, being a part  of a larger fabric of 
ongoing language use.  No ut terance can be isolated:  
Form ing itself in an atmosphere of the already spoken, the word is 
at  the same t ime determ ined by that  which has not  yet  been said 
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Bakht in states internal dialogism  to be an ever-present  condit ion of 
language, but  in a novelist ic text  it  is stylist ically acknowledged;  it  
‘becomes one of the most  fundamental aspects of prose style and 
undergoes a specific art ist ic elaborat ion’. 65
Galesia’s verse let ters are presented as act ive responses, which in 
turn prompt  more react ions.  However, nearly all of this interchange is 
inaccessible to the reader.  With the except ion of some vague 
paraphrasing and one reprinted note, the Cambridge side of the 
interchange is invisible.
  The heteroglot  text , the novel, 
integrates dialogism  into its aesthet ic substance.  More so than the 
heteroglossia of ‘Anatomy’, the variabilit y of Galesia’s voice in her 
correspondence poems capitalizes on this type of dialogism . 
66
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  The status of these poems as fragments of a 
larger, ongoing dialogue means that  there is always something else said 
beyond the eavesdropper’s ken.  All the auditors of the conversat ion, from 
Galesia’s Cambridge fr iends to the implied reader addressed by the 
authorial persona, must  reconst ruct  contexts and intent ions in order to 
flesh out  Galesia’s words.  With so many silent  interlocutors 
simultaneously overlaid, the pragmat ic profile of Galesia’s voice is 
correspondingly obscure.  Galesia herself shows some anxiety about  the 
interpret ive range this deficit  allows.  She cont inually seeks to deflect  any 
scandal by reassuring her listener/ reader that  her communicat ion with 
these young men is ‘pure and candid, such as m ight  be amongst  the 
Celest ial I nhabitants’ (p. 95) .  Galesia’s defensive posture shows that  her 
correspondence is dialogic not  only as an interact ion between its 
part icipants, but  also as an int imat ion of other, undocumented 
significances.  
66
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I n spite of their suggest ive vocal presence, Galesia’s fr iends do not  
speak with dist inct , autonomous voices.  I n this sense they funct ion in 
much the same way as Lower in ‘Anatomy’ - -  they exist  in the text  as a 
foil for Galesia’s own self-awareness and development , another means, 
like Lower, of mult iplying her voice.  They are unlike Lower, though, in the 
crucial respect  that  they occupy the same narrat ive plane as Galesia, 
outside of her writ ings.  They are an independent  part  of the world in 
which she lives.  Galesia, then, is dialogic not  only in the sense that  she is 
changeable, altered by her interact ions with others, but  also in the sense 
that  her own understanding, though cent ral, is not  the lim it  of the 
possibilit ies port rayed in the text .  The fact  that  a dialogic aesthet ic 
extends beyond her poems and let ters and into the larger narrat ive means 
that  the reflexive and dynam ic self-awareness Barker uses to achieve 
psychological realism  is also ascribed to the wider world in which Galesia 
lives.  That  is, Galesia is depicted as one part icular, thinking being among 
many.  Although Barker does not  develop them fully, the voices she places 
alongside Galesia represent  liv ing, context -dependent  idiolects, 
components of heteroglossia.  They imply, as Bakht in writes, ‘specific 
points of view on the world, forms for conceptualizing the world in words, 
specific world views, each characterized by its own objects, meanings and 
values’. 67
The world Barker describes in the patchwork fict ions is it self a 
patchwork made up of a mult itude of languages and voices.  As the coach 
journey framework that  begins A Patch-Work Screen indicates, it  is a 
world in which human experience is filtered through channels of telling and 
re- telling, so that  events are reviewed and reflected upon even by people 
who m ight  be at  many removes from the events themselves.  Minor 
  The heteroglossia of Galesia’s environment  signifies its 
epistem ic m ult iplicity. 
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characters, when they encounter Galesia, are eager to narrate their own 
past  experiences to her.  For example, while Galesia is in London, a nurse 
arr ives on a nameless errand and proceeds to divulge the story of her 
unlucky marriage, disinheritance, and subsequent  poverty (pp. 119-122) .  
She then disappears from the text  just  as suddenly, never to return.  
Barker seems to have included some of these framed digressions simply 
for their own sake, as if to illust rate dynam ic human variat ion. 
I ncongruous though some of them may be, the mult iple voices of 
Barker’s framed narrat ives place Galesia against  a backdrop of variable 
human possibilit ies, some of which test  the lim its of Galesia’s 
comprehension.  Galesia’s inset  story ‘The Unaccountable Wife’ begins as a 
love t r iangle between a husband and wife and their female servant , but  
ends with the eventual exclusion of the man from what  appears in today’s 
terms to be a lesbian partnership.  The tale provokes an emot ional 
react ion on the part  of Galesia and the Lady but  seems to disallow any 
final interpretat ion.  Galesia harshly judges the servant  who succumbs to 
her master’s advances and dares to behave as an equal to her m ist ress.  
Such conduct  makes her a ‘v ile Wretch’ and a ‘St rumpet ’.   Galesia also 
proffers her mother’s conclusion that  the wife’s desire to cohabitate with 
her servant  rather than her husband, is a ‘Contradict ion of Nature’ (pp. 
144-145) . 
However, after Galesia and her mother (who were present  as the 
events of the tale unfolded)  at tempt  in vain to reason the wife out  of her 
at tachment  to the servant , and after the inducements of the Queen herself 
fail to effect  any change, Galesia’s language shifts from out rage to 
bewilderm ent .  The situat ion fills her with ‘the greatest  Amazement  
possible’;  it  is ‘such a Truth as I  believe never was in the World before, nor 
never will be again’ (pp. 146-147) .  When she at tempts to describe the 
partnership of the two women away from the husband’s household, in 
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voluntary poverty and exile, Galesia’s incomprehension overshadows even 
the narrat ive act ion itself:  
 
Now what  this unaccountable Creature thought  of this kind of 
Being, is unknown, or what  Measures she and her Companion 
thought  to take, or what  Schemes they form ’d to themselves, is 
not  conceivable. (p. 147)  
 
The unaccountable wife is so unfathomable that  Galesia cannot  imagine 
even the circumstances of her lifestyle, let  alone her mot ives.  As Spacks 
remarks, ‘the lack of explicit  mot ive appears almost  to const itute the 
story’s point ’. 68
Though all of Barker’s tales of object ionable pair ings and ruined 
relat ionships have their Jacobite overtones, ‘The Unaccountable Wife’ 
provides no easy didact ic soapbox for Galesia.  I t  serves only to reveal her 
bafflement  when confront ing inscrutable difference.  I t  is, like Barker’s 
frequent  use of the rhetorical ‘I  know not ’, a marker of the lim its of 
Galesia’s - -  or any individual’s - -  understanding.  The cultural codes 
available to Galesia and the other witnesses of the narrat ive simply do not  
apply to the part icular events that  have occurred.  As Williamson writes, 
‘Women wooed by the same man and binding across class lines are simply 
not  to be understood’.
  Upon hearing the tale, the Lady can explain it  only with 
recourse to the supernatural, suggest ing that  the ‘poor Creature was 
under some Spell or I nchantment ’ (p. 149) .  Galesia, uncharacterist ically 
dumbst ruck, neglects to make any closing comment  at  all.  
69
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them by fict ional act ion’. 70
Though she is not  a fully developed character, the wife embodies 
the Bakht inian ‘dialogizing background’ of the text ;  her presence 
announces Galesia’s voice to be ‘contested, contestable and contest ing’, 
however cent ral it  m ight  be.
  I n its ‘unaccountabilit y ’, the tale stands as an 
unspoken affront  to Galesia’s understanding of the world. 
71
  As such, Galesia’s out rage at  the events of 
the tale is object ified, de-authorized.  This is why, in the welter of 
novelist ic heteroglossia, Bakht in believes that  ‘images of vir tue (of any 
sort :  monast ic, spir itual, bureaucrat ic, moral, etc.)  have never been 
successful in the novel’. 72
 
  A rule declared dialogically reveals its 
boundaries;  it  is a way rather than the way.  Speaking of the case of the 
unaccountable wife, King reads the conspicuous situatedness of Galesia’s 
opinion as a gesture toward alter ity:  
I n moments of interpret ive indeterm inacy such as these Barker’s 
fict ions point  toward a space between cultural format ions that  
const itutes an ‘elsewhere’, a space outside or, if that  is too utopian, 




The reader may wholeheartedly endorse Galesia’s judgement , but  only as 
an act  of taking sides, only against  a content ious, dialogized atmosphere.  
There is a persistent  ‘elsewhere’ or ‘other’ overshadowing such a stand.  
Galesia’s moralizing is a useful tool in dealing with the vicissitudes of her 
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experience, but  here, as elsewhere, it  does not  offer the comfort  of 
certainty.  I t  cannot  account  for the unaccountable. 
Later in The Patch-Work Screen,  another dialogizing voice emerges 
to cont radict  Galesia’s understanding.  This happens while Galesia is 
musing on the avarice of the Duke of Monmouth, whom she believes ‘to be 
possess’d with [ the]  Devil of Ambit ion’ in his bid to depose James I I .   Her 
moralizing monologue is interrupted by the voice of a neighbour singing a 
‘Hymn’ of praise to the Duke:  ‘Preserve thy Holy Servant  Monmouth, 
Lord,/  Who carr ies for his Shield thy Sacred Word’ (p. 159) .  Like the 
physical barr ier that  separates her from the singer’s room, Galesia’s 
polit ical and religious orientat ion excludes her from the singer’s contexts.  
Galesia cannot  put  herself in the other’s place, and so instead of 
interpret ing and understanding, she can only wonder at  such wrong-
headedness:  
 
Happy had such been to have died in their I nfancy, before the 
Bapt ismal Water was dry’d off their Face!   But , ah!  if I  think on 
that , who is there so Righteous, but  that  they may wish they had 
dyed in the State of I nnocency? (p. 160)  
 
The astounding fact  that  someone could hold such views can only be 
assim ilated as a mark of all people’s liabilit y to folly.  And yet , though the 
‘Wicked Song’ horr ifies her, Galesia nevertheless reproduces it  in it s 
ent irety.  To Galesia, and surely to Barker as well,  Monmouth’s 
unsuitabilit y is self-evident , and yet  there on the other side of a wall,  
singing a full nine lines, is the incarnat ion of a cont rary understanding. 
Rivka Swenson reads in this image of a physical and ideological 
schism  between the two women a m icrocosm of the division between 
‘Britain and Brit ish subjects’.  She cites Barker’s quotat ion of the ‘Wicked 
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Song’ as evidence that , ‘While Barker doesn’t  relish the mult iplicity of 
modern experience, she is commit ted to its representat ion’. 74  Such a 
commitment  means that , while the text  condemns the singer of the pro-
Monmouth lines as ‘wicked’, ‘graceless’ and ignorant , Barker nevertheless 
depicts Galesia’s posit ion as embat t led, and thus dialogized, however 
privileged it  m ight  be (p. 160) .  The singer of the hymn not  only praises 
the Duke, she does so in religious terms, as if James I I  were the enemy of 
God.  She is a direct  inversion of Galesia’s belief - -  an ant i-Galesia.  I n this 
respect  the singing woman is a Bakht inian ‘fool’,  a figure who, with or 
without  the sympathy of the author or narrator, ‘by [ her]  very 
uncomprehending presence [ …]  makes st range the world of social 
convent ionality ’. 75
I ndeed, as she does so frequent ly, Galesia seems to revise her 
conclusions after she makes them.  I n this case, after finding all mankind 
to be so imprudent  that  anyone m ight  wish to have ‘dyed in the State of 
I nnocency’, Galesia dreams of the fate of unbapt ized Christ ians in the 
after life.  Her dream-poem ‘The Childrens, or Catechumen’s Elysium ’ 
  The singer ‘makes st range’ by embodying an 
ideological opposite so different  as to be unfathomable to Galesia, 
disrupt ing the prospect  that  one understanding could ever be the 
understanding.  Significant ly, no narrat ive act ion intervenes to bear out  
Galesia’s point  of view.  Unlike the rake Bellair , who robs his way to 
execut ion, or the several sexually indiscreet  women of Barker’s texts, the 
supporter of Monmouth goes uncorrected by fate.  I n fact , she vanishes 
from the text  altogether after her brief cameo.  Galesia’s opinion may be 
presented as preferable, but  without  any plot -based confirmat ion of her 
t irade, her view is condit ional, not  authoritat ive. 
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envisions a quasi-paradise in which ‘every one was happy in his Sphere: /  
That  is to say, if Happiness can be,/  Without  th’Enjoyment  of a Deity’.   
I nnocent  bliss is incomplete;  it  is ‘but  half t rue Happiness’ (pp. 160-161) .  
Complete happiness requires complete salvat ion, which for Galesia is only 
possible after catechism  and bapt ism  - -  knowledge and responsibilit y.  
Unless, as Galesia cynically observes, one dies immediately after one’s 
christening, life must  be lived with such knowledge and responsibilit y, 
along with free will.   This last  of course allows for the wilful liv ing even of 
such exasperat ing individuals as wives who run away with female servants 
or neighbours who praise an illegit imate usurper.  The placement  of the 
poem immediately following the st ranger’s hymn to Monmouth serves to 
downplay the epithets and condemnat ions of Galesia’s init ial react ion to 
the incomprehensible other, emphasizing instead the ult imate outcome of 
her incomprehension:  a withholding of judgement , a musing upon the 
fallen, divided state of mankind generally.  Galesia’s dream of pity for the 
catechumens, who have died neither damned nor fully saved, makes a 
covert  acknowledgement  of the unt idy metaphysics of the world of the 
liv ing, in which whatever organizing logic m ight  exist  is largely beyond the 
individual’s grasp. 
Barker makes it  clear that  while a patchwork approach may yield 
greater understanding, it  may just  as easily produce confusion.  I n the 
preface to A Patch-Work Screen,  she counters her image of tea- table 
harmony with a more ambivalent  passage.  Declar ing that  she has 
‘carr[ ied]  the Metaphor too high’, she shifts to the past  tense:  
 
My high Flight  in Favour of the Ladies, made a mere I carus of me, 
melted my Wings, and tumbled me Headlong down, I  know not  
where.  Nevertheless my Fall was amongst  a joyful Throng of 
People of all Ages, Sexes, and Condit ions!  who were rejoycing at  a 
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wonderful Piece of Patch-Work they had in Hand;  the Nature of 
which was such, as was to compose (as it  were)  a New Creat ion, 
where all Sorts of People were to be Happy, as if they had never 
been the Off-spring of fallen Adam. (p. 53)  
 
At  first , the narrator ( recall that  Barker writes her preface as the signatory 
‘Jane Barker’)  is delighted, but  when the crowd discover her to be in 
possession of ‘some Manuscript  Ballads’, they angrily expel her from their 
group.  Bilger and Donovan see in this image a figurat ion of the social 
dangers faced by female writers. 76
 
  However, in this case the exile of ‘Jane 
Barker’ turns out  to be fortunate;  the crowd have more reason than she to 
regret  their ambit ion:  
Their Patch-Work Scheme, by carrying the Point  too high, was 
blown up about  their Ears, and vanish’d into Smoke and Confusion;  
to the ut ter Ruin of many Thousands of the Unhappy Creatures 
therein concern’d. (p. 53)  
 
Wilson suggests in a footnote to this passage that  the ‘Scheme’ is a 
reference to the 1720 collapse of the South Sea Bubble.  Accordingly this 
scene allegorizes, in King’s reading, ‘the outcast  female poet  [ …]  in 
symbolic opposit ion to a corrupt  and mercenary Whig order’ of bourgeois 
greed. 77
There are two falls in this passage, but  they share a basic pat tern.  
The first , that  of ‘Jane Barker’,  is the I carian fall of an individual.  The 
  The scene lends itself to topical readings focused on issues of 
gender and class, but  underlying this allegor ical content  is a more general 
pessim ism about  people’s capacity to understand their place in the world. 
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second is an Adam ic fall,  dramat izing the fallen state of all mankind, which 
the diverse ‘Throng’ at tempt  unsuccessfully to surmount .  Both falls are 
images of the vanity and fut ilit y of human st r iv ing.  As a narrator prone to 
indulge in and then repent  bouts of pr ide, Galesia often uses the 
counterpart  figures of r ise and fall.   The various falls she imagines unfold 
according to a common paradigm:  like in the case of the schem ing 
patchworkers of the preface, intellectual act ivity seems to be a means of 
ascension, but  it  is t ruly so only if pract ised to perfect ion;  a fall inevitably 
occurs when that  perfect ion proves to be out  of reach. 
I n Galesia’s personal experience, erudit ion prom ises flight  but  
invites a fall.   Speaking of her adm irat ion for Katherine Philips, Galesia 
says, ‘Her Poet ry I  found so interwoven with Vertue and Honour, that  each 
Line was like a Ladder to climb, not  only to Parnassus, but  to Heaven’.  
However, when in ‘Boldness’ Galesia sets out  to im itate her literary role 
model, she does not  climb but  instead is ‘dropp’d into a Labyrinth of 
Poet ry’ (p. 76) .  Sim ilar ly, when Galesia seeks out  a private room in which 
to write, she opts for a garret , which she calls ‘my exalted Study:  Or, to 
(use the Phrase of the Poets)  my Closet  in the Star-Chamber;  or the Den 
of Parnassus’, but  she is barred from the room when her mother discovers 
its vulnerabilit y to the corrupt ing influence of int ruders (p. 124) .  Much of 
Galesia’s anxiety about  some kind of fall is, as in the case of her exclusion 
from the garret  study, the direct  result  of her gender.  I n a verse let ter to 
her Cambridge fr iends, Galesia openly covets the young men’s educat ional 
opportunity, lament ing that  the ‘Tree of Knowledge [ …]  disdains to grow in 
our cold Clime’ (pp. 94-95) .  (The word ‘our’,  she discloses in a footnote, 
specifies ‘A Female Capacity’.)   The Tree of Knowledge is a fit t ing symbol, 
for Barker port rays scholar ly endeavour as at  once irresist ibly allur ing and 
enormously dangerous.  As an aspir ing intellectual and poet , Galesia must  
remain wary of the cont roversy of her pursuits.  For a woman, such 
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at tempts at  self- improvement  can occasion a fall in the eyes of society;  
learning can render her ‘unfit  Company for every body’ (p. 83) . 
However it  is not  only women whose at tempts at  intellectual 
advancement  are t reated ambivalent ly in the fict ions.  Scient ific pursuits 
pose a sim ilar danger to any would-be adept , as in ‘Anatomy’, where an 
otherwise enthusiast ic Galesia cannot  help but  recall the role of knowledge 
in the biblical Fall,  remarking, ‘But  O how dearly Wisdom ’s bought  with 
Sin,/  Which shuts out  Grace;  lets Death & Darkness in’, before she 
embarks on her fantast ic voyage through the human body (p. 87) .  Barker 
cont inually connects the difficulty of advancing human understanding to 
the general fallenness of humanity.  When Galesia’s brother dies, the 
paradise she imagines for him  is one in which understanding reaches a 
completeness that  would be unat tainable for liv ing mortals:  
 
The only Comfort  I  have, is, when I  think on the Happiness he 
enjoys by Divine Vision;  All Learning and Science, All Arts, and 
Depths of Philosophy, without  Search or Study;  whilst  we in this 
World, with much Labour, are groping, as it  were, in the Dark, and 
make Discoveries of our own I gnorance. 78
 
 (p. 90)  
The scope of Galesia’s pronouns has expanded from the female-cent red 
‘our’ in her let ter to the young men at  Cambridge.  I n this more private 
remark to the Lady, the impossibilit y of comprehensive knowledge is a fact  
of human existence that  everyone must  endure. 
I f heaven is intellectual clar ity, the corrupt ion of the material world 
shows itself as chaos and confusion.  At tendant  to the ignorance Galesia 
observes in the world is a parallel sense of disordered mult iplicity, which 
she illust rates with lists.  When her father dies, young Galesia confronts 
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‘the Troubles of the World’ in ‘a thousand Disappointments’.  She lists 
among them ‘deceit ful Debtors, impat ient  Creditors, dist ress’d Friends, 
peevish Enem ies, Lawsuits, rot ten Houses, Eye-servants, spight ful 
Neighbours, impert inent  and interested Lovers, with a thousand such 
Things to terr ify and vex me’ (p. 107) .  She and her mother seek respite 
in London, but  find their peace there upset  by ‘Lodgers, Visiters, 
Messages, Howd’ye’s, Billets, and a Thousand other I mpert inencies’ (p. 
116) .  To highlight  the absurdity she sees in the role reversal of the 
unaccountable wife and her erstwhile servant , Galesia lists the household 
chores that  had fallen to the wife’s lot  (p. 145) .  Barker uses cataloguing 
to build up a sense of material disorder that  corresponds to the immaterial 
disorder of clouded understanding or comprom ised moralit y.  Most  telling 
is Galesia’s list  of the legal manoeuvres that  congest  Westm inster courts, 
in which she conflates variabilit y, obscurity, and even error as symptoms 
of corrupt ion:  
 
For Truth is too often disguised, and Just ice over-ballanced, by 
means of false Witnesses, slow Evidences to Truth, avarit ious 
Lawyers, poor Clients, Perjury, Bribery, Forgery, Clamour, Party, 
Mistakes, Misapprehensions, ill- stat ing the Case, Demurrs, 
Reverses, and a thousand other Shifts, Querks and Tricks, 
unknown to all but  Lawyers. (p. 126)  
 
These myriad act ivit ies, diverse as they are, are alike in their abilit y to 
distort  the t ruth.  I n light  of this equat ion of mult iplicity and fallenness, 
Barker’s reliance on coincidence and happenstance as narrat ive devices 
meshes well with the parataxis of her framed fict ions.  The fallen world 
Barker aims to describe is one in which the confusion of human experience 
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- -  whether due to iniquity or incompetence - -  masks the t ruths that  
underlie it .  
I n ‘On the Difficult ies of Religion’, the poem that  becomes the last  
patch of the screen, Galesia presents confusion as the most  imposing 
obstacle to salvat ion:  
 
We are inst ructed of a Future State, 
Of Just  Rewards, and Punishments in That ;  
But  ign’rant  How, or Where, or When, or What . 
I ’m  shew’d a Book, in which these things are writ ;  
And, by all Hands, assur’d all’s True in it ;  
But  in this Book, such Mysteries I  find, 
I nstead of Healing, oft  corrode the Mind. 79
 
 (p. 164)  
Study, even of scripture, cannot  deliver enlightenment  because no 
individual can be t rusted to properly understand.  Yet  recourse to 
unthinking faith is equally ineffect ive.  The result  is a cr isis of 
epistemology that  portends disaster:  ‘Now Faith, now Reason, now Good-
works, does All; /  Betwixt  these Opposites our Virtues fall’ (p. 164) .  
Grasping at  knowledge, it  seems, re-enacts grasping at  the fruit  of the 
Tree of Knowledge, and it  carr ies with it  on a smaller scale the same 
dangerous hubris, the same prom ise of a fall.  
Galesia does not  read this poem aloud, perhaps due to its volat ile 
subject  mat ter, and the Lady manages to read it  only because of another 
fall - -  Galesia accidentally drops it  in front  of her.  As Galesia’s most  
int imate statement  on the possibilit y of understanding, it  is also her most  
t roubled.  What  she earlier port rays with a hint  of m ockery to her 
Cambridge fr iends as a fem inine failing is in this poem universal and 
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profound, a grave and even damnable flaw in human nature.  I n an 
apparent  gesture of reassurance, the Lady counters with another poem, 
‘An Ode In Commemorat ion of the Nat ivity of Christ ’, previously given to 
her ‘by an Excellent  Hand’ (p. 166) .  I n this long, anonymous poem, God 
is ‘the Thought - t ranscending Being’ and the infant  Christ  is a liv ing 
paradox, a ‘Mighty Helpless Thing’ (p. 169) .  The resurrect ion also 
emerges as a paradox, the acceptance of which is the cognit ive act  that  
can bridge from reason to faith:  
 
Man’s Union hence with God ev’n Reason can, 
Tho’ but  by Consequence and faint ly, scan:  
 Enough, howe’er, to lead to Faith’s t rue Road, 
Since this we find was done by Man, 
 And could not  but  by God:  (p. 172)  
 
Thus the terms of Galesia’s verses on the unreliabilit y of human 
comprehension are reframed as a celebrat ion of reason outst r ipped by 
faith, but  in such a way that  the remedy to the nagging doubt  described 
by Galesia remains obscure.  The claim  that  faith must  ult imately surpass 
reason is convent ional enough;  however, consider ing that  Galesia’s poem 
concludes with the nearly blasphemous wish to be an animal with no 
immortal soul at  all,  the Lady’s presentat ion of the ode as a response falls 
somewhat  flat . 80
The reader must  ponder Galesia’s recept ion of the ode unassisted 
by the text , for the poem makes up the final pages of A Patch-Work 
Screen.   I f not  for the bold ‘FI NI S’ pr inted just  below the closing line, one 
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imagines Barker’s original readers m ight  have suspected a binding error, 
so abrupt ly does the text  end.  King points out  that  most  cr it ical 
commentaries on this sudden stop overlook its polit ical symbolism .  The 
last  lines of the ode make a plea for the conversion of Jews, which, King 
explains, ‘in Jacobite contexts [ …]  stood for that  conversion of English 
hearts and m inds that  would usher in a Stuart  restorat ion’. 81
This is fit t ing in a dialogic text  like A Patch-Work Screen, since the 
absence of a neat  resolut ion makes it  clear that  the end is not , in fact , the 
end.  The fram ing fict ion, the dialogue between Galesia and the Lady, does 
not  conclude with the text  either;  the two women ant icipate an evening of 
entertainment .  Galesia’s self-cr it ical internal dialogue must  surely 
cont inue as well,  since, among other concerns, the profound anxiet ies of 
faith she expresses in her last  patch are not  fully or finally addressed by 
the reassurances of the ode.  The fict ions’ heteroglot  texture is consistent  
with this plot ted open-endedness.  Every voice announces itself as one 
among many, bound by subject ivity to a part ial view.  I n essence, no word 
is final, whether in terms of narrat ive closure or authoritat ive 
understanding.  I n both its form  and its exhortatory content , the end of 
Barker’s text  makes a turn toward the reader. 
  Thus, either 
as Christ ian or as Jacobite propagandizing, the ode is open-ended, cast ing 
a hopeful eye toward the possibilit y of future redempt ion. 
Barker presents voices that  conflict  with Galesia’s, and though 
Galesia is baffled and offended by them, they dialogize her perspect ive 
even so.  This effect  is compounded by Galesia’s subsequent  reflect ions on 
her understanding, which, without  overt ly alter ing her view, complicate 
her earlier certainty.  There remains, as a direct  result  of Barker’s 
patchwork aesthet ic, an interpret ive gap.  I n the aforement ioned port rayal 
of the Monmouth supporter and the polit ical division she represents, 
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Swenson sees an example of Barker’s text -wide implicat ion of the reader’s 
interpret ive power:  
 
Readers must  work to find unifying threads in the fict ions, since, 
like the patch-work nat ion, it s cross-sect ional representat ion is r ife 
with compet ing subjects and mult iple voices, form  against  form , 
genre against  genre, poem against  poem, song against  song. 82
 
 
This is a crucial point , because it  reveals the way the patchwork fict ions, in 
building up a heteroglot  mult iplicity of voices, dialogize the text ’s narrat ive 
voice and, in so doing, also dialogize their relat ion to the reader.  For 
instance, the reader who sides with Galesia when she reviles the 
unaccountable wife and the singing woman has chosen agreement , a 
posit ion that  Morson and Emerson note is necessarily dialogic because it  
‘concedes the possibilit y of disagreement ’. 83
I n A Patch-Work Screen,  Galesia is pr imarily a re- teller.  She reads 
aloud her own writ ings and recounts tales from memory.  While there is no 
obvious overarching st ructure, she is cont inually t racking the responses 
and prompts of her interlocutor.  The Lady listens, comments, makes 
requests, and even supplies the last  several pages of the text  herself.   As 
Swenson writes, ‘Meaning is thus made in conversat ion between Galesia or 
Barker and the Lady or the reader.’  Just  as the heteroglot  substance of 
the patchwork inst itutes a dialogue among its const ituent  voices, the 
conversat ional fram ing fict ion models a dialogic relat ionship between teller 
  Galesia’s understanding of 
the world is always marked as one among many, and it  is precisely this 
background of difference that  invites an act ive response from the reader. 
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and listener, and by extension writer and reader, in which recept ivity is an 
act ive, const ruct ive state, so that  ‘the Lady models the kind of invested 
behavior Barker solicits from readers’. 84
I n The Lining of the Patch Work Screen,  reading cont inues to be a 
cent ral act ivity of the fram ing fict ion, with texts of diverse provenance 
providing narrat ive substance.  Two of the interpolated tales are stories 
that  Galesia reads while alone.  The second of these, ent it led ‘The Cause 
of the Moors Overrunning Spain’, displays themes typical of Barker - -  
t reachery in a royal court  and endangered fem inine vir tue - -  but  does so in 
a st r ik ingly different  set t ing.  A usurper king, after incit ing rebellion by 
raping the daughter of a general, seeks the advice of the devil by entering 
an ancient  fort if icat ion named the Devil’s Tower.  The tower contains 
poison gas, a cauldron of boiling blood, a m ill that  gr inds human beings, 
mysterious inscript ions, menacing creatures, and ‘many more st range and 
monst rous Appearances, not  easily to be remember’d, much less to be 
describ’d’ (p. 209) . 
  Galesia herself believes as much, 
declar ing that  ‘though Reading inr iches the Mind, yet  it  is Conversat ion 
that  inables us to use and apply those Riches or Not ions gracefully ’ (p. 
109) .  I n such a frankly textual fict ion as this, the claim  that  reading is 
incomplete without  supplementary human interact ion necessarily makes 
some address to the reader. 
The explorers of the tower are horr ified, but  their predom inant  
state is puzzlement .  Twice they wonder about  the nature of the monsters 
they see, but  both t imes ‘they could not  tell’ what  the creatures m ight  be.  
They at tempt  a natural explanat ion for the boiling blood, but  ‘no body 
could conclude;  tho’ every one made their several Conjectures thereon’ (p. 
209) .  The inscript ions they find leave them sim ilar ly bewildered.  After the 
entourage make their escape from the tower, it  sinks into the earth.  The 
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devil never appears, nor is much explanat ion offered for the ( rather 
com ically m isleading)  t it le.  Galesia seems to enjoy the tale - -  she reads it  
late into the night  - -  but  it  has no direct  bearing on any subsequent  
content , and she makes no comment  on it  at  all.  
Galesia evident ly is not  the sort  of involved reader Barker praises in 
A Patch-Work Screen;  however, the ut ter inexplicabilit y of the tale seems 
to be another gesture toward the reader’s own interpret ive responsibilit y.  
Spacks categorizes the tale of the Devil’s Tower with ‘The Unaccountable 
Wife’ as examples of the way ‘Barker’s fict ion demands a part icularly 
act ive reader, forced constant ly to shift  expectat ions’. 85
 
  Throughout  the 
patchwork fict ions, Barker tends to follow her more realist ic segments with 
her most  fantast ic imagery.  Perhaps, Spacks suggests, this is an at tempt  
to offset  the tales’ occasional sordidness, but  most  of all it  reveals the high 
prior ity Barker places on variety:  
Agilit y becomes a desideratum for reading as the text  places in the 
foreground the fict ionality of it s own const ruct ion. [ …]  The 
vigorous, varied, lavishly mult iplied narrat ives that  compose her 
novels declare the power of fict ion, not  to make the reader suspend 
disbelief;  rather, to make disbelief irrelevant . 86
 
 
Spacks’s characterizat ion of Barker’s patchwork aesthet ic is accurate, but  
Barker achieves an effect  that  is more complex than Spacks indicates.  At  
least  as st r ik ing as their obvious modal differences is the sim ilar ity of 
these tales’ situat ion within their surrounding narrat ive frame.  Like so 
many of Barker’s sub-narrat ives, both are delivered to the reader as 
discrete units, independent  of the rest  of the text .  Though ‘The 
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Unaccountable Wife’ is presented as an episode from Galesia’s own 
experience and ‘The Cause of the Moors’ is a tale from a book, very lit t le 
dist inct ion is made between their ontological condit ions.  This haphazard 
piling up of cont rast ing tableaux does indeed demand readerly agilit y, but  
a co-effect  of making disbelief ir relevant  is a heightened emphasis on 
recept ivity;  the reader is incited to be act ive, but  in such a way that  
part icularly analyt ical and select ive capacit ies remain dormant .  Barker’s 
mult iplicity const itutes a deferral of scept icism . 
Like Galesia when she encounters people whose understanding of 
the world inverts her own, and like the explorers of the Devil’s Tower, the 
reader is to focus on perceptual comprehension, ‘taking it  all in’,  rather 
than on the conceptual comprehension of full understanding.  Barker 
makes this obvious not  only with her sporadic leaps from realism  to 
fantasy, which are prominent  even when she writes as ‘Jane Barker’ in her 
prefaces, but  also with her vaguely indirect  discourse, rhetorical aporia, 
and convoluted fram ing.  Though hierarchy can be t raced in the patchwork 
fict ions’ st ructure, it  is overshadowed by the paratact ic onrush of variety, 
in which the relevance and meaning of respect ive fragments is left  
evocat ively implicit .   The reader can thus press onward with the 
impression that  all is freighted with meaning without  the requirement  of 
uncovering and isolat ing that  meaning.  This is the sort  of at tent ive, 
enabling listening performed by the Lady in A Patch-Work Screen,  and as 
The Lining cont inues Galesia too sustains just  this sort  of engaged-but -
indiscrim inate recept ivity, reading books and hearing tales from other 
fr iends and st rangers.  As the text  proceeds, Galesia’s acquaintances 
provide st ill more models of, and material for, this type of recept ivity.  
Barker seems determ ined at  t imes to complicate the provenance of 
the text ’s mult iple, som et imes over lapping, interpolated tales.  I n one 
case, two women, Lady Allgood and Philinda, visit  Galesia.  They decide 
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that  Allgood should tell the story of Philinda’s life, while Philinda waits in 
the next  room.  They claim , oddly, that  this is in order to avoid ‘Confusion’ 
(p. 211) .  Upon her return Philinda shares another story, unrelated to her 
own, that  she has just  read from a book.  The characters approach these 
two tales with uniform ly disinterested openness, regardless of whether 
they are immediately involved with the events being described.  The tale 
from the book yields only an aphorist ic interpretat ion:  ‘Marry in Haste, and 
Repent  at  leisure’ (p. 217) .  Philinda’s own life story, in which she is 
m istaken for a prost itute and jailed, only narrowly escaping permanent  
ruin, provokes an even more unenlightening banality:  ‘After a Storm  
comes a Calm ’ (p. 214) .  Both in their incorporat ion into the frame 
narrat ive and in the uninspired react ions they elicit ,  the two stories are 
granted equal status.  I t  is the variety they provide that  just ifies their 
telling more than any communicat ive or affect ive impact ;  the listening 
characters and the reader simply take it  all in.  
The contexts of ‘Philinda’s Story out  of the Book’ are in this way an 
address to the reader, another instance of Barker endorsing a part icular 
or ientat ion toward the text .  The content  of the tale itself is also significant  
to the reader’s posit ion in the patchworks.  Wilson observes in a footnote 
that  the story Philinda tells, which comes from the same volume in which 
Galesia reads the tale of the Devil’s Tower, is pat terned after Aphra Behn’s 
1689 The History of the Nun;  or, The Fair Vow-Breaker  (p. 214) .  More 
Behn material features in the intertwined tales ‘The History of the Lady 
Gypsie’ and ‘The Story of Tangerine, The Gent leman Gypsie’ (p. 227) . 87
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 Donovan adds to these examples the life story of Barker’s character 
Malhurissa, which she claims draws upon Behn’s ‘The Unfortunate Happy 
Lady:  A True History’ (Wom en and the Rise of the Novel,  pp. 92-93) . 
  
Unlike Philinda’s Behn story, these lat ter two are presented by Allgood as 
having been delivered to her by a witness - -  ‘an ancient  Gent lewoman’ she 
met  during a coach journey.  Barker’s reader m ight  very well have 
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encountered these tales previously.  I f so, they const itute an inject ion of 
metafict ional self-awareness into the narrat ives, an addit ional means by 
which the stories ‘acknowledge their own fict ionality ’,  as Spacks 
remarks. 88
The Behn references are not  explicit .   Aside from at t r ibut ing the 
first  to a book, Barker offers no hint  of their or igin, perhaps wary of 
cont radict ing her condemnat ion of Behn by name in A Patch-Work Screen 
(p. 108) .
  The fact  that  these appropriat ions of Behn are placed at  two 
different  narrat ive rem oves - -  one at t r ibuted to a book of old romances, 
the other essent ially a bit  of anonymous gossip - -  means that  they 
produce a blurr ing effect  both internally, between narrat ive frames, and 
externally, between Barker’s text  and the world of the reader.  I t  is as if a 
fict ional Behn lives alongside her own characters in the world of The 
Lining,  and simultaneously as if Barker’s characters inhabit  the same world 
as the reader, in which they m ight  thumb through Behn’s History of the 
Nun. 
89
                                          
88
 Spacks, Novel Beginnings, p. 38. 
  Barker is eager, however, to place her work in conspicuous 
dialogue with other texts.  Through all three of the Galesia fict ions, Barker 
supplements the mult iplicity of voice she achieves through liberal use of 
aphorisms and proverbs with an ongoing campaign of name-dropping, 
allusion and quotat ion.  The intertextuality of Love I nt r igues has been 
touched upon above.  I n A Patch-Work Screen,  along with the conspicuous 
citat ion of medical texts and their authors, biblical references, and 
allusions to Classical works, Barker specifically cites the names or t it les of 
Horace, Ovid, Virgil,  Cervantes, Dryden, and Behn (pp. 143, 132, 167, 
124, 76, 108) .  Barker also quotes others’ poet ry as a means of 
89
 This need not  be read as a cont radict ion, however.  For instance, 
Williamson sees moralist ic and fem inist  revisionism  in Barker’s 
appropriat ions of Behn:  ‘The old stories from the libert ine t radit ion refined 
and set  in a moral framework impress the reader with the scope of the 
female com munity and its st rong internal bonds’ (p. 251) . 
109 
 
encapsulat ing her own opinions, as she does twice with John Denham’s 
‘Cooper’s Hill’,  and once with Rochester’s ‘A Sat ire Against  Mankind’ (pp. 
115, 126, 155) .  She also claims Katherine Philips, ‘the Matchless Orinda’, 
as her primary inspirat ion, praising her in prose and verse and reproducing 
six lines from her ‘Song to the Tune of Adieu Phillis’ (pp. 76, 108, 127, 
139) .  I n The Lining of the Patch Work Screen, she references more than a 
dozen addit ional writers or works, peppering the text  with quotat ions and 
allusions.  This is clear ly a test imony on Barker’s part  of her own erudit ion 
and her texts’ cultural legit imacy, but  her use of intertextuality has the 
added effect  of furthering her texts’ metafict ional blurr iness.  By 
complicat ing and obscuring the provenances of her framed fict ions, she 
subordinates credulity to recept ivit y.  By populat ing her fict ions with 
fam iliar textual artefacts, she illust rates that  her work is in dialogue with 
the real-world cultural mat r ix of which her readers are a part .  These 
act ions allow Barker’s fict ions to announce their own fict ionality, and to 
indulge in the narrat ive freedoms such an acknowledgement  perm its, but  
at  the same t ime to declare a presence in - -  and so a relevance to - -  the 
real world of readers’ experience.  Barker plants her flag in both terr itor ies 
as it  were, and yet  because she does so by blurr ing boundaries, she need 
not  defend any claim  overt ly. 
The various mechanisms of Barker’s aesthet ic of mult iplicity - -  
shift ing narrat ive frames, fantast ic and rapidly successive events, allusions 
to real-world texts - -  undergo a messy fusion in the final port ion of The 
Lining.   Meditat ing on moral lessons she has gleaned reading Oswald 
Dykes, Galesia falls into a long and ext raordinary dream, which begins 
with lists of nightmarish scenes of a chaot ic world full of vice and 
suffer ing.  The dream ends with a vision of Katherine Philips high atop 
Parnassus, crowned with laurel as ‘Queen of Female Writers’ and 
serenaded by famous seventeenth-century poets, enormous grasshoppers, 
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night ingales, and fair ies (pp. 275-277) . 90
The dream reiterates the double fall experienced by ‘Jane Barker’ in 
the preface to A Patch-Work Screen.   Seeking respite from the chaos of 
the fallen world, Galesia ascends to a poet ic Parnassus, only to be 
returned to imperfect  reality by her eject ion from the hilltop celebrat ion.  
Spencer remarks that  there is ‘something wist ful’ in the dream sequence.  
Galesia’s late arr ival at  the coronat ion and her place at  it s periphery reveal 
Barker’s sense of liv ing in ‘a new and uncongenial age when the great  
t r ibutes to the poet  she adm ires are over’ and the opportunity for another 
female writer to reach such stature has passed.
  Galesia is unnot iced by Philips, 
but  the queen of the fair ies spots her and commands her to leave, though 
not  without  first  giving Galesia a pocket ful of gold. 
91
Galesia awakens to find the ambiguously generous deed 
immediately repeated in waking life - -  a st ranger delivers gold to her door.  
The money makes Galesia anxious;  by way of illust rat ion, Barker 
shoehorns in the ‘Story of a Cobler’,  in which a poor cobbler is dr iven to 
dist ract ion after finding a cache of gold.  The story breaks off in m edias 
res,  however, and Galesia’s waking experience returns to dream like 
fantasy when a sea captain calls on her hoping to sell a cargo of ‘Female 
Vertues’ he has imported from the I ndies.  She purchases them with her 
‘Fair ie-Treasure’, and by means of a hardworking dist r ibutor, whom she 
calls her ‘Factor’,  at tempts to sell them on to women of various classes all 
across London, without  much success.  I nterrupted once when a ‘Mrs. 
Castoff’ relates the tale of her descent  from respectabilit y into squalid 
  That  Galesia is paid at  
the same t ime that  she is expelled from her vision of poet ic paradise 
implies that  historically high literary arts have been degraded by modern 
commodificat ion. 
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prost itut ion, this bout  of moral mercant ilism  all but  ends the third and final 
Galesia fict ion - -  after receiving an invitat ion from the Lady, Galesia sets 
off with her vir tues for the count ry. 
The dream ’s celebrat ion of the art ist ic past  has a complementary 
polit ical intent  when read together with the heavy-handed moralizing of 
Galesia’s investment  in vir tues.  Swenson writes that  the vir tues have ‘a 
certain metonym ical value, associated as they are with a fict ional world of 
“ t imes-gone-by” ’.   The recovery of these symbolic values partakes of ‘a 
rhetorical Jacobite project , in which the idea that  a moral standard was 
lost  with the passing of an age was germane’. 92  Swenson adds, however, 
that  in Barker’s case this is not  so much a regressive nostalgia as it  is a 
call for a ‘cyclical progression’ congruent  with the springt ime set t ing of the 
text ’s final lines - -  a restorat ion. 93
I t  is then especially appropriate that  what  shut t les between 
Galesia’s dreamed and waking worlds is gold.  As King points out , gold is 
symbolically ambiguous;  it  could denote ‘the degenerat ion of the t imes or 
the pure gleam of t ranscendent  value’.
  Like the end of A Patch-Work Screen,  
The Lining ’s lack of closure, even with its glance to the past , is deliberately 
orientated toward futurity. 
94
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  I n this case, with appropriately 
Barkerian ambivalence, each sense enriches the other.  I n the course of 
her career as a writer, Barker found herself shift ing from writ ing 
manuscripts for narrow coterie circulat ion at  Cambridge in the 1670s and 
1680s to writ ing for a larger, more anonymous body of consumers of pr int  
in the eighteenth century, those whom she ent reats to ‘buy these patches 
93
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personifying t rade or booksellers.  This accommodat ion of m iddle-class 
commercialism  adds an addit ional progressive element  to the moral 
restorat ion Barker envisions. 
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up quickly’ (p. 54) . 95  I t  was a move toward commercialism  that  must  
have embarrassed her t radit ionalist  literary sensibilit ies.  Yet  to the extent  
that  Barker is a moral or polit ical polem icist , it  was also a very pragmat ic 
move - -  enabling her to get  the word out  among a disconnected diaspora 
of recept ive readers. 96
Galesia’s situat ion corresponds, whether read literally or 
metaphorically.  Her fall from  Parnassus provides her with the means and 
circumstances to reach out  to others, combat ing the disorder of the fallen 
world and comfort ing its vict ims.  Important ly, those who are most  eager 
for the vir tues she sells are those in the most  fallen circumstances:  the 
prost itutes who walk the ‘Hundreds of Drury’.  Galesia’s Factor succeeds in 
dist r ibut ing ‘Repentance and Piety’ there only after other vir tues are 
rejected (and not  always graciously)  by women of higher stat ion at  court  
and in the city (p. 282) .  Galesia is a forthr ight  narrator when dealing with 
her emot ional condit ion, yet  after lament ing a corrupt  world where 
humans are ‘more irrat ional than Brutes’ and dream ing of her own 
incompat ibilit y with the lofty realm  of her literary idol, she does not  
despair.  Despite her pessim ism about  human potent ial, Galesia seem s 
convinced that  a fall can catalyse redempt ion. 
  Though her texts are not  altogether ‘high art ’,  they 
may capitalize on their m isfit  status in order to serve a high purpose. 
Though not  normally at tended by such stoicism , resiliency is always 
in Galesia’s nature.  When her brother dies, she is inspired to apply herself 
to medicine unt il she is able to pract ise as a physician and write 
prescript ions in Lat in (p. 116) .  Over a larger plot  arc, her reject ion by 
Bosvil in Love I nt r igues spurs her toward a life of art ist ic and financial 
independence - -  an init ial failure that , as Spacks remarks, becomes ‘oddly 
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like a t r ium ph’ by the end of A Patch-Work Screen. 97
The state of fallenness, in all it s figural depth, is crucial to the 
project  assumed by Barker’s fict ion.  The social, polit ical, and religious 
cr it iques she offers are alike in finding the present  world to be fragmented, 
disordered, and bewildering because it  has in some way failed.  I n fact  it  
would be more accurate to phrase this diagnosis in the progressive:  the 
world of Barker’s fict ion is failing, because the manifold confusions she 
presents are ongoing, capable of producing ever more anomalies, 
injust ices, and dilemmas.  The tact ic dictated by this ongoing fall is a 
mot ile, provisional responsiveness on the part  of subject ive individuals.  
Barker demonst rates that  epistemological unset t ledness is the lot  of the 
individual subject , who cannot  expect  to know with certainty what  is r ight  
and yet  must  persist  anyway, without  benefit  of complete understanding 
or final confirmat ion.  Barker’s texts employ generically novelist ic 
techniques because, with their formal emphasis on reflect ing the 
complicat ions of knowledge in the phenomenal world, these are well suited 
to images of mult iplicity and indefiniteness.  The ‘ongoingness’ of the 
dialect ic between empir icism  and scept icism  inheres in the form  itself,  and 
thus the novel can efficient ly port ray the fallenness of both individual and 
world. 
  Even the literal fall 
of her coach into a r iver occasions the beginning of a rewarding 
relat ionship with the Lady. 
By craft ing fict ions in which dynam ic subject ive interior ity is cast  
against  the backdrop of an open-ended, mult iply interpretable world, 
Barker is able to cast  the fallen state of the individual subject  as a 
symptom of the fallen world but  also, crucially, as a means of dealing with 
its vicissitudes and its obscurity.  The fragmented and confused nature of 
the world requires of the individual an ongoing, good- faith st r iv ing, 
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because this is the only kind of effort  that  can proceed in the face of 
uncertainty, without  closure or affirmat ion.  There is something in this of 
the Christ ian not ion of the felix culpa or the fortunate fall.   Victor Yelverton 
Haines defines the concept :  
 
The paradoxical doct r ine of the felix culpa teaches that  the Fall of 
Adam was from one point  of view fortunate, since without  it  




Haines notes that  in this context , many human virtues are seen as 
responsive to the chain of events set  in mot ion by sin and salvat ion, such 
as ‘hopeful penance’ and ‘pat ient  suffer ing, [ …]  none of which would have 
been possible (or, of course, necessary)  without  the Fall’. 99  Barker would 
have been fam iliar with the concept  in Western literary t radit ions as well 
as in her own religious faith.  I t  is ment ioned in the Exsultet , a hymn sung 
at  the Easter Vigil of Roman Catholicism , and recurs in various theological 
and art ist ic guises throughout  Western Christ ian history, where it  is 
associated with oxymoron and juxtaposit ion. 100
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a clear connect ion to the underlying themes of Barker’s fict ions, which 
depict  a world where a person aspir ing to vir tue must  put  up with rather 
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sublime paradox, Barker’s use of novelist ic technique amounts to a call for 
faith as a means of staving off - -  though not  necessarily surmount ing - -  
the doubt  that  results from the problem of subject ive understanding.  
Barker’s rather haphazard formal m ixture carr ies this plea for recept ivity 
beyond a specifically religious context  and into a general or ientat ion 
toward otherness. 
The turn toward the reader that  so much of the text  enacts is thus 
not  a demand for unreserved agreement , or even final interpretat ion, but  
rather an appeal for the withholding of any decisiveness or finality, a 
thought ful openness.  The final openness of the text  is the most  important  
feature for Barker’s exhortatory purposes as well as for the text ’s generic 
ident ity.  What  in the specific textual content  is, for instance, a call for the 
individual to have faith in God relies upon a deeper generic analogue of 
this faithfulness - -  a humble or ientat ion to alter ity and potent ial, the sense 
that  all is neither known nor even knowable from a single subject ive 
stance, but  that  one may approach this epistem ic horizon through the 
provisional acceptance of heterogeneity.  I n generic terms, it  is the 
impossibilit y of the novelist ic task - -  the textual representat ion of 
subject ive part icular ity - -  that  allows for any specific novelist ic text  to 
proceed.  The Galesia fict ions, too scat tered and uneven to const itute a 
typological model for the novel, are nevertheless novelist ic because they 
make so evident  their provisional negot iat ions with this problem of 
representat ion in the medium of extended prose fict ion.  Their flaws, it  
could be said, comprise a literary theoret ical ‘fortunate fall’.   Barker’s texts 
proclaim  by vir tue of their very form  that  there can be no access to any 
absolute, but  that  this need not  preclude a st r iv ing toward the absolute.  
Over and above the historical details of their composit ion, it  is in this 






Mimet ic duplicity and ‘the Devil’s tennis ball’ 
 
I n the preceding chapter, Jane Barker’s emphasis on the sense of 
embat t led, condit ional understanding that  experience of mult iplicity fosters 
in individual human subjects is shown to be cent ral to the art ist ic and 
polem ical underpinnings of her Galesia t r ilogy.  More important ly to a 
broad theoret ical considerat ion of the novel, this epistemological 
provisionalit y is shown also to be situated inext r icably within the generic 
mode of novelist ic prose fict ion itself,  independent ly of Barker’s part icular 
themat ic emphases on, for instance, piety and Jacobit ism .  To label a piece 
of extended prose fict ion a novel is to label it  as invested with 
epistemological provisionality, because such is the novelist ic or ientat ion to 
the possibilit y and quality of human knowledge.  (One m ight  more usefully 
deploy this statement  in reverse:  to discover such provisionality in a text  
is to discover that  that  text  is to some degree novelist ic.)  
That  the complicat ions of understanding highlighted by this 
novelist ic epistemological stance are ingrained in the realist ic port rayal of 
individual experience has been suggested already.  Realism  is closely 
associated with the generic ident ity of the novel because, though realism  
is not  in and of it self the generic mark of the novel, it  is product ive of that  
mark.  Realism , in various forms, allows for the depict ion of problems of 
knowledge that  are open-ended and unfinalizable, problems that  require a 
correspondingly part ial and provisional way of knowing.  This claim  has 
subsequent ly been borne out  by Barker’s reliance on realism , first  as a 
port rayal of psychological interior it y, but  also in her infusing her fict ions 
with ‘t ruth to life’ by other means more deeply rooted in the genre itself,  
like themat ic emphasis on mult iplicity and a pervasive sense of 
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‘fallenness’.  These effects are components of the novel’s or ientat ion 
toward provisionality.  I n order more thoroughly to characterize this 
stance, it  is worthwhile to linger a bit  longer on what  engenders it :  figural 
reflect ion of the world. 
Mimesis, the act ion of reflect ion, can provide an informat ive source 
for such an inquiry, because, as a categorical designat ion, it  encompasses 
the various realisms that  a writer m ight  deploy to achieve novelist ic 
effects.  I ndeed, this is so even when the term  realism  is used, as in this 
study, with deliberate imprecision.  I f it  is assumed that  the novelist ic 
stance is derived, at  least  in part , from  problem s of knowledge that  are 
foregrounded by literary realism , an exam inat ion of some of the 
permutat ions the figure of m imesis has taken throughout  its use in 
Western culture can be a way to uncover derivat ive characterist ics of the 
novelist ic stance.  Accordingly, this chapter will f irst  consider the figure of 
m imesis in an abst ract  sense, independent ly of part icular literary or even 
art ist ic applicat ions.  After indicat ing some ways in which m imesis tends 
toward sim ilar problems of knowledge to those implicated by the novel, 
the chapter will proceed to t race m imet ic figures and their consequences 
in a specific novel, Tobias Smollet t ’s The Adventures of Roderick Random . 1
The word m imesis, taken direct ly from the Greek (ǋǁǋǆıǈǐ) , 
documents something of it s own status as a word of theoret ical 
importance in Western discussions of knowledge and art ist ic product ion.  
As often happens with words borrowed unt ranslated from another 
language or culture, m imesis retains an element  of the j e ne sais quoi,  
overlapping with ‘im itat ion’ but  also perm it t ing t ranslat ion as 
‘representat ion’ and generally cont r ibut ing its conspicuous and fert ile 
open-endedness to any theoret ical deliberat ions that  concern it .   Malcolm  
 
                                          
1
 Tobias Smollet t ,  The Adventures of Roderick Random ,  ed. by David 




Heath, who opts for the term  ‘im itat ion’ in his 1996 t ranslat ion of 
Aristot le’s Poet ics,  reasons that  ‘a quasi- technical term  of modern 
aesthet ics may tend to obscure the cont inuity which Aristot le perceives 
between m im êsis in paint ing, poet ry and music and in other, non-art ist ic 
forms of act ivity ’. 2  I n cont rast , Stephen Halliwell cr it icizes ‘the dangerous 
inadequacy, for the understanding of Aristot le at  least , of the 
neoclassically established and st ill current  t ranslat ion of m imesis as 
“ im itat ion” ’. 3  One suitably indeterm inate t ranslat ion m ight  be Heath’s 
phrase ‘the creat ion of likeness’. 4
Halliwell further points out  the insufficiency of any one t ranslat ion 
by emphasizing the connotat ive shift  of the term  ‘im itat ion’ that  has 
rendered it  increasingly inappropriate since its earlier use by neoclassical 
cr it ics.  Perhaps a pract ical approach is, following Halliwell,  to use m imesis 
as a ‘general designator’,  keeping in m ind a broad semant ic field rather 
than a st r ict  and proscript ive definit ion.
 
5
  Beyond Classical studies, Erich 
Auerbach’s Mim esis:  The Representat ion of Reality in Western Literature,  
emphasizes, as its subt it le indicates, the representat ive capacity of 
m imet ic im itat ion as a flexible, general impression. 6  Mat thew Potolsky 
provides an ample supply of cognates - -  ‘emulat ion, m im icry, 
dissimulat ion, doubling, theat r icalit y, realism , ident ificat ion, 
correspondence, depict ion, verisim ilitude, resemblance’ - -  and points out  
the inclusivity of m imesis as the province of ‘art ists as well as apes’. 7
                                          
2
 Aristot le, Poet ics,  t rans. by Malcolm  Heath (London:  Penguin, 1996) , p. 
xiii.  
  I n 
the pages that  follow, m imet ic term inology will be used with an eye 
3
 Stephen Halliwell,  ‘Aristotelian Mimesis Reevaluated’, Journal of the 
History of Philosophy ,  28.4 (1990) , 487-510 (p. 488) . 
4
 Poet ics,  p. xiii.  
5
 Stephen Halliwell,  The Aesthet ics of Mim esis:  Ancient  Texts and Modern 
Problem s,  (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University, 2002) , p. 14. 
6
 Erich Auerbach, Mim esis:  The Representat ion of Reality in Western 
Literature, t rans. by Willard R. Trask (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University, 
1953;  repr. 2003) . 
7
 Mat thew Potolsky, Mim esis,  (London:  Rout ledge, 2006) , pp. 1-2. 
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toward such inclusiveness and in accord with - -  and substant iat ion of - -  
the assert ion that  ‘m imesis is an int r insically double- faced and ambiguous 
concept , which is a major reason for it s long- last ing presence in the 
vocabulary of aesthet ics and crit icism ’. 8
Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz t races the origins of the term  to ‘the r ituals 
and mysteries of the Dionysian cult ’,  in which it  ‘stood for the acts of cult  
performed by the priest  - -  dancing, music, and singing’.
 
9
  Halliwell,  more 
reluctant  to speculate about  an etymology he deems ‘irrecoverable’, 
concedes that  ‘by the t ime of Aeschylus words from the mim -  root  had 
already come to be associated with the musicopoet ic arts’. 10
I n the Republic, book ten, the crux of Socrates’ argument  for the 
banishment  of poets from the ideal state is his understanding of the 
nature of m imet ic im itat ion.  He envisions an ontological hierarchy in 
which the most  absolute reality resides only in the divinely created forms 
of things, of which any individual manifestat ion is but  an imperfect  
specimen.  I m itators - -  that  is, art ists and poets - -  create mere images of 
such manifestat ions, incomplete and devoid of substance, hopelessly 
distant  from  the t ruth that  invests forms.  Because images thus 
necessarily deviate from essent ial t ruth, their power derives from an 
appeal to the irrat ional side of human psychology, and so they pose a 
double danger to the health of the republic:  they m islead by distort ing and 
dim inishing reality, and, in so doing, they foster irrat ional habits of m ind 
  However 
clouded the origins of m imesis as a concept  may be, it  is Plato whose 
t reatment  of m imesis in his Socrat ic dialogues, part icularly the Republic,  
init iates it  as a philosophical touchstone of enduring importance in the 
West . 
                                          
8
 Halliwell,  The Aesthet ics of Mim esis,  pp. 22-23. 
9
 Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, ‘Mimesis’, in Dict ionary of the History of I deas:  
Studies of Selected Pivotal I deas, ed. by Philip P. Wiener, 5 vols (New 
York:  Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973) , I I I ,  225–230 (p.226) . 
10
 Halliwell,  The Aesthet ics of Mim esis,  pp. 17, 19. 
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which pose a danger to the health of society at  large.  Hence Socrates 
proclaims, ‘A low-grade mother like representat ion, then, and an equally 
low-grade father produce low-grade children’. 11
Before progressing any further from this point , it  is important  to 
note that  the hierarchy of being envisaged in the Republic need not  be 
const rued as an encapsulat ion of Plato’s ontology.  Halliwell caut ions 
readers that  the ‘cr it ique of m imesis as “ twice removed”  from the t ruth’ is 
not  an unassailable statement  of some Platonic (or Socrat ic)  dogma.  
I nstead, it  is ‘the most  pronounced invitat ion ever issued to Plato’s readers 
to cont inue the debate themselves’.
 
12
Rigidly conceived, Platonic m imesis is less a principle set  forth in 
any one text  of Plato than it  is a rather purposeful reading of key 
passages, of which Republic ten is a principal example.  Tatarkiewicz 
summarizes this concept ion of m imesis as ‘a passive and faithful act  of 
copying the outer world’.
  The goal here is not  to reconst ruct  
the opinions of the historical Plato, but  to ext rapolate from influent ial 
concept ions of m imesis that  have emerged from that  debate, remaining 
visible in one form  or another since the earliest  cr it ical t reatments of the 
subject . 
13
                                          
11
 Plato, Republic, t rans. by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford:  Oxford University, 
1993;  repr. 1998) , p. 356. 
  Plato maintains that  the primary concern of 
the im itator is to represent  the sensory aspect  of the natural world.  
I mage-making on this account  is an act  of reproduct ion.  Furthermore, 
because m imesis precludes actual duplicat ion, the represent ing that  Plato 
describes must  be carr ied out  in as decept ive a manner as possible to 
have maximal impact .  The efficacy of a paint ing or poem is direct ly 
proport ional to its power to m islead, since, ‘An image-maker, a 
12
 Halliwell,  The Aesthet ics of Mim esis,  p. 39. 
13
 Tatarkiewicz, p. 226. 
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representer, understands only appearance, while reality is beyond him ’. 14
As a prototypical poet  and image-maker, Homer bears the brunt  of 
Socrates’ withering rhetorical interrogat ion in the Republic.   Homer writes 
of medicine, yet  cures no one;  he writes of warfare, yet  leads no one in 
bat t le;  he writes like a mentor, yet  educates no one.
  
Mortals cannot  t ruly copy reality;  they must  therefore copy it  falsely. 
15
  Homer is indeed 
eloquent , but  he is a liar, and his effect  on society is like ‘someone 
dest roying the more civilized members of a community by present ing 
ruffians with polit ical power’. 16
Preparing to declare philosophers most  fit  to rule the ideal republic, 
Socrates peppers the ever-agreeable Glaucon with rhetorical quest ions:  
 
 
I s it  possible for anything actual to match a theory?  I sn’t  any 
actual thing bound to have less contact  with t ruth than theory, 
however much people deny it?  Do you agree or not?17
 
 
I n an endnote, t ranslator Robin Waterfield suggests the above 
pronouncement  is ‘gnom ic’ and ‘rather implausible’, but  in terms of 
adhering to a metaphysics of forms, the implicat ions are at  least  internally 
consistent . 18
                                          
14
 Republic, p. 352, [ 601b, c] . 
  Socrates knows that  his discussion of an ideal state must  not  
be bogged down with adherence to real-world examples and illust rat ions, 
because such part iculars would divert  the dialogue away from its object .  
I f the state in quest ion is in fact  ideal, it  will of necessity remain at  the 
lofty height  of the world of forms, only appearing in the world of 
experience as a flawed derivat ion.  Plato’s pract ical intent  is simply to 
‘discover how a community’s adm inist rat ion could come very close to our 
15
 Republic, pp. 350-352, [ 599b-600e] . 
16
 Republic, p. 359, [ 605b] . 
17
 Republic, p. 192, [ 473a] . 
18
 Republic, p. 412. 
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theory’. 19  This is simple expediency, a response to the predicament  of the 
inhabitants of the famous allegor ical cave, where ‘the shadows of artefacts 
would const itute the only reality people in this situat ion would 
recognize’. 20
For Plato, the decept ive quality of images rests in their capacity to 
occlude the ontological gap between a form  and its phenomenal 
expression.  This inherent  deceit  is the pivotal point  in his exclusion of 
art ist ic m im esis from the ideal republic.  However, it  is precisely the 
difference of the image from the thing it  represents that , for Aristot le in 
the Poet ics, complicates its value and makes of it  something perhaps not  
quite so reprehensible.  The Poet ics develops m imesis more deeply, 
elaborat ing upon the narrowly conceived im itat ive act ions condemned by 
Socrates in Plato’s Republic.   For Aristot le, images and impressions 
themselves are the proper product  of m imesis, and so the fact  that  
im itat ion always falls short  of ontological com pleteness and factual 
exact itude is not  such a det r iment .  I m itat ion, the making of likenesses, 
ought  to st r ive for a sense of t ruth specifically in its effects, independent ly 
of documentary perfect ion;  this is why, in depict ing the world, ‘Probable 
impossibilit ies are preferable to implausible possibilit ies’.
  Whatever t ruth and reality may be found in the phenomenal 
world, they are but  the shadows of the pure essences residing at  a distant  
remove from normal human life.  Because pure form  precedes its material 
expression, Socrates and Glaucon seek to discover a theory of statecraft  to 
properly precede its pract ice.  I n the world of the cave, it  is perhaps 
opt im ist ic enough to seek to ‘come very close’ to the light  that  filters in. 
21
This reconsiderat ion of m imet ic act ion enables Aristot le to make 
claims that  would have been impossible in the Republic,  for example that  
Homer ‘taught  other poets the r ight  way to tell falsehoods’ or that  ‘it  is 
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 Republic, p. 241, [ 515c] . 
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 Poet ics,  p. 41, [ 1460a] . 
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less serious if the art ist  was unaware of the fact  that  a female deer does 
not  have ant lers than if he painted a poor im itat ion’. 22  The not ion that  
there m ight  be a ‘r ight  way’ to be false or that  a paint ing could be both 
good and erroneous would be ludicrous to Plato.  However, Aristot le’s 
redefinit ion of the object ive of m imesis changes its relat ion to the state of 
the community while maintaining a nearly unchanged concept ion of it s 
methods and ult imate nature.  Aristotelian m im esis derives its value 
through its craft ,  which is not  the flawless re-creat ion of the world, but  the 
achievement  of certain generic effects.  Moreover, these effects, far from  
‘deform ing even good people’, make people bet ter, offer ing pleasure or 
catharsis, and providing an out let  for the expression of universals. 23
Halliwell caut ions against  the m isconcept ion that  those universals 
are t ranscendent , ‘quasi-Platonic’ essences, ethical precepts, or even 
‘generalized abst ract ions’.  I nstead, he interprets Aristot le’s universals to 




  However 
conservat ively one conceives of the terms, though, the claim  that  m imesis 
is a means of im itat ing part iculars in order to make universal t ruths more 
tangible nevertheless locates Aristot le’s m imesis within a hierarchical 
ontology akin to Plato’s, albeit  one more fr iendly to image-making.  For 
both philosophers, m imet ic act ion takes place at  a manifold remove from 
ult imate reality.  I n Aristot le, though, this is not  such a cr ippling 
concession to make;  the im itat ion and its effects take place in a 
recognisably art ificial m ilieu, so that  whatever decept ion the image may 
achieve is consensual and benign.  As Gebauer and Wulf put  it :  
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I n dist inct ion to Plato, who feared the consequences of negat ive 
models, Aristot le sees precisely in their m imet ic recapitulat ion a 
possibilit y of lessening their effects. 25
 
 
Such an emphasis on the ends, rather than the means, of m imesis as an 
aesthet ic craft  lightens the burdens of factual accuracy and impeccable 
morality, and it  loosens the bonds of formal t radit ion as well.   The point  in 
t ragedy, for example, is t ragic effect , and this is not  always best  served by 
unswerving devot ion to t radit ion, ‘so one need not  t ry at  all costs to keep 
to the t radit ional stories’. 26
The Aristotelian take on m imesis carr ies on Plato’s supposit ions 
about  t ruth’s emanat ion from a realm  beyond the compass of m imet ic 
approximat ion, but  it  also im plants into this worldview a degree of 
flexibilit y not  offered to the image-makers of the Republic.   I t  is perhaps 
Aristot le’s foregrounding of m imet ic effects and leniency toward genre and 
art ist ic t radit ion, placed against  the background of a Platonic hierarchy of 
t ruth and authority, that  synthet ically const itute the adapt ive capacity of 
m imesis as a locus of aesthet ic and philosophical thought .  A variety of 
interpretat ions regarding the power and significance of m imesis can spring 
up from the same general background of assumpt ions.  Tatarkiewicz 
writes that , as the concept  of m imesis persisted in Western culture, ‘the 
Platonic and Aristotelian concept ions proved to be basic enduring concepts 
in art ;  they were often fused into one and the awareness that  they were 
different  concepts was frequent ly lost ’.
  
27
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 Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, Mim esis:  Culture, Art , Society , 
t rans. by Don Reneau (Berkeley:  University of California, 1995) , p. 26. 
  I n such a fusion, reverence for 
the a prior i assumes various forms, but  remains as a constant  accessory to 
m imesis in general. 
26
 Poet ics,  p. 16, [ 1451b] . 
27
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I n this sort  of hierarchical schema, m imet ic act ion would seem to 
be subject  to the rule of dim inishing returns.  Between the original and 
whatever im itat ion follows it ,  there must  exist  a gradient  of value such 
that  the precedent  always stands a lit t le higher that  it s successor.  I n turn, 
that  successor, dim inished though it  must  be, will nevertheless stand 
superior to any subsequent  copy for which it  serves as model.  The 
legit imacy of the original is therefore t ransferable, albeit  as an 
incrementally shrinking legacy, from im itated to im itator.  Such a state of 
affairs is art iculated to a great  extent  by Neoplatonist  thinkers like 
Plot inus, who, centuries after the Republic,  envisages a ‘systemat ically and 
magisterially hierarchical worldview’, in which ‘being or reality “ flows”  
down the cosmos from top to bot tom ’ and m imesis illust rates ‘the process 
by which all being endeavours to revert , upward, to its source’. 28
Two important  pr inciples derive from this relat ionship between copy 
and copied.  First , m imesis is a means of drawing forth and propagat ing 
that  abst ract  quality of superior ity - -  one m ight  call it  genet ic authent icity 
- -  which makes the original.  Second, inasmuch as a relat ionship of 
or iginal/ copy is hierarchical, with the original standing as the definit ive 
standard toward which the im itator st r ives, the im itat ion exalts the 
original.  Evoking the original celebrates it ,  test ify ing to its worthiness of 
emulat ion and broadening its sphere of influence, helping in turn to 
legit imate any subsequent  m imet ic references.  There is a sort  of two-way 
merit  exchange taking place in m imesis, then, wherein the im itat ion is 
valuable because it  is like the (st ill more valuable)  or iginal, and, 
  This is 
the nature of the Platonic hierarchy of being, in which any im itat ion points 
upward to the next  rung in the metaphysical ladder, so to speak, 
indicat ing some more authent ic precursor from which it  inevitably falls 
short . 
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conversely, the original is proven superior because it  inspires im itat ion.  As 
Gebauer and Wulf explain, the early medieval European concept ion of 
aesthet ic m imesis illust rates such a t ransact ion:  
 
People of the Middle Ages seem not  to have made a principled 
dist inct ion between the beauty of a sunrise, an artwork, and a 
person.  The respect ive beauty of each had always to be a 
reflect ion of the beauty of God, and thus the three different  forms 
share in common a m imet ic relat ion to the beauty of God. 29
 
 
The divine origin of beauty means that  beaut iful things are graced by the 
mark of divinity, while at  the same t ime their splendour at tests to the 
always greater magnificence of God himself.  
I n the theological polit ics of the same epoch, an analogous 
understanding of m imet ic hierarchy organized the st ructure of monarchy, 
hinging upon a ‘Christ -cent red just ificat ion of kingship’. 30  I n such a 
st ructure of im itat ion, the relat ion of God to king was as a ‘divine 
prototype and his visible vicar’. 31
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 Gebauer and Wulf, p. 67. 
  The monarch, as a material reflect ion of 
divinity, establishes an authority second only to God through a Christ - like 
im itat ive relat ion.  Read in the opposite direct ion, to im itate is likewise to 
invest  the object  of im itat ion with the authority of or iginality, which 
combines the pre-em inence of having come before with the merit  of being 
important  or influent ial enough to inspire im itat ion.  When conceived as a 
form  of im itat io Christ i or  im itat io Dei,  sovereign authority is circular and 
self- legit im at ing.  Since royal power is in fact  God’s power t ransferred, the 
st rength of the ruler is the seal of heavenly approval, and such an 
30
 Gebauer and Wulf, p. 73. 
31
 Ernst  H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies:  A Study in Mediaeval 
Polit ical Theology  (Princeton:  Princeton University, 1957) , p. 47;  quoted in 
Gebauer and Wulf, p. 72. 
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endorsement  in turn appears to be the very source of such st rength.  
I ndeed, the sovereign is consequent ly duty-bound to wield such power in 
order to acclaim  and substant iate divine will.  
Even in the late m iddle ages, as monarchical command comes to be 
conceived as deriving not  direct ly from God, but  rather from the law, the 
ontological pedigree which just ifies polit ical power retains the same 
st ructure.  I n The King’s Two Bodies,  Ernst  H. Kantorowicz explains:  
 
The ancient  idea of liturgical kingship gradually dissolved, and it  
gave way to a new pat tern of kingship centered on the sphere of 
Law which was not  want ing in its own myst icism . [ …]  I n the Age of 
Jurisprudence the sovereign state achieved a hallowing of it s 
essence independent  of the Church, though parallel to it ,  and 
assumed the eternity of the Roman empire as the king became an 
‘emperor within his own realm ’. 32
 
 
Gebauer and Wulf find in John of Salisbury’s Policrat icus ‘the idea of rex 
im ago aequitat is,  the metaphor of the king as the image of just ice’, which 
bears out  the propagat ion of royal r ight  as a species of im age-making. 33  
Law arises as the human-made m imesis of divine order, and therefore the 
ruler, though perhaps at  one further remove from the absolute than a 
‘visible vicar’,  st ill stands as the representat ive and envoy of divine force -
-  the head of ‘a secular corpus myst icum ’. 34
When beauty, goodness, and power are const ructed as emanat ions 
from the same spir itual ether, a conceptual blend begins to take shape.  
For when aesthet ic experience is conceived in such a way as to fall into 
t iered ranks, authority becomes an aesthet icizing force.  Something 
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beaut iful is so because it  embodies the divine essence of beauty.  
Likewise, the power of the medieval ruler just ifies itself inasmuch as it  
m irrors the divine m ight  of God.  Mimesis emerges in this light  as a 
component  of both r ight  and r ightness, encompassing both authority and 
obedience;  it  commands of the im itator a certain mode of existence, and 
the fealty of the im itat ion further just ifies the commanding power to which 
it  responds.  All things point  with their flaws toward perfect ion, toward the 
generat ive original atop the hierarchy of being.  This is the ‘Vast  chain of 
being, which from God began’ that  Pope t reats poet ically in his ‘Essay on 
Man’. 35
Mimesis, when conceived in the context  of a Classically inspired 
hierarchical ontology, is the mechanism by which anything is what  it  is, 
and by which it  can lay claim  to whatever r ight  or r ightness it  m ight  have, 
be it  beauty or t ruth, purity or power.  Such values cross over from the 
formal realm  into the sphere of everyday experience by means of m imesis, 
passing through successively more est ranged st rata of im itat ive distance 
as they diffuse into the compound material world.  The more faithful the 
m imesis of the copy, the more of the original’s genet ic authent icity the 
copy can at tain.  And as detailed above, because m imesis is a two-way 
t ransact ion, such a system of m imet ic self-authorizat ion ret roact ively 
characterizes the original as well as the copy.  Even as an im itat ion shapes 
  From a Neoplatonic standpoint , the ent ire world is engaged in 
m imesis, exist ing as it  does solely by vir tue of sim ilitude to a distant  a 
prior i.   Likeness (and thus compliance)  to an inaccessible abst ract  or iginal 
is thus the measure of polit ical, art ist ic, or any other kind of authority.  I t  
is the very substance of correctness.  As long as the divine prototype 
hovers somewhere beyond the vanishing point  of human understanding, 
like makes r ight . 
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it s ident ity after another, the ident ity of the object  of im itat ion shifts also, 
by vir tue of being im itated, so that  for all the passivity of the original in a 
m imet ic relat ionship, both im itated and im itator work in concert  to self-
ident ify respect ively as original and derivat ion.  I n spite of whatever 
formal, temporal, or spat ial distance separates them, im itator and im itated 
are thus brought  into proxim ity by m imesis.  Accordingly, the im itat ive 
choices of an image-maker become, in the words of Gebauer and Wulf, a 
‘movement  toward the world’, a path that  the subject  takes toward the 
object . 36
The im itat ion in this sense is an invocat ion of the original.   They co-
occur to some degree, through this referral, when the act  of im itat ion 
takes place.  Mimesis in this respect  is a remembrance;  it  establishes itself 
by harkening back to some previous thing or event .  I ndeed, the 
ident ify ing power of m imesis is an extension of this historicizing funct ion, 
since likeness connects the im itat ion to one or more precursors.  I n The 
Light  in Troy ,  Thomas Greene suggests that  a precondit ion of im itat ive art  
is an awareness of such a link between history and ident ity:  
 
 
As individuals and as communit ies, we learn who we are by means 
of pr ivate or collect ive memory.  An amnesiac is considered sick 
and unfortunate because he doesn’t  know who he is.  When he 
recovers his memory, he recovers his ident ity. 37
 
 
The im itat ive act  or object  stands apart  from  the original, but  indicates it ,  
reaches toward it ,  through m imet ic reference.  Mimesis is the act ion of 
recalling ident ity.  Things (or act ions, or individuals, or any other 
phenomena)  are what  they are through their sim ilar ity to something that  
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came before, through drawing closer to the immaterial or elusive original.  
Mimesis, because it  is im itat ive and referent ial, must  involve this kind of 
ret rospect ive ‘making close’, a movement  toward the a prior i.   This mot ion 
is conceptual rather than spat ial or temporal, but  m imesis quite literally 
approximates;  it  seeks closeness. 
As a means of establishing this type of conceptual proxim ity, 
m imesis seems to disclose a kind of reverence, especially to the extent  
that  m imet ic proxim ity sanct ions a hierarchical or iginal/ copy dynam ic.  
The t ransact ional nature of im itat ive act ion calls at tent ion to the 
hierarchical st ructure of authority in which propriety and correctness, and 
even being itself,  course downward through channels of sim ilitude.  As the 
t raits of an original repeat  in an im itat ion, or in a whole host  of im itat ions, 
the status of the original as original, and as originator, is reified.  
Compounding this celebrat ion of the precursor is the mode of homage that  
inheres in the memorializing remembrance enacted by m imesis.  The 
derivat ion proclaims itself as both document  and component  of the 
significance of the original. 
This pervading sense of reverence, of deferral to precursors, is a 
natural extension of the Neoplatonic worldview.  I n Western aesthet ics and 
theory of art , the reverent  im itat ion of role models has at tained a 
sophist icated art iculat ion under the label of im itat io.   Im itat io is essent ially 
m imesis directed toward exemplary human models, rather than toward 
nature in its raw state.  I t  was a ‘cent ral and pervasive’ standard in the 
I talian, French, and English Renaissance, influencing ‘not  only literature’, 
but  nearly every aspect  of life involving the purposeful dissem inat ion of 
knowledge. 38
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  I t  is not  exclusive to any one region or era, however, and 
resists even its most  basic definit ion, since the im itat ion of models and of 
nature seem to bleed together:  ‘some theorists [ …]  held that  to im itate 
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the greatest  master was only another way of im itat ing nature at  it s 
highest  and most  characterist ic’. 39
 
  Potolsky finds praise for im itat io 
( though at  a t ime when it  suffered cr it ical at tack)  in Alexander Pope’s 
1711 ‘An Essay on Crit icism ’:  
Unerr ing nature!   St ill divinely bright , 
One clear, unchanged, and universal light , 
Life, force, and beauty, must  to all impart ,  
At  once the source, and end, and test  of art . 40
 
 
The job of the art ist  is to im itate the perfect ion of nature, the expression 
of divinity on Earth.  And yet , as in the case of the rex im ago aequitat is,  
the individual must  approach the great  or iginal through a pre-exist ing 
st ructure of mediat ion.  I n art ist ic im itat io, this st ructure comprises the 
works of art ist ic precursors.  Pope makes this clearer as the ‘Essay’ 
cont inues, celebrat ing the greatness of Virgil,  that  ‘Mantuan Muse’, who 
‘but  from Nature’s fountains scorned to draw’;  however, Pope emphasizes 
that  Virgil’s greatness germ inated only under the tempering and refining 
influence of Homer, whose work is so well regulated that  it  prefigures ‘the 
Stagir ite’,  Aristot le. 41  Potolsky explains, ‘Following nature, in this 
instance, does not  mean t rust ing inst inct  or describing flowers.  I t  means 
following the best  human role models and im itat ing t rusted convent ions’. 42
A lineage is established here, in which a Platonic, immaterial 
or iginator in the world of forms endows Nature ( to borrow Pope’s totalizing 
majuscule)  with ‘life, force, and beauty’, those fam iliar avatars of genet ic 
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authent icity.  This originality, in turn, comes to the art ist  via the mediat ion 
of a sort  of fam ily t ree of image-makers, who, like an assembly of r ich 
aunts and uncles, have inherited shares of that  enduring authority and can 
bestow them upon their favourites among succeeding generat ions.  As 
would be expected of any heir to a lofty pedigree, the favour of these 
art ist ic predecessors demands faithful adherence to the rules of the fam ily.  
To push the filial metaphor a step further, one could state that  the role of 
im itat io in carrying forward this legacy is not  to enforce rote duplicat ion, 
but  to shape successive art ist ic product ion according to the forms that  
shaped previous works - -  to create fam ily resemblance.  As Potolsky 
notes, ‘Epic, pastoral, comedy and t ragedy [ …]  became recognizable as 
literary forms because they were objects of im itat ion’. 43
Like the m imesis described in the Republic and the Poet ics,  which 
in both cases allows a crossing over of formal or universal realit ies into the 
realm  of human experience, im itat io also is a form  of crossing over.  These 
various concept ions of m imesis all involve invest ing specific im itat ive 
behaviours or artefacts with an ethereal authorizing/ aesthet icizing force 
that  or iginates externally.  I n ‘On the Sublime’, Longinus (praising the 
Republic and echoing I on)  describes the influence of art ist ic predecessors 
as spir itual possession:  
  Convent ions and 
t radit ions are systemat ized im itat ion;  im itat io engenders genre and canon. 
 
From the great  natures of the men of old there are borne in upon 
the souls of those who emulate them (as from sacred caves)  what  
we may describe as effluences, so that  even those who seem lit t le 
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likely to be possessed are thereby inspired and succumb to the 
spell of the others’ greatness. 44
 
 
Whether it  takes the form  of sovereignty, beauty, or some nameless 
‘effluence’, authent icity in m imet ic relat ionships nonetheless propagates 
from top downward, from before to after, and m imet ic act ion moves in the 
opposite direct ion.  That  is, the passive original is approached by the 
im itat ion, which is inferior - -  if not  in value then certainly in hierarchical 
posit ion - -  and the original establishes the authoritat ive set  of 
characterist ics that  the im itator st r ives to adopt .  Thus Gebauer and Wulf 
can characterize m imesis as ‘a precondit ion of fellow- feeling, compassion, 
sympathy, and love toward other people.  I t  is im itat ion, assim ilat ion, 
surrender’. 45
I t  is this at t ract ive force of m imesis that  allows a genre or an 
art ist ic t radit ion to cohere, or a writer to feel as if possessed by the spir it  
of a literary forebear.  Such a ready conflat ion of im itat ion and love 
underscores once again the potent ial in m imesis for homage, the result  of 
the copy’s reaching upward toward its model in a vert ically-orientated 
st ructure of or iginal authority.  Reaching in this way typifies the drawing 
near of m imesis, and it  reveals a driving mechanism of im itat ion to be 
desire.  Potolsky notes that  in the Dialect ic of Enlightenment ,  Adorno’s 
concept ion of m imesis ‘does not  respect  r igid divisions between subject  
  I m itat ion is faithfulness. 
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and object .  I t  is thus akin to “ touch, soothing, snuggling up, coaxing” ’. 46
I n the works of René Girard, an especially important  type of desire 
is it self born of m imesis.  I n Girard’s discussion, this m imet ic desire forms 
a t r iangular st ructure.  The desir ing subject  feels inclined toward an object  
because of the mediat ing influence of another ent ity.  The points of 
Girard’s m imet ic t r iangle are therefore the subject , the object  and the 
mediator.  Drawing an example from Cervantes, Girard points out  that  
Don Quixote quite lucidly expresses his yearning for a chivalrous life 
through a desire to be as sim ilar as possible to his supposed precursor in 
knight -errant ry, Amadis of Gaul.  ‘Chivalr ic existence is the im itat ion of 
Amadis in the same sense that  the Christ ian’s existence is the im itat ion of 
Christ ’.
  
As homage, as remembrance, and as a movement  into proxim ity, m imesis 
enacts desire. 
47
  Sim ilar ly, Sancho Panza’s ambit ious plans for his future do not  
ar ise spontaneously;  instead they are born through m imesis, for ‘it  is Don 
Quixote who has put  them into his head’. 48  I n both cases, the characters’ 
wills are shaped by a ‘desire according to the Other ’. 49  The m imet ic 
nature of this type of t r iangular desire is engrained so deeply in its act ion 
as to be invisible.  ‘Don Quixote and Sancho borrow their desires from the 
Other in a movement  which is so fundamental and prim it ive that  they 
completely confuse it  with the will to be Oneself’. 50
The way these characters idolize their m imet ic models of desire 
illust rates the capacity for love inherent  in reverent  m imet ic act ion.  The 
emulat ion of the model easily t ranslates into adorat ion.  I n language 
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st r ik ingly compat ible with a Platonic metaphysical hierarchy, Girard writes 
that  a character engaged in this kind of m imesis ‘worships his model 
openly and declares himself [ the model’s]  disciple’. 51  I n such a situat ion, 
the m imet ic model is ‘external’,  distant , ‘enthroned in an inaccessible 
heaven’, which makes worship possible. 52  I f,  however, that  distance 
collapses and the subject  and model of m imet ic desire fall into reciprocal 
interact ion, the possibilit y of compet it ion for the same object  awakens the 
conflictual potent ial of m imet ic proxim ity.  I ndeed, in this more volat ile 
‘internal’ mediat ion, typified in Girard’s discussion by characters from 
Stendhal, the mere prospect  that  such compet it ion could develop can 
intensify the m imet ic subject ’s desire, fostering a sort  of vicious, and 
perhaps violent , cycle.  I n such a situat ion, m imesis alone may invest  the 
object  with its importance;  as Gebauer and Wulf comment , ‘The at t ract ive 
force of the object  does not  lie in its inherent  value;  nor is it  rendered 
valuable by the libido of the compet itors’. 53
To emulate the model, the desir ing subject  must  emulate the 
model’s desires, thereby compet ing for the same object .  Likeness 
paradoxically places them at  odds:  
  Each compet itor, that  is, 
im itates what  he or she perceives to be the other’s desire for the object . 
 
The mediator can no longer act  his role of model without  also 
act ing or appearing to act  the role of obstacle.  Like the relent less 
sent ry of the Kafka fable, the model shows his disciple the gate of 
paradise and forbids him  to enter with one and the same gesture. 54
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Don Quixote’s m imet ic desire leads him  to admire and venerate his model, 
and yet  essent ially the same desire - -  the wish to be like another - -  can 
foster an equally powerful enm ity between subject  and model.  I n internal 
mediat ion, ‘The subject  is torn between two opposite feelings toward his 
model - -  the most  subm issive reverence and the most  intense malice’. 55
Desire is of singular im portance to m imesis, for not  only does it  
provide the impetus for m imet ic act ion, but  the paradoxical nature of 
desire suggests a cont radict ion at  the heart  of any im itat ive undertaking.  
Desire implies, in fact  requires, absence.  The potent ial violence of Girard’s 
internal mediat ion makes this clear.  The dest ruct ive capacity of a m imet ic 
relat ion is proport ionate to the mutual presence of subject  and object .  
Even in a very concrete instance of desire - -  for example a person want ing 
a glass of water - -  what  is desired must  yet  be out  of reach.  One cannot  
want  what  one already has.  The same holds t rue for m imesis, the desire 
for likeness, which in spite of it s tendency to abst ract ion is nevertheless 
subject ive and direct ional.  I m itat ion is t ransit ive;  it  needs an other, a 
model, even if that  model happens to be hypothet ical or imaginary.  By 
definit ion, to want  is to lack, and so desire exists by vir tue of a void at  it s 
end.  And m imesis, like its adjunct , desire, moves toward its object  
without  at taining it .  
  
This propensity to fuel both ‘reverence’ and ‘malice’ is latent ly 
characterist ic of m imesis in general, because m imesis always yokes 
together likeness and unlikeness.  I t  is the duplicity of m imesis that  allows 
Girard to open the convent ionally linear st ructure of desire into a t r iangle, 
and to discover in its workings the st r ik ing sim ilar ity between the recipes 
for love or hat red. 
The counterpart  to the im itat ion’s self- ident ificat ion through 
sim ilar ity is it s concurrent  self-definit ion as other than the original.  The 
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aforement ioned m imesis of sun and king may be repeated in this context :  
the Platonic beauty of a sunset  is praiseworthy because it  funct ions as a 
reference to divine beauty;  such a reference is accessible, is present  at  all,  
only by vir tue of it s falling short  of t rue divinity.  The same follows for the 
monarch who merits subm ission as rex im ago aequitat is or im itat io Dei.   
The king rules as an earthly viceroy for the immaterial, a m imesis of divine 
will,  and the just ificat ion of his posit ion hinges on the inevitable falling 
short  of m imesis.  He is both like God (and so to be obeyed)  and yet  also 
unlike God (and so physically present  to rule) .  Within this all- important  
falling short  appears a crucial dist inct ion between desire and m imesis:  
whereas desire may move toward its object  to the point  of fulfilment , 
m imesis inherent ly preserves difference.  I t  remains confined to the realm  
of likeness, always outside of sameness. 
Reviewing Auerbach’s Mim esis,  Terry Eagleton points out  that  an 
im itat ion must  preserve some kind of difference in order not  to disappear 
altogether:  
 
I f a representat ion were to be wholly at  one with what  it  depicts, it  
would cease to be a representat ion.  A poet  who managed to make 




The not ion of the flawless copy is an oxymoron;  a copy cannot  be 
recognized as flawless if it  is to be recognizable as a copy.  As Jacques 
Derr ida notes in an essay that  will be discussed below,  ‘A perfect  im itat ion 
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is no longer an im itat ion’. 57  Hence, m imet ic act ion approaches the 
original, but  at  the same t ime, it  reinforces the otherness of what  has 
come before.  This complicates the not ion of m imesis as the foundat ion for 
a relat ion of proxim ity.  The closeness of m imesis places im itat ion and 
original beside each other in unavoidable comparison, but  any 
resemblance becomes a marker of discrepancy, and so m imet ic sim ilar ity 
highlights difference:  ‘Sim ilar ity is thus the determ inat ive characterist ic of 
the image [ …] ;  on the one hand, the image is a double, and on the other, 
it  is a mere illusion’. 58  The drawing near of m imesis is also a falling short , 
because it  reaches into an impassable gulf of ident ity.  As much as it  may 
contain a ‘movement  toward the world’, it  also ‘secures the “primacy of 
the object ”  against  the subject ’s claims to dom inat ion’. 59  Sim ilar ity must  
encompass sameness and difference;  it  must  reach but  not  grasp.  This 
seems to parallel what  Halliwell describes as a ‘tension between discrepant  
impulses in Plato’s thinking’.  On the one hand, the impoverished nature of 
images and image-making promotes a sense ‘that  reality cannot  
adequately be spoken of, described, or modeled [ …] ’;  on the other hand is 
the implicat ion ‘that  all human thought  is an at tempt  to speak about , 
describe or model reality ’.   The result  is that  Plato’s m imesis appears as ‘a 
lost  cause, doomed to failure’ yet  also ‘all we have, or all we are capable 
of’ - -  the only available mechanism of human apprehension. 60
Because the im itat ion can never be ident ical with the original, 
m imet ic act ion must  be to some extent  select ive.  I t  must  temper 
sameness with difference.  As such, it  becomes not  only a passage into the 
ident ity of the original, but  also into the im itat ion as an object  in its own 
r ight .  I ndeed, in the Poet ics,  Aristot le equates the pleasure of images with 
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that  of ‘understanding’, because the recognit ion of an object  as im itat ive 
of something else requires an informed, interpret ive act . 61
Auerbach sees m imesis as a key to relat ing the use of figure in 
human expression to the social and historical moment  from which it  
springs.  The select ions made through im itat ion, the om issions or 
amplificat ions that  reveal the heredity and uniqueness of part icular 
cultural objects, are for Auerbach windows which offer to an exam ining, 
interpret ing eye a prospect  on the preoccupat ions of the historically-
located societ ies that  produce and reproduce them.  Hence, through 
interpretat ion, not  of Don Quixote but  rather of the way in which the 
Quixote engages the currents of t radit ion and im itat ion on which it  dr ifts, 
Auerbach can speak of a Cervant ic ‘at t itude toward the world’.
  Further, 
spot t ing an im itat ion as an im itat ion requires recognit ion of both sim ilar ity 
and difference.  This visibilit y of the select ions entailed by m imet ic 
associat ion is a precondit ion of hermeneut ic understanding.  To recognize 
likeness is (at  least  to begin)  to recognize ident ity.  Those aspects of the 
original that  reappear in the im itat ion, and those that  are om it ted, as well 
as any distort ions or addit ions int roduced into the m imet ic act , become 
readable and interpretable as a text .  I t  is this aspect  of m imesis - -  the 
opening of a space between original and im itat ion that  reflexively grants 
access to both - -  that  const itutes one of Auerbach’s cent ral themes in his 
Mim esis. 
62
  I n the 
divergence of biblical from  Classical stor ies, he reads the rise of early 
Christ ianity and the consequent  volat ilit y in concepts of high and low, 
sacred and profane. 63
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the chorus of voices invoked by the myriad connect ions from which a 
given work draws in establishing its own ident ity.  As the work of Auerbach 
demonst rates, looking for a culture’s signatures in certain texts provides 
insights not  only on that  culture or those texts, but  also on how texts 
reveal culture at  all.   Mimet ic select ivity generates and makes available 
not  only new inroads into understanding the respect ive contexts of both 
im itat ion and original, but  also an altogether new synthesis of these two:  
their relat ion of proxim ity as an interpretable object . 
To return to context , a component  of the distance maintained by 
m imesis inheres in the contextual reference int r insic to any im itat ive act .  
I ts appearance in new circumstances is part  of the im itat ion’s self-
ident ificat ion as an other, part  of what  marks it  as an im itat ion, and, 
indeed, part  of what  allows a reader from Auerbach’s vantage to find that  
m imesis informs on both original and copy as a kind of hermeneut ic meta-
text .  However, the contextual shift  brought  about  by m imesis re-
contextualizes sim ilar it ies as well as differences.  Even the likeness of an 
im itat ion cont r ibutes to its status as other;  hence the unset t ling power of 
repet it ion, doubling, and the ‘secret ly fam iliar ’ of the Freudian uncanny. 64  
This is why meet ing one’s doppelgänger  would be far more disturbing than 
meet ing someone merely wearing the same out fit , or why a perfect ly 
executed t rom pe l’œil paint ing of ivy would be more st r ik ing (and more 
cost ly)  than the plant  it  represents.  I t  is precisely because of m imet ic 
distancing that  im itat io in the Renaissance could honour ut ter ly pagan 
art ist ic pract ices without  overt ly cont radict ing Christ ian orthodoxy:  
‘I m itat ing the ancients also meant  distancing oneself from  them ’. 65
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creat ion of likeness’ without  conceding that  m imesis must  inversely create 
unlikeness as well. 66
The making other of even those characterist ics that  are, for all 
appearances, faithfully carr ied over from the original means that  the 
select iv ity of an im itat ion supplies a commentary.  That  is, the im itat ion 
draws at tent ion to the pre-existence of certain aspects of the original, but  
draws them out  of their earlier context  into new surroundings.  
Consequent ly, the original, conjured into a new m ilieu, is de-historicized, 
made closer to contemporaneous judgment , but  concurrent ly held at  arm ’s 
length, placed at  the extent  of an ironic, scrut inizing distance.  I n the 
process of being called forth from its historical context , the object  of 
im itat ion becomes subject  to new valuat ions, and by vir tue of being thus 
judged, it  also becomes distanced as an other, bearing the signature of it s 
historical m oment  even as it  is divorced from it .   Of course ‘every parody 
pays its own oblique homage’,  and interpret ive scrut iny implies some 
inherent  worthiness in its object .
 
67
   Besides, the process of making other 
need not  take the form of an at tack.  Nostalgia could not  operate without  
this same apparatus of m imet ic select ion and re-contextualizat ion.  I n 
Potolsky’s words, ‘As every school child knows, im itat ion can be cruel as 
well as complim entary’. 68
As discussed previously, m imesis makes a kind of homage as it  
draws near its object .  How then can it  also embody antagonism?  Mimesis 
necessarily involves a ‘moving toward’, and so in the temporal hierarchy in 
which prior ity makes validity, m im et ic im itat ion is the mark of the 
devotee, or even the supplicant .  However, this vert ical arrangement , in 
which the original presides over the state and posit ion of the im itat ion, is 
  I n fusing proxim ity and distance, m imesis 
inst igates both t r ibute and t ravesty. 
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not  the sole expression of m imet ic proxim ity.  Without  abandoning t ime as 
an organizing principle in m imet ic relat ion, the hierarchy of or iginalit y, of 
dom inant  prior ity, may undergo an inversion.  Mimesis is potent ially as 
much a performance of aggression as it  is one of devot ion. 
Time and proxim ity are integral to the m imet ic act , and in light  of 
the passivity and precedence of the original, they illum inate this duality 
between approbat ion and aggression.  For im itat ion to amount  to 
devot ion, temporal and conceptual pr ior ity must  be synonymous with pre-
em inence, a posit ion im plied by the Neoplatonic ontological hierarchy.  The 
passivity of the original in this paradigm is the aloof disinterest  of the 
ranked superior.  However, the state of antecedence, of having been 
before, does not  guarantee such superior ity.  As much as m imesis 
memorializes, it  also sets in mot ion the process of forget t ing. 69
Considered from a point  in t ime contemporaneous with the 
im itat ive act , the original resides at  a distance, claimed by the past .  I t  is 
the prototype, perhaps, but  bears its influence on the im itator not  as the 
standard of aspirat ion, but  rather from the distant  and immaterial remove 
of inspirat ion.  Cont rarily, the im itat ion is, in more than one sense, 
present ;  it  stands over and above the original, overshadowing it ,  the 
culm inat ion of a prim it ive forerunner.  As J. G. Droysen points out  
concerning historical understanding, ‘We can only find and posit  the origin 
in relat ion to that  which has already become’.
 
70
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  When the temporal 
relat ion between original and im itat ion is conceived in such a light , the 
passivity of the original is that  of the outmoded and the usurped.  
Observing m imet ic repet it ion in the speeches of Chryses and Achilles 
which bookend the I liad,  Arne Melberg notes repet it ion’s openness to 
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alterat ion:  ‘Repet it ion repeats what  has been, but  turns it  into something 
else:  repet it ion re-presents and overcomes its or igin’. 71
Herein lies the aggressive capacity of m imesis.  I f the m imet ic 
process is one of ‘moving toward’, of creat ing a relat ionship of proxim ity 
between im itator and im itated, then the implied end of such a mot ion 
m ight  be collision, alterat ion, or replacement  as easily as worship or 
surrender.  Gebauer and Wulf note that  the t ransformat ive power of 
m imesis features even in Aristot le’s descript ion of the im itat ive arts, which 
‘aim  much more at  “beaut ifying”  and “ improving”  individual features, at  a 
universalizat ion.  Mimesis is thus copying and changing in one’.
  Mimet ic proxim ity 
is established through the im itat ion approaching its or iginal, but  within its 
outward show of devot ion such an approach carr ies the threat  of 
deposit ion. 
72
  The 
im itat ion, as a more current  and potent ially bet ter version of the original, 
threatens to efface its own heredity, impersonat ing the original and cut t ing 
it  off from the present .  Such a sense is conveyed in the t ranslat ion of 
m imesis as representat ion;  it  may involve ‘the “absent ificat ion”  of the 
represented object :  the object  is replaced’. 73
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  The im itat ion cannot  become 
the original,  but  it  can, by represent ing it ,  eclipse it  into invisibilit y.  As 
much as it  approaches the a prior i, m imesis remains rooted in its own 
context .  As a commentary, a fam iliar izat ion, or even an improvement , the 
im itat ion can both m ake over  the original and make the original over .   I n 
either case, the later derivat ion im pinges on the original, obscuring it  and 
threatening to conceal it  behind the mask of it s own reflect ion.  Mimet ic 
closeness can thereby be the method of the original’s displacement . 
72
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I t  is a telling duplicity that  ‘or iginality ’ connotes both prior ity and 
novelty.  To be the first  of a kind is to be new;  yet , in a series of 
iterat ions, to be newest  is to be latest  and last .  What  takes the form  of a 
cont radict ion is not  necessarily a cancellat ion.  For m imesis is a 
t ransact ion;  it  moves in more direct ions than one.  I t  is, to repeat  
Halliwell,  ‘double- faced and ambiguous’. 74  This is part  of the danger Plato 
at t r ibutes to m imesis in the Republic.   The so-called lies of reckless poets 
are too volat ile for their  inexpert  hands;  though they can be ‘helpful [ …]  as 
a preventat ive medicine’, they are injur ious if poorly prescribed. 75  What  
Waterfield t ranslates in this passage as ‘medicine’ is the problemat ic term  
pharm akon (ĳƾǏǋĮǉǎǑ) , of which Gebauer and Wulf write: 76
 
 
The Greek concept  of pharmakon is unt ranslatable;  it s 
characterist ic significatory ambivalence cannot  be conveyed in 
other languages.  Pharmakon means poison, drug, and remedy all 
at  once.  I ts ambiguity and ambivalence cannot  be sublated. 77
 
 
I n a considerat ion of the slipper iness and reversibilit y of m imesis, the 
concept  of the pharm akon is a useful tool. 
I n ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, Derr ida discusses the significance of this 
term  to the Phaedrus.   I t s polysemy exposes it  to the ‘imprudence or 
empir icism  of the t ranslators’, so that , as Gebauer and Wulf note above, it  
may be expressed only with part ial approximat ions in English (or of course 
French) .  However, the r ich imprecision of pharm akon precedes its 
t ransferral into another language;  the term  takes on such a diversity of 
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meaning in Socrates’ thought  that  it  has essent ially been t ranslated within 
the same language, ‘between Greek and Greek’, and made from a 
‘nonphilosopheme into a philosopheme’. 78  Derr ida links this ambiguous 
term  to writ ing, cit ing a passage from late in the Phaedrus in which the 
capacity to write is explicit ly labelled as a pharm akon and presented as an 
aid to memory by vir tue of the very same capacity that  makes it  also a 
threat  to memory. 79
 
  He proceeds to develop a complex of associat ions in 
which writ ing, as pharmakon,  is embodied in the mythos of the Egypt ian 
god of writ ing, Thoth, a ‘god-doctor-pharmacist -magician’ capable of 
standing in for the hierarchically superior god Ra:  
As a subst itute capable of doubling for the king, the father, the 
sun, and the word, dist inguished from these only by dint  of 
represent ing, repeat ing, and masquerading, Thoth was naturally 
also capable of totally supplant ing them and appropriat ing all their 
at t r ibutes. 80
 
 
Repet it ion and representat ion that  carr ies with it  the threat  of effacement  
and usurpat ion, an upward reaching that  upsets metaphysical order, these 
are the qualit ies of Thoth that  Derr ida aligns with writ ing as pharm akon.   
Thoth is an im itator, a m imet icist  who ‘extends or opposes by repeat ing or 
replacing’, by enact ing the paradox of m imesis:  
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The figure of Thoth takes shape and takes its shape from the very 
thing it  resists and subst itutes for.  But  it  thereby opposes it self, 
passes into its other, and this messenger-god is t ruly a god of the 
absolute passage between opposites. 81
 
 
As in book ten of the Republic,  the Phaedrus dialogue also links writ ing 
with paint ing, considering both to be im itat ive of reality. 82  Both ‘have 
faithfulness to the model as their model’;  both are ‘m imet ic techniques’. 83
The denotat ive complexity and reversibilit y of the word pharm akon 
is perfect ly suited to the Janus- faced mutabilit y of m imesis:  
  
Mimesis is thus an instance of the Derr idean pharm akon,  and so the 
characterist ics of the lat ter concept  can be used as a key to those of the 
former. 
 
Ambivalent , playing with itself by hollowing itself out , good and evil 
at  once - -  undecidably, PLPŋVLV is akin to the pharm akon.  No 
‘logic, ’ no ‘dialect ic, ’ can consume its reserve even though each 
must  endlessly draw on it  and seek reassurance through it . 84
 
 
What  m imesis does, it  undoes.  I t  enacts reverence, remembrance, love 
and desire, and yet  it  is the substance of mockery, of effacement , jealousy 
and hat red.  I t  illum inates likeness and resemblance even as it  proves and 
preserves difference.  Mimesis enables the carrying over of universals, 
allowing the t ransferabilit y of abst ract ions like beauty, power, and 
categorical resemblance across concrete, individual expressions.  
Nevertheless, it  perpetually falls short  of this same feat , for sim ilar ity 
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encloses difference, and the part icular is always also the incomplete.  As 
Derr ida writes, ‘I m itat ion does not  correspond to its essence, is not  what  it  
is - -  im itat ion - -  unless it  is in some way at  fault  or rather in default ’. 85
The dissim ilar ity embedded within likeness is the keystone for the 
ent ire edifice of m imesis.  I t  is the falling short  from  the absolute original 
that  allows any im itat ion to exist  as a separate and apprehensible im age.  
By such a mechanism, m imet ic authority announces itself present ;  the 
two-way, t ransact ional nature of m imet ic authorizat ion and ident ificat ion 
funct ions thanks to this not -being.  To repeat  is simultaneously a mot ion 
‘back in t ime to what  “has been” ’ and ‘a movement  forward:  it  “makes”  
new and is, therefore, “ the new” ’.
  
Almost  and not  quite, drawing close but  keeping a distance, m imesis is 
approximat ion. 
86
Like the ‘passage between opposites’ Derr ida at t r ibutes to the 
figure of Thoth, m imesis has the capacity to act  as a shut t le, moving 
interst it ially between scales, t imes, or degrees of abst ract ion, and this 
allows it  to endure as an axis of cr it ical discourse.
  Mimesis reaches toward its or igin, 
establishing sim ilar ity, desir ing.  Yet  in this at t ract ion the im itat ion proves 
its difference, because the original is as untouchable as a mathemat ical 
asymptote, infinitely approachable and ever separate. 
87
  At  the same t ime, this 
makes it  insidious;  m im esis, as pharm akon,  underm ines dualist ic 
opposit ions.  The self-perpetuat ion of m imesis invests even Plato’s 
condemnat ion of image-making.  Melberg calls this ‘the puzzling paradox 
that  is never conceptually art iculated, but  is always present  in Plato’s 
argument  against  m imet ic poet ry:  the argument  is it self m imet ic’. 88
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  This 
is not  so much a weakness in Plato’s argument , though, as it  is an 
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inevitable characterist ic of the topic.  Gebauer and Wulf explain, ‘A 
conceptual representat ion of m imesis is not  a prior i superior to simple 
m imesis;  it  too contains a m imet ic representat ional component ’. 89  
Speaking specifically of representat ion in a literary context , Eagleton 
makes a sim ilar point , claim ing that  ‘you cannot  compare representat ions 
with “ reality”  [ …] , since what  we mean by “ reality”  it self involves 
quest ions of representat ion’. 90  One must  im itate to think about  and 
discuss im itat ion, and so every illum inat ion of the subject  will cast  new 
shadows.  I n the words of Halliwell,  ‘The m imet icist  t radit ion [ …]  was, 
from the outset , a framework for argument  and dialect ic, not  [ …]  a 
doct r inaire cont inuum ’. 91
Such unfinalizable generat ivity invests the theorizat ion of m imesis 
because m imesis itself is generat ive.  I n Derr ida’s words, ‘No “ logic” , no 
“dialect ic” , can consume its reserve even though each must  endlessly 
draw on it  and seek reassurance through it ’.
  As a pharm akon,  as a simultaneous carrying 
over and falling short , m imesis engenders a dialect ical dynam ism that  
accommodates an indefinite range of analyt ical act ivity. 
92
  I t  follows, then, that  
m imet ic art ist ic pract ices exemplify what  Melberg calls a corresponding 
‘act ive, product ive, and highly moveable paradox’. 93
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  More than being 
simply at  odds with itself,  m imet ic act ivity generates from internal 
opposit ion the capacity for renewal and creat ivity, for a reproduct ion more 
organic than mathemat ical, fostering growth and variat ion.  This is why 
innovat ion arises in the works of a faithful pract it ioner of Renaissance 
im itat io consciously im itat ing the past .  Likewise, this is why the works of 
a Romant ic individualist  st ruggling against  the ghosts of t radit ion can 
90
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achieve the culm inat ion of a t ime-honoured canon.  ‘To make new is 
impossible;  and it  is impossible not  to make new’. 94
As Aristot le points out  in the Poet ics,  im itat ive representat ion, 
because it  in some degree part icipates in the relat ion of universals to 
part iculars, takes place in the realm  of probabilit y.  So in m imesis is ‘the 




At  this point , some general characterist ics of m imesis as a figural 
mechanism can be ext rapolated from the preceding discussion.  Mimesis 
posits a hierarchically superior and temporally pr ior or iginal.  I m itat ive 
authent icity and authority are subject ively quant ifiable degrees of likeness 
to this original, which must  itself be somehow absent .  Mimesis thus 
establishes a horizon in which the original is incompletely approachable - -  
im itat ion may draw ever nearer to it ,  but  by definit ion cannot  possibly 
at tain it .   Consequent  to this situat ion of the im itated ideal at  an 
unbridgeable remove is the not ion of a m imet ic short fall,  a gap between a 
representat ion and its object , which has been shown to be cent ral to 
Barker’s representat ions of mult iplicity and falleness.  This chapter has 
suggested that  such a short fall is the source of the decept ive capacity of 
  Perhaps the key to the ( re)product ive power of m imesis, 
whether in cr it ical or art ist ic terms, is this state of ‘as if’,  in which exist ing 
st ructures of understanding prevail just  as in a purely empir ical world, but  
benefit  from  the added potent ial of provisionality.  I n an im itat ion, what  is 
remains open to what  m ay be,  and every theoret ical approach or art ist ic 
success broadens the scope of possibilit y.  No im itat ion can be conclusive 
because in the lineage of every dominant  mode rest  the materials of it s 
deposit ion.  The power of m imesis lies at  once in doubling and in doubling 
back. 
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mimesis, which involves not  merely the illusory power of sim ilar ity to 
occlude that  which it  m im ics, but  also the paradoxical mutual entailm ent  
of sim ilar ity and difference.  Because it  moves toward the horizon of 
sameness, m imesis enacts likeness only by simultaneously proving 
unlikeness.  I n this cont rariness is the doubleness of the Derr idean 
pharm akon, as well as the generat ive capacity of m imesis:  making new by 
making over. 
I n Tobias Smollet t ’s 1748 novel The Adventures of Roderick 
Random ,  m imesis is the ever-present  cent re of problems of human 
behaviour, morality, and knowledge.  I n addit ion to Smollet t ’s concern 
with m imet ic realism , apparent  in his detailed port rayal of the often sordid 
material condit ions of day- to-day life, the novel develops themes of 
impersonat ion, decept ive appearances, and inverted hierarchies.  
Smollet t ’s protagonist , the t it le character, is quite literally set  in mot ion by 
a version of the m imet ic gap - -  he is out raged that  the world is not  as it  
ought  to be.  As he moves through a fallen landscape, Roderick assumes 
various roles and appearances, unt il he himself becomes a sort  of liv ing 
pharm akon.  I n order to bring the novel to its comedic conclusion he 
assim ilates to the society against  which he has previously railed, enact ing 
a m imet ic reversal that  takes place in mult iple, overlapping aspects of his 
being.  Not  only does he finally pay im itat ive homage to the moral fluidity 
and ad hoc authority that  once disgusted him , but  he does so in a way 
that  reinforces his erstwhile cr it icism  of these faults, thus making an 
affirmat ion and an affront  in one gesture.  I n doing so, he also takes on 
paternal t raits, both by re-establishing his connect ion to his own father 
and by becom ing a father himself, so that  his metaphysical m im esis 
engenders physical m imesis.  The remainder of this chapter will therefore 
focus on Roderick Random  as an example of the way m imesis, already 
posited to be integral to the generic ident ity of the novel, reiterates and 
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reconfigures the problems of understanding associated with novelist ic 
fict ion in the previous discussion of Barker’s Galesia t r ilogy. 
I n terms of narrat ive content , Smollet ’s novel shares lit t le with 
Barker’s fict ions;  however, both authors seek, as Jerry C. Beasley notes, 
to ‘v igorously detail the spreading decay of English culture’. 96  Sim ilar ly, 
Michael Rosenblum exam ines Smollet t ’s novels as what  he deems 
‘conservat ive sat ire’. 97  A sat ir ist  seeks to uncover relat ions and 
commonalit ies in the world, Rosenblum writes, which reveal the deeply 
flawed nature of life as it  is.  They create an image of ‘the bad society’, a 
culture that  holds together only because it  is ‘coherent ly bad’. 98  What  
makes Smollet t ’s sat ir ical vision conservat ive, argues Rosenblum, is that  
in his novels ‘the bad society is loose, unst ructured, perm issive, uncertain 
of it s values’. 99  Ronald Paulson also detects in Smollet t  a Tory distaste, 
common in the sat ire of the t ime, for ‘uncont rolled and chaot ic license’. 100  
Though ‘Smollet t  himself scorns those who make too much of the 
Tory/ Whig dist inct ion’, the author’s social conservat ism  seems abundant ly 
clear in Roderick Random . 101
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  The Random  world is t ruly a disordered 
place.  Smollet t  illust rates a broken class st ructure, corrupt  authority 
figures, an absence of moral st r ictures, lawlessness, and a generally 
reigning chaos that  permeates society down to the diseased and disfigured 
bodies of the beings who comprise it .   As Rosenblum observes, the evils of 
this novelist ic world arise as the result  of too much license - -  insufficient ly 
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governed agency.  People, whether as social beings, representat ives of the 
state, or biological ent it ies, do not  behave as they should.  Beasley points 
out  that , with ‘moral rot tenness and stupidity’ ascendant  in the m ilitary, 
government , and legal systems, social hierarchy becomes a kind of 
contagious counter-order:  ‘The rest  of society repeats the failures of these 
polit ical inst itut ions’. 102
The eponymous hero of the tale is just  one man, however, for 
whom reining in such a tumult  would be a fut ile endeavour.  Roderick’s lot , 
Smollet t  asserts in his preface, is to embody ‘modest  merit  st ruggling with 
every difficulty to which a fr iendless orphan is exposed’, elicit ing the 
sympathy of the reader, whose ‘heart  improves by the example’ (pp. 5, 3) .  
Conscient ious physician that  he is, Smollet t  prescribes the im itat ive 
internalizat ion of orderliness as a tonic not  only for the corrupt  world of his 
narrat ive, but  for the reader who apprehends it  as well.   The chapters that  
follow this polite apologet ic are not  quite so st raight forwardly didact ic, 
however.  The reader finds neither a fantasy of utopian order labor iously 
reclaimed, nor an exemplary tale of vir tue maintained in a host ile world.  
I nstead, Smollet t  presents a text  that , while superficially venerat ing order 
and propriety, simultaneously casts doubt  upon the possibilit y of these 
aspirat ions, posing uneasy quest ions that  never quite find their answers.  
Mimesis is duplicitous, always moving in two direct ions, and so when the 
solut ion to the problems of the bad society materializes as r ight  regained 
  Considered from a Neoplatonic perspect ive in 
which human inst itut ions are an im itat ive st r iv ing toward the order of 
or iginal form , the downfall from  which the bad society suffers is a failure of 
m imesis.  The only adjustment , it  follows, that  could possibly set  such a 
fallen world aright  is a m imet ic regression to a purer state by means of the 
imposit ion of order. 
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through m imesis, Roderick Random , conservat ive as it  may be, becomes 
something far more complex than the unilateral r idicule of disorder. 
Roderick’s earliest  experiences make it  clear that  the world into 
which he has been thrown is one where he can count  on nothing except  
the general indifference and cruelty of others.  I t  is a world turned upside-
down, in which neither high birth nor loving parents can guarantee safety 
and comfort .  Effect ively parent less, Roderick faces the ‘implacable hat red’ 
of his cousins and the hypocrit ical indifference of his grandfather, who 
‘would st roak my head, bid me be a good boy, and prom ise to take care of 
me’, yet  who then bundles him  off to a school where ‘he never paid for my 
board, nor supplied me with cloaths, books, and other necessaries I  
required’, leaving Roderick ‘very ragged and contempt ible’ (p. 13) .  
Consequent ly, Roderick’s difficult  posit ion results from the inconstancy of 
the fam ily pat r iarch ( rather injudicious behaviour from one who acts as 
judge in local ‘cases of scandal’)  compounded by the jealous malice of his 
extended fam ily.  Such t reatment  is obviously callous and dishonest , but  
more important ly, it  is unjust .  I t  cont radicts the dictates of convent ion.  
However more or less unpleasant  young Roderick’s experience of his 
fam ily’s unconcern m ight  be, the greater wrong is that  they simply ought  
not  to behave as they do.  As representat ives of a culturally founded 
inst itut ion - -  the fam ily - -  Roderick’s cousins and grandfather are 
supposed (by both the reader and the int ratextual norms of Roderick’s 
world)  to look after him .  That  the reader’s concept ion of what  is r ight  
m irrors propriety as it  should manifest  in the novel is declared in 
Smollet t ’s preface, when he invokes ‘that  generous indignat ion which 
ought  to animate the reader’.  The novel’s deformat ion of that  reflect ion 
reveals, to borrow the rest  of Smollet t ’s phrase, ‘the sordid and vicious 
disposit ion of the world’ (p. 5) . 
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Smollet t  presents domest ic instabilit y more as an incidental 
condit ion of life than a source of pathos.  Boucé notes that  the ‘dislocat ion 
of the fam ily group’ in Roderick Random  const itutes an ‘ambiguous 
character of the Smollet t ian world’. 103
 
  I t  is as visible in the fractured 
fam ilies of the apothecary Lavement  and Roderick’s love interest , 
Narcissa, as in that  of Roderick himself.  Such a failure to fulfil the ‘ought ’ 
of a part icular stat ion or circumstance unites the many forms of 
m isfortune Smollet t  invents for his characters.  The schoolmaster, for 
instance, assures Roderick’s guardian that  he will st r ive ‘to prevent  
[ Roderick’s]  future improvement ’ (p. 13) .  I ndeed, this teacher’s 
subsequent  at tempt  to sabotage Roderick’s educat ion culm inates in a 
pivotal moment  in the development  of his character.  Using a board that  
has been lashed to his hand to curb his budding literacy, Roderick splits 
the scalp of a taunt ing schoolmate.  I n the bloody aftermath of his anger, 
he feels a fleet ing instant  of ‘great  terror’ - -  a rare moment  of self-
reproach (p. 13) .  I t  is not  long, however, before the consequences fill him  
with an aggressive sense of having himself been wronged:  
I  was so severely punished for this t respass, that , were I  to live to 
the age of Methusalem, the impression it  made on me would not  be 
effaced;  no more than the ant ipathy and horror I  conceived for the 
merciless tyrant  who inflicted it .  (p. 14)  
 
I t  is noteworthy that  the undisclosed ‘impression’ Roderick derives from 
his punishment  is something explicit ly dist inct  from  his distaste for it s 
executor.  The blows he receives in this passage will echo throughout  the 
rest  of the novel.  Though it  remains unart iculated, what  impresses itself 
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upon Roderick is an uncomfortable awareness of a perversely cruel and 
arbit rary world - -  a world in which lit t le or no connect ion sustains between 
the conceptual state of what  is r ight  and the material condit ion of what  
actually is.  Such ‘injust ice is a marked feature of Roderick’s youth’ and is 
the principle influence on his character. 104
Many punishments follow from this ‘merciless tyrant ’;  often they 
are so absurd that  they seem to be at tacks not  only on Roderick, but  on 
common sense itself.   Roderick enumerates some of the non-crimes for 
which he is ‘inhumanly scourged’:  
 
 
I  have been found guilty of robbing orchards I  never entered, of 
killing cats I  never hurted, of stealing gingerbread I  never touched, 
and of abusing old women I  never saw.  Nay, a stammering 
carpenter had eloquence enough to persuade my master, that  I  
fired a pistol loaded with small shot  into his window;  though my 
landlady and the whole fam ily bore witness, that  I  was a-bed fast  
asleep at  the t ime when this out rage was commit ted.  I  was once 
flogged for having narrowly escaped drowning, by the sinking of a 
ferry-boat  in which I  was passenger.  Another t ime for having 
recovered of a bruise occasioned by a horse and cart  running over 
me.  A third t ime, for being bit  by a baker’s dog. (p. 14)  
 
The beat ings young Roderick endures surely are unpleasant , but  physical 
pain makes no appearance in the passage, eclipsed by the sheer absurdity 
of his persecut ion.  Their injust ice, and therefore their affect ive power, 
or iginates in these punishments’ irrelevance to their purpose.  Completely 
cont rary to the nature of a just  penalty, Roderick’s cast igat ion answers no 
offence, enact ing the very capriciousness and disorder that  discipline 
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purports to enforce.  ‘I n short , ’ explains Roderick, ‘whether I  was guilty or 
unfortunate, the correct ion and sympathy of this arbit rary pedagogue 
were the same’ (p. 14) . 
Deeper than any physical mark, that  epiphanous ‘impression’ left  
by his punishment  has its effect :  the conspicuously unjust  world kindles in 
Roderick a deep sense of out rage.  He declares, ‘my indignat ion t r iumphed 
over that  slavish awe which had hitherto enforced my obedience’ (p. 14) .  
Roderick learns that  in the fallen world he inhabits, just ice and r ight  reside 
at  such a remove from everyday experience as to be ut ter ly arbit rary.  
Through spite and malice, or even simple ignorance, human beings have 
subst ituted their own capricious sense of personal offence and revenge for 
r ight .  Morality, authority, duty - -  emanat ions from some grand 
metaphysical r ight  - -  have been dethroned by manmade impostors.  This 
failure of order itself,  more than the disagreeable part icularit ies that  result  
from  it ,  is the source of Roderick’s indignat ion.  Disinherited by t rue 
authority, obedience merely expresses ‘slavish awe’ to sham morality, a 
decept ive copy that  distorts and usurps its or iginal.  
Newly aware of the arbit rar iness and unreliabilit y of convent ion, 
Roderick adopts a new persona, demonst rat ing an ‘impression’ of another 
sort :  the impersonat ion of the very capriciousness against  which he seems 
to react  - -  what  Boucé calls ‘a compulsive need for vengeance’, adding 
that  ‘“ revenge”  is a key-word, not  only in the first  half of Roderick Random  
but  of the whole novel’. 105
Even before Smollet t  concludes the paragraph in which his 
protagonist  discovers his new, more vengeful self,  Roderick has led a 
group of his peers in a series of schoolyard bat t les and smashed out  the 
  Right  and wrong become a personal, 
react ionary cont r ivance for self-sat isfact ion.  Impart ial just ice becomes 
impromptu just ificat ion. 
                                          
105
 I bid. 
158 
  
teeth of his cousin’s tutor with a rock.  ‘I t  is remarkable’, observes 
Paulson, ‘that  every t ime something is done to Roderick, his first  react ion 
is that  he must  revenge himself ( “ revenge”  is one of the most  frequent ly 
repeated words of the novel) ’. 106  This violent  protagonist  recalls the 
Cont inental lineage of Roderick Random :  ‘Roderick undoubtedly draws 
upon the convent ion of punishment  t raced in picaresque literature’. 107
I n fact , most  of Smollet t ’s characters must  have experienced a 
childhood crisis of injust ice like Roderick’s, because the novel is 
punctuated with acts of out raged ret r ibut ion from even m inor figures.  
Again and again, insults, fists, musket  balls, and the contents of chamber 
pots fly, always set t ling a score.  The common drive for Smollet t ’s 
revenge-seekers is their personal sense of out rage, of having been 
wronged.  I n this way, they all react  to the out -of-balance world of the 
  
I ndeed, a tendency toward vengeful punishment  complements Roderick’s 
resemblance to the figure of the it inerant  pícaro who has abandoned the 
shelter of social convent ion in exchange for egocent r ic self-assert ion;  
however, Roderick is not  alone in his new line of at tack.  When Lieutenant  
Bowling exacts violent  ret r ibut ion on Roderick’s behalf - -  binding and 
whipping the schoolmaster in front  of his pupils - -  Bowling too seems to 
believe that  revenge is a correct ive force:  ‘I  have given you a lesson that  
will let  you know what  flogging is, and teach you to have more sympathy 
for the future’ (p. 26) .  Yet , given that  the punishment  that  awakened 
Roderick’s desire for revenge was one he actually earned (by violent ly 
set t ling a score with his schoolmate, no less) , one must  wonder if 
Bowling’s lesson will render the impression he intends.  For, whereas 
revenge aims to enforce conform ity to another’s will,  it  seems instead 
more apt  to breed wilfulness. 
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novel.  But  in seeking to mete out  punishment  according to their own 
whim , they serve only to intensify civilizat ion’s reigning disorder.  With no 
overarching pat tern to follow, seeking just ice propagates injust ice.  Like 
filial duty, class dist inct ion, honesty, and the myriad other failed systems 
of valuat ion in Roderick Random , just ice has no universal form .  I t  resides 
in the judging m ind of every individual, and is subject  to each individual’s 
vast ly cont ingent  complex of defects.  Paulson writes that , ‘I n Roderick 
Random ,  Smollet t  connects evil with the effects of egot ism  - -  the 
impingement  of one individual on the liberty, security or serenity of 
another’. 108
This highlights a paradox of sat ir izing disorder by emphasizing its 
ubiquity.  The violent  and anarchic Smollet t ian world reveals ‘a profound 
disbelief in the benevolence of fate’;  order has failed.
  Yet  for Roderick, just ice and revenge are one.  I f the same 
holds t rue for even a fract ion of the squabbling, belligerent  masses that  
people Roderick’s t ravels, just ice appears so warped as to be nothing but  a 
figment . 
109
  The great  t ragedy 
of this fall hinges on the loss of some ideal st ructure.  To thus decry 
humanity’s decent  into chaos is simultaneously to long for a return to 
some distant  golden age when everything was in its proper place.  But  
such a return, pract icality aside, is unreachable, ever distant .  As 
Rosenblum phrases it ,  ‘Utopia was or will be, but  is not  now ’. 110
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  The 
Platonic good, that  m imet ic original, always eludes regression, always 
recedes like a m irage when approached.  The divine perfect ion of a prior 
order lies in its definit ive firstness, which occludes the possibilit y of 
disorder.  Once such harmony has been lost , even the most  faithful 
im itat ion of it s st ructure cannot  erase its previous failure.  The lurking 
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anxiety of degenerat ion will remain to underm ine any regained stabilit y.  
What  good are barr iers, after all,  once they have been broken?  They are 
not  barr iers at  all.  
By demonstrat ing the need for order with hyperbolic illust rat ions of 
it s universal absence, Smollet t  succeeds in condemning chaos, but  
paradoxically shows order to be lit t le more than a dream, infinitely out  of 
reach.  Rosenblum writes that  ‘the present  state of society which the 
sat ir ist  diagnoses as “sickness”  may seem more normal than health’. 111  
Paulson spots an analogous tendency, point ing out  that  ‘sat ire, that  thr ifty 
genre, often uses the ideal- real opposit ion to catch aspects of both’ the 
object  of r idicule and the norms which censure it . 112
With convent ion left  bankrupt , what  can an individual do when 
faced with the power of the unredeemable masses?  One opt ion is 
surrender.  And while Roderick himself makes a few half-hearted at tempts 
at  capitulat ion to a corrupt  world, he simply is not  the quit t ing kind.  After 
being shipwrecked, bludgeoned, robbed, and left  for dead, he is ut terly 
overwhelmed:  
  Here again m imesis 
affirms its reversibilit y.  The sat ir ized world is an incorr igible mess;  it  
test ifies to its own imperfect ion and, simultaneously, proves the 
inapplicabilit y of the standards from which it  falls so short .  Lost  vir tue 
only returns as an approximat ion. 
 
I  cursed the hour of my birth, the parents that  gave me being, the 
sea that  did not  swallow me up, the poignard of the enemy, which 
could not  find the way to my heart , the villainy of those who had 
left  me in that  m iserable condit ion;  and, in the extacy of despair, 
resolved to be st ill where I  was and perish.  (p. 213)  
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Then he gets up to seek help.  After being robbed by a t reacherous monk 
in France, Roderick wanders the count ryside in hunger and despair, so 
disgusted with humanity that  he wishes to sink into some primordial state:  
‘A thousand t imes I  wished myself a bear, that  I  m ight  ret reat  to woods 
and deserts, far from  the inhospitable haunts of man’ (p. 245) .  This 
lament  echoes Galesia’s envy of the animals - -  ‘happy brutes’ - -  who, 
unburdened by rat ional thought , are obliv ious to the fallenness of the 
world. 113
The comfort  of obliv ion never holds its appeal for long, but  the 
escape from the awareness of corrupt ion - -  through the self-effacement  of 
enforced conform ity - -  cont inues to ent ice Roderick.  When he happens 
upon a group of starving French soldiers, their kindness and merriment  
amaze Roderick.  I t  does not  take long, though, for the French soldiers’ 
cheery resiliency to irr itate Roderick.  I n what  seems like a deliberate 
at tempt  to incite violence, Roderick decides that  an old veteran has 
‘insulted me with his pity and consolat ion’ and proceeds to start  an 
argument  over the divine r ight  of kings (p. 247) .  The veteran asserts that  
‘the characters of pr inces were sacred, and ought  not  to be profaned by 
the censure of their subjects’ (p. 248) .  Such steadfast  belief in the royal 
m imesis of divinity is out rageous to Roderick, who has had the 
impossibilit y of part iculars reflect ing absolutes quite literally impressed 
upon him .  I n an irony he seems not  to not ice, Roderick’s at tack on the 
  The desire to be like an animal makes it  clear that  it  is not  
physical suffer ing that  has pushed Roderick to such desperat ion but  rather 
the anguish of seeing that  all is not  as it  should be.  I t  is his awareness of 
the falling short  of the world from an imagined ideal that  gr ieves him . 
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veteran’s unthinking loyalty emerges as the rote repet it ion of ‘all the 
arguments commonly used’ in favour of individual liberty (p. 248) . 
St ill,  his indignat ion is real, and the language of his at tack reveals 
that  Roderick’s disgust  for such obedience is a recurrence of that  ongoing 
disappointment  in an arbit rary world he has felt  since his boyhood.  The 
French veteran is a ‘desperate slave’ suffer ing ‘to sooth the barbarous 
pride of a fellow-creature, his superior in nothing but  the power he derived 
from the subm ission of such wretches as him ’.  Those who so willingly 
subm it  are ‘the slaves of arbit rary power’ (pp. 247-248) .  The argument  
escalates into a duel of swords.  As McNeil points out , such an 
argum entum  ad baculinum , or ‘argument  by the rod’, reveals just  how 
irreconcilable Roderick’s m indset  is with that  of unquest ioning servitude. 114
Surrendering to the vicissitudes of such a mad world would require 
of Roderick either physical suicide or intellectual docilit y, pr ices he is 
unwilling to pay.  St ill other characters in Smollet t ’s novel exemplify an 
opposite approach to the fallen world.  Rather than subm it  to the caprice 
of chance and the insults of corrupt ion, they seek to dom inate their 
environment  through the oppression of others.  These are Smollet t ’s 
tyrants, of whom there are several.  The tyrant  presides over some kind of 
m icrocosm, be it  a household, a ship, or a court  of law, and within that  
small realm  has ult imate power.  These m iniature dom inions ‘are at  once 
reflect ions and distort ions of realit y ’.
 
115
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  As a result ,  the tyrant ’s just ice is 
no less idiosyncrat ic than that  of anyone else, but  because it  bears both 
the sword and seal of officialdom, it  can be uniform ly (and arbit rar ily)  
imposed, at  least  within the confines of the tyrant ’s narrow jur isdict ion.  
Put  in such general terms, despot ic rule seems like the only real means to 
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reform  the ‘bad society’ port rayed by Smollet t ’s sat ire.  I nvested with 
inst itut ional power and backed by the threat  of physical violence, the 
dictates of the tyrant  become, pract ically speaking, universal laws.  
Finally, in the shadow of a fearsome ruler, some regularity and order 
m ight  enter the world. 
However, Roderick Random  is no Leviathan.  The tyrant  figures 
who swagger and bully their way through the episodes of Roderick’s life 
are caricatures at  best  and wanton brutes at  worst , and the m icrocosms 
over which they rule are so small as to cont r ibute nothing but  a lit t le more 
incongruity to the already muddled world.  Sheltered by their own 
autocracy, they are also prone to stupidity.  Wrongly accused of theft  by 
London prost itutes, Roderick appears before a just ice who is eager to 
condemn him  to the gallows without  even hearing the complaint .  ‘The 
surgeons will fetch you from your next  t ransportat ion’, he gloats.  When 
finally convinced he has made a m istake, this out landish judge claims to 
have known all along that  Roderick was no hardened crim inal, but  that  ‘it  
was always his way to terr ify young people’ to ‘deter them from engaging 
in scenes of r iot  and debauchery’ (p. 97) .  Throughout  Roderick’s t ravels, 
he sees a land where the presiding representat ives of what  is r ight  are 
malicious, foolish, or corrupt .  I t  is an especially telling occasion when the 
highwayman Rifle is captured and brought  to stand t r ial,  only to escape 
because the just ice has left  town.  I t  would seem just ice is conspicuously 
absent  most  everywhere. 
On sea, t rue order also seems to be beyond the reach of tyrants.  
Take, for example, Crampley, who, when promoted to captain, rules with a 
marked poverty of both mercy and expert ise.  Eventually he runs the ship 
aground and abandons it  to be ransacked by its crew.  Another shipboard 
dictator, Captain Oakhum, is one of the most  despicable figures in the 
ent ire novel, though not  nearly so inept  a seaman.  His abilit y to navigate 
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and his apparent  courage in bat t le do lit t le to redeem him , however, after 
he spitefully works dozens of ailing men to death, dr ives the sensit ive Mr 
Thomas to at tempt  suicide, and does his best  to hang Roderick for a false 
charge of mut iny.  The dest ruct iveness of imposing an individual will on 
reality cannot  be overlooked when, driven by what  McNeil calls ‘Lilliput ian 
passions’, Oakhum engages a fr iendly French vessel in bat t le, leading to 
the most  violent  scenes in the novel. 116
Despite the sense of fut ilit y that  underlies so much of the 
pandemonium in Roderick Random , there remains room for hope.  
Smollet t  provides some rare hopeful moments in the form  of intuit ions and 
visions, as if some Platonic superst ructure of goodness were st ill in 
tenuous contact  with the quot idian world.  Roderick’s infancy, for instance, 
elicits an opt im ist ic predict ion from a ‘highland seer’, who assures 
Roderick’s parents that  ‘he would flourish in happiness and reputat ion’, 
and other visions crop up during the tale to rem ind readers of the 
protagonist ’s auspicious dest iny (p. 9) .  For example, the witch- like Mrs. 
Sagely, who probably saves Roderick’s life, also gives him  ‘a happy 
presage of my future’, and Roderick himself, while st ill in uncertain 
circumstances, dreams of his beloved Narcissa, ‘who seemed to sm ile 
upon my passion, and offer her hand as a reward for all my toils’ (pp. 216, 
256) . 
  As Roderick, in chains on the 
deck, witnesses the fray, he is spat tered with blood, brains, and ent rails.  
He can do nothing but  ‘bellow with all the st rength of my lungs’ and 
scream fut ile ‘oaths and execrat ions’ unt il he collapses (p. 171) .  Just  as 
meek surrender to life’s madness is an unacceptable st rategy for survival, 
it s polar opposite, the rule of an iron- fisted dictator, is not  the answer 
either.  I n Smollet t ’s depict ion, totalitar ian order rests on inverted logic 
and violence.  I t  is no order at  all.  
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These hopeful present iments are borne out  by Smollet t ’s recurrent  
use of astoundingly lucky coincidences to propel his protagonist  through 
his adventures.  Whenever the situat ion seems most  dire, the benevolent  
hand of providence will usher in a saviour like Bowling, Sagely, Miss 
Williams, or the fanat ically loyal St rap.  I n fact  there are quite a few such 
characters in the novel, people who, perhaps not  without  some flaws, are 
for the most  part  generous, benevolent , and vir tuous.  Boucé notes that  
even during the ‘absurd nightmare’ of Roderick’s naval experience, there 
are to be found some ‘simple and kindly people’. 117  However twisted the 
values of humanity m ight  be, evidence regularly surfaces for an underly ing 
st ructure of t ranscendent  meaning, some object ive good toward which 
these kind characters incline.  The easy reversibilit y of Roderick’s 
m isfortunes, as Milton Allan Goldberg writes, ‘seem[ s]  to indicate that  
these crises are not  wholly arbit rary, [ …]  for they move with a pat tern 
scarcely fortuitous toward the culm inat ion afforded in the final sect ion of 
the novel’. 118
I t  comes as no shock, then, when Roderick is languishing in the 
Marshalsea prison, despair ing of life once again, that  a m iraculous accident  
restores his faith.  Having had ample t ime for self- reflect ion, Roderick has 
realized that  the woman he loves is a part  of the same apparent ly broken 
world against  which he has fought  so bit ter ly.  Goldberg comments, ‘He is 
aware, for perhaps the first  t ime, of the real dual nature of society, which 
encompasses not  only a “perfidious world,”  but  also “ the am iable 
  I n the words of Morgan, another of Smollet t ’s upright  
characters, ‘There is such a thing as just ice, if not  upon earth, surely in 
heaven’ (p. 174) .  With such glimm ers of vir tue persist ing in the chaos, 
even disregarding the first -person narrat ion, the reader may wonder how ,  
but  never if,  Roderick will survive. 
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Thus begins a series of events that  br ighten the tone of the final 
chapters to a baffling extent .  John M. Warner, jarred by this shift , finds 
that  ‘the third volume really deserts sat ire’ for an ‘unlikely’ ending.
  As if on provident ial cue, Bowling arr ives, flush from 
privateer ing, to offer freedom, money, and employment  to both Roderick 
and St rap. 
120
Roderick’s perennial combat  against  the unjust  world seems to 
come to arm ist ice.  His great  reward at  the end of his journey is doled out  
st r ict ly according to the standards of class and law that  proved so 
inadequate in the preceding volumes.  He marries Narcissa, who is, as 
Edward C. Mack remarks, ‘overly discreet , colorlessly pure, and tearful’ - -  
an ‘exact  reproduct ion’ of convent ional eighteenth-century fem inine 
vir tue.
  
Roderick reaffirms his vows of love to Narcissa, and after arr iv ing in South 
America he happens upon none other than his own father.  Perhaps 
acknowledging the stat ist ical near- impossibilit y of such a reunion, father 
and son exalt  the deus who has just  emerged ex m achina.  Don Rodrigo 
cr ies, ‘O infinite Goodness!  let  me adore thy all-wise decrees! ’ at  which 
cue Roderick also ‘adore[ s]  the all-good Disposer, in a prayer of mental 
thanksgiving’ (p. 411) .  The theist ic bent  of their language serves only to 
emphasize that  the two are praising, in essence, the arr ival of that  
object ive and universal benevolence that  has been so conspicuously 
lacking in prior chapters.  From this point , it  is a smooth and happy coast  
to the end of the novel. 
121
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  He earns a hefty sum in colonial t rade and expects to gain st ill 
more when a legal technicality grants him  access to Narcissa’s fortune.  
The very system of law that  sanct ioned his disinheritance and drew his ire 
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has become the authority by which he commands his own life. 122  As if 
these windfalls were not  conservat ive enough, he also returns with his 
father and wife to his ancest ral estate, and to the ecstat ic adorat ion of a 
host  of peasants, an act  of reversion at  once social, historical, 
geographical, and genealogical.  Just  to ensure that  the return to order is 
as patent ly endorsed by t radit ion as possible, the ret rospect ively narrat ing 
Roderick offers a ‘pompously Johnsonian’ post lude: 123
 
 
I f there be such a thing as t rue happiness on earth, I  enjoy it .  The 
impetuous t ransports of my passion are now set t led and mellowed 
into endearing fondness and t ranquillit y of love, rooted by that  
int imate connexion and interchange of hearts, which nought  but  
vir tuous wedlock can produce.  (p. 432)  
 
Roderick’s new capacity to act  out  social norms has allowed him  to 
experience love in the expressly m imet ic form  of emot ional ‘interchange’.  
This in turn makes possible a more concrete m imesis, predicted in the last  
lines of the novel:  
 
My dear angel has been qualm ish of late, and begins to grow 
remarkably round in the waist ;  so that  I  cannot  leave her in such 
an interest ing situat ion, which I  hope will produce something to 
crown my felicity. ( I bid.)  
 
The regal imagery is appropriate, for Roderick has finally gained 
the noble status he was always certain he deserved.  After so much 
vacillat ion between resistance and surrender, Roderick has learned to take 
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pract ical advantage of the world, to part icipate.  Appropriate too, is the 
procreat ive source of Roderick’s ‘crown’, for it  is only after he has learned 
to reproduce in himself the images of conform ity and propriety that  the 
reproduct ive capacity of m imesis can fully unfurl.   Though he takes on 
many occupat ions before his final t r iumphant  voyage with Bowling, he 
always does so as if he is assum ing a temporary role, a disguise.  John 
Barrell observes that  Roderick’s abilit y to drift  from  job to job is unique to 
him :  
 
I n Roderick Random  people are what  they do;  but  Roderick himself 
is the except ion that  proves the rule, for he changes his occupat ion 
cont inually, without  ever taking on the stereotypical characterist ics 
of the ‘normal’ pract it ioners of the various occupat ions he enters. 124
 
 
He is always an outsider in the m idst  of crowds, a posit ion that  allows him  
mobilit y and a privileged posit ion of judgement , but  also est ranges him .  
Only after his epiphany in prison, when his love for Narcissa ‘preserved my 
at tachment  to that  society of which she const ituted a part ’,  and after 
Bowling’s arr ival affords him  the opportunity, does Roderick internalize his 
impression enough to effect ively act  as a part  of society, rather than an 
unfortunate alien t rapped within it  (p. 394) .  ‘Only love’, writes Leo 
Braudy, ‘finally reconciles Roderick Random to society’. 125
But  as Warner has noted, this is somewhat  of an unlikely solut ion 
to the very concrete flaws of the world.  After enduring barbarous 
violence, filth, corrupt ion, and more than one passionate existent ial cr isis, 
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Austen,  ed. by Richard Kroll (London:  Longman, 1998) , pp. 97-127 (p. 
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the pugnacious Roderick t r iumphs through orthodoxy?  I t  would seem 
from the final paragraphs of the novel that , indeed, he does.  He has 
found lucrat ive employment , set t led down with a nice young lady, and 
outgrown the hot -headed idealism  of his youth.  He is happy.  I n fact , 
everyone is happy, apparent ly, except  those rogues who have deservedly 
died or found their way to imprisonment  or poverty.  A return to the long-
forsaken ought  has redeemed the ‘bad society’.  But  then, if the end of 
Roderick Random  is to be taken as an affirmat ion of some grand 
metaphysical and moral order, an affirmat ion made through m imet ic 
adherence to a material part icularizat ion of that  order, there must  
necessarily remain some nagging imperfect ions in this blissful 
denouement .  Mimesis reproduces;  it  does not  duplicate. 
One quest ion raised by the events in the novel but  never clearly 
confronted involves Roderick’s adventures in the Brit ish naval forces.  
Boucé observes that , as cr it ical as Smollet t  (or rather the narrat ing 
Roderick)  is of the violence of the press-gang, forced conscript ion itself 
receives no scrut iny;  ‘at  no point  in Roderick Random  does [ Smollet t ]  
raise the issue and express an explicit  condemnat ion of this inst itut ion’. 126  
Roderick’s impressment  into m ilitary service reiterates in new terms the 
impression he receives as a boy from the ruthless schoolmaster:  though 
he laments the injust ice of unprovoked brutality, he nevertheless proceeds 
to join, and thereby to repeat , the inst itut ionalized chaos that  perpetuates 
it .   James H. Bunn writes that , ‘Among eighteenth-century novels only 
Roderick Random  evokes the wastefulness of [ …]  soldier ing for empire 
upon a global landscape’. 127
                                          
126
 Boucé, p. 291. 
  Yet , as McNeil points out , despite the 
appallingly high body count  of the naval chapters, it  is the 
127
 James H. Bunn, ‘Signs of Randomness in Roderick Random ’,  
Eighteenth-Century Studies,  14.4 (1981) , 452-469, p. 454. 
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‘m ismanagement  of the expedit ion’ which faces the fury of Smollet t ’s 
sat ire, never ‘the morality of colonial expansion itself’. 128
However, to moralize on such a level would be a bit  unwieldy for 
Smollet t ,  since to condemn the colonial project  too severely m ight  cast  
aspersions upon the novel’s pr incipal agents of benevolence.  Rosenblum 
points out  that  Smollet t  is ‘quite explicit  about  the means by which three 
such innocent  characters as Roderick, his father, and his uncle were able 
to get  r ich so quickly’.
 
129
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 McNeil,  p. 99. 
  The irreproachable posit ion of colonialism  in 
Roderick Random  is perhaps most  prom inent  to modern readers when 
Roderick makes part  of his fortune in the slave t rade.  Though it  was 
perm issible by contemporaneous legal standards, one cannot  help but  
wonder how Roderick, who was horr ified by the filthy and crowded 
condit ions on a Brit ish man-of-war, could so coldly disparage his ship’s 
‘disagreeable lading of Negroes, to whom indeed I  had been a m iserable 
slave’ (p. 408) .  To equate the hassle of t ransport ing slaves to the m isery 
of actual enslavement  is a remark of almost  absurd callousness.  The 
Afr ican capt ives are reduced to a composite non-ent ity incapable of 
elicit ing compassion, perhaps because their plight  offers a monetary 
benefit  to Roderick.  Furthermore, for a man to whom the ‘slavish awe’ of 
forced obedience is the ult imate injust ice, and for whom the complacent  
French ‘slaves of arbit rary power’ are ut ter ly contempt ible, such an 
at t itude is bleakly ironic indeed.  I t  is a st r ik ing demonst rat ion of 
Roderick’s newfound abilit y to mediate between his own sense of 
indignat ion and the pressing dictates of expediency.  Evident ly the ‘modest  
merit ’ Smollet t  cites in his preface can modest ly turn away when out rage 
is inconvenient . 
129
 Michael Rosenblum, ‘Smollet t ’s Hum phry Clinker ’,  p. 183. 
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Rosenblum notes that  Roderick’s establishment  in his fam ily estate 
is like a withdrawal into the idealized past . 130  With this backward grasp at  
elem entary order he im itates the tyrant  figures he so despises.  He creates 
a m icrocosm ic niche for himself, fort if ied against  the degeneracy of the 
outside world by distance and by the bulwarks of class and t radit ion.  He 
also partakes of the unthinking escapism of the joyfully obedient  French 
soldiers;  how else would he manage to sacrifice his r ighteous anger, what  
Roderick comes to call his ‘impetuous t ransports’,  to convenience (p. 
432)?  Herein lies the tension of irresolut ion.  There is ‘no int imat ion of a 
final defeat  of the bad forces’, just  a ‘st rategic ret reat ’. 131
Certainly he does not  measure up to the moral exempla of more 
didact ic contemporaneous fict ion.  Samuel Johnson seems to have 
Roderick Random  in m ind when, in the 31 March 1750 issue of The 
Ram bler , he warns that  when ‘writers, for the sake of following nature, so 
m ingle good and bad qualit ies in their pr incipal personages, that  they are 
both equally conspicuous’ the result  is that  ‘we lose the abhorrence of 
their faults’.
  Roderick’s tact ic 
against  disorder, then, is accommodat ionist :  giving in where necessary, 
adapt ing to the dom inant  social st ructure (and the flimsiness thereof) , yet  
receding into safety at  the same t ime in order to dim inish that  
comprom ise. 
132
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 Rosenblum, ‘Smollet t  as Conservat ive Sat ir ist ’, pp. 571-574. 
  Roderick part icipates in this kind of m ingling because he 
has learned to capitalize on m imet ic select ivity.  Though, as Goldberg 
131
 Rosenblum, ‘Smollet t  as Conservat ive Sat ir ist ’, p. 571. 
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 Samuel Johnson, ‘The Rambler, No. I V, Saturday, March 31, 1750’, in 
The Ram bler:  I n Four Volum es,  ed. by Alexander Chalmers (Philadelphia, 
PA:  J. J. Woodward, 1827) , I , pp. 56-60 (p. 59) .  Reprinted in Tobias 
Sm ollet t :  The Crit ical Heritage,  ed. by Lionel Kelly (London:  Rout ledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1987) , p. 45.  For a brief reading of Johnson’s remark as a 
comment  specifically on Roderick Random  (along with Tom  Jones) , see I an 
Wat t , The Rise of the Novel:  Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding 
(London:  Pim lico, 1957) , p. 280.  I oan William s at t r ibutes the init ial 
suggest ion that  Johnson wrote with Smollet t  and Fielding in m ind to 
Alexander Chalmers;  see Novel and Rom ance 1700-1800:  A Docum entary 
Record (London:  Rout ledge & Kegan Paul, 1970) , p. 142. 
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notes, Roderick’s development  through the course of the novel shows his 
turn from impudence to reason, his seems a part icular ly calculat ing st rain 
of rat ionalit y. 133
On one hand, aspects of the novel’s or ientat ion must  be 
fundamentally conservat ive, in the sense that  order, having been lost , 
needs reinstatement .  Only against  a background of conservat ive 
presumpt ions could Roderick’s concessions to a corrupt  world stand out  as 
what  they are.  On the other hand, he seems as ready to hide behind 
principles of precedent  and t radit ion as he is to adhere to them.  The 
suddenness with which he learns to act  the part  of upstanding social 
convent ionality confirms that  he is doing just  that :  act ing a part , 
perform ing an impression.  Roderick steps into a life of vir tue as if it  were 
a pair of boots, and the apparent  superficialit y of this swift  volte- face, 
especially after vir tue itself has proven to be lit t le more than an effigy, 
discloses a tense negot iat ion between emulat ive celebrat ion and cynical 
mockery of rule-bound order.  As Wat t  indicates, Smollet t  is no 
Richardson;  he does ‘not  demand our acceptance of [ his]  posit ive 
standards’ of morality.
  As an im itator, Roderick follows a haphazard morality, 
one which is unset t led (and, to Johnson, unset t ling)  because it  is only an 
impression, a sort  of product ive hypocrisy that  may repeat  or resist  as 
circumstance requires.  I ndeed, as Johnson’s comments on Smollet t ’s 
m ixture of vice and vir tue suggest , the reader may find an uncomfortable 
reflect ion of his or her own variable standards in Roderick’s pragmat ism ;  
reading of his adventures is surely at  least  as voyeurist ic as it  is edifying. 
134
  Mack adds that  ‘I n Smollet t  the Richarsonian 
ideal has been drained of all content  and meaning’. 135
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  I ndeed, because 
Smollet t  presents conform ity as an im itat ive performance, as m imesis, he 
hints at  both t r ibute and insult  without  any prom ise of resolut ion.  Warner 
134
 Wat t , p. 219. 
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senses this anxiety throughout  the author’s work:  ‘Most  broadly 
conceived, Smollet t ’s intent ion is to show the impossibilit y of maintaining 
fixed, dogmat ic at t itudes in the face of the ever-changing texture of 
experience itself’. 136  Roderick’s success is a confirmat ion of societal 
norms, t rue, but  it  confirms them as art ifice rather than naturally 
emergent  st ructures.  His presence in such happy circumstances, 
paradoxically, proves the arbit rar iness of the order it  endorses. 137
While considering the precarious posit ion in which Roderick set t les -
-  set t ling into the sanct ioned stabilit y of mat r imony and yet  set t ling for 
conform ity and a relat iv ist ic ethos - -  it  is important  to note the com ic 
nature of Smollet t ’s novel.  However comfortable Roderick is in his new 
home, he must  know that  nothing is ever certain;  indeed, the pragmat ic 
turn of his maturity proves that  he knows.  And he knows, too, that  
beyond the provisional t ranquillit y of his domest ic haven the chaos of the 
world rages on unabated.  However, his adventures compose themselves 
not  into a lament , but  a laugh ( though perhaps of the kind qualified with a 
shrug) .  He has quite literally lived to tell the tale.  The final images of the 
book cent re appropriately on fecundity:  Mr and Mrs St rap’s farm , and 
Roderick and Narcissa’s child.  Just  as the narrator has been repeat ing his 
own story through the course of the novel, the final chapter assures the 
reader that  the impersonat ions will cont inue to repeat  as a legacy. 
 
A reader com ing to Roderick Random  hoping either for scandal or 
bet terment  will find scraps of both, but  the whole of neither.  Truly, the 
world is broken, but  for Roderick it  is a lucky break, without  which his 
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product ive hypocrisy would fail.   Elizabeth Kraft ’s remarks on com ic fict ion 
are substant iated in Roderick’s mocking dialect ical impression:  ‘Comedy 
exalts flexibilit y ’,  and the inconstancy of the ought  is precisely why ‘com ic 
consciousness is shaped by an interplay between the authoritat ive and the 
individual point  of view’. 138  One may add Boucé’s comment  that , in 
Smollet t ’s work, ‘Humour appears as the obst inate affirmat ion of an 
individual dynam ism which t r iumphs in spite of the servitude of our human 
condit ion and the const raints of society’. 139
When pregnant , Roderick’s mother has a prophet ic vision:  
 
 
She dreamed, she was delivered of a tennis-ball,  which the devil 
(who, to her great  surprize, acted the part  of a m id-wife)  st ruck so 
forcibly with a racket , that  it  disappeared in an instant ;  [ … after 
which]  she beheld it  return with equal violence, and enter the 
earth, beneath her feet , whence immediately sprung up a goodly 
t ree covered with blossoms. (p. 9)  
 
Roderick’s resilience is mot ile;  it  consists in shift ing and shut t ling between 
alternat ives.  And as adumbrated by the dream ’s Edenic imagery, his 
t r iumph resides in the fert ilit y - -  and the ambiguity - -  of m imesis.  The 
sat ir ical import  of Smollet t ’s text  performs a sim ilar impression to that  of 
his protagonist .  Whatever conservat ism  inhabits these pages presents 
itself not  so much as an answer, but  rather as a stopgap, a provisional, ad 
hoc ploy to accommodate a profound uncertainty that  reverberates more 
impressively in the final pages than at  the beginning.
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Am is’s Money :  ‘A realism  problem ’ 
 
Extended prose fict ion that  seeks to faithfully represent  the phenomenal 
world must  contend with the inevitable gap, the falling short  that  at tends 
m imesis.  As a literary mode founded on realism  ( in the most  inclusive 
sense of that  term) , the novel can therefore be said to be a genre that  
bears within it  the epistemological consequences of realism  - -  the 
reversals, problems, and potent ials of the m imet ic short fall.   This cr it ical 
or ientat ion toward understanding is the novel’s pr incipal generic ident ifier, 
exist ing prior to narrat ive content , invest ing that  content  with a sense of 
provisionalit y and open-endedness.  The most  direct  means to t ransform  a 
romance into a novel, for instance, would be to rewrite it  with a sustained 
emphasis on subject ive, part icular experience in a world of phenomenal 
variat ion.  Some plots lend themselves to such an orientat ion more readily 
than others, but  the orientat ion itself stands independent ly of any plot .  
The novel, corresponding to the m imesis that  underlies it ,  reaches toward 
the world it  represents and in doing so marks out  an unbridgeable 
separat ion from it .  
That  such a literary form  became prom inent  in eighteenth-century 
Britain seems, in this light , to be a consequence of the empir ically inclined 
culture of the t ime.  Novelist ic fict ion, as a form  of discourse that  
foregrounds the mult iplicity of experience and a sense of the inaccessibilit y 
of comprehensive understanding, provided a convenient  forum for the 
dialect ic tension between naive empir icism  and ext reme scept icism .  I ts 
derivat ion from the cultural m ilieu of the Brit ish Enlightenment  shows that  
the generic ident ity of the novel is to some extent  historically situated.  
However, because this ident ity consists more in a stance toward problems 
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of representat ion and subject ivity than in any rigidly enforced formal 
imperat ive, it  is highly adaptable.  More than, say, the romance, the novel 
has the potent ial to out live the specific historical frame to which it  once 
responded by means of such adaptat ion - -  becom ing in its successive 
iterat ions something outwardly different , though st ill novelist ic because 
st ill engaged with represent ing situated subject ivity and thus the 
provisionalit y of knowledge.  I n a novel, the problem of individual 
subject ivity can be mediated through the specific, historically ent renched 
concerns of the culture of it s t ime, but  individual subject ivity it self exists 
outside of and prior to this mediat ion.  The generic ident ity of the 
novelist ic text  is situated not  so much in the part icular literary devices it  
deploys as in the collect ive preoccupat ion of those methods with a 
representat ion of problemat ic subject ivity.  The methods themselves - -  
techniques and formal features - -  provide for sub-generic dist inct ions.  
Thus, one may speak of an eighteenth-century novel, a Victorian Realist  
novel, a Modernist  novel, and so on, with whatever degree of specificity 
one requires, yet  all of these are subsets of the much broader taxon 
encompassing all extended prose fict ions inflected with subject -cent red 
epistemological provisionality.  The sub-generic features are more volat ile 
and context -dependent  than the provisionality they art iculate, and so it  
can be said that  the novel is part ly determ ined by, but  not  finally reducible 
to, it s historicity. 
I t  is the instabilit y and adaptabilit y of the novel that  perm its, 
indeed perhaps requires, considerat ions of the genre itself to draw upon 
source texts from more than one historical situat ion.  Because the present  
study is concerned with characterizing the novel as a literary genre in 
broadly applicable term s, at tent ion to the mechanisms and consequences 
of the novel’s at tempt  to interface with reality must  take precedence over 
the specific socio-historical condit ions of a part icular novel or subset  of 
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novels.  I n other words, the intent  of this study is not  to establish a 
diachronic lineage or narrate an evolut ionary progression, but  rather to 
sketch a synchronic image of the way the novel, as it  appears from the 
cr it ical vantage point  of the early twenty- first  century, announces (and the 
palimpsest  of it s history is part  of this announcement )  it s epistemological 
stance. 
Exam ining novels of different  periods is useful, therefore, not  in 
this case as a means of reconst ruct ing the contexts from which specific 
novels have arisen, but  instead as a means of using the analogous aspects 
of dissim ilar texts to uncover the collect ive, generic ident ity they iterate.  
A cont inuous panorama of novels since the early eighteenth century would 
allow for the most  inst ruct ive pool of sample texts;  however, pract ical 
const raints dictate a more abbreviated approach.  To that  end, the 
discussion that  follows will at tempt  a counterpart  analysis to the preceding 
discussion of eighteenth-century novels by shift ing focus to contemporary 
novels. 
The discussion that  follows will exam ine a late twent ieth-century 
novel:  Mart in Am is’s Money:  A Suicide Note. 1  I n many respects, Am is’s 
work is representat ive of it s t ime - -  it  displays the postmodernist , self-
reflexive turn visible in a great  deal of late twent ieth-century art .  Among 
those aspects of Money  that  have led cr it ics to label it  as postmodernist  
are techniques such as parody, allusion, and metafict ion. 2
                                          
1
 Mart in Am is, Money:  A Suicide Note (London:  Jonathan Cape, 1984;  
repr. London:  Penguin, 2000) .  Subsequent  references appear in the text . 
  This last  device 
2
 Most  cr it ical t reatments of Money  make at  least  cursory use of the 
concept  of ‘postmodernism ’.  Sources in which it  plays a cent ral role are 
numerous and include:  Jon Begley, ‘Sat ir izing the Carnival of Postmodern 
Capitalism :  The Transat lant ic and Dialogic St ructure of Mart in Am is’s 
Money ’,  Contemporary Literature,  45.1, (Spring 2004) , 79-105.;  Catherine 
Bernard, ‘Dismembering/ Remembering Mimesis:  Mart in Am is, Graham 
Swift ’, in Brit ish Postmodern Fict ion,  ed. by Theo D’haen and Hans Bertens 
(Amsterdam:  Rodopi, 1993) , pp. 121-144.;  Richard Brown, ‘Postmodern 
Americas in the Fict ion of Angela Carter, Mart in Am is and I an McEwan’, in 
Forked Tongues? Comparing Twent ieth-Century Brit ish and Am erican 
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features prom inent ly, taking the form  of near-constant  stylist ic fabulat ion 
and a number of author-surrogate characters, one of which depicts Mart in 
Am is out r ight .  James Diedrick cites Money  as an exemplary postmodern 
novel because of just  these techniques, writ ing, ‘The language of 
[ postmodern]  texts calls at tent ion to itself,  and the author or an author 
surrogate is often present  as a character in the narrat ive’. 3  Am is himself 
has accepted the label for his habit  of ‘drawing at tent ion to the fact  that  
you are writ ing a novel’. 4  Am is uses these techniques to foreground 
mediat ion throughout  the novel, cont r ibut ing to an aesthet ic of dislocat ion, 
fracture, and decline that  serves as a vehicle for the (at  least  categorically 
analogous)  epistemological problems bodied forth by eighteenth-century 
novels’ own formal/ aesthet ic features.  Because of this, Money  is 
especially suited for explor ing the epistemologically-derived sense of 
fallenness that  permeates the novels on which the previous chapters 
focus, because its reflexivity presents a kind of self-cr it icism . 5
                                                                                                            
Literature, ed. by Ann Massa and Alistair  Stead (London:  Longman, 1994) , 
pp. 92-110.;  Robert  Duggan, ‘Big-Time Shakespeare and the Joker in the 
Pack:  The I nt rusive Author in Mart in Am is’s Money ’,  Journal of Narrat ive 
Theory , 39.1 (Winter 2009)  86-110.;  Elie A. Edmondson, ‘Mart in Am is 
Writes Postmodern Man’, Crit ique, 42.2 (2001) , 145-154;  Amy J. Elias, 
‘Meta-m im esis?  The Problem of Brit ish Postmodern Realism ’, in Brit ish 
Postm odern Fict ion, ed. by Theo D’haen and Hans Bertens (Amsterdam:  
Rodopi, 1993) , pp. 9-31.;  Peter Stokes, ‘Mart in Am is and the Postmodern 
Suicide:  Tracing the Postnuclear Narrat ive at  the Fin de Millennium ’, 
Crit ique, 39.4, (1997) , 300-312.;  and Richard Todd, ‘The I nt rusive Author 
in Brit ish Postmodernist  Fict ion:  The Cases of Alasdair Gray and Mart in 
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Workshop on Postm odernism  at  the XI th I nternat ional Com parat ive 
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Douwe Fokkema (Amsterdam:  John Benjam ins, 1987) , pp. 123-137. 
  This 
chapter therefore will take up the quest ion of how these postmodernist  
3
 James Diedrick, Understanding Mart in Am is (Columbia, SC:  University of 
South Carolina, 1995) , p. 6-7. 
4
 Christopher Bigsby, ‘Mart in Am is’, in New Writ ing, ed. by Malcolm  
Bradbury and Judy Cooke (London:  Minerva, 1992) , pp. 169-184 (p. 171) . 
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 This cr it ical tendency is it self typical of postmodern aesthet ics.  As 
Pat r icia Waugh writes, ‘All postmodern fict ion foregrounds [ …]  cr it ical self-
reflexiv ity in a highly self-conscious fashion’;  see Pract ising 




features engage with the novel’s genre-defining problems of knowledge in 
such a way that  generic ident ity is perpetuated at  the same t ime that  
unconvent ional literary effects are at tempted. 
Speaking with John Haffenden short ly after the publicat ion of 
Money ,  Am is remarks that  ‘the plot  is almost  a dist ract ion in this book’. 6  
I t  is clearly secondary to the style of the text  it self.   Joseph Brooker writes 
that , ‘For [ Am is]  more than for any Brit ish contemporary, “ to write”  is the 
int ransit ive verb that  Roland Barthes called it .   His prose is self-delight ing, 
flaunt ing a joy at  it s own capacity’. 7  Of Money  in part icular, Diedrick 
writes, ‘Am is’s language becomes a kind of character [ …]  - -  self-conscious, 
vir tuosic, vying for at tent ion with the plot  and the other characters’. 8  Eric 
Korn, reviewing the novel in the Tim es Literary Supplem ent , impersonates 
narrator John Self’s slangy parataxis to describe ‘the astonishing narrat ive 
voice [ Am is]  has devised, the jagged, spent , st reet -wise, gut ter-wise, 
gut tural m id-At lant ic twang, the but tonholing, earbending, lughole- jarr ing 
monologue’. 9
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 John Haffenden, Novelists in I nterview  (London:  Methuen, 1985) , p. 5. 
  As Korn clear ly believes, linguist ic innovat ion is the most  
prom inent  stylist ic device in Money ,  but  vir tually every aspect  of the text  -
-  from  the prefatory address to the reader ( ‘the dear, the gent le’, coos the 
signatory ‘M.A.’)  to the typographically dist inct  final coda - -  bears the 
imprint  of a manipulat ing authorial presence.  I n an interview with 
Christopher Bigsby, Amis claims that  his work consists of ‘much more 
7
 Joseph Brooker, ‘The Middle Years of Mart in Am is’, in Brit ish Fict ion 
Today , ed. by Rod Mengham and Philip Tew (London:  Cont inuum, 2006) , 
pp. 3-14 (p. 9) .  Brooker seems to have in m ind Roland Barthes’s essay 
‘To Write:  An I nt ransit ive Verb?’, in which Barthes claims that  ‘to write is 
today to make oneself the center of the act ion of speech, it  is to effect  
writ ing by affect ing oneself, [ …]  to leave the scriptor  inside the writ ing 
[ …] ’.  Barthes makes these remarks to just ify what  he calls ‘sem io-
crit icism ’;  however, their appropriateness to Am is’s techniques in Money  
should become apparent  below.  See The Rust le of Language,  t rans. by 
Richard Howard (Berkeley, CA:  University of California, 1989) , pp. 11-21 
(pp. 18, 12) . 
8
 Diedrick, p. 7. 
9
 Eric Korn, ‘Frazzled Yob-Gene Lag-Jag’, Tim es Literary Supplem ent ,  4253 
(5 October 1984) , 1119. 
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writ ing than story’, explaining that  he uses plot  and st ructure as 
facilitators for ‘com ic invent ion’ and ‘interest ing situat ions’. 10
Self is a director of television advert isements who lives a life of 
vulgar excess.  He shut t les between London and New York, angling to 
produce his first  feature film , a loosely autobiographical drama with the 
working t it le Good Money  and then, after innumerable difficult ies and 
disasters, Bad Money .   Assured by his suntanned American producer and 
‘moneyman’, Fielding Goodney, that  his film  project  is backed by generous 
investors, Self sets about  spending large port ions of his pre-product ion 
budget  engaging in his many personal vices:  ‘fast  food, sex shows, space 
games, slot  machines, video nast ies, nude mags, dr ink, pubs, fight ing, 
television, handjobs’ (pp. 19, 67) .  He suffers the indignit ies at tendant  
upon such a lifestyle, along with the demands of his quarrelsome cast  
members, the inconstancy of his covetous and unfaithful (and, one should 
add, ill- t reated)  gir lfr iend, Selina St reet , and a series of bizarre and 
disturbing anonymous telephone calls. 
  As the above 
comments indicate, the style of Money  emanates from the narrat ing voice 
of John Self, but  this voice is too stylist ically loaded to cohere.  The 
part iculars of it s fragmentat ion inform  not  only on the narrated world of 
the novel, but  also on the state of the text  it self - -  the ident ity of Money  
as a novel. 
Self’s perpetual impairment , confusion, and dist ract ion finally lead 
to his undoing;  Fielding Goodney has been deceiving Self.  With the 
complicity of other characters he has exploited Self’s vulnerabilit y to play 
an elaborate ‘confidence t r ick’ (pp. 392-393) .  There is in fact  no film , and 
there are no real investors;  Self has been throwing away his own money, 
dest roying his career and making himself (more)  r idiculous in the process.  
This is only one of several final prat falls suffered by Self.  By the end of 
                                          
10
 Bigsby, p. 179. 
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the novel, he is ruined financially and socially, rejected by Selina, and 
loathed by the man he believed was his father.  Even his at tempt  at  
suicide fails. 
Self’s dest ruct ion is narrated in his own voice, though it  is never 
completely his own;  it  is fragmented and mult iple from the beginning.  
Self is, in Am is’s phrase, a ‘stupid narrator’. 11
 
  His direct  speech is often 
clichéd or merely phat ic, tending toward vulgarity, repet it ion, and 
monosyllabism .  He is barely verbal, for example, when he at tempts to 
explain Good Money  to Doris Arthur, the screenwriter hired by Goodney to 
produce a script :  
‘Tell me,’ said Doris.  ‘What ’s the mot ivat ion of the Butch 
Beausoleil character?’ 
‘Uh?’ 
‘The Mist ress.  What ’s her mot ivat ion?’ 
‘Uh?’ 
'Why is she sleeping with these two guys?  Father gives her 
money.  Okay.  But  why the Son.  I t ’s a big r isk for her.  And the 
Son’s such a meatball. ’ 
‘I  don’t  know,’ I  said.  ‘Maybe he’s brill in the bag.’ 
‘Pardon me?’ 
‘Maybe he’s a hot  lay.’ (p. 61)  
 
The tone of this rather impoverished idiolect  carr ies over into Self’s 
narrat ion as well,  but  this lat ter voice, reading m ore like that  of a media-
saturated ad-man, is far more evocat ive.  Describing his beloved sports 
car, for example, Self composes what  reads like voiceover material for an 
advert isem ent :  ‘Now my Fiasco, it ’s a beaut iful machine, a vintage-style 
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 Haffenden, p. 8. 
182 
  
coupé with oodles of dash and heft  and twang.  The Fiasco, it ’s my pride 
and joy’ (pp. 62-63) .  However stupid he may be, Self’s narrat ion can be 
quite clever.  As reviewer John Gross notes, Self’s ‘wit ty and insinuat ing 
narrat ive voice [ …]  is brisk and slangy, but  it  can also luxuriate into 
vir tuoso extended metaphors’.  Gross refers to one of Self’s most  
developed figures, his descript ion of his dental t roubles in the term inology 
of urban decay. 12  Narrat ing, Self also combines and reconfigures 
American and Brit ish slang, coins neologisms, and draws out  his ad-speak 
into onomatopoet ic r iffs that  seem to prior it ize creat ivity over 
communicat ion.  As Diedrick observes, ‘Self’s conversat ions with other 
characters may be halt ing and fractured, but  Am is has infused his 
soliloquies with a dazzling punk-poet ic eloquence’. 13  Am is has 
acknowledged this split  between Self’s thoughts and his speech, cit ing V. 
S. Pritchet t  and Saul Bellow as writers who have effect ively used a sim ilar 
type of separat ion in their characters’ voices. 14
With his drunkenness, greed, violence, and chauvinism , Self is an 
unpleasant  man.  However, as Gross comments above, the disparity 
between his lout ish behaviour and his idiosyncrat ic narrat ion can have an 
‘insinuat ing’ effect .  Diedrick makes a sim ilar claim  when he writes that  
Self is not  ‘merely [ …]  a monster of wretched excess.  He is so fully, 




                                          
12
 John Gross, ‘Books of the Times;  Money:  A Suicide Note. By Mart in 
Am is’, New York Tim es, 15 March 1985, p. C25.  The body-as-city t rope 
begins at  Am is, p. 4.  Gross quotes a more developed example from p. 26, 
which is considered below. 
  What  allows for some degree of readerly sympathy for the 
13
 Diedrick, p. 75. 
14
 Haffenden, p. 8.  See also Pat r ick McGrath’s 1987 interview, in which 
Am is cites Saul Bellow’s Henderson the Rain King as his model for this 
technique;  ‘Mart in Am is’, in Bom b:  I nterviews,  ed. by Bet ty Sussler (San 
Francisco, CA:  City Lights, 1992) , pp. 187-198, (p. 190) .  Am is gives 
Bellow’s t it le a cameo in Money  when Self dr inks a ‘Rain King’ cocktail (p. 
20) . 
15
 Diedrick, p. 74. 
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repellent  John Self is not  necessarily his inward expressiveness as much as 
his cont inuous failure to art iculate it  to those around him  - -  his pathet ic 
dividedness between thought  and deed.  He feels this schism  acutely, at  
one point  describing ‘four dist inct  voices in [ his]  head’:  ‘money’, 
‘pornography’, ‘ageing and weather’,  and a nagging, unlabelled voice that  
‘has to do with quit t ing work and needing to think about  things I  never 
used to think about ’ (pp. 107-108) .  To some extent  he is a man t rapped 
between his voices, left  helpless by his habits, his weak will,  and his 
overpowering appet ites. 
Self’s dim  awareness of his psychological dividedness finds 
expression in his at tent ion to animals.  Dogs in part icular int r igue Self;  
they seem to emblemat ize his feelings of at tenuated agency.  When Self 
hears a dog barking outside his Manhat tan hotel room, he reports the 
scene with ironic hyperbole:  ‘His lungs are fathom less, his hellhound rage 
is huge.  He needs those lungs - -  what  for?  To keep them in, to keep 
them out ’.  I n fact  the dog’s barking is meaningless;  ‘tethered in the 
airwell beneath [ Self’s]  room ’, the animal has nothing to protect  or 
defend, no one to keep in or out , and yet  on it  goes, fervent ly, point lessly 
obeying the compulsion to bark (p. 13) .  At  t imes of abject  helplessness 
Self may see himself in canine terms.  Recount ing his crushing tennis 
defeat  at  the hands of Fielding Goodney, Self confides, ‘basically I ’m  a dog 
on the court ’,  and when during the match he is knocked off his feet  by a 
ball to the face he tells the reader, ‘I  lay there like an old dog, an old dog 
that  wants its old belly st roked’ (pp. 31, 33) .  Out  of shape and in 
borrowed clothes, he is publicly made a fool of by Fielding, the man who, 
Self will only discover much later, has much greater hum iliat ion in store 
for him .  And yet  Self endures his hour of agonizing tennis without  
complaint , doggedly seeking approval, longing for comfort . 
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I t  is a part icular type of helplessness that  leads Self to ident ify with 
dogs:  the tendency toward compulsion, the condit ion of part ial self-
awareness in cont inual thrall to the dictates of inst inct .  This canine 
debilit y becomes st ill more overt  in relat ion to Self’s involvement  with 
Mart ina Twain.  Twain is the only character in Money  who seems to wish 
him  well.   She is neither disgusted by him  nor out  to deceive or exploit  
him .  At  her urging, Self at tempts to read Animal Farm .   Expending 
considerable effort , he interprets the book literally, at  one point  cr it icizing 
Orwell for unrealist ically port raying the habits of pigs - -  ‘Either that , or I ’m  
m issing something’, he declares with unwit t ing accuracy (p. 205) .  He 
decides that  if he lived on Animal Farm  he would be a rat , but  then, 
reconsidering, he offers a revealing moment  of int rospect ion to the reader 
in another image of an immobilized dog:  
 
Now, after mature considerat ion, I  think I  m ight  have what  it  takes 
to be a dog.  I  am  a dog.  I  am  a dog at  the seaside tethered to a 
fence while my master and m ist ress romp on the sands.  I  am  
bouncing, twist ing, weeping, consum ing myself.  A dog can take 
the odd slap or kick.  A slap you can live with, as a dog.  What ’s a 
kick?  Look at  the dogs in the st reet , how everything implicates 
them, how everything is their concern, how they race towards 
great  discoveries.  And imagine the grief, tethered to a fence when 
there is act ivity - -  and play, and thought  and fascinat ion - -  just  
beyond the holding rope. (p. 207)  
 
That  Self m isconst rues Anim al Farm  as a story concerned only with 
animals, and yet  finds it  compelling for precisely that  reason, is, as 
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Diedrick writes, ‘one of the great  com ic conceits in the novel’. 16  More than 
just  a joke at  Self’s expense, however, the pit iful image of the tethered 
dog ‘nudges the reader toward genuine sympathy’. 17
As Twain goes on to point  out , Self is in effect  one of two dogs she 
has taken in.  The second beneficiary of Twain’s charity is an actual dog 
unsubt ly called Shadow, an Alsat ian discovered ‘ownerless, starving, 
chewed up from fights with other dogs and the random clouts and kicks of 
the human canines on Twenty-Third St reet ’ (p. 285) .  Under Twain’s care, 
Shadow becomes ‘a twir ling hysteric of grat itude and health’, and yet  
whenever he is walked past  his old, unwelcom ing home on Eighth Avenue, 
he looks ‘baffled and hungry, momentarily lupine, answering to a sharper 
nature’ (pp. 285, 289) .  When Twain worr ies that  Shadow will run away, 
  True to the figure of 
the tormented but  ineffectual animal, Self cannot  express the impact  of 
Orwell’s novel to the woman who recommended it .   With what  he believes 
to be a ‘shrewdly rehearsed’ dism issal, he says to her, ‘Come on, give me 
a break.  How about  a real book next  t ime?  Porker and Squeaky and the 
rest  of the guys.  I ’m  too old for animal stories’ (p. 212) .  Though Self is 
unable to art iculate his thoughts beyond the bounds of his outward, more 
intellectually lim ited persona, Twain seems to feel st irr ings of the same 
sympathy Diedr ick ment ions above.  She tolerates Self’s often out rageous 
boorishness and even allows him  to stay in her apartment , shares her bed, 
provides more books, and offers kind advice and bet ter food.  Even the 
self- indulgent  Self perceives the st r ik ing asymmetry of such generosity.  
When he asks her why she likes him , she replies, ‘You’re like a dog’ (p. 
334) . 
                                          
16
 Diedrick, p. 87.  Am is has remarked that  he ‘thought  it  would be 
wonderfully funny’ to at t r ibute such a literalist  reading to Self ( in 
Haffenden, p. 23) .  Edmondson reads Self’s literalist ic take on Orwell as 
evidence of his ent rapment  in ‘the commodified world of the marketplace’ 
(p. 151) . 
17
 Diedrick, p. 87. 
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Self at tempts to reassure her with a statement  that  applies equally well,  
and equally anxiously, to his own situat ion:  ‘And leave you?  Relax.  He 
knows what  the good life is’ (p. 289) .  Later, when Self and Shadow pass 
Eighth Avenue and the dog makes its customary ‘noise of yearning’, Self 
clear ly feels the significance of the dog’s conflict ;  when Shadow pulls at  
the leash, Self pulls back ‘harder, much harder’ (p. 321) .  He too is 
st ruggling to defy his self-dest ruct ive desires, but  finds that  his will 
cont inually comes up short  against  his baser drives. 
I n the m idst  of this st ruggle, Self visits a sex shop.  Surveying the 
com ically exaggerated depravit ies on offer, he thinks to himself, ‘Me, I  
don’t  like what  I  want .  What  I  want  has long moved free of what  I  like, 
and I  watch it  slip away with grief, with helplessness’ (p. 324) . 18
Self is split  between more than one self,  and the difference 
between his narrat ive voice and the voice he clumsily wields in dialogue 
with other characters is indicat ive of this divide.  I t  is a separat ion that  
leaves him , as he says when he pictures himself as a dog, ‘consum ing 
myself’ (p. 207) .  Excessive consumpt ion is, for Self, a cont inuat ion of his 
  
Nourished though they are by Twain’s efforts, in their respect ive ways 
both Self and Shadow are lured away from her by their inescapable 
animality, subject  to their unthinking appet ites.  When Selina St reet  
arr ives in New York with the intent  to seduce Self and expose his 
unfaithfulness to Twain, he succumbs immediately, sacrificing his chance 
to live the ‘good life’ Twain had offered.  As if in confirmat ion of their 
connect ion, Twain loses both of her st rays at  once;  at  the very moment  
that  Selina is seducing Self by showing him  ‘her eighth avenue’, Shadow 
finally runs away (pp. 363, 347) . 
                                          
18
 This grief has already surfaced.  Earlier in the novel, for instance, Self 
watches an unset t lingly pert inent  film  about  a prehistoric ape-man 
t ransported through t ime into the present .  He cannot  contain his 
emot ional response:  ‘Moved?  I  had a nervous breakdown.  The tears were 
st ill pissing from my eyes when I  fled to the can’ (p. 128) . 
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bat t le between selves, and a guarantee that  it  is Self the animal who wins.  
His vices are all carnal indulgences:  food, sleep, sex, intoxicat ion, 
violence.  I n consum ing all of these, his animal self also consumes - -  in 
that  it  overcomes - -  his rat ional self.   His desires have turned against  him .  
Early in the novel, for example, Self is shaken by the discovery that  a 
prost itute he has picked up is visibly pregnant .  He lectures her 
paternalist ically, but  he also feels a kinship with her:  
 
She was like me, myself.  She knew she shouldn’t  do it ,  she knew 
she shouldn’t  go on doing it .   But  she went  on doing it  anyway.  
Me, I  couldn’t  even blame money.  What  is this state, seeing the 
difference between good and bad and choosing bad - -  or 
consent ing to bad, okaying bad? (p. 26)  
 
I n a subsequent  interview, Am is provides an answer;  it  is ‘a state of 
corrupt ion’, ‘moral unease without  moral energy’. 19
Tying together the animal mot if with the concepts of unbridled 
consumpt ion and a corrupt , fractured self,  Self at  one point  undertakes a 
digression on two-headed snakes:  
  To some degree, Self 
knows bet ter, and yet  he cont inues ‘choosing bad’;  he is split ,  watching 
himself, helplessly witnessing his own choices, his fallenness. 
 
Two-headed snakes are rare and don’t  last  very long.  They’re 
forever quarrelling about  food and which way to go.  They keep 
t rying to kill and eat  each other all the t ime.  Soon, one head 
becomes dom inant .  The smaller head is obliged to tag along but  
has no say in things any more.  This arrangement  keeps them 
going for a lit t le while.  But  they both die quite quickly. (p. 173)  
                                          
19




He later refers to himself as having a ‘beady scaly face, the face of a fat  
snake’ (p. 316) .  Though it  is not  the cent ral animal in the novel’s 
figurat ive menagerie, the snake is present  enough to imbue the best ial 
Self with a dist inct ly post - lapsarian wretchedness.  Further, Self’s two-
headedness and the animalism  by which it  manifests itself is symptomat ic 
of fallenness in the parallel sense that , by a failure of will,  he falls short  of 
his potent ial.  Twain’s apparent  affect ion for Self would seem to 
corroborate this - -  she t reats him  not  as the man he is, but  as the man he 
could be, a man who reads inst ruct ive books, at tends art  galler ies and 
operas, and eats food suited to moderate and mature tastes.  There is a 
degree of caricature in the bourgeois ideals of Twain’s mentorship, but  her 
benevolence nevertheless points up Self’s latent  capacity to choose self-
improvement  over self-debasement .  I nstead, he fails.  True to his 
corrupt ion, Self falls short  of the life that  Twain ant icipates for him , and 
with embarrassing literalness - -  his sexual indiscret ion with Selina follows 
weeks of impotence with Twain. 20
Self’s dissat isfact ion with his lifestyle, and with his inabilit y to 
change it , leads him  to fantasize about  effect ing - -  by purchasing, of 
course - -  some profound change in his body.  He imagines having his 
‘whole body drilled down and repaired, replaced’ at  a Californian clinic (pp. 
5-6) .  Watching television, he adm ires the plast ic sheen of a heavily 
reconst ructed ‘veteran entertainer’ with a tan ‘like a paint job’ and ‘falsy 
ears’, and imagines one day asking a team of surgeons to remake him  
‘just  like that ’.   The condit ion of this television star, who has been ‘sutured 
and st itched together in a state-of- the-art  cosmet ics lab’ seems to prom ise 
relief for Self’s fractured ident ity, but  it  is the relief of obliv ion rather than 
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redempt ion.  The man on the screen is an ‘aged android’, and his 
programme has a ‘funeral-parlour glow - -  numb, t ranced and shiny, like a 
corpse’ (pp. 17-18) .  The cosmet ically altered hyper- life Self desires is also 
a kind of death, the final voiding of selfhood to make room for the empty 
imagery of media simulacra.  Later, after a long passage envisioning 
California as his ideal art if icially enhanced Elysium, Self adds a note of 
uncertainty:  
 
Ah but  you know, you know somet imes I  feel as if I ’ve already 
been to California - -  and it  didn’t  work out .  I  feel . . .  prosthet ic.  I  




The paradox of Self’s divided psyche is that  it  leaves him  both crowded 
and empty, torn in opposite direct ions but  lacking any cent re.  I n such a 
context , Self’s ravenous consumpt ion of alcohol and other drugs would 
seem to be another at tempt  at  self- replacement , an urge to dissociate by 
quite literally filling his empty core.  Finally, money, the means to 
at taining any of Self’s favoured methods of escaping himself, is imbued 
with the power of intoxicat ion and self-effacement .  I t  consists of ‘suicide 
notes’ and amounts to ‘the great  addict ion’ (pp. 116, 384) . 
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 The term  ‘skinjob’ in part icular carr ies t ragic suggest iveness.  I t  comes 
from Ridley Scot t ’s 1982 film  Blade Runner , in which it  is a pejorat ive term  
for ‘replicants’, synthet ic humans who are vir tually indist inguishable from 
biological humans.  Although replicants are self-aware and so life- like that  
they may even believe themselves to be human, they are designed to self-
dest ruct  after only a few years.  Self’s sim ilar ity to these doomed 
simulacra of humanity is obvious.  Perhaps also relevant  is Self’s sim ilar ity 
to Scot t  - -  both are Brit ish directors with backgrounds in advert ising who 
sought  to advance their careers by ‘going Hollywood’.  Note also that  Self 
uses the word ‘skinjob’ anachronist ically - -  Money  takes place in 1981, 
before even the earliest  test  screenings of the unfinished Blade Runner .   
See Brian J. Robb, Ridley Scot t  (Harpenden:  Pocket  Essent ials, 2001) , p. 
18;  and Paul M. Sammon, Future Noir:  The Making of Blade Runner  
(London:  Orion Media, 1996) , p. 286. 
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As his ‘body t ransplant ’ daydreams imply, Self has what  Diedrick 
calls ‘a mechanist ic self-concept ion’, regarding his body as a collect ion of 
replaceable parts (p. 18) . 22
 
  Alterat ion of appearance, even when not  as 
drast ic as surgery, is a ‘rethink’ in Self’s parlance, and so hairstyling 
sessions become ‘rug- rethinks’ and a bathroom a ‘rethink parlour’ (pp. 83, 
153, 178, 273, 280) .  The word suggests the vain hope of more than 
superficial change - -  indeed, Self at  one point  applies the ident ical term  to 
the Russian Revolut ion (p. 212) .  The clinical at tent ion Self does receive is 
dedicated to his rot ten tooth, the pain in his ‘upper west  side’.  The urban 
imagery with which he communicates his pain externalizes his ailments, as 
if his body is a sprawling, disconnected terr itory over which he has lit t le 
cont rol:  
My head is a city, and various pains have now taken up residence 
in various parts of my face.  A gum-and-bone ache has launched a 
cooperat ive on my upper west  side.  Across the park, neuralgia has 
rented a duplex in my fashionable east  sevent ies.  Downtown, my 
chin throbs with lofts of jaw- loss.  As for my brain, my hundreds, 
it ’s Harlem up there, expanding in the summer fires.  I t  boils and 
swells.  One day soon it  is going to burst . (p. 26)  
 
That  Self’s remarks are set  in 1981, a year in which England suffered 
urban r iots, emphasizes his sense that  to be like a city is to be disunited 
by internal pressures. 23
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 Diedrick, p. 80. 
  Stewing in afflict ions and addict ions, Self’s body 
is not  his own;  he merely observes as it  careens from one indulgent  self-
abuse to another.  I n another self-mechanizing metaphor he asserts, ‘I ’m  
23
 Am is has stated that  these r iots, along with the wedding of Prince 
Charles and Lady Diana, guided his choice to set  Money  in 1981 
(Haffenden, p. 3) . 
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not  the stat ion, I ’m  not  the stop:  I ’m  the t rain’ (p. 112) .  His habits and 
vices are in a sense autonomous;  whatever watches them from within, 
whatever is left  of Self, is of very lit t le consequence.  As Self laments, ‘My 
brain is gim micked by a m icroprocessor the size of a quark and cost ing ten 
pee and running the whole deal.  I  am  made of - -  junk, I ’m  just  junk’ (p. 
265) . 
Self,  however, is not  the only one observing.  As he discovers near 
the end of the novel, Selina has been keeping watch over his dest ruct ion;  
she and her new lover Ossie have arranged for his involvement  with Twain 
(who is Ossie’s wife)  as a means of ‘crosschecking’ their whereabouts (p. 
363) .  Fielding Goodney also observes Self.  He t rails Self through New 
York, often dressed as a woman, from their first  meet ing.  Assum ing a 
persona that  Self nicknames Frank the Phone, Goodney also makes 
menacing, anonymous calls to Self which reveal, along with an enraged 
sense of persecut ion, a near-omniscient  knowledge of Self’s movements, 
as well as int imate details of his personal history and weaknesses (pp. 28, 
45-46, 116-117, 137, 290, 328, 347-348) .  I n one revealing call,  Goodney 
seems to speak as Self’s disembodied conscience, torment ing him  with a 
sampling of past  wrongs:  
 
Remember, in Trenton, the school on Budd St reet , the pale boy 
with glasses in the yard?  You made him  cry.  I t  was me.  Last  
December, Los Angeles, the hired car you were driving when you 
jumped that  light  in Coldwater Canyon?  A cab crashed and you 
didn’t  stop.  The cab had a passenger.  I t  was me.  1978, New 
York, you were audit ioning at  the Walden Center, remember?  The 
redhead, you had her st r ip and then passed her over, and you 
laughed.  I t  was me.  Yesterday you stepped over a bum in Fifth 
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Avenue and you looked down and swore and made to kick.  I t  was 
me.  I t  was me. (pp. 217-218)  
 
Self cannot  recall any but  the last  of these callous acts, though he assents 
that  all are plausible.  St rangely, Self is not  at  all unnerved that  someone 
would know these details of his life, as if it  is perfect ly natural for him  to 
be the focus of some unseen, judging observer.  
With his indeterm inate ident ity and pervasive invisible presence, 
Goodney parallels another prom inent , though unseen, observer of Self:  
the reader.  Rather than a soliloquy, Self’s narrat ion often takes the form  
of an int imate confidence, exclaim ing, posing rhetorical quest ions, 
apologizing for leaving out  details.  He clearly seeks to ingrat iate himself 
with his addressee, often referr ing to the reader as ‘brother’ or ‘sister ’.  
Early in the novel, after waking up with a hangover and gorging himself on 
fast  food, he playfully boasts about  his resiliency while at  the same t ime 
confessing that  he seeks the reader’s favour:  
 
Now, how bad do you assume I ’m  feeling? ... Well,  you’re wrong.  
I ’m  touched by your sympathy (and want  much, much more of it :  I  
want  sympathy, even though I  find it  so very hard to behave 
sympathet ically) .  But  you’re wrong, brother.  Sister, you slipped. 
(p. 29)  
 
Later, at tempt ing a joke, he shows a sim ilar self-consciousness, both of 
his own tendency to behave inappropriately and of his being observed by a 
potent ially disapproving reader:  
 
So, towards the end of dinner, as Mart ina stood at  my side pouring 
out  the last  of the wine, I  rammed my hand up her skirt  and said, 
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‘Come on, darling, you know you love it ’ . ..  Relax.  I  didn’t  really. 
(p. 215)  
 
This comes a few pages after a more desperate ent reaty to the reader.  
After he confesses that  he has downplayed his frequent  visits to brothels 
and porn shops, Self whimpers:  ‘Ah, I ’m  sorry.  I  didn’t  dare tell you 
earlier in case you stopped lik ing me, in case I  lost  your sympathy 
altogether’ (p. 211) .  Am is’s use of direct  address in Self’s narrat ion is a 
rhetorical device that , as Self openly hopes, lends some sympathet ic 
appeal to a character who, on the whole, is obnoxious.  I t  is also, 
however, a metafict ional technique, not  simply because it  appears to 
advert ise an intended effect  upon the reader, but  because at  t imes it  
const ructs a character who is aware that  he is being read. 
Although Self often seems to be currying the reader’s favour, his 
address can also take on a more host ile edge.  For instance, Self’s disdain 
for his screenwriter, Doris Arthur, prompts a rant  against  people who have 
earned degrees (Arthur is a Harvard graduate) , then against  people of a 
certain social class.  Self’s bit terness, his language makes clear, extends 
to the readers of Money  as well:  
 
I  hate people with degrees, O- levels, eleven-pluses, I owa Tests, 
shorthand diplomas ...  And you hate me, don’t  you.  Yes you do.  
Because I ’m  the new kind, the kind who has money but  can never 
use it  for anything but  ugliness.  To which I  say:  You never let  us 
in, not  really.  You m ight  have thought  you let  us in, but  you never 
did.  You just  gave us some money. (p. 58)  
 
With her high-culture tastes, Mart ina Twain would seem to belong to that  
group as well.   Comment ing on Twain, Self makes another abrupt  turn to 
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the reader:  ‘She knew far more than me.  But  then, who doesn’t?  You do’ 
(p. 301) .  The accusatory italics are like a jab from an index finger.  Self’s 
persistent  t raversing of the fourth wall is in fit t ing with his character.  I t  is 
a t ransgression - -  just  the sort  of act  in which he specializes - -  and it  is 
one that , to the extent  that  it  can be sympathet ic, can also be wheedling 
and manipulat ive.  Further, because it  is a metafict ional device as well,  it  
indicates that  larger manipulat ions are taking place, of which Self is only a 
component , and in which the reader is complicit . 
Because Money  is narrated in Self’s unique manner of internal 
speech, punctuated with his act ive efforts to change the way in which the 
reader receives his narrat ion, the mediat ion of the plot  is always 
prom inent ly displayed.  The lim itat ions of Self’s intellect , compounded by 
the lim itat ions imposed on his awareness by his various vices, mean that  
he is a doubly unreliable narrator:  neither lucid nor necessarily honest .  I n 
this capacity, he embodies a problem sim ilar to the one noted by Henry 
Stubbe in his 1670 crit ique of the methods of the Royal Society, discussed 
previously:  if a narrat ive is to derive its authority from its proxim ity to the 
experience of the perceiving subject , then it  will only be as authoritat ive 
as that  subject ’s claims. 24
All the narrat ion of Money  f ilters through Self’s muddled 
consciousness, but  that  is not  the only mediat ing force present ing itself 
through the narrat ive.  The first  direct  address to the reader - -  a request  
to be ‘on the lookout  for clues or giveaways’ - -  comes not  in Self’s 
fractured voice but  in a note poised on the border of the fict ional frame, 
  The whole of Money  is Self’s representat ion to 
the reader.  What  is mediated bears the mark of it s mediator;  the world of 
Money  is decept ive and disordered, and it  can be known, by Self and the 
reader alike, only provisionally. 
                                          
24
 Henry Stubbe, A Specim en of Some Anim adversions upon a Book, 
Ent ituled, Plus Ult ra, or, Modern I mprovements of Useful Knowledge 
(London:  [ n. pub.] , 1670) .  See chapter one. 
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immediately preceding page one, signed by ‘M.A.’.   The note differs from 
the typical authorial preface less for it s content  than for the content  that  
follows it ,  because Mart in Am is is also a character in Money .   He is 
int roduced into the text  of the novel by Self, who, when Twain ment ions 
writers, thinks to himself, ‘A writer lives round my way in London.  He 
looks at  me oddly in the st reet .  He gives me the fucking creeps’ (p. 39) .  
Obliv ious as he is to Goodney and St reet ’s surveillance, Self is unnerved 
by the gaze of Mart in Am is, as if he senses some kind of preternatural 
influence.  When he ment ions this unset t ling writer again, he uses almost  
the ident ical words:  
 
I  think I  must  have some new cow disease that  makes you wonder 
whether you’re real all the t ime, that  makes your life feel like a 
t r ick, an act , a joke.  I  feel, I  feel dead.  There’s a guy who lives 
round my way who really gives me the fucking creeps.  He’s a 
writer, too... (p. 60)  
 
I n this case, the cause of his unease is made clearer;  Self is prompted to 
think of Mart in Am is by his feeling of art if icialit y and lack of agency.  When 
Mart in Am is is ment ioned a third t ime, Self repeats the same phrases yet  
again - -  ‘round my way’ and ‘gives me the creeps’ - -  as if in those 
moments when he recalls the writer, the text ’s reflexivity causes stylist ic 
decay, like feedback from a loudspeaker placed too near its m icrophone. 
Self finds Am is’s face to be ‘knowing, with a sm irk of collusion’, and 
when he finally ment ions Am is’s name to the reader, it  is with the air of a 
suspicious interrogator t rying to start le a conspirator:  ‘This writer ’s name, 
they tell me, is Mart in Am is.   Never heard of him .  Do you know his stuff 
at  all?’ (p. 71) .  I ndeed, the reader is a conspirator of sorts, having had 
access to Am is’s insinuat ing prologue in a realm  - -  the paratextual frame -
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-  that  is ut ter ly off- lim its to Self. 25  With this tact ic, as Victoria Alexander 
notes, ‘The reader’s willing suspension of disbelief is discouraged, his awe 
of the art ist -writer encouraged’. 26
Self’s metafict ional t ransgression, his gesturing toward the reader 
with ent reat ies and accusat ions, leads to the st ill more reflexive act  of 
speaking to his own author.  He is already just ifiably paranoid, since he is 
after all stumbling into Fielding’s elaborate t rap, and he is further alarmed 
by the Am is character’s coy knowingness, so that , after the two men meet  
in a pub ( insinuat ingly called the Blind Pig) , Self’s literary t ransgression 
nearly incites a physical one:  
  Along with the words ‘Mart in Am is’ 
pr inted on the cover and in the front  mat ter of Money ,  the note from ‘M.A.’ 
is proof of the reader’s collusion with someone whose machinat ions Self 
can only dim ly suspect . 
 
[ …]  ‘Well,  see you around, Mart in.’ 
‘No doubt . ’ 
‘. . . What ’s that  mean?’  I  didn’t  much like his superior tone, 
come to think of it ,  or his tan, or his book.  Or the way he stares at  
me in the st reet . 
‘Mean?’ he said.  ‘What  do you think it  means?’ 
‘You calling me a cunt?’ I  said loudly. 
‘What?’ 
‘You called me a cunt ! ’ 
‘You’re m istaken.’ 
                                          
250DJGDOHQD0ąF]\ĔVNDPDNHVDVLPLODUFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ$PLV¶V
paratextual note and ‘reader complicity’;  see ‘Writ ing the Writer:  The 
Quest ion of Authorship in the Novels of Mart in Am is’, in Literature and the 
Writer ,  ed. by Michael J. Meyer (Amsterdam:  Rodopi, 2004) , pp. 191-207 
(pp. 198-199) . 
26
 Victoria N. Alexander, ‘Mart in Am is:  Between the I nfluences of Bellow 
and Nabokov’, Ant ioch Review , 52.4 (Fall 1994) , 580-590. 
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‘Ah.  So you’re calling me a liar now.  You’re calling me a 
liar! ’ 
‘Hey, take it  easy, pal.  Christ .  You’re fine.  You’re great .  
I ’ll see you around.’ (p. 88)  
 
Self’s belligerence toward Am is underscores the literary awkwardness of a 
fict ional character encountering his creator.  The threat  of violence within 
the confines of the narrat ive signals another, pr ior violence enacted upon 
the convent ions of novelist ic fict ion.  Considered from the external 
perspect ive of a reader, Am is, though he is the more passive man in this 
scene, is in fact  the more act ive part icipant  in the situat ion of the fict ion.  
He has set  it  up;  the insults originate with him , and any violence that  
m ight  occur would be his alone. 
The Mart in Am is character knows more than he could if he were 
simply another inhabitant  of the fict ional London in which Self resides.  
When he next  encounters Self, Am is (or rather both Am ises, the writ ten 
and the writ ing)  is even less subt le about  his authorial advantage.  He 
knows Self int imately.  He ment ions one of Self’s actors by name, 
describes in detail an argument  Self had with a st ranger, and elaborates 
on Self’s pr ivate musings about  ‘choosing bad’ (pp. 175-177) .  However, 
he is not  some otherworldly seer;  Self repeatedly happens upon Am is in 
decidedly m undane circumstances - -  eat ing a ‘standard yob’s breakfast ’,  
liv ing ‘like a student ’ in ‘two dust - furred rooms off a sooty square’ (pp. 
176, 237) .  The Am is who appears in Money  is thus a part  of the fict ional 
world of the other characters - -  subject  to the same unglamorous m inut iae 
- -  but  also separate from their world - -  endowed with an awareness that  
supersedes that  of the other characters.  Because of his uncertain status, 
wavering between that  of a character and that  of an omniscient  author 
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figure, the lim itat ions that  govern the lives of the other characters are, for 
the Mart in Am is character, present  but  provisional. 
This blurr iness means that , when Self eventually hires the uncanny 
Am is to doctor the screenplay of his film , a st range recursive tangle takes 
shape:  Self’s writer - -  the person who has writ ten Self’s life in the novel 
Money  - -  is also Self’s writer - -  the person cont racted to rewrite Self’s life 
as it  appears in the film  Bad Money .   Am is’s two roles in fact  combine, 
since, by providing the necessary alterat ions to Self’s screenplay, the in-
text  Am is also alters the course of Self’s life - -  prolonging the period in 
which the film  seems viable and allowing Fielding’s ruse to gather more 
dest ruct ive momentum. 
The Mart in Am is character becomes integral to the plot  specifically 
as a writer, which affords him  the opportunity to expound on theories of 
fict ion.  Speaking to Self, who has only just  discovered that  Selina is 
leaving him  and is pregnant  by another man, Am is wonders, ‘I s there a 
moral philosophy of fict ion?  When I  create a character and put  him  or her 
through certain ordeals, what  am I  up to - -  morally?’ (p. 260) .  He all but  
adm its to authoring Self, subject ing him  to ‘certain ordeals’ with an aloof 
curiosity.  With these comments’ unambiguous relevance to Self’s present  
abject ion, Am is affirms his self- referent ial colonizat ion of the text .  His 
influence is greater than that  of a character operat ing solely within the 
framework of the plot , but  it  also exceeds that  of a detached, invisible 
author. 
When Self has been ut ter ly vanquished by Fielding’s hoax, he 
barely makes it  back over the At lant ic, abandoning the wreckage of his 
American life for the wreckage of his Brit ish life.  He has been thoroughly 
duped, and it  takes Mart in Am is’s insight  to unravel the scheme for him  
over a game of chess.  Only by means of conflat ing two ident it ies, the 
int ra-  and ext ra- textual Am ises, can Am is exploit  the possibilit ies of both 
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f igures at  the same t ime.  Am is authors Self - -  he manufactures his world 
and his words - -  and then he authors him self,  so that  he may intervene 
direct ly as a component  of that  world, prodding Self through his maze, 
steering him  to self-dest ruct ion.  Am is’s literary game then finally 
culm inates in a literal game.  Self and Am is play for money, and in the last  
moments of the match the two men hast ily raise the stakes:  
 
‘This is exquisite, ’ [ Am is]  said - -  and made a wait ing move 
with the king. 
[ …]  ‘I  hope you mean that , pal, because you’re not  having it  
back.  Double.’ 
‘Double.’ 
‘Double.’ 
‘Double.’ (p. 378)  
 
When Am is defeats Self by forcing him  into a final, suicidal move - -  a 
Zugzwang - -  what  has been so overbearingly obvious to the reader all 
along finally dawns on Self, manifest ing, unsurprisingly, in yet  another 
voice:  
 
I  clamped my hands over my ears.  Mart in talked on, shadowy, 
waxy, flicker- faced.  I  don’t  know if this st range new voice of m ine 
carr ied anywhere when I  said, ‘I ’m  the joke. I ’m  it !  I t  was you. I t  
was you. ’ (p. 379)  
 
Thus does Am is’s revelat ion to Self take place in a scene of 
confounding mult iplicity, of doubling and repet it ion.  Self’s voice has 
doubled by becom ing ‘st range’ to him , but  it  has doubled in other ways 
too.  His repet it ion - -  a verbal doubling - -  of the phrase ‘it  was you’ 
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precisely echoes the Am is character’s doubled words on the previous page, 
when he reveals to Self that  Fielding Goodney had been spending Self’s 
money all along:  ‘You were paying.  I t  was you.  I t  was you’ (p. 378) .  
Self’s exclamat ion can thus be read as expressing the delayed realizat ion 
that  he has been cheated by Goodney, and thus as a repet it ion of the 
Am is character’s message in a different  tone.  At  the same t ime, though, it  
also echoes Goodney, in the persona of Frank the Phone, when he speaks 
as the vict im (s)  of Self’s past  m isdeeds:  ‘I t  was me.  I t  was me’ (p. 218, 
see above) .  Alternat ively, Self’s repet it ion of the phrase can be read as an 
accusat ion directed at  his double, Mart in Am is, expressing Self’s deeper 
and more t raumat ic realizat ion that  Am is is a con man of an even higher 
order than Goodney, an authorial dem iurge who has orchest rated all the 
details of Self’s downfall.   Thus the climact ic m oment  of the narrat ive, the 
point  at  which knowledge makes its catast rophic int rusion into Self’s 
awareness, is blurred, refracted, and irreducibly mult iple. 
When asked by interviewer John Haffenden about  the Mart in Am is 
character, Am is ambiguously uses the pronoun ‘I ’ in a way that  could 
apply equally well to author or author-character:  ‘Every character in this 
book dupes the narrator, and yet  I  am  the one who has actually done it  all 
to him ’. 27
                                          
27
 Haffenden, p. 11.  I n this context  the word ‘dupes’ seems r ichly 
ambiguous as well,  implying as it  does both decept ion and duplicat ion. 
  Self’s actors use the pronoun in the same double-voiced way 
when referr ing to the characters they will port ray, even as they detachedly 
discuss rearranging those characters’ lives (pp. 16, 110-111, 186) .  They 
are neither one nor the other, but  shift  provisionally between the two 
ident it ies.  The figure of the author-character shares this elusive sem i-
presence.  Mart in Am is’s adm it tance into his own fict ion as a character is 
an adm ission of his exterior, authorial existence, and drawing a definit ive 
separat ion between the two is not  possible. 
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As in their previous row at  the Blind Pig, Am is’s violence to literary 
boundaries provokes violence within the text :  
 
I  didn’t  see my first  swing com ing - -  but  he did.  He ducked or 
shied or stood swift ly aloof and my fist  slammed into the light  
bracket  above his head.  I  wheeled sideways with a wide 
backhander, fell against  the low chair and caught  its shoulder-spike 
deep in the r ibs.  I  came up flailing.  I  hurled myself round that  
room like a big ape in a small cage.  But  I  could never connect .  Oh 
Christ , he just  isn’t  here, he just  isn’t  there. (p. 379)  
 
Am is is only provisionally present ;  he is there and not  there.  Thus he can 
lead Self into his own downfall as easily in Self’s life as on the chessboard.  
Self’s violent  outburst  reveals a difference in their physical qualit ies that  
underscores this ontological dispar ity:  Am is hovers out  of reach like an 
ethereal spir it  while the perennially animalist ic Self degenerates into a 
clumsy caged ape.  For Self, the plot  of Money  is against  him .  He is 
doubly in Zugzwang. 
I ndeed, even this odd bit  of chess term inology points to Am is as 
omnipotent  author figure;  it  is one of several anomalies of dict ion that  
offer glimpses of Am is’s manipulat ing presence.  Self is (somewhat  
counter- intuit ively)  a confident  chess player, and the first  appearance of 
the term  ‘zugzwanged’ in the text  is in his narrat ing voice (p. 119) .  When 
he hears Am is say it ,  however, Self can only roar, ‘What  the fuck does that  
mean?’ (p. 379) .  This highlights the gap between Self’s voices;  the dict ion 
of the narrat ing Self can be incomprehensible to the Self who speaks.  
Another, sim ilar, vocal crack m ight  be found in Self’s reference to his 
television commercials as ‘nihilist ic’ (p. 78) .  I t  is a word the speaking Self 
would never use, and an opinion the narrat ing Self would be unlikely to 
202 
  
hold.  Self can also ut ter words that  are chronologically inaccessible to 
him , as when he calls himself a ‘skinjob’ - -  a neologism  he somehow lift s 
from an unfinished, unreleased film  (p. 329;  see above) .  Self’s mult iple 
voices have shown him  to be drawn and quartered by the broken, chaot ic 
world he inhabits, but  in context  with the int rusive authorial presence of 
Mart in Am is, they also reveal something else.  Self is a puppet , not  just  to 
the mass-cultural forces around him , but  also, as he is a mere figment  of 
fict ion, to the manipulat ing consciousness which has composed those 
forces.  Self’s many selves - -  the beast , the lout , the addict , the 
consumer, as well as the wounded sent imentalist  and the uniquely 
expressive narrator - -  have pulled him  apart , and between these 
component  voices a unifying ident ity shines through.  The voice which 
underlies all the others is that  of Am is. 
This revelat ion is, obviously, no revelat ion at  all.   Am is wrote the 
novel.  However, what  is revealed along with the profusion of Am is’s 
authorial voice is the corresponding deficiency of the other voices.  These 
voices resolve themselves as filters or conduits rather than autonomous 
sources.  Richard Todd has noted the sim ilar it y of Self’s narrat ive voice to 
Am is’s own authorial voice as it  appears in other texts.  Cit ing the 
‘bizarrely figurat ive expressiveness’ to be found in certain passages of 
Money ,  Todd suggests that  ‘in devising a voice for John Self, the ext ra-
fict ional Mart in Am is has, it  seems to me, quite explicit ly chosen to use his 
own’. 28
With the visibilit y of the authorial imprint  upon Self’s voice(s)  ar ises 
the possible inhibit ion of the vocal mult iplicity that , for Bakht in, is the 
  Like the punning names of products and people, the hyperact ive 
and hyperbolic language, and the inclusion of an author figure as 
character, John Self’s disjunct ive voice can be read as yet  another mark of 
Am is’s presence throughout  the text . 
                                          
28
 Todd, p. 135. 
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hallmark of novelist ic discourse.  One m ight  point  out  the variety of 
registers, the evocat ive skaz,  the sustained heteroglossia of Self’s 
narrat ive, but  one could do so only while point ing through Self to Am is. 29  
As Karl Miller writes, ‘it  is somet im es possible to sense that  only the one 
man is on show, to doubt  the authent icity of those characters who t rail no 
shadow of a Siamese connect ion with the author’. 30  Does this reveal 
Money  to be a failed novel, one that , as Bakht in writes, ‘composit ionally 
and themat ically [ is]  sim ilar to a novel’,  but  exhibits only ‘a prim it ive, 
art if icial,  worked-up double-voicedness’?31
These elem ents are indeed present  in Am is’s text , but  Lodge makes 
the st rongest  case for the novelist ic status of Money  when he describes 
Self as ‘a hero or ant i-hero who not  only answers the author back, as 
Bakht in said of Dostoevsky’s heroes, but  actually throws a punch at  
him ’.
  Placed alongside the 
Dostoevskian mult iplicity of irreducible voices celebrated by Bakht in, 
Money  m ight  appear to be monological, a collect ion of impersonat ions 
carr ied out  by a single performer.  Lodge, however, cites Money  
specifically as an example of a Bakht inian novel, calling it  a ‘skaz narrat ive 
in the Notes from Underground t radit ion’ and point ing out  Am is’s broad 
use of the carnivalesque. 
32
                                          
29
 For a discussion of the dialogic potent ial of skaz,  see Mikhail M. Bakht in, 
Problem s of Dostoevsky’s Poet ics, ed. and t rans. by Caryl Emerson 
(Minneapolis, MN:  University of Minnesota, 1984) , pp. 185, 190-194. 
  More than Self’s procliv ity for violent  outbursts, it  is his potent ial 
to ‘answer back’ that  marks him  out  as an indicator of double-voicedness 
in Money .   The voices that  permeate the text , interwoven within Self’s 
30
 Karl Miller, Doubles:  Studies in Literary History  (Oxford:  Oxford 
University, 1985) , p.414. 
31
 Mikhail M. Bakht in, The Dialogic Im aginat ion, ed. by Michael Holquist , 
t rans. by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist  (Aust in, TX:  University of 
Texas, 1981) , p. 327. 
32
 David Lodge, ‘The Novel Now:  Theories and Pract ices’, in After Bakht in:  
Essays on Fict ion and Crit icism  (London:  Rout ledge, 1990) , pp. 11-  24 (p. 
24) .  See also Bakht in, Problem s of Dostoevsky’s Poet ics, pp. 63-64;  and 




narrat ing voice as well as supplem ent ing it  from  without , are not  
reconcilable to a single register or ideology.  Bakht in provides a relevant  
list  of some so-called ‘prerequisites for an authent ic double-voiced prose 
discourse’:  
 
The relat iv izing of linguist ic consciousness, it s crucial part icipat ion 
in the social mult i-  and vari- languagedness of evolving languages, 
the various wanderings of semant ic and expressive intent ions and 
the t rajectory of this consciousness through various languages 
( languages that  are all equally well conceptualized and equally 
object ive) , the inevitable necessity for such a consciousness to 
speak indirect ly, condit ionally, in a refracted way. 33
 
 
Even excluding secondary characters, the narrat ion and speech of John 
Self alone fulfil these specificat ions.  Todd echoes Bakht in when he 
suggests that  one must  confront  ‘the extent  to which the novel’s various 
voices both are and are not  claim ing to be aspects of a single 
consciousness’.  Todd’s own conclusion is that  the voices are those ‘of a 
single selfhood complexly refracted through the existence of various, 
duplicitously conflict ing, voices’. 34  Self is, in this sense, something like the 
tortured Raskolnikov, whose m ind is, in Bakht in’s words, ‘a field of bat t le 
for others’ voices’. 35
Nonetheless, and t rue to his name, Self is in many ways an 
autobiographical reflect ion of Am is.  Diedrick observes how Self’s 
difficult ies in producing Bad Money  appear to echo Am is’s own experiences 
  The voices of Money  underm ine and complicate each 
other, making the novel a vocal composite, even if they carry with them a 
record of their authorial genesis. 
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 Bakht in, The Dialogic Im aginat ion, p. 326. 
34
 Todd, pp. 133, 136. 
35
 Bakht in, Problem s of Dostoevsky’s Poet ics,  p. 88. 
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as screenwriter for the 1980 film  Saturn 3.   He also points out  that  both 
Am is and Self had American mothers and lived temporarily in New Jersey 
as children, and proposes that  Mart ina Twain may be modelled after 
Antonia Phillips, Am is’s first  wife. 36  I n fact , Am is and Phillips were married 
on the same day that  Money  was published, a coincidence Am is in his 
autobiography calls ‘almost  crassly appropriate’. 37  However, if John Self’s 
name can be taken as a clue to his role as author surrogate, the name 
Mart ina Twain would seem to imply a sim ilar role.  Within the context  of 
the fict ion, Twain is in some respects Mart in’s counterpart , or perhaps his 
twin. 38  Residing in New York, she is Am is’s geographical complement , and 
the role she plays in Self’s life correlates with that  played by the Am is 
character.  She is Self’s source of stabilit y in New York, the one whose 
commentary on his life offers him  some of the few insights to which he has 
access.  Robert  Duggan refers to her as ‘the “nice”  side of the author’. 39
 
  
With her books and art  and music, she is also the representat ive of high 
culture among Self’s American circle, just  as Am is is among Self’s Brit ish 
acquaintances.  Like the Am is character, she is also prone to abst ract  
digressions with obvious metafict ional implicat ions:  
She talked about  percept ion, representat ion and t ruth.  She talked 
about  the vulnerabilit y of a figure unknowingly watched - -  the 
                                          
36
 Diedrick, pp. 95, 102. 
37
 Am is also comments on the same page that  ‘it  would be a ferocious 
slander of Mart in Am is [ …]  if I  called Money  autobiographical’,  though he 
concedes that  ‘the story turned on my preoccupat ions’ about  bachelorhood 
and childlessness;  Mart in Am is, Experience (London:  Jonathan Cape, 
2000) , p. 177.  For an example of one crit ic’s at tempt  to const rue Self as 
the mouthpiece of Am is’s own prejudices, see Laura L. Doan, ‘“Sexy 
Greedy is the Late Eight ies” :  Power Systems in Am is’s Money  and 
Churchill’s Serious Money ’,  Minnesota Review:  A Journal of Comm it ted 
Writ ing 34-35 (Spring-Fall 1990)  69-80. 
38
 Karl Miller, alternat ively, reads Mart ina Twain as more of an 
intermediary, ‘a sort  of br idge between Self and the sobersides Mart in 
Am is’ (p. 412) .  This possibilit y st ill depends upon Twain reflect ing Am is to 
some extent , however. 
39
 Duggan, p. 100. 
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difference between a port rait  and an unposed study.  The 
analogous dist inct ion in fict ion would be that  between the 
conscious and the reluctant  narrator - -  the sad, the unwit t ing 
narrator. (p. 132)  
 
Twain and Am is seem to know Self bet ter than he knows himself, and this 
penet rat ing understanding, coupled with their uncanny metafict ional 
comments, link these characters together.  All three, in their respect ive 
ways, seem to cast  glances at  the reader.  As Diedrick writes, ‘The reader 
is vir tually invited to consider Self, Am is, and Mart ina as aspects of a 
single consciousness’. 40
I f Mart ina Twain’s insight  into Self’s condit ion can read as authorial 
involut ion, what  about  the mad percept iveness of that  other author of 
Self’s downfall,  Fielding Goodney?  Fielding, with his literary forename, is 
in many respects another double of Mart in Am is.  His plot t ing provides the 
substance of Am is’s plot , and, with his shifts between personalit ies and his 
manipulat ion of symbolic systems like gender and money, he certainly 
uses fict ion to his advantage.  Unlike Self, but  like Mart in and Mart ina, 
Fielding also speaks the language of high culture.  When assaulted, he 
quotes Othello:  ‘O damn’d I ago!   O inhuman dog! ’.
 
41
  The line is 
unrecognizable to Self, who thinks he hears ‘O damn dear go, [ …]  Oh and 
you man dog’, but  Am is later t ranslates Fielding’s exclamat ion, finding it  
‘fascinat ing’ (pp. 350, 377) . 42
                                          
40
 Diedrick, p. 92. 
  As an init iate into the literary culture 
shared by Mart in and Mart ina, and as the masterm ind of so much of the 
41
 The line, comprising Roderigo’s dying words, appears in Othello at  
v.1.62.  William  Shakespeare, in William  Shakespeare:  The Com plete 
Works,  ed. by Peter Alexander (London:  Collins, 1951) , pp. 1114-1154 (p. 
1148) .  For an observant  considerat ion of the intertextuality of Money  that  
pays part icular at tent ion to Shakespeare and Shakespearean crit icism , see 
Duggan’s ‘Big Time Shakespeare and the Joker in the Pack’. 
42
 Self’s m ishearing is nonsensical but  not  nonsense;  he is after all 
something of a ‘man dog’. 
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act ion of Money  (at  least  within the confines of it s narrat ive frame) , 
Fielding Goodney acts as another extension of authorial will.  
Even a m inor character like Doris Arthur, Self’s first  screenwriter, 
bears a professional resemblance to Am is.  She has published a collect ion 
of short  stor ies called The I ronic High Style,  a t it le that  names, as 
0ąF]\ĔVNDUHPDUNVµa mode also favored by Am is’. 43
Once Am is announces his presence within the narrat ive, the totalit y 
of the fict ion at tests to that  presence.  The situat ion is something like that  
of a person who, revealed as a habitual liar, can never be unreservedly 
t rusted again.  I n this case, however, it  is t ruth that  has altered all 
subsequent  discourse.  Am is’s technique makes a stylist ically const ituted 
confession - -  ‘I  have writ ten this;  you are reading it ’.  This should surprise 
no one, but  the presence of such a proclamat ion in the fabric of the fict ion 
itself changes the way in which that  fict ion is read.  As Patr icia Waugh 
writes, ‘The reader is made aware that , paradoxically, the “author”  is 
situated in the text  at  the very point  where “he”  asserts “his”  ident ity 
outside it ’.
  The eponymous 
story, which Self manages to read, features a cent ral character with an 
inexplicable command of language, ‘a t ramp who spoke exclusively in 
quotat ions from Shakespeare.  All he did was beg and ponce and 
scrounge, but  he talked Shakespeare while doing it ’ (p. 59) .  I f Self 
resembles the art iculate t ramp, so too does Doris Arthur resemble Am is, 
who, in his fict ional persona, will eventually step into her role to rework 
her screenplay. 
44
                                          
43
 0ąF]\ĔVNDS 
  The most  prom inent  metafict ional features of the novel 
license the reader to consider Money  as an artefact  that  has been created 
and mediated by a cont rolling consciousness;  thereafter, every aspect  of 
the text  becomes potent ially metafict ional.  Once one fict ional elem ent  in 
44
 Waugh, Metafict ion, p. 133.  For a sim ilar com ment  in regard to the 
figure of Am is in Money ,  see Edmondson, pp. 149-150. 
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the text  points beyond its frame, the frame has been breached.  Any 
component  of the text  has the potent ial to repeat  the t ransgression.  
Everything is suspect . 
Some suggest ion of why this is so can be made with reference to 
Derr ida’s concept  of rupture, and to a certain discursive st rategy that  an 
awareness of this rupture would seem to demand.  I n Derr ida’s account , 
st ructure (and for Derr ida this concept  includes the st ructurality of any 
discourse and thus of understanding in general, at  least  in Western 
culture)  relies upon some cent re or ‘point  of presence’ in order to funct ion:  
‘By orient ing and organizing the coherence of the system, the center of a 
st ructure perm its the play of it s elements inside the total form ’.  Such a 
perm ission is also a prohibit ion, however, because since the cent re is the 
organizing principle of the play within a st ructure, it  must  also be ‘the 
point  at  which the subst itut ion of contents, elements or terms is no longer 
possible’.  I n this way the cent re acts as a sort  of anchor or hub, the node 
of fix ity that  grants to the play of the st ructure its ‘fundamental ground’ 
and allows for a sense of ‘reassuring certainty’. 45
I n the history of Western metaphysics, in which the st ructural 
cent re has borne labels like ‘HLGRVDUFKŋWHORVHQHUJHLDRXVLD (essence, 
existence, substance, subject ) ’, a rupture occurred ‘when the st ructurality 
of st ructure had to begin to be thought ’ - -  that  is, when the subst itutabilit y 
of the cent re became visible.  This rupture was ‘the moment  when 
language invaded the universal problemat ic, the moment  when, in the 
absence of a center or or igin, everything became discourse’.  For Derrida, 
this rupture ‘has always already begun’, but  it  is typified in its modern 
iterat ion in the works of Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger.
 
46
                                          
45
 Jacques Derr ida, ‘St ructure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the 
Human Sciences’, in Writ ing and Difference,  t rans. by Alan Bass (London:  
Rout ledge, 1978) , pp. 278-293 (pp. 278-279) . 
  Of course, 
46
 Derr ida, ‘St ructure, Sign and Play’, pp. 279-280. 
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awareness of the subst itutabilit y of the st ructural cent re does not  waive 
one’s reliance upon it  - -  one cannot  step outside the compass of discourse.  
However, as Derr ida writes, ‘The quality and fecundity of a discourse are 
perhaps measured by the cr it ical r igor with which [ it s]  relat ion to the 
history of metaphysics and to inherited concepts is thought ’. 47
 
  One 
method of cult ivat ing such crit ical r igour, which Derr ida detects in the 
ethnology of Claude Lévi-St rauss, is to proceed with the inherited methods 
of discourse on the condit ion of their provisionality:  
[ This conserves]  all those old concepts within the domain of 
empir ical discovery while here and there denouncing their lim its, 
t reat ing them as tools which can st ill be used.  No longer is any 
t ruth value at t r ibuted to them;  there is a readiness to abandon 
them, if necessary, should other inst ruments appear more useful. 48
 
 
Lévi-St rauss acts as ‘bricoleur’ (Derr ida appropriates this term  from Lévi-
St rauss in order to apply it  to him) , proceeding as if the framework in 
which he works is anchored by pure object ivit y, even while conceding that  
it  is not . 49
A key feature of the cr it ical stance embedded in bricolage is the 
self- reflexiv ity of it s concessionary content .  I f a discourse is to shed light  
upon the shortcom ings of it s own methods while cont inuing to implement  
them, then it  must  interweave whatever object ive assert ion it  aims to 
make with a concurrent  subject ive adm ission.  I t  must  refer to itself 
simultaneously with its object .  The result  of such bi-direct ionality is 
  By proceeding provisionally in this way, post - rupture discourse 
avoids the paralysis of total relat iv ism  through self- reflexive, cr it ical 
scept icism . 
                                          
47
 Derr ida, ‘St ructure, Sign and Play’, p. 282. 
48
 Derr ida, ‘St ructure, Sign and Play’, p. 284. 
49
 Derr ida, ‘St ructure, Sign and Play’, p. 285. 
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unm istakably m imet ic.  I n the specific case of Lévi-St rauss, ‘discourse on 
the acent r ic st ructure that  myth itself is, cannot  itself have an absolute 
subject  or an absolute center’;  it  ‘must  it self be mythom orphic’.   Put  
succinct ly and in more general terms, self-cr it ical discourse that  proceeds 
in awareness of rupture ‘must  have the form  of that  of which it  speaks’. 50
To return therefore to Money ,  Am is has crafted a fict ion that  
cont inually foregrounds its fict ionality by bearing a clear authorial imprint  
at  mult iple levels.  The dict ion, the characterizat ion, and the plot , for 
example, all repeat  the self- referent ial confession ment ioned above - -  
announcing the text  as created artefact .  Waugh describes the effect  of 
metafict ional emphasis on ‘the sign as sign’ - -  the artefactual, acent r ic 
quality of the language of fict ion:  
 
 
To be aware of the sign is thus to be aware of the absence of that  
to which it  apparent ly refers and the presence only of relat ionships 
with other signs within the text . 51
 
 
There is therefore a stylist ic rupture in Money , one in which, to apply 
Derr ida’s expression, everything becomes discourse.  This is why 
breaching the convent ions of realism  init iates a chain react ion in which any 
textual feature m ight  be interpreted as sim ilar ly t ransgressive of 
convent ion. 
By entering so conspicuously into his own fict ion, Am is disrupts the 
authorial invisibilit y that  cloaks the originat ing voice of t radit ionally 
realist ic fict ion.  Rather than posing as editor or witness, or hovering 
above the act ion like a disembodied eye, Am is lays open his role as author 
                                          
50
 Derr ida draws this claim  from his reading of Lévi-St rauss’ The Raw and 
the Cooked;  see ‘St ructure, Sign and Play’, p. 286. 
51
 Pat r icia Waugh, Metafict ion:  The Theory and Pract ice of Self-Conscious 
Fict ion (London:  Rout ledge, 1984) , p. 57. 
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to the reader, making the necessity of that  role impossible to ignore.  I n 
doing so, he de-cent res his authorial voice, because, as Derr ida explains, 
in order to funct ion as cent re it  must  remain disregardable:  
 
The center is at  the center of the totalit y, and yet , since the center 
does not  belong to the totalit y ( is not  part  of the totalit y) , the 
totalit y has its center elsewhere. 52
 
 
Plunging into the discursive framework of his own fict ion, Am is is not  
‘elsewhere’, at  least  not  fully.  He is too visible.  There are many 
overlapping convent ions guiding the ways in which a reader m ight  use a 
novel, and to the extent  that  those convent ions rely upon the author’s 
remaining outside of the ‘totalit y ’ of his or her text , those readerly uses 
are reconfigured by authorial involut ion and metafict ion.  The rule of 
realist  m im et ic illusion is broken.  This is why, having made a metafict ional 
reference beyond its frame, the text  of Money  alters the interpret ive 
possibilit ies, not  just  of it s metafict ional figures, but  of the text  as a whole.  
When the cent re invades the st ructure it  can no longer serve as its 
foundat ion;  consequent ly, the play of that  st ructure’s significat ion is 
changed. 
Am is’s violat ion of t radit ional realist  poet ics inst igates a rupture in 
which the fict ion comes unmoored from the foundat ional not ion of m imet ic 
reportage and edges toward a freer play of significat ion.  This poses what  
appears at  first  to be a problem for the status of Money  as novel.  I f 
realism , however loosely conceived, and its at tendant  epistemological 
emphases are to cont inue to serve as the generic marker of novelist ic 
writ ing, then Money  would seem to be act ively resist ing the genre.  
However, the m imet ic component  of cr it ical self- referent ialit y should not  
                                          
52
 Derr ida, ‘St ructure, Sign and Play’, p. 279. 
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be overlooked.  I n order to cont inue to explore the generic ident ity of the 
novel, Money  can be considered, consistent ly with the preceding novels in 
this study, as representat ional of a part icular aspect  of subject ive 
experience.  As in the technical condit ion of the text  it self, the world it  
port rays is one in which the stabilit y of cent red significat ion has been 
disrupted;  all has become discursive.  I n this way, a modified sort  of 
realism  persists in Am is’s work.  I t  takes ‘the form  of that  of which it  
speaks’. 
The connect ion between Money ’s metafict ional self- referent ialit y 
and its novelist ic representat ional capacity can be t raced from, among 
other elements, the character of John Self, who is an emblem of the world 
in which he exists as well as of the author who has delineated that  
existence.  The mult iplicity of Self’s personality funct ions synecdochically.  
I t  depicts an isolated psychological phenomenon, but  it  also enacts in 
m iniature a broader fragmentat ion of experience that  extends beyond him  
and in which other characters part icipate as well.   Catherine Bernard 
writes that  ‘the course of history comes to be crystallized in the physical 
decay of some of [ Am is’s]  protagonists’;  in the case of John Self the 
correlat ion is psychological as well as physical. 53
 
  Just  as Self’s body is like 
a dystopian met ropolis,  so too is the city he inhabits like his m ind - -  
fragmented and chaot ic, prone to confusing mult iplicat ion.  I n his more 
percept ive narrat ing mode, Self explicit ly connects urban and human 
fragmentat ion in New York:  
Cars are doubling while houses are halving.  Houses divide, into 
two, into four, into sixteen.  I f a landlord or developer comes 
across a decent -sized room he turns it  into a labyrinth, a Chinese 
puzzle.  The bell-but ton grills in the flakey porches look like the 
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dashboards of ancient  spaceships.  Rooms divide, rooms mult iply.  
Houses split  - -  houses are t r ipleparked.  People are doubling also, 
dividing, split t ing.  I n double t rouble we split  our losses.  No 
wonder we’re bouncing off the walls. (p. 63)  
 
Self’s claim  that  ‘people are [ …]  split t ing’ indicates that  the process he 
describes refers not  only to the literal mult iplicat ion of people and 
propert ies, but  also to a more abst ract  and insidious state of being, in 
which once-coherent  wholes are disintegrat ing.  Underlying the ent ire 
spect rum of mult iplicity that  his comments encompass, from apartment  
sublets to shat tered selfhood, is a sense of ontological dissolut ion in which 
the world is no longer reducible to stable, unitary principles that  stand 
independent ly of context .  The fragmentat ion of Self’s voice shows that  he 
is caught  up in the very condit ion he describes.  He is, in Bernard’s phrase, 
a ‘pr ismat ic’ reflector ‘of the world’s mad farce, of it s loss of meaning’. 54  
The many-selved Self, who ident ifies as ‘addicted to the twent ieth 
century’, embodies his t ime (p. 91) .  His name is ‘the name of the very 
era’. 55
Diedrick points out  that  ‘aesthet ic postmodernism  can never be 
separated from, is always already implicated in, polit ical postmodernity’.
  His afflict ions model the world that  has produced him . 
56
  
I n the case of Money , stylist ic emphases on mediat ion - -  intertextuality, 
metafict ion, language play - -  which invite the label of postmodernism  are, 
in concert  with their self- referent ialit y, referent ial to aspects of human 
experience in the empir ical world in which the novel is read. 57
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 Bernard, p. 126. 
  Am is’s 
55
 John Mullan, ‘Signs of the Times:  John Mullan Analyses Money by Mart in 
Am is. Week One:  Names’, Guardian,  13 September 2003, p. B32.  For 
addit ional comments on Self as an archetypal ‘Postmodern Man’, see 
Edmondson, pp. 147-149. 
56
 Diedrick, p. 11. 
57
 To speak of ‘the world’ while invoking postmodernity is somewhat  
uncrit ical, but  perhaps the pragmat ism  of the bricoleur just ifies assum ing 
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postmodernism , that  is to say, is not  only a stylist ic flour ish but  is also a 
depict ion of postmodernity.  Diedrick advances this claim  by reading Self’s 
physical, psychological,  and vocal disunity as indicat ive of the state of 
contemporary life more generally, writ ing that  his ‘temporal confusion, 
psychic fragmentat ion, and anxiety are common symptoms - -  of the 
postmodern condit ion that  has shaped his voice as well as the voices of his 
fellow “Earthlings” ’. 58
Self shares this at tent iveness to his cultural moment  with the 
ext ra- fict ional Mart in Am is.  I n different iat ing his work from that  of 
Kingsley Am is for interviewer John Bigsby, the junior Am is dist inguishes 
himself by cit ing the way both he and his father reflect  their respect ive 
historical contexts, claim ing that  he writes ‘about  a different  world’ to that  
of Kingsley Am is.
  ‘Earthlings’, incidentally, is the universalizing 
designat ion Self applies to those around him  who seem to embody what  
m ight  be called postmodernity:  those who play their lives like actors, 
‘Manhat tan groundlings, ext ras and understudies, walk-ons and bit -part  
players’;  those who are culturally displaced, ‘Lithuanian or Albanian or 
whatever’;  those who feel cont rolled by alien forces, ‘haunted t innit ic 
taxmen, bug-eyed barristers and smart -bombed bureaucrats’;  and even 
his own disordered internal voices, ‘these squat ters and hoboes who hang 
out  in my head’ (pp. 44, 128, 330, 267) .  Self sees his condit ion reflected 
in the state of people around him , and he unambiguously diagnoses it  as 
an effect  of the twent ieth-century Western mode of being. 
59
                                                                                                            
(provisionally)  a shared object ive reality.  Suffice it  to say that , however 
arbit rary such a binary m ight  be, there is in some respect  an ‘inside’ and 
an ‘outside’ of the fict ion ent it led Money ,  even if neither of these zones 
t ranscends the framework of textuality and discourse.  That  fict ions refer 
to respect ive historically-ent renched ‘worlds’ is a possibilit y taken up by 
Am is himself in his interview with John Bigsby;  see below. 
  That  the ‘world’ Am is refers to is determ ined more by 
generat ional state of m ind than by simple chronological succession is 
58
 Diedrick, p. 75. 
59
 Bigsby, p. 170. 
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emphasized by the vigour of the elder Am is’s own novelist ic output .  
Kingsley’s cont roversial novel Stanley and the Wom en was published in 
the same year as Money ,  and his subsequent  novel, The Old Devils, would 
win the Booker two years later. 60
Speaking to Mira Stout  in 1990, Mart in Am is also claims the 
accurate depict ion of the present  as a concern that  sets him  apart  from  his 
literary peers:  
  Clearly the world about  which the elder 
Am is wrote was not  simply usurped by that  of the younger.  Rather, the 
two coexisted, at  least  for some t ime, as products of respect ively different  
subject ive relat ionships to history. 
 
The 19 th-century Brit ish novel was, if you like, a superpower novel. 
[ …]  With decline, the novel has shrunk in confidence, in scope.  I n 
its current  form , the typical English novel is 225 sanit ized pages 
about  the m iddle classes [ …] .  What  I ’m  interested in is t rying to 
get  more t ruthful about  what  it ’s like to be alive now. 61
 
 
One clearly dom inant  element  of the t ruth Am is seeks to approach in 
Money  is the corrosiveness of consumerist  late capitalism  to the social 
fabric.  The acquisit ive money-m indedness that  John Self, in spite of his 
                                          
60
 Michael Cox, ed., The Concise Oxford Chronology of English Literature 
(Oxford:  Oxford University, 2004) , pp. 575, 579. 
61
 Mira Stout , ‘Mart in Am is:  Down London’s Mean St reets’, New York 
Tim es,  4 February 1990, pp. SM32-36, 48 (p. 35) .  Am is seems at tached 
enough to this cr it icism  of the modern novel to have rehearsed it  to the 
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protagonist  Keith Nearing describes the ‘English novel of about  1970’ as 
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‘English fict ion was domest ic and dull’ in the m id- twent ieth century as a 
‘literary cr it ical myth’, cit ing Money  as a successful blend of American and 
English styles that  proves the obsolescence of such a generalizat ion;  
quoted in Nicolas Tredell,  ed., The Fict ion of Mart in Am is:  A Reader’s Guide 
to Essent ial Crit icism  (Cambridge:  I con Books, 2000) , pp. 60-61. 
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frequent  socially cr it ical asides, equates with upward mobilit y is, for Am is, 
the root  cause of widespread decline:  
 
The money age we’re liv ing through now is a short - term , futureless 
kind of prosperity [ …] .  Money is a more democrat ic medium than 
blood, but  money as a cultural banner - -  you can feel the whole of 
society deteriorat ing around you because of that .  Civilit y, 
civilizat ion is falling apart . 62
 
 
Am is argues that  contemporary fict ion is in a state of decline specifically 
because it  does not  - -  or because as a result  of certain rest r ict ions it  
cannot  - -  faithfully reflect  the social decline of the world that  produces and 
consumes it .    
As his displeasure with the ‘sanit ized’ contemporary novel 
indicates, Mart in Am is considers his formally innovat ive writ ing to have an 
at  least  part ly representat ional funct ion.  I n comments to Susan Morrison, 
just ify ing what  she calls his ‘postmodern literary prankishness’, Am is 
situates his style firm ly in the present :  
 
Well,  it  all comes under the main heading of ‘Fucking Around With 
the Reader.’  My father thinks that  there’s an orderly cont ract  
between writer and reader, which has very much to do with his 
generat ion, and he’s incensed by any breach of those rules. 63
 
 
Style is thus a means of engaging with a part icular historical moment , and 
so writ ing, as Am is says, ‘about  a different  world’ to the one experienced 
by his father requires a different  technical palet te if it  is to at tain any 
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degree of t ruth- to- life.  Style, in this view, facilitates a kind of 
representat ional honesty. 
I n Am is’s account , to write in a fashion that  takes for granted the 
convent ions of Realist  prose fict ion is to write for (and from)  a previous 
generat ion.  The stylist ic innovat ions of postmodernism  are for him  as 
irreversible as the int roduct ion of perspect ive to Renaissance paint ing, and 
they will endure unt il they are supplanted by some new aesthet ic 
upheaval. 64  To write a purely Realist  novel in his t ime would be 
impossible;  no mat ter how assiduously const ructed, it  could not  escape at  
least  a t inge of past iche. 65
 
  As the int ra- textual Am is of Money states, 
‘Even realism , rockbot tom realism , is considered a bit  grand for the 
twent ieth century’ (p. 248) .  To ‘fuck around’ with the reader as Am is does 
is in this considerat ion perhaps the most  t ransparent  style available to a 
late twent ieth-century novelist , a means of representat ion that  avoids the 
‘grand’ cont r ivance of pretended object ivity.  Waugh proposes that  
postmodernist  literary techniques need not  be const rued as making the 
novels that  deploy them ‘any less serious or less engaged with history’.  
She asks:  
Have these novels, in fact , abandoned the norms of the historical 
descript ion of reality?  Could it  not  be argued equally that  they 
have simply challenged the rest r ict ive and reduct ive 
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 The spect re of past iche arises because, as David Lodge explains, a 
contemporary novelist  who creates fict ions that  rely upon an unchallenged 
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of Writ ing (New York:  Allen Lane, 1997) , pp. 3-19 (pp. 5-6, 9-10) . 
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representat ional forms which these norms can take within specific 
discursive format ions [ …] ?66
 
 
I n this capacity, Am is’s stylist ic acrobat ics m ight  be considered, as in 
Head’s phrasing, ‘a reworking of the realist  cont ract , involving the reader’s 
willing acceptance that  the text  provides a bridge to reality ’. 67
Amy J. Elias registers this tension between the techniques of 
postmodernist  fict ion and the potent ially representat ional effects those 
techniques generate.  She writes that  Am is produces texts that  are 
‘postmodernist  in style, tone, and focus’, and yet  ‘often seem to be closely 
allied with a m imet ic aim ’.
  And yet  
Am is’s postmodernism  is anything but  t ransparent .  I t  places style before 
plot , author before characters.  I t  announces the text  as a text , calls 
at tent ion to its status as a created artefact .  I f Am is’s novel is engaged in 
such self- reference, how m ight  it  also serve as a ‘br idge’ to the world? 
68
  At  one level, this connect ion could be 
at t r ibuted to a superficial coincidence of theme.  For example, Elias calls 
at tent ion to the characterist ically Realist  ‘focus on class and the (often 
mundane)  act ivit ies of social life’ to be found in Money ,  which with its 
pointed adm ixture of low and high culture also happens to be both 
typically postmodernist  and realist ic in the Auerbachian sense. 69
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 Waugh, Pract ising Postm odernism ,  pp. 60-61.  I n this passage, Waugh 
is referr ing in part icular to Kurt  Vonnegut ’s Slaughterhouse 5 and Salman 
Rushdie’s Sham e.  The quest ions are applicable, however, to any novel 
that  resists Realist  convent ion with postmodernist  devices. 
  However, 
the elements of the text  that  do the most  toward resolving the apparent  
paradox between self- referent ialit y and reference to ext ra- textual reality 
are those that  diverge from convent ional realism  - -  the overt ly 
metafict ional devices already under discussion. 
67
 Dom inic Head, The Cam bridge I nt roduct ion to Modern Brit ish Fict ion, 
1950-2000 (Cambridge:  Cambridge University, 2002) , p. 229. 
68
 Elias, p. 22. 
69
 I bid. 
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Elias’s argument  suggests that  the emphasis on mediat ion that  
permeates Money  is it self m imet ic, const itut ing what  she designates as 
‘Postmodern Realism ’, which ‘at tempts to record the real’ revealing with 
this effort  that  ‘the real it self has become a st range new world:  mediated 
reality ’. 70
Such is the reality of any text , but  in Money  it  is a cent ral part  of 
the fict ion as well - -  it s plot , theme, and style.  This forceful spot light  on 
mediat ion, though it  is already a kind of authorial int rusion into the text , 
demands a further exposure of the author’s hand as a response to what  
Todd calls ‘a perceived threat  of solipsist ic closure’.
  The problem of mediated reality certainly features in the 
fict ional world of Money .   Self’s occupat ion, his addict ions, and his 
eventual downfall all involve the distort ion and impoverishment  of 
understanding as a result  of decept ive mediat ing pract ices.  Part  of the 
metafict ional content  of these themes is their covert  but  inevitable 
reference to the mediated nature of the very narrat ive that  presents them.  
As Self complains of his screenplay, ‘We have a realism  problem ’ (p. 237) .  
However engrossed in the reading of Money  he or she m ight  be, the 
reader cannot  ignore the fact  that  these concepts are accessible only 
through mult iple, overlapping systems of signifiers. 
71
 
  The art ifice of any 
text  points to its or igin;  to include an image of the author in the text  is to 
adm it  this fact  with unconvent ional frankness.  I f disbelief cannot  be 
suspended, then, as Lodge’s characterizat ion of authorial involut ion 
implies, to obscure the author’s presence in the text  is an unnecessary 
affectat ion:  
I n pursuing m imet ic methods to their lim its, modernist  fict ion 
discovered that  you cannot  abolish the author, you can only 
                                          
70
 Elias dist inguishes this from magical realism , which in her view 
‘defam iliar izes the real’;  p. 26. 
71
 Todd, p. 135. 
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suppress or displace him .  Post -modernism  says, in effect :  so why 
not  let  him  back into the text?72
 
 
Duggan cont r ibutes to this point , writ ing that  ‘the int rusion of the author is 
a consequence of the contemporary unraveling of faith in t radit ional 
narrat ive poet ics and perhaps even in a shared percept ion of the social 
totalit y ’. 73  Having ironized the discursive nature of experience with a 
discursive novel, Am is completes this cr it ical acknowledgement  by 
conceding the subject ivity of his own role as part icipant  in the discourses 
he port rays and deploys.  The overt  self- reference of involut ion cont radicts 
the more solipsist ic, because covert  and unacknowledged, self-
referent ialit y of t radit ional Realism .  Metafict ion, as Waugh writes, not  only 
‘exposes the inauthent icity’ of realism , it  also ‘fails deliberately ’ to build 
seam less m imet ic illusions itself. 74  Thus, paradoxically, an act  of authorial 
self-aggrandizement  is simultaneously an act  of hum ilit y.  The duplicit y of 
the mocking t r ibute lies at  the heart  of m imesis, and the confessional 
content  of Am is’s self- reference suits both of these m imet ic modes:  ‘only I  
have writ ten this’,  it  proudly declares, and cont rarily but  simultaneously, ‘I  
have only writ ten this’. 75
For all it s antagonism toward realist  convent ion, Money  manages to 
achieve m imesis by depict ing the reality of subject ive experience, or 
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 David Lodge, ‘Mimesis and Diagesis in Modern Fict ion’, in After Bakht in:  
Essays on Fict ion and Crit icism  (London:  Rout ledge, 1990) , pp. 25-44 (p. 
41) . 
73
 Duggan, p. 88.  Lodge, along sim ilar lines, sees metafict ion as a 
‘defensive response [ …]  to the quest ioning of the idea of the author and of 
the m imet ic funct ion of fict ion by modern cr it ical theory’;  see ‘The Novel 
Now:  Theories and Pract ices’, in After Bakht in:  Essays on Fict ion and 
Crit icism  (London:  Rout ledge, 1990) , pp. 11-24 (p. 19) . 
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 Waugh, Metafict ion, p. 101. 
75
 I t  is perhaps this potent ial for stylist ic technique to display vir tues like 
honesty and hum ilit y that  leads Am is to write, in praise of Nabokov, that  
‘style is morality:  morality detailed, configured, intensified.  I t ’s not  in the 
mere narrat ive arrangement  of good and bad that  morality makes itself 
felt .   I t  can be there in every sentence’ (Experience,  p. 121) . 
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rather the inaccessibilit y, by mediat ion, of that  reality.  I t  is, in its 
reflexiv ity, representat ive of the inescapabilit y of representat ion.  The fact  
that  the text  it self exemplif ies this monopoly of mediat ion at  the same 
t ime that  it  depicts it  shows a kind of literary good faith or honesty.  
Money ,  if it  is to at tempt  to comment  without  naivety on mediated reality, 
must  adm it  the naivety it  cannot  escape;  it  must  be self- referent ial in 
regard to its own mediat ion.  To repeat  Derr ida’s phrase once again, it  
‘must  have the form  of that  of which it  speaks’. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, art ist ic m imesis inevitably 
falls short  of it s ult imate object .  Am is’s postmodernist  techniques provide 
a remedy - -  a pharm akon - -  for this short fall not  by somehow bridging the 
gap of representat ion but  by indicat ing its presence with a sort  of 
deliberate failure.  He creates what  Waugh describes as the ‘fundamental 
and sustained opposit ion’ of metafict ion:  ‘the const ruct ion of a fict ional 
illusion (as in t radit ional realism)  and the laying bare of that  illusion’. 76  
Am is’s self- referent ialit y both m it igates and exacerbates the m imet ic 
short fall,  because its disrupt ion of realist  convent ion is carr ied out  with 
what  is nevertheless referent ial t ruth- to- life, something like the t r icky 
forthr ightness of René Magrit te’s capt ion:  ‘Ceci n’est  pas une pipe’.   As 
Bernard writes, Am is’s confrontat ion with convent ion is ‘indicat ive of the 
irreducible gap exist ing between fict ion and the excesses of our world’, 
and amounts to ‘an ontological meditat ion on the elusiveness of 
meaning’. 77  Bernard’s claim  at t r ibutes to a novel like Money  a m imet ic 
efficacy that  ar ises from what  she calls the ‘dedefinit ion of m imesis’, a 
self-cr it ical mode that  enables ‘fict ion to revisit  the concept  of reference’ 
even as it  interrogates it . 78
                                          
76
 Waugh, Metafict ion, p. 6. 
  Thus it  is by sustaining doubt  about  the 
possibilit y of m imesis, by proceeding in cognisance of rupture, that  a text  
77
 Bernard, p. 142. 
78
 Bernard, p. 144. 
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like Money  performs m imesis.  And yet , of course, this performance can 
only occur to the extent  that  it  is provisional, announcing its own 
insufficiency.  Bernard puts this paradox in appropriately oxymoronic 
terms, assert ing that  ‘if f ict ion st ill retains its hermeneut ic power, the 
certaint ies it  imparts are precarious’. 79
There is an inherent  epistemological scept icism  in an art ist ic mode 
that  presents its content  with the condit ion of this precariousness.  
However, though in the case of Money  it  develops out  of Am is’s use of 
typically postmodernist  aesthet ics, this scept ical doubt  regarding the final 
knowabilit y of the world pre-dates the postmodern moment  as such.  I t  
reiterates the scept icism  that  has at tended novelist ic discourse from its 
early stages, in which its dialect ical interplay with naive empir icism  helped 
to establish the generic convent ions of novels in general.  Lodge writes 
that  ‘the novel came into existence under the sign of cont radict ion’, 
point ing out  the way eighteenth-century English novels appropriated ‘the 





  Following this thread through the history of the novel, Lodge 
cont inues, ‘The ambivalent  and somet imes cont radictory relat ionship 
between fact  and fict ion in the early novel persists into its classic and 
modern phases’.  This cont inuity, which is a cont inuity of epistemological 
or ientat ion rather than of formal st rategies, at tends novels regardless of 
their specific content  or historical moment , and it  manifests itself,  
unsurprisingly, as a kind of schism :  
Novelists are and always have been split  between, on the one 
hand, the desire to claim  an imaginat ive and representat ive t ruth 
for their stor ies, and on the other the wish to guarantee and 
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 I bid. 
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 Lodge, ‘The Novel Now’, p. 17.  Here Lodge is paraphrasing Lennard J. 
Davis’s Factual Fict ions;  see chapter one. 
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defend that  t ruth-claim  by reference to empir ical facts:  a 
cont radict ion they seek to disguise by elaborate myst ificat ions and 
metafict ional ploys such as fram ing narrat ives, parody and other 
kinds of intertextuality and self- reflexivity or what  the Russian 
formalists called ‘baring of the device’. 81
 
 
The tendency of m imesis toward duplicity is discernible at  two points in 
Lodge’s descript ion:  first  in the tension between the subject ive and 
object ive ‘t ruth’ sought  after by novelists, and second in the generic 
features such a tension incites, which manage to be at  the same t ime 
obscurant ist  ‘ploys’ and candid revelat ions of the mechanisms of fict ion.  
As has been suggested previously, it  is the novel’s paradoxical 
referent ialit y, the odd state of novelist ic m imesis being at  odds with itself,  
that  allows for the product ive variabilit y of the genre, precisely because 
this is the source of it s open-endedness. 
The novelist ic mode announces itself and its content  as const ructed 
and provisional, and it  is this t ransparency that  dr ives its m imet ic 
capacity, independent ly of specific novels’ interact ion with the convent ions 
of Realism .  The t ruth of novelist ic representat ion lies first  and foremost  in 
its confessional self- revelat ion.  I t  has been proposed previously that  the 
generic ident ity of the novel involves realism , but  of a kind that  is 
responsive to the dialect ical tension between empir ical and scept ical 
epistemologies.  Thus, the novel, by a variety of means, inevitably calls 
at tent ion to the duplicity and reversibilit y of m imesis and the falling short  
from  the object  such a condit ion causes - -  in effect  preserving and 
dim inishing this deficiency with one and the same gesture.  I t  is as a result  
of this tenuousness that  the novel can be characterized with the 
Bakht inian vocabulary of polyvocality and open-endedness.  Waugh, for 
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 Lodge, ‘The Novel Now’, p. 18. 
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example, cites the Bakht inian dialogism  of the novel when she claim s that  
‘metafict ion is a tendency or funct ion inherent  in all novels’. 82
I n Money , the same condit ion of provisionality (and a comparable 
sat ir ical correct ive)  invests Am is’s use of metafict ion and the free play of 
signifiers.  Mot ifs like fragmentat ion, alienat ion, confusion, intoxicat ion, 
and deceit  depict  Self inhabit ing a world of epistem ic corrupt ion, liv ing in a 
state in which unproblemat ic access to understanding is impossible.  
Because Self is the narrator, the reader’s access to the fict ional world of 
Money  is correspondingly degraded.  However, this image of deferral is 
present  precisely as a depict ion of the experient ial world, so that  it  reflects 
by vir tue of it s distort ion.  A sim ilar ly product ive cont radict ion resides in 
Am is’s use of authorial involut ion.  The inclusion of the Mart in Am is 
character, together with the many other techniques that  foreground an 
authorial presence, at  once confirms and denies the m imet ic reflect ion of 
an exterior world within the confines of the text .  The text  adm its its own 
mediat ion.  The result  of the self- reflexivity of Money  is a candour that  
materializes by means of dissimulat ion, a t ransparency that  reveals the 
provisionalit y of the novel’s representat ional capacity without  fully 
disallowing such representat ion.  I t  should be emphasized here that , had 
  The 
novelist ic text  foregrounds its epistemological incompleteness and 
separat ion from the finality of absolutes.  This provisionality can arise in 
the form  of didact ic moralizing that  depends covert ly on moral relat iv ism , 
as in Roderick Random , or as an ideologically- loaded aesthet ic of 
mult iplicity that  interweaves the anxiet ies of individual subject ivity, 
polit ical advocacy, and Christ ian st ruggle for salvat ion, as in the Galesia 
t r ilogy. 
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 Waugh, Metafict ion, p. 5.  While all novels harbour this capacity, Waugh 
explains that  an overt ly metafict ional novel ‘displays and rejoices in ’ the 
mult iplicity that  a more monological novel must  act ively suppress 
(Metafict ion,  pp. 5-6;  see also pp. 66-67) . 
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Amis chosen to write a novel without  the techniques cited above, other 
features of the text  would necessarily, if less obviously, have made an 
analogous reflexive gesture toward provisionality, because, as the 
preceding discussion of eighteenth-century novels has suggested, to do so 
is an inevitable component  of extended fict ional narrat ives that  mediate 
subject ive individual experience in the world. 
The novel is generically inclined to adm it  provisionality.  The 
mediat ing apparatus of such an adm ission is variable, but  it  nevertheless 
carr ies over a generic ident ity with some degree of cont inuity through 
mult iple permutat ions.  Derr ida describes this process when he writes that  
genre involves ‘the ident ifiable recurrence of a common t rait  by which one 
recognizes, or should recognize, a membership in a class’. 83  The mark of 
the novel recurs with every novel, but  the means by which it  m ight  do so 
are variable, and so the iterat ion of this ‘common t rait ’ takes place as a 
m imet ic re-making - -  a simultaneous repet it ion and revision.  To echo the 
words of Melberg in the previous chapter, ‘Repet it ion repeats what  has 
been, but  turns it  into something else’. 84
                                          
83
 Jacques Derr ida, ‘The Law of Genre’, in Acts of Literature, ed. by Derek 
At t r idge (London:  Rout ledge, 1992) , pp. 221-252 (pp. 229-229) . 
  The mark of the novel, 
therefore, is m imet ic in two dist inct , interrelated ways.  On the one hand, 
the common feature shared by novels is a foregrounding of the 
provisionalit y of human understanding by means of reference to individual 
subject ivity.  As a special mode of realism , this is m imesis.  On the other 
hand, because this foregrounding funct ions as a generic marker, it  refers 
via repet it ion to a generic ident ity that  supersedes the part icular text , 
while at  the same t ime it  provides a new and unique instant iat ion of that  
ident ity.  Because it  is a re-making, this is once again m imesis.  I n effect , 
the novelist ic epistemological stance does a sort  of referent ial double duty:  
84
 Arne Melberg, Theories of Mim esis (Cambridge:  Cambridge University, 
1995) , p. 37. 
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it  is it self a form  of m imesis, and its presence fosters a further m imet ic 
relat ion between the individual text  and its classificatory taxon. 
Derr ida terms this second act ion the ‘re-mark’ of genre, the means 
by which a text  declares its membership in a certain group:  
 
A defense speech or newspaper editor ial can indicate by means of 
a mark, even if it  is not  explicit ly designated as such, ‘Violà!   I  
belong, as anyone may remark, to the type of text  called a defense 
speech or an art icle of the genre newspaper-editor ial’. 85
 
 
Sim ilar ly, a novel, by exemplifying the novelist ic stance, announces itself 
to be a novel.  The re-mark of genre is in this capacity a rather 
st raight forward affirmat ion.  However, because it  is a m imet ic figure, this 
badge of membership is of course prone to duplicity.  The act ion of 
m imesis is one of being like rather than being, and so even as a novel 
announces its relat ion to the novelist ic, it  alienates itself.   I t  locates the 
novelist ic at  a remove.  As Derr ida writes of the generic re-mark, ‘Such a 
dist inct ive t rait  qua mark is [ …]  always a prior i remarkable’. 86
I nherent  in the relat ion between general pr inciple and specific 
instance is the inevitable short fall that  at tends any m imet ic relat ion.  
There remains between a novel and its generic ident ity as a novel a gap, a 
gap of the same kind as that  which lies between an object  and its image.  
I n Derr ida’s discussion of genre, this gap shows itself as a ‘paradox’, one 
he likens to an image of a blinking eye:  
  
Prototypicality is always elsewhere than the single, specific instance.  This 
is precisely why a text  can cite within itself it s own generic mark;  the mark 
is not  ident ical to the text  it self. 
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 Derr ida, ‘The Law of Genre’, p. 229. 
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The re-mark of belonging does not  belong.  I t  belongs without  
belonging, and the ‘without ’ (or the suffix ‘- less’)  which relates 
belonging to non-belonging appears only in the t imeless t ime of the 
blink of an eye.  The eyelid closes, but  barely, an instant  among 
instants, and what  it  closes is verily the eye, the view, the light  of 
day.  But  without  the respite or interval of a blink, nothing would 
come to light . 87
 
 
The mark of genre, along with the text  that  bears it ,  is not  ident ical to the 
genre it  signals.  This distance allows for sim ilar ity, the fam ily resemblance 
that  makes genre classificat ion possible, but  it  also makes each specific 
text ’s generic status unset t led, because provisionality always inheres in 
likeness.  Consequent ly, Derr ida writes of ‘the designat ion “novel” ’ that  ‘it  
gathers together the corpus and, at  the same t ime, in the same blinking of 
an eye, keeps it  from  closing, from ident ify ing itself with itself’. 88
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 Derr ida, ‘The Law of Genre’, p. 230. 
  The 
‘blink’ that  Derr ida describes is a st rategy for dealing with the m imet ic 
short fall of the generic relat ion, in which the singular instance can never 
give a full account  of, or fully be accounted for by, the normalizing 
st r ictures of genre.  The generic category is acent r ic.  To recognize and 
read a text  as a novel, one must  approach that  text  as an iterat ion of an 
already extant  genre, and yet  the nature of that  genre is open to the 
innovat ive amendment  performed by the specific text .  Thus, integral to 
the designat ion of a text  as novel (and indeed to any assert ion of genre-
ident ity)  is the implicit  affirmat ion that  the individual instance overflows its 
classificatory boundaries, because it  both falls short  from  and makes new 
the genre it  references. 
88
 Derr ida, ‘The Law of Genre’, pp. 230-231. 
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The novel therefore makes its m imet ic reach both toward the 
empir ical world and toward an abst ract  generic category.  Along with 
resemblance, these novelist ic m im eses inevitably establish a separat ion 
from their objects.  I t  can be said, then, that  the dialect ical tension 
between scept icism  and empir icism  which inheres in the novelist ic m ode 
extends outward, beyond the epistemological or ientat ion of certain novels, 
or even of all novels, to include the genre designat ion itself.   A novel is 
novelist ic only provisionally, by means of represent ing something other 
than and exterior to itself.  
This embat t led connect ion between singular instance and general 
category underlies any genre designat ion.  However, in the case of the 
novel, it  occurs in the presence, and as a direct  result ,  of textual features 
that  foreground the epistemological consequences of the m imet ic short fall.   
Thus the confessional capacity of the novel, in which it  exposes its own 
provisionalit y, implicates its generic ident ificat ion as well.   I n this way the 
novel is inherent ly, generically self-cr it ical;  it  acknowledges the ad hoc 
condit ion of it s own status as novel, a status that  is in turn substant iated 
by this selfsame adm ission.  Like the presence of Mart in Am is in the 
fict ional world of Money ,  the generic mark of the novel at  once underm ines 
and enables reference beyond the bounds of the text .  There is therefore 
imbedded in the genericity of novels a metafict ional mechanism, an 






Helplessly culpable:  I an McEwan’s Saturday  
 
I t  is conceivable that  a reader m ight  happen upon the Vintage UK 
paperback edit ion of I an McEwan’s novel Saturday  never before having 
heard of the t it le or author.  Helpfully, the book provides its own frame of 
reference.  I n addit ion to illust rat ing a scene from the first  few pages, the 
cover announces that  Saturday  is ‘the no. 1 bestseller ’,  and that  the 
Observer  has found it  to be ‘Dazzling ... profound and urgent ’.  I n effect , it  
has secured both popular and crit ical acclaim .  The inside covers and four 
full pages of excerpted reviews corroborate this double success, assuring 
potent ial readers that  the novel is both entertaining and edifying, a 
‘Hitchcockian thr iller ’ that  ‘belongs to the t radit ion of Ulysses and Mrs 
Dalloway ’.   The chorus of reviewers even provides a themat ic int roduct ion:  
it  is a novel that  interweaves public and private realms, managing 
simultaneously to be ‘a port rait  of an age’ and ‘a brilliant  character study’.  
McEwan himself is crowned ‘the supreme novelist  of his generat ion’ in a 
blurb from the Sunday Tim es,  and several other reviewers make sim ilar 
assert ions with only marginally more reserve.  Perhaps to emphasize the 
basis of such plaudits, the publisher lists - -  twice - -  eleven of McEwan’s 
previous works. 1
                                          
1
 I an McEwan, Saturday  (London:  Vintage, 2006) , front  mat ter.  
Subsequent  page references appear in the text .  The quotat ions are 
at t r ibuted to, respect ively, the Washington Post ,  Financial Tim es,  Daily 
Telegraph, and Frankfurter Allgemeine. 
  Thus before even laying eyes on McEwan’s prose, this 
hypothet ically benighted reader will have been briefed by the novel’s 
paratextual frame, inducted into an apparent  consensus of opinion toward 
Saturday  as an art ful and important  novel and I an McEwan as a novelist  of 
the highest  order. 
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This sort  of enthusiasm is to be expected in the front  mat ter of any 
best -selling paperback novel.  I n the case of Saturday ,  however, the 
image of McEwan and his work projected by publishing house market ing 
execut ives is, though part ial,  relat ively accurate.  From even the very 
early stages of his writ ing career, when he studied as a postgraduate 
under Malcolm  Bradbury and Angus Wilson at  the University of East  Anglia, 
McEwan composed fict ion that , if not  unanimously praised, was certainly 
well recognized.  Though much of his early work was subject  to reduct ive 
readings due to its t ransgressive subject  mat ter, McEwan seems to be an 
author who, as David Malcolm  claims, ‘has always been taken seriously by 
reviewers’. 2  His first  published collect ion of short  stor ies, the 1975 First  
Love, Last  Rites,  earned him  the Somerset  Maugham Award, and many 
literary honours have followed, including the 1988 Man Booker Prize for 
Am sterdam .   He has been nom inated four other t imes for the Booker, 
most  recent ly in 2007 for On Chesil Beach. 3  McEwan’s respect  within the 
literary community is matched by his popular success.  His novels feature 
on bestseller lists and are a staple of reading groups.  They have been 
adapted for cinema and television and marketed as appropriate for lit erary 
curr icula at  secondary and university levels. 4
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 David Malcolm , Understanding I an McEwan (Columbia, SC:  University of 
South Carolina, 2002) , p. 3.  Kiernan Ryan provides a pointed cr it icism  of 
early reviewers’ tendency to caricature McEwan as ‘the sick delinquent  
confrère of Genet , Burroughs, and Céline’ or to reduce his developing 
social and polit ical concerns to ‘an exemplary tale of moral maturat ion’ in 
I an McEwan,  (Plymouth:  Northcote House, 1994) , p. 4. 
  I n Dom inic Head’s phrase, it  
is his ‘abilit y to make the serious popular, and the popular serious, that  
3
 [ anon.] , ‘Who’s Who in the Man Booker Prize:  1969-2009 Winners, 
Short listed Authors and the Panels of Judges Who Chose Them ’, (2009)  
< ht tp: / / www.themanbookerprize.com/ downloads/ Whos_who_2009-0.pdf>  
[ accessed 08 December 2009]  
4
 McEwan’s official promot ional website recommends study guides and 
other secondary materials for students, teachers, and reading group 
part icipants:  < ht tp: / / www.ianmcewan.com> .  For a t reatment  of The 
Child in Time,  Enduring Love,  and Atonem ent  as curr icular materials, see 
Margaret  Reynolds and Jonathan Noakes, eds, I an McEwan:  The Essent ial 
Guide (London:  Vintage, 2002) . 
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indicates McEwan’s importance, as a writer who has helped reinvigorate 
thinking about  the novel within and without  academ ia’. 5  He does not  lack 
compet itors, but  a claim  may be, and often is, made for his status as the 
foremost  novelist  in Britain today. 6
The previous chapters have at tempted to set  forth a descript ive 
account  of a novelist ic epistemological stance, an at t itude toward 
knowledge and the knowabilit y and communicabilit y of human experience 
that  is exemplif ied by novels.  This account  is drawn from novelist ic 
fict ions which, in their respect ive ways, challenge generic definit ions even 
while reinforcing them.  Smollet t ’s and especially Barker’s texts stand at  
what  is either the historical front ier of the genre or, at  the very least , a 
watershed moment  in the longer history of novelist ic cultural pract ice.  By 
vir tue of this situat ion, the novelist ic fict ion of the eighteenth century is 
necessarily experimental.  Further, it  relates to present  not ions of the 
novel only when considered ret rospect ively, and so cannot  provide insight  
  For obvious reasons, McEwan merits a 
cent ral posit ion in discussions of contemporary fict ion.  I n part  because of 
this prom inence, McEwan is of special relevance to the aims of this study. 
                                          
5
 Dom inic Head, I an McEwan (Manchester:  Manchester University, 2007) , 
p. 2. 
6
 For example in early 2005, following the success of Atonem ent  and 
support ing the publicat ion of Saturday ,  such praise for McEwan was a 
staple of interviews and reviews.  Examples include:  Ruth Scurr, 
‘Happiness on a Knife Edge’, The Tim es,  29 January 2005, 
< ht tp: / / entertainment .t imesonline.co.uk/ tol/ arts_and_entertainment / book
s/ art icle507285.ece>  [ accessed 18 December 2009] ;  Jasper Gerard, 
‘I nterview:  Jasper Gerard Meets I an McEwan’, Sunday Times,  23 January 
2005, < ht tp: / / www.t imesonline.co.uk/ tol/ news/ art icle505214.ece>  
[ accessed 22 November 2009] ;  Catherine Deveney, ‘First  Love, Last  
Writes’, Scot land on Sunday ,  30 January 2005, 
< ht tp: / / news.scotsman.com/ ViewArt icle.aspx?art icleid= 2599187>  
[ accessed 22 November 2009] ;  Lee Siegel, ‘The I maginat ion of Disaster’,  
Nat ion,  11 April 2005 < ht tp: / / www.thenat ion.com/ doc/ 20050411/ siegel>  
[ accessed 27 October 2009] ;  Laura Miller, ‘The Salon I nterview:  I an 
McEwan’, Salon.com , 9 April 2005 
< ht tp: / / www.salon.com/ books/ int / 2005/ 04/ 09/ mcewan/ index.htm l>  
[ accessed 17 November 2009] ;  and Jeffrey Brown, ‘Conversat ion:  I an 
McEwan’, NewsHour ,  (13 April 2005)  [ television interview and t ranscript ]  
< ht tp: / / www.pbs.org/ newshour/ bb/ entertainment / jan- june05/ mcewan_4-
13.htm l>  [ accessed 22 November 2009] . 
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into the genre it  informs without  also raising the spect re of anachronism .  
I n cont rast , contemporary novelists compose to (and against )  a t radit ion 
of novel reading and writ ing that  has become engrained in the Western 
cultural landscape.  For example, Mart in Am is has presented his work as 
correct ive of that  of his predecessors and peers. 7
This agonist ic relat ion between text  and genre is useful because 
exploring those sites of resistance at  which a text  but ts against  categorical 
generalit ies helps to highlight  the way the specific instance part icipates, 
even if antagonist ically, in the general pr inciple.  Of course, to t reat  the 
novel completely requires an exam inat ion of all novels, a Sisyphean task 
surpassing any methodology.  I t  must  suffice, then, to rely on individual 
texts as makeshift  prototypes, vantage points from which to sketch the 
boundaries of a large and indefinite canon.  However, although a 
descript ion of the novel can be ext rapolated from its generic margins in 
this way, any general pr inciple that  m ight  be suggested must  endure 
within, and not  just  along, those margins.  To this end, the later novels of 
I an McEwan are prom ising candidates.  McEwan is em inent  as a novelist , 
  Beyond any formal self-
consciousness, modern novels are inevitably metafict ional inasmuch as 
they are accessible as novels.  An eighteenth-century novel must  be 
fraught  with genre issues because it  was born without  it s own t radit ion;  a 
contemporary novel, conversely, must  st ruggle not  to be subsumed by the 
t radit ion that  bears it .   Of course, these apparent ly opposed stances are in 
effect  two sides of the same coin.  The relat ion of the individual iterat ion 
to the genre it  references always invests itself with the precarious tension 
of part icularity, of m imesis. 
                                          
7
 Christopher Bigsby, ‘Mart in Am is’, in New Writ ing, ed. by Malcolm  
Bradbury and Judy Cooke (London:  Minerva, 1992) , pp. 169-184 (p. 107) ;  
Mira Stout , ‘Mart in Am is:  Down London’s Mean St reets’, New York Tim es,  
4 February 1990, 
< ht tp: / / www3.nyt imes.com/ books/ 98/ 02/ 01/ home/ am is-stout .htm l>  
[ accessed 06 March 2010]  (para. 26 of 39) ;  see previous chapter. 
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t rue, but  more important ly he is em inent ly cent ral to the cultural pract ices 
of the Brit ish novel as it  lives today, carrying on but  also adapt ing the 
t radit ion, as at tested by his combined crit ical and commercial success.  
While canonicity is not  bestowed upon a literary work with any degree of 
certainty unt il long after it s first  appearance, McEwan’s cent rality is as 
near an analogue to canonicity as any writer of his generat ion could 
current ly claim .  I f some descript ion of novelist ic epistemology is to be 
hazarded, it  should be applicable, and amenable, to McEwan’s novels. 
This channels the discussion back to Saturday .  As should have 
been made clear above, it  is first  of all a secure representat ive of 
McEwan’s unanimously acknowledged posit ion as ‘novelist ’.   Simply put , 
whatever definit ion one m ight  favour for the novel, it  would be difficult  to 
claim  Saturday  is not  one.  Beyond literary celebrity, Saturday  offers 
another convenience:  a narrat ive and themat ic emphasis on many of the 
epistemological issues that  underlie the generic form  of the novel across 
its lifet ime, as considered throughout  the previous chapters.  (This should 
become evident  in the material that  follows.)   Also, Saturday  is recent  
enough to provide some closure to the scheme of historical ext rem it ies 
deployed in this study.  I t  is one of McEwan’s most  recent  novels, followed 
only by the novella On Chesil Beach (2007)  and the recent ly released 
Solar  (2010) , and it  has only just  begun to elicit  a more considered crit ical 
response than can be found in its reviews.  For all of these reasons, 
Saturday  is significant  to a considerat ion of what  the novel ‘does’. 
As the breathless reviewers quoted in the paperback’s first  pages 
make clear, Saturday  is plot ted to entertain.  McEwan has noted that  
‘contemporary novelists have a great  burden laid upon them, which is 
what  Henry James said the novelist ’s first  duty is:  to be interest ing’. 8
                                          
8
 Laura Miller, para. 46 of 80.  McEwan cites the same quotat ion in Daniel 
Zalewski, ‘The Background Hum:  I an McEwan’s Art  of Unease’, New 
  I n 
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the case of Saturday ,  McEwan sustains this interest  by deploying a classic 
suspense-making device:  the reader is acutely aware of a threat  to the 
protagonist , who nevertheless proceeds in apparent ly blithe ignorance of 
the loom ing danger.  As Michael Dirda remarks in a review excerpted in 
the front  mat ter, this is indeed a ‘Hitchcockian’ device. 9  (The famous 
director him self makes this kind of discrepancy of awareness the cent ral 
feature in his model suspense scenario:  a group of people have a chat  
about  baseball,  all the while unaware of a threat  that  is clear ly visible to 
the audience - -  a bomb t icking beneath their table.) 10  The hapless 
innocent  of Saturday  is the affluent  London neurosurgeon Henry Perowne, 
who is faced with dangers abst ract  and distant  as well as concrete and 
personal.  Unlike the unwit t ing vict ims of Hitchcock’s bomb, Perowne is 
somewhat  cognisant  of his peril,  though to what  degree is not  completely 
apparent .  Part  of the task McEwan lays out  for both Perowne and the 
reader is the evaluat ion of the various dangers Perowne faces.  How 
severe m ight  they be?  What  responses do they demand?  The inherent  
uncertainty of these threats, along with the potent ial disparity between the 
respect ive evaluat ions made by protagonist  and reader, cult ivates a 
suspenseful desire to discover more, if not  for Perowne himself then 
certainly for the reader. 11
The desire for disclosure, ‘to know what  happens next ’,  is a 
common enough mot ivat ion for the audiences of fict ional narrat ive.  I n the 
 
                                                                                                            
Yorker ,  23 February 2009, 
< ht tp: / / www.newyorker.com/ report ing/ 2009/ 02/ 23/ 090223fa_fact_zalew
ski>  [ accessed 11 February 2010]  (para. 8 of 116) . 
9
 Michael Dirda, ‘Shat tered’, Washington Post ,  20 March 2005, 
< ht tp: / / www.washingtonpost .com/ gog/ profile/ ian-
mcewan,1110462/ crit ic- review.htm l>  [ accessed 08 January 2010]  (para. 
3 of 16) . 
10George Stevens, ed., ‘Alfred Hitchcock’, in Conversat ions with the Great  
Moviem akers of Hollywood’s Golden Age at  the Am erican Film  Inst itute 
(New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 2006) , pp. 256-277 (p. 259) . 
11
 Head notes that  McEwan’s use of the present  tense also cont r ibutes to 
the suspense of the novel and draws together the experience of narrator 
and reader;  I an McEwan,  pp. 192-193. 
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case of Saturday , though, McEwan’s use of suspense foregrounds this 
desire for knowledge, in the reader and protagonist  alike, in a manner that  
resonates with the novel’s themat ic makeup.  McEwan depicts a type of 
knowledge, specifically Perowne’s ongoing process of com ing to know the 
world, in inext r icable interact ion with moral responsibilit y, his way of being 
in the world. 
I n the tone-set t ing opening scene of the novel, Perowne wakes 
before sunrise to see ‘a meteor burning out  in the London sky’ (p. 13) .  
Cont inuing to observe, he st ruggles to establish the scale of what  he sees.  
Perhaps it  is actually a comet , ‘not  hundreds but  m illions of m iles distant ’.  
When ‘he revises the scale once again’, Perowne determ ines that  what  he 
sees is neither a meteor nor a comet , but  rather something much closer 
and consequent ly more fr ightening.  A plane is on fire, descending on the 
Heathrow flight  path ‘that  he himself has taken many t imes’ (p. 14) .  As 
Perowne builds an explanat ion of what  he sees and begins to consider its 
ram ificat ions, the reader follows his quest ions and false starts, discovering 
what  happens only in fragments.  Perowne, t rue to his scient ific 
procliv it ies, deduces what  he can methodically, with act ive and reflexive 
reasoning. 
Even after Perowne realizes what  he sees, McEwan withholds the 
word ‘plane’ for a few more lines, deliver ing the image obliquely and from 
inside out , in the form  of Perowne’s memory of the fam iliar pre- landing 
r itual of ‘adjust ing his seat -back and his watch’ and of the subt le anxiety 
that  always at tends flight , the knowledge that  if something goes wrong, 
‘there will be no half-measures’ (pp. 14, 15) .  As the plane takes shape in 
Perowne’s consciousness, it  is representat ive of an associat ion the reader 
will likely already have made, the sinister aura large aircraft  have acquired 
since the terrorist  at tacks of 11 September.  No longer ‘innocent ’,  they 
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seem either ‘predatory or doomed’ (p. 16) . 12
As his day progresses, Perowne will learn more about  the burning 
plane in dribs and drabs gleaned from television and radio news.  The 
t ruth of the mat ter is not  especially alarm ing:  the aircraft  is laden with 
mail,  not  passengers, and the crew handles the fire, caused by a 
mechanical failure, competent ly and safely.  But  from the moment  
Perowne recognizes what  he sees, he begins imbuing the fire with personal 
and social significance, considering what  he sees from mult iple scales and 
vantages, and evaluat ing the reliabilit y of his own understanding.  McEwan 
thus int roduces a device that  will comprise the greater part  of the novel, in 
which the events of Perowne’s experience t r igger self-conscious, free-
associat ive reflect ion.  Perowne’s contemplat ion of the plane also sets out  
the themat ic binaries that  will underpin the ent ire narrat ive - -  among 
them the impingement  of larger public events upon the domest ic, personal 
sphere and the interplay between the rat ional and affect ive capacit ies of 
humanity - -  and the always shift ing condit ion of the individual 
consciousness as it  navigates these opposed but  interwoven aspects of 
experience. 
  With this prompt , Perowne’s 
thoughts shut t le between perspect ives, first  considering the morbid 
alienat ion of ‘watching death on a large scale, but  seeing no one die’, then 
back to the posit ion of an individual vict im  on board, with an empathet ic 
quest ion posed in the second person:  ‘To escape the heat  of that  fire 
which part  of the plane m ight  you run to?’ (p. 16) .  As it  will throughout  
the novel, the rat ional act ivity of Perowne’s m ind, his self-cr it ical cognit ive 
habit  of test ing hypotheses, leads him  to an affect ive sensit iv ity. 
                                          
12
 McEwan has remarked that  Saturday  ‘is writ ten in the shadow’ of 9/ 11;  
‘the general tone is in part  set  by this new world situat ion we find 
ourselves in’.  See Carlos Caminada, ‘I an McEwan, Finishing New Novel, 
Ponders World After Sept . 11’, Bloom berg.com , (15 July 2004)  
< ht tp: / / www.bloomberg.com/ apps/ news?pid= newsarchive&sid= a4L6SJH6
SmN0&refer= europe>  [ accessed 10 December 2009]  (para. 15 of 29) . 
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Standing at  his bedroom window, as yet  ignorant  of the fire’s cause 
or severity, Perowne’s thoughts on the plane culm inate in a many- layered 
sense of his own subject ivity.  Sliding between various scales of 
experience as he ponders the burning plane, Perowne explores different  
avenues of com ing to know what  is happening.  I n addit ion to the two 
discrete points of view he imagines - -  doomed passenger and distant  
witness - -  he considers what  act ion he should take as responsible cit izen 
(calling emergency services) , as medical professional (calling the hospital 
in which he works) , and as husband (waking his wife, Rosalind, to reveal 
the event  to her) .  Perowne’s concerns are ent renched in his sense of self;  
he projects himself into a hypothet ical first -hand experience of the fire, 
then considers ways he ought  to react .  However, he conscient iously 
avoids the egocent r ism  of an overly credulous reliance on his senses.  He 
knows, for example, that  part  of what  he sees could be ‘a t r ick of vision’ 
(p. 16) .  He imagines the react ion of a witness ‘inclined to religious 
feeling’, who m ight  see the fire as a message from a supernatural power, 
an indulgence he disdains as ‘an excess of the subject ive, the ordering of 
the world in line with your needs, an inabilit y to contemplate your own 
unimportance’ (p. 17) .  His rat ionality seems to Perowne to allow for a 
kind of humilit y - -  in the form  of deference to chance and randomness - -  
that  would be eroded by grandiose beliefs in a hidden order. 
As his frequent  re- imaginings of scale demonst rate, Perowne is 
caut ious of being led into fallacy by this ‘anthropic principle’, yet  he is 
caut ious too of the disempowerment  that  m ight  at tend fatalist ic 
disinterestedness (p. 17) .  He at tempts to walk a line between apathy and 
self-aggrandizement , moderat ing the detachment  of rat ionalist ic 
object ivity with humanist ic empathy.  I t  is an uneasy balance, and one 




He feels culpable somehow, but  helpless too.  These are 
cont radictory terms, but  not  quite, and it ’s the degree of their 
overlap, their manner of expressing the same thing from different  
angles, which he needs to comprehend.  Culpable in his 
helplessness.  Helplessly culpable. (p. 22)  
 
This is the dilemma of the self-aware subject  - -  the not -quite-
cont radictory state of seeking certainty while set t ling, always, for 
provisionalit y.  I t  is the t roublesome kernel from  which springs the 
novelist ic sense of human understanding, discernible in all three of the 
fict ions explored thus far.  For Perowne, this preoccupat ion appears most  
clear ly as the problem of accommodat ing uncertainty without  relinquishing 
responsibilit y, the problem of helpless culpabilit y.  I t  is a problem he 
at tempts to defer after seeing the fire - -  he decides at  last  simply to close 
the shut ters and turn his at tent ions to his household - -  but  it  will 
overshadow Perowne’s act ions for the rest  of his Saturday, creat ing a 
sense of sustained unease that  resonates beyond its source in the fear of 
plane crashes or terrorism . 13
On 15 September 2001, The Guardian published a column by 
McEwan in which he considers at  the level of the individual the Anglo-
American shock at  the terrorist  at tacks of four days before.  The scene he 
envisions is very much like Perowne’s experience:  ‘Waking before dawn, 
going about  our business during the day, we fantasize ourselves into the 
 
                                          
13
 The connect ion between the burden of uncertainty and violence was of 
part icular currency in the media that  week.  Three days earlier, United 
States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, when asked for evidence 
connect ing I raq to terrorism  or weapons of mass dest ruct ion, had implied 
that  I raq’s ‘unknown unknowns’ const ituted a threat , adding that  ‘absence 
of evidence is not  evidence of absence’;  see United States Department  of 
Defense, ‘DoD News Briefing - -  Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Meyers’ 
[ t ranscript ] , (12 February 2002)  
< ht tp: / / www.defense.gov/ Transcripts/ Transcript .aspx?Transcript I D= 2636
>  [ accessed 15 January 2010]  (para. 158, 198 of 208) . 
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events.  What  if it  was me?’  Envisioning the situat ion of the vict ims is a 
natural human reflex, in McEwan’s descript ion.  More important ly, such a 
project ion ‘is the nature of empathy, to think oneself into the m inds of 
others’:  
 
I f the hijackers had been able to imagine themselves into the 
thoughts and feelings of the passengers, they would have been 
unable to proceed.  I t  is hard to be cruel once you perm it  yourself 
to enter the m ind of your vict im .  Imagining what  it  is like to be 
someone other than yourself is at  the core of our humanity.  I t  is 
the essence of compassion, and it  is the beginning of morality. 14
 
 
The violence of the hijackers was possible only because they had 
deadened this natural inclinat ion to hypothesize the realit y of other 
people.  Through pathological thinking, predicated in part  on a ‘fanat ical 
certainty’, they had induced a numbing ‘failure of the imaginat ion’. 15
This concept ion of imaginat ive empathy, in which a cognit ive 
pract ice makes possible a moral sense, fit s neat ly with the sent iments 
McEwan furnishes for Perowne as he rum inates in his bedroom on the 
state of the post -9/ 11 world.  Addit ionally, and as Head has remarked, it  
shows ‘a start ling sim ilar ity ’ with the consciousness-based morality 
elaborated in much greater detail in the philosophical works of another 
novelist , I r is Murdoch.
 
16
                                          
14
 I an McEwan, ‘Only Love and Then Obliv ion. Love Was All They Had to 
Set  Against  Their Murderers’, Guardian,  15 September 2001, p. 1. 
  Murdoch builds her philosophy of morals on a 
framework of metaphysics rather than evolut ionary psychology, but  like 
15
 McEwan, ‘Only Love and Then Oblivion’, p.1.  This is not  st r ict ly a post -
2001 philosophy.  McEwan sets forth a sim ilar not ion in interviews from 
1994 in the journal Études Britanniques Contem poraines and in the 
Financial Tim es;  quoted respect ively in Head, I an McEwan,  p. 9, and in 
Bernie C. Byrnes, I an McEwan’s Atonement  and Saturday (Not t ingham:  
Pauper’s, 2006) , p. 106. 
16
 Head,  I an McEwan,  p. 9. 
240 
  
McEwan she places the cognit ive act ivity of an individual consciousness at  
it s cent re. 
For Murdoch consciousness, simply by vir tue of being aware, 
already values what  is perceived.  She provides the example of a mother 
who, through ‘self-cr it icism ’ and the applicat ion of ‘careful and just  
at tent ion ’,  reappraises her at t itude toward her daughter- in- law, whom she 
had previously disliked. 17  The mother’s change in percept ion, her mere 
not icing, pr ior to any outward change such not icing m ight  precipitate, is 
already a moral event .  As Maria Antonaccio explains, ‘This correlat ion 
[ between consciousness and value]  provides the basis for a moral 
ontology that  includes the reality of others as the paradigmat ic locus of 
value’. 18
 
  I n their reliance on reflect ive self-awareness and concern with 
epistem ic access to a reality beyond the self,  McEwan and Murdoch’s 
senses of the moral are inclined toward hum ilit y and empathet ic interest  in 
the other.  Antonaccio indicates this connect ion in Murdoch:  
The reality of others is for Murdoch the preem inent  instance of 
knowledge of the real, a knowledge that  shat ters the moral 
solipsism  of the ego and connects the self with the good. 19
 
 
McEwan’s published remarks, part icular ly in his Guardian column on the 
2001 at tacks on New York, show a sim ilar concept ion of ethical 
consciousness, though without  Murdoch’s argument  for the ontological 
reality of goodness. 
To return specifically to Saturday , Perowne too sees avoiding 
solipsism , which for him  is accomplished by pract ising conscient ious 
                                          
17
 I r is Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London:  Rout ledge, 1970) , p. 
17.  See also Maria Antonaccio, Picturing the Hum an:  The Moral Thought  
of I r is Murdoch (Oxford:  Oxford University, 2000) , pp. 86-95. 
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 Antonaccio, p. 95. 
19
 I bid. 
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rat ionalism  - -  that  is, by seeking certainty yet  accept ing only provisionality 
- -  as a means to morality.  I n effect , Perowne, as self-aware subject , 
embodies a dialect ical tension between the two opposed impulses 
considered in the first  chapter under the labels naive empir icism  and 
ext reme scept icism .  His world is knowable but  never fully known.  
Acknowledging the incompleteness of his own understanding, Perowne 
grasps for insight  by imagining and at tempt ing to assim ilate the 
experience of others, yet  he does so while at  the same t ime doubt ing any 
insight  he m ight  achieve as potent ially fallacious, because it  is accessible 
only though his own situated consciousness.  Thus, understanding, in both 
the epistem ic and empathet ic sense, involves an ongoing recept ivity to 
that  which is not  self. 20
I n her essay ‘The Sublime and the Good’, Murdoch uses Kant ian 
term inology to underscore the way in which what  is essent ially a stance of 
self-cr it ical openness to provisionality and incompleteness can foster an 
at tent ion to the reality of other people, making the individual other into a 
kind of epistemo-ethical sublime:  
 
 
What  stuns us into a realisat ion of our supersensible dest iny is not , 
as Kant  imagined, the form lessness of nature, but  rather its 
unut terable part icularit y;  and most  part icular and individual of all 
natural things is the m ind of man. 21
 
 
                                          
20
 The significance of this ‘ongoingness’ of understanding will be further 
considered below. 
21
 I r is Murdoch, Existent ialists and Myst ics:  Writ ings on Philosophy and 
Literature, ed. by Peter Conradi (London:  Chat to & Windus, 1997) , p. 215.  
Unless otherwise specified, references to Murdoch pertain to this 
collect ion.  I n another essay published the same year, ‘The Sublime and 
the Beaut iful Revisited’, Murdoch reiterates the idea of the other as, not  
the only, but  ‘the most  important  form ’ of the Kant ian sublime (p. 282) . 
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An encounter with otherness prompts a humbling revision, a new degree 
of self-awareness for the subject , and thus it  serves to make compassion 
possible by dissolving solipsist ic certainty.  Elsewhere she remarks that  
‘Tolerance is connected with being able to imagine cent res of reality which 
are remote from oneself’. 22
Herein lies one cause of Perowne’s sense of responsibilit y.  The 
capacity for empathy, rooted as it  is in an ongoing way of thinking, is 
suscept ible to the malignancy of other, fallacious, ways of thinking.  The 
result  of this vulnerabilit y is that  the ‘anthropic principle’ that  the narrator 
of Saturday classifies as ‘a problem of reference’ amounts to a kind of 
seed of evil.   From the irrat ional comfort  of certainty, that  ‘inabilit y to 
contemplate your own unimportance’, can arise a cold and murderous self-
centeredness (p. 17) .  Thus, scept icism  is safety;  uncertainty becomes a 
precondit ion of compassion.  Urged by a desire for knowledge, one would 
seek to imagine the subject ive experience of some exterior other only 
after recognizing a deficiency - -  the incompleteness of one’s own 
understanding. 
  I n these terms McEwan and Murdoch appear 
to agree:  imaginat ive openness is both the result  of and the means to 
compassionate hum ilit y in the face of otherness.  Unlike Murdoch, Perowne 
does not  single out  the m ind of an other as the ult imate and unreachable 
asymptote of knowledge;  in fact  he has ‘faith’ that  science, it self a method 
of systemat ized doubt , holds the prom ise of finally securing some 
‘irrefutable t ruth about  consciousness’ (p. 255) .  (Events later in the novel 
will reveal the extent  to which the other-as-sublim e st ill shapes Perowne’s 
experience.)   However, though he does not  seek out  it s most  potent  
expression in the manner of Murdoch, Perowne’s sense of subject ive 
epistemological uncertainty as he experiences the world is clear ly the 
source and sustenance of his ethical posture. 
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 Murdoch, p. 29. 
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The hum ilit y of self-cr it ical subject ivity, because it  is precedent  to 
imaginat ive empathy, defends against  a manner of thinking that , beyond 
its init ial ir rat ionality, is potent ially deadly.  I t  follows that  the sense of 
responsibilit y Perowne feels when he witnesses the burning plane is not  
only the part icular responsibilit y to react  appropriately in an emergency, 
but  also the more general responsibilit y to maintain a sense of 
perspect ive, to remember that  his experience of the event  is cont ingent  
and part ial.   He must  play both scept ic and empir icist .  He must  
remember, in other words, that  he is in a certain fashion both culpable and 
helpless. 
The part icular Saturday on which Perowne has awakened so early is 
one in which a t roubled sense of responsibilit y will f ind a touchstone in 
public spectacle.  I t  is 15 February 2003, the day of record-breaking public 
demonst rat ions in London and around the world in opposit ion to the 
m ilitary invasion of I raq.  For Perowne, the turmoil of the Middle East  is 
insulated by distance in much the same way as is his vision of the burning 
plane.  I t  int r igues him  enough that  he has sought  out  books on the 
subject , and it  is a source of discussion with his fam ily and colleagues.  
However, as with the plane, Perowne’s acute awareness of the uncertainty 
of the I raq invasion ( the just ificat ion for which, in 2003, was as obscure as 
its possible consequences)  leads him  into an ambivalence that  precludes a 
specific response.  He is personally acquainted with a vict im  of Saddam 
Hussein’s depravity, and after ‘compulsive reading up on the regime’, 
believes that  opposit ion to the impending war amounts to support  of the 
dictator’s crimes (p. 72) .  Yet  he feels he can see the other side of the 
debate as well.   ‘The marchers could be r ight ’,  he adm its to himself, and 
credits his ambivalence to ‘a roll of the dice’;  it  is the result  of his having 




As a result  of this double awareness, Perowne is compelled to 
disagree with anyone whose opinion of the war seems too confident .  
When he talks with Jay St rauss, his American and staunchly pro-war 
anaesthet ist , ‘a man of unt roubled certaint ies’, Perowne ‘finds himself 
tending towards the ant i-war camp’ (p. 100) .  Sim ilar ly, when he sees 
Tony Blair on television, the Prime Minister’s assurances seem hollow.  
Blair could be lying, even to himself:  he ‘m ight  be sincere and wrong’ (p. 
141) .  Perowne’s uncertainty is thus at t r ibutable not  to out r ight  dist rust , 
but  rather to a nagging cognisance of the decept ive nature of human 
understanding.  McEwan has remarked that  Perowne’s indecision makes 
him  something of a ‘Ham let  figure’;  he is defined, and to a great  extent  
confined, by his uncertainty. 23
Whenever Perowne considers the protestors, his suspicion of 
certainty is at  it  most  intense.  As he argues the topic with his daughter 
Daisy, the only character in the novel who at tends any part  of the 
demonst rat ion, he insists that  the protestors are wilfully ignorant  about  
the brutality of the regime they are in effect  defending:  
 
 
Why else are you all singing and dancing in the park?  The 
genocide and torture, the mass graves, the security apparatus, the 
cr im inal totalitar ian state - -  the iPod generat ion doesn’t  want  to 
know.  Let  nothing come between them and their ecstasy clubbing 
and cheap flights and reality TV.  But  it  will,  if we do nothing.  You 
think you’re all lovely and gent le and blameless, but  the religious 
nazis loathe you.  What  do you think the Bali bombing was about?  
The clubbers clubbed.  Radical I slam  hates your freedom. (p. 191)  
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His contempt  is st rong enough to lead him  into uncharacterist ic 
irrat ionality, even to the point  of parrot ing the Bush adm inist rat ion’s 
fatuous refrain about  freedom-hat ing I slam ists. 24
 
  But , as his outburst  
implies, it  is not  the opinions of the marchers that  so inflame Perowne;  it  
is their apparent  comfort  with those opinions.  He has earlier declared as 
much to himself, imbedding a concession to the ant i-war stance in a 
condemnat ion of the jubilant  protest :  
I f they think - -  and they could be right  - -  that  cont inued torture 
and summary execut ions, ethnic cleansing and occasional genocide 
are preferable to an invasion, they should be sombre in their view. 
(pp. 69-70)  
 
However, instead of solemnity Perowne sees heaps of protest  tat  for sale, 
‘folded banners and cards of lapel but tons and whist les, football rat t les 
and t rumpets, funny hats and rubber masks of polit icians’ (p. 61) .  The 
commercialism , the ‘cloying self regard’ of the slogans, indicate to 
Perowne not  only an insipid superficialit y, but  also a smug claim  for ‘an 
exclusive hold on moral discernment ’ (pp. 72, 73) .  The protestors’ 
manner bet rays their uninformed laziness.  ‘I t ’s likely most  of them barely 
registered the massacres in Kurdish I raq, or in the Shi’ite south’, Perowne 
grumbles to himself (p. 73) .  But  far more damning than their ignorance is 
their failed self-cr it icism .  Had they fully explored the reality of their 
cause, Perowne implies, they m ight  support  it  st ill,  but  their support  would 
be solemn and t roubled by doubt .  They would find themselves 
championing not  unilateral goodness, nor even a definitely lesser evil,  but  
                                          
24
 When not  challenged by his daughter, Perowne can of course dist inguish 
between the goals of Hussein’s regime and those of Al Qaeda;  see for 
example p. 73. 
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only the grim  hope that  non- intervent ion m ight  yield a comparat ively 
smaller harvest  of at rocit ies.  They would recognize, with a collect ive 
wince to corroborate Perowne’s own discomfort , the cont ingency and 
part ialit y of their knowledge. 
The immorality of the protest , in Perowne’s est imat ion, becomes 
visible therefore not  in its content , but  in its affect .  To be so unt roubled, 
so assured, requires a shirking of the responsibilit y Perowne feels so 
acutely to be a product  of subject ive existence itself.   Certainty comes 
only as a consequence of a preference for blindness - -  to one’s 
helplessness and culpabilit y alike - -  that  can engender not  just  ignorance 
but  also terr ible violence.  I t  is this pathological certainty that  unites the 
various objects of Perowne’s scorn - -  religious zealots, terrorists, ant i-war 
protestors, and dictators.  For Perowne, to believe that  the world is 
precisely as one understands it  to be is a comfort  far too decadent , and 
ult imately too dangerous, to be moral.  
Yet  as much as he recoils from the comforts of epistem ic illusion, 
Perowne is not  averse to pleasure.  Materially, he enjoys all the benefits 
that  come with his posit ion as a highly successful neurosurgeon.  His well 
appointed home in Fitzrovia, his luxury car, his fine wine and food, these 
are components of Perowne’s rout ine.  He is lucky enough, too, to 
wholeheartedly delight  in the work that  provides him  with such a high 
standard of liv ing.  He is also wealthy by less tangible measures.  He is in 
a marriage of unwavering faithfulness and love with Rosalind, his beaut iful 
wife of comparable professional success.  They have two young adult  
children, each of them talented, charm ing, and successful in their own 
ways.  All of the fam ily enjoy excellent  physical and mental health.  I n 
spite of the worrying affairs of his day, Henry Perowne is of such sanguine 
disposit ion that  he is prone to wax rhapsodic about  his razor, gleam ing like 
an ‘indust r ial gem ’, or the engineering marvel that  is his elect r ic ket t le, 
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which in his eyes is so well conceived that  it  seems to portend utopia:  ‘The 
world should take note:  not  everything is get t ing worse’ (pp. 57, 69) . 
Deeply suspicious of, even disgusted by, the levity of the ant i-war 
protestors, and yet  surrounded by an abundance of his own joys and 
comforts, Perowne may seem to exhibit  a degree of inconsistency.  This is 
the reading of John Banville, who in a famously scathing review of 
Saturday  f inds the ‘cloying self- regard’ imputed to the demonst rators to be 
equally apparent  in the cushy m iddle-class lifestyles of ‘Perowne in his 
cream-upholstered Merc, and fair  Rosalind of the shampooed hair ’. 25
 
  
Though he is far too conflicted to carry a sign through the st reets of 
London, in many other respects Perowne leads an ext raordinarily 
unt roubled life.  I ndeed, it  is a life likely far less t roubled than the lives of 
many of the protestors whose apparent  consumerism  and ideological ease 
so offends him .  Ellis Sharp sees in this disparity evidence of what  he calls 
McEwan’s ‘sleight  of hand’:  
Those who take the t rouble to t ravel to cent ral London and march 
against  the war are self-cent red consumers.  Those who spend that  
Saturday doing other things like playing squash or shopping or 
playing their guitars are not  self-cent red but  superior creatures 
possessed of a more complex inner life. 26
 
 
When Sharp st r ips away the rat ionalizing int imacy of the narrator’s 
omniscience, the purpose of Perowne’s act ions (and the act ions of his 
musically gifted son, Theo)  seems more egoist ic:  creat ing pleasure for 
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himself.  There is no cr ime in a man t rying to enjoy his weekend, of 
course.  However, when that  man is contemptuous of those who - -  
m isguided, superficial, and inappropriately fest ive though they may be - -  
spend their day engaged with dist inct ly larger-scale issues, he r isks 
slipping from conscient ious uncertainty to facile knowingness.  Zoë Heller 
makes explicit  this apparent  connect ion between material comfort  and 
self-cent redness, writ ing that  Perowne’s ‘mult itude of blessings, coupled 
with his confidence in the certainty of scient ific progress, gives r ise to a 
contentment  that  verges perilously on complacency’. 27
Yet  surely anyone, even a r ich neurosurgeon liv ing in a domest ic 
paradise, is ent it led to an opinion.  What  is so irksome to these crit ics 
about  Henry Perowne’s ambivalence toward the invasion of I raq?  A 
comment  by Sophie Harr ison offers a clue.  Of Perowne’s fam ily, she 
quips, ‘Hearing about  them is like reading one of those Christmas round 
robins in which you learn that  Charlot te got  five A* s in her A- levels and is 
now studying Cantonese in her t ime off from  the orphanage’.
 
28
                                          
27
 Zoë Heller,  ‘One Day in the Life’,  New York Tim es,  20 March 2005, pp. 
G1, 10-11 (p. 10) . 
  
Superficially, this cr it icism  may appear to be unfair.  Unlike dear 
Charlot te’s overbearingly proud parents, Perowne is not  advert ising his 
good fortune for others to adm ire.  However, he shares with the writers of 
tact less holiday let ters a type of sat isfact ion that  blinds him  to the self-
serving nature of his out look.  This blinding sat isfact ion is not , in 
Perowne’s case, that  of someone who feels immanent ly deserving of every 
boon ( though a whiff of that  sent iment  may steal into his thoughts from 
t ime to t ime) .  Rather, the sat isfact ion that  blinds Perowne is, perhaps 
counter- intuit ively, his sat isfact ion with dissat isfact ion.  That  is, Perowne is 
so alert  to the dangers of certainty that  he has become certain of his 
28
 Sophie Harr ison, ‘Happy Fam ilies’, New Statesm an,  24 January 2005, 
pp. 48-49 (p. 48) . 
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uncertainty.  Though he disdains the contentment  of the ant i-war 
marchers, he too is content  - -  content  to be discontented, to withhold 
judgement , remaining unset t led and therefore assured.  As a result , 
Perowne’s comfort  becomes a cipher of inauthent icity, to enough of a 
degree that  Dennis Lim , writ ing in The Village Voice,  can scoff, ‘A 
stereotypical hand-wringing bourgeois liberal, he luxuriates in a 
convenient  ambivalence that  flat ters itself as complexity’. 29
I ndeed, the form  of Perowne’s humilit y is it self an indicat ion of 
what  m ight  be deemed a second self- indulgence in Perowne’s comfort ing 
worldview.  As McEwan first  sets out  the rat ionale behind Perowne’s 
at t itudes, along with his dist rust  of over-certainty arises a sense of being 
subject  to chance.  This deference to cont ingency mot ivates the 
imaginat ive project ion that , as McEwan at tests, ‘is the nature of 
empathy’.
  Perowne’s 
cr it ical consciousness of his subject ivity, in itself a precondit ion of hum ilit y, 
becomes the grounds for a dist inct ly non-humble - -  because ult imately 
self- indulgent  - -  ambivalence. 
30
Two months after the at tacks of 11 September, the writer John 
Berger com posed an essay, fram ing a poem, which imputed suicidal 
terrorism  to a part icular depth of despair:  
  Gazing at  the burning plane, Perowne considers that  he 
himself could have been on the plane, about  to die at  the hands of 
terrorists.  But  his imaginat ion can only reach so far.  Perowne never 
ventures to consider that , but  for the caprice of chance, he also could have 
been aboard the plane, not  as a hapless vict im , but  as a terrorist  about  to 
murder the other passengers. 
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This despair consists of what?  The sense that  your life and the 
lives of those close to you count  for nothing.  And this is felt  on 
several different  levels so that  it  becomes total.  That  is to say, as 
in totalitar ianism , without  appeal. 
 
He cont inues:  
 
These are seven levels of despair - -  one for each day of the week -
-  which lead, for some of the more courageous, to the revelat ion 
that  to offer one’s own life in contest ing the forces which have 
pushed the world to where it  is, is the only way of invoking an all,  
which is larger than that  of the despair. 31
 
 
For Berger, to work against  the phenomenon of suicidal violence requires 
an act  of imaginat ion.  He concedes that , ‘I t  is hard for the First  World to 
imagine such despair ’,  but  contends that  ignoring this imaginat ive 
challenge will end in st rategic failure. 32  I gnoring that  challenge is just  
what  Perowne does.  Unlike the ant i-war movement , the spect re of radical 
I slam , though it  looms in the background of his thoughts throughout  the 
novel, is to Perowne a faceless horror into which no empathet ic project ion 
can penet rate.  Thus, albeit  to a lesser degree than the callous terrorists 
envisioned by McEwan, Perowne exhibits a failure of the imaginat ion.  As 
Bernie C. Byrnes writes, ‘he suggests that  “ they”  should empathise with 
“us”  and stop hurt ing and fr ightening “us” .  Nowhere does he make an 
at tempt  to empathise with “ them” ’. 33
                                          
31
 John Berger, ‘Seven Levels of Despair ’,  in Hold Everything Dear:  
Dispatches on Survival and Resistance (London:  Verso, 2008)  pp. 3-5. 
(pp. 4, 5) . 
 
32
 I bid. 
33
 Byrnes, p. 112.  This applies to Perowne an assert ion which Byrnes uses 
to characterize McEwan himself.  Her claim  is legit imate, considering 
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McEwan writes that  Perowne ‘takes the convent ional view’ of 
violent  I slam ists:  
 
The pursuit  of utopia ends up licensing every form  of excess, all 
ruthless means of it s realisat ion.  I f everyone is sure to end up 
happy for ever, what  crime can it  be to slaughter a m illion or two 
now? (p. 34)  
 
The word ‘sure’ performs a twofold funct ion here.  I t  plants dest ruct ive 
certainty into the mouth of a hypothet ical zealot , and in doing so it  also 
assures Perowne that  he is in the r ight .  He has convent ion on his side, 
after all,  and if the mot ivat ion behind fanat icism  is such elementary 
irrat ionality, then (surely)  there is lit t le demand for an empathic project ion 
into the abject ion that  fosters it .  
McEwan reports that  Perowne has read ‘Fred Halliday’s book’, (Two 
Hours that  Shook the World, Septem ber 11, 2001:  Causes and 
Consequences)  finding in it  the argument  that  ‘the New York at tacks 
precipitated a global cr isis that  would, if we were lucky, take a hundred 
years to resolve’ (pp. 32-33) . 34  The solut ion Halliday offers to this debacle 
hinges on ‘reasoned argument  and an engaged scept icism  toward emot ive 
claims in internat ional affairs’. 35
                                                                                                            
McEwan’s many public statements of opinion on the issue, but  it  is drawn 
from, and thus perhaps more appropriate to, Perowne and the voice that  
narrates him . 
  The appeal of such a proposal to Perowne 
is obvious, but  it  requires a dose of opt im ism along with its adm irable 
reason.  I n the words of Head, Halliday’s suggest ion is ‘prem ised on a 
quest ionable faith in the benign aspects of US influence and the global 
extension of capitalist  democracy’, with an expectat ion that  such 
34
 Halliday makes an almost  ident ical pronouncement ;  see Two Hours that  
Shook the World, Septem ber 11, 2001:  Causes and Consequences 
(London:  Saqi Books, 2002) , p. 24. 
35
 Halliday, p. 27.  See also pp. 191-192. 
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development  will unfold according to ‘a universal set  of values that  m ight  
t ranscend the global ideological stand-off’. 36
When dealing with a subject  less obscured by popular paranoia, 
Perowne recognizes the way pragmat ism  somet imes nudges ethics aside.  
Visit ing a fishmonger, he is unset t led by the writhing crabs and lobsters, 
imagining that  they would be ‘howling’ in terror if they could.  He turns 
away to look at  the fish, but  despite ‘their unaccusing stare’ he is bothered 
by the ethical implicat ions of his knowledge of neurology.  Fish have 
‘polymodal nociceptor sites just  like ours’ - -  they feel pain.  Yet  despite his 
qualms about  animal suffer ing and the state of the ‘emptying seas’, 
Perowne has no plans to give up fly- fishing or preparing fish stews for his 
fam ily.  As he selects ingredients for his evening meal, he reflects on the 
moral manoeuvring this entails:  
  Even more unfavourable for 
Perowne’s stance than the confident  faith required by such a project  is it s 
conspicuous flat tery:  in order for the state of the world to improve, people 
should become more Perowne- like.  What  bet ter salve for a nagging sense 
of helpless culpabilit y than the suggest ion that  simply being oneself 
bolsters the cause of liberal humanism?  Perowne’s assured dism issal of 
radicalism  as a symptom of the irrat ional ‘anthropic principle’ is 
undoubtedly founded on sincere hope for the common good, but , at  least  
to some extent , it  conceals at  it s heart  a preference for his own ease. 
 
The t r ick, as always, the key to human success and dom inat ion, is 
to be select ive in your mercies.  For all the discerning talk, it ’s the 
close at  hand, the visible that  exerts the overpowering force.  And 
what  you don’t  see... (p. 127) 37
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 When Perowne eventually cooks the mussels he has purchased during 




Perowne the rat ionalist  has no rat ionale, only a ‘t r ick’, an empty ellipsis.  
Troubled by the dismal spect res of polit ics and the environment , Theo 
remarks to his father that  ‘the bigger you think, the crappier it  looks’.  The 
way to happiness, Theo concludes, is simple:  ‘think small’ (p. 33-34) .  
Perowne seems to have taken his son’s advice to heart .  There are t imes, 
he declares to himself, when wilful ignorance is necessary for 
contentment . 
I n an interview McEwan describes this sort  of select ive mercy as a 
means of containment :  
 
We can be desperately, genuinely concerned about  the m isery 
created by the tsunam i in the m iddle of the I ndian Ocean, then 20 
m inutes later we’re having a nice t ime drinking a glass of wine with 
a fr iend.  These things go in boxes. 38
 
 
I n a world where m isery can always be found somewhere, some degree of 
compartmentalizat ion is an unavoidable part  of get t ing on with life.  
I ndeed, in a cont rary way it  is a mark of compassion, for only a cold heart  
needs no protect ion.  However, in a text  overshadowed by terrorism  and 
war, Perowne is prepared to acknowledge his defensive blindness only 
part ially, and only in regarding the t r iv ial ( to most )  subject  of seafood.  
McEwan would seem to be invit ing cr it icism  of his protagonist ’s 
complacency. 
Crit ical at tacks on Perowne’s ambivalence in effect  charge him  with 
hypocrisy, because he condemns in others what  he perm its in himself.  
Mot ivated as he is by a dist rust  of dangerously fallacious certainty, 
                                                                                                            
compassionate at tent ion:  ‘I f they’re alive and in pain, he isn’t  to know’ (p. 
177) . 
38
 Gerard, para. 22 of 26. 
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Perowne finds that  the safest , most  comfortable posit ion is one of 
abstent ion.  He is a t ruly compassionate person, and rat ional too, but  he is 
careful to extend these cognit ive tools only within a fam iliar, pract icable 
scope.  I n opt ing for this kind of security, Perowne is making a choice 
based not  on what  he believes to be r ight  - -  he does not  deign to know 
enough for that  - -  but  rather on what  is least  t roubling, what  feels best .  
From the safety of his uncertainty, Perowne decries the demonst rators’ 
complacency on precisely these terms, supposing that  those whose 
placards declare ‘Not  in My Name’ are merely ‘demanding to feel good, or 
nice’ (p. 72) .  Daisy sees this double standard, accusing Perowne of 
evasive hedging:  ‘You’re saying let  the war go ahead, and in five years if it  
works out  you’re for it , and if doesn’t , you’re not  responsible’ (p. 188) .  I n 
shaping his at t itude to the impending invasion and its det ractors around 
his own affect ive ease, he has underm ined the rat ionalism  he so 
frequent ly celebrates, and he has exposed his own indulgence in the 
solipsist ic certainty he finds so deplorable among peaceful act ivists and 
violent  radicals alike.  David Wiegand reads this double standard as a kind 
of disconnect ion, writ ing that  Perowne suffers from ‘the delusion that  he 
somehow exists separately from the world’. 39
But  perhaps some crit ical compassion is now due.  I f Perowne is a 
hypocrite, he is an unwit t ing one.  The inconsistency of his ethical 
disposit ion is not  calculated deceit , but  rather the result  of his own 
subject ive, cont ingent  understanding - -  the very same condit ion, it  should 
be remembered, that  makes possible his ethical stance in the first  place.  
I n this light , a circularity materializes:  that  which allows for Perowne’s 
  To his unbecom ing 
grat ificat ion, Perowne has backed into the very t rap he sought  to avoid. 
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understanding (whether affect ive or intellectual)  allows also for his 
m isunderstanding.  I t  is this circle which has ensnared him .  From this 
situat ion arises the quest ion of responsibilit y Perowne formulates when he 
contemplates his helplessness and culpabilit y, those ‘cont radictory terms, 
but  not  quite’ of his subject ivity (p. 22) .  I t  is not  in Perowne’s power to 
see all of his own shortcom ings, let  alone to remedy them.  The degree of 
Perowne’s hypocrisy is proport ionate to his complicity in his blindness.  Yet  
the magnitude of Perowne’s moral failure must  be tempered by a failure of 
another, related kind - -  the flawed and provisional nature of his 
knowledge. 
The condit ions of this provisionality are obscure to Perowne, but  as 
the preceding discussion shows, they are not  altogether invisible.  To the 
reader, they are clearer st ill.   McEwan uses a free indirect  style of 
narrat ion, so that  descript ive passages focusing on m inute details of 
Perowne’s surroundings blur into long digressive st retches that  seem to 
verbalize his unart iculated impressions.  But  Perowne, though he is prone 
to narrat ivizing his life, is not  the narrator of the novel.  McEwan 
int roduces moments of irony, of caricature even, that  impose a gap 
between Perowne and the narrator, and thus also between Perowne and 
the reader.  This separat ion at tests to the lim its of Perowne’s 
understanding ( though it  does not  necessarily draw them concretely) .  The 
narrator allows the reader to peer into Perowne’s m ind, but  not  without  
insinuat ing tonal rem inders that  the reader resides at  a cr it ical distance, 
peering in from without , and that  Perowne is a separate, bounded, and 
lim ited ent it y. 
One prom inent  feature of the dict ion of Saturday  is McEwan’s 
liberal use of medical jargon.  Work is exceedingly important  to Perowne, 
and many pages of the novel are dedicated to relat ing surgical procedures 
like the t ranssphenoidal hypophysectomy that  first  br ings Rosalind into his 
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life (pp. 43-44) .  This specialized language emanates from Perowne’s side 
of the narrat ive gap - -  an accomplished neurosurgeon need not  use lay 
terms as he thinks to himself.  As if to indicate that  the professional 
term inology is the mark of a peculiar way of understanding the world, 
McEwan even has Perowne apply it  creat ively:  when he spots an early-
stage heroin addict  in Fitzroy Square, he muses that  her drug use ‘will 
bind her as t ight ly to her m isery as an opiate to its mu receptors’ (p. 65) .  
Perowne’s personal life gets the scient ific t reatment  too.  Describing his 
careful courtship of Rosalind, who was then st ruggling to cope with the 
death of her mother, Perowne recalls that  he had to proceed caut iously, ‘at  
the old- fashioned pace of a slow lor is’ (p. 47) .  Mat ters of love and grief 
seldom call for obscure zoological allusions, and this reference to the slow 
lor is - -  a teddy- like primate whose bulging eyes give it  a look of perpetual 
astonishment  - -  seems especially inappropriate.  However, for someone 
like Perowne, steeped in the study of life sciences, the awkward image 
seems sweet ly earnest .  Whereas the narrator’s words tend toward a 
reserved elegance, these ungainly const ruct ions announce themselves as 
ent irely Perowne’s. 
McEwan’s free indirect  style allows these two voices to interm ingle, 
so that  descript ions of surgery do not  read like lab reports.  One surgical 
scene describes ‘the removal of a pilocyt ic ast rocytoma’, a type of brain 
tumour, with a hint  of aesthet ic delicacy:   
 
Finally it  lay exposed, the tentorium  - -  the tent  - -  a pale delicate 
st ructure of beauty, like the lit t le whir l of a veiled dancer, where 
the dura is gathered and parted again. (pp. 9, 11)  
 
Of a longer ext ract  that  includes this passage, Wiegand remarks that , 
‘McEwan’s writ ing is sublim e and poet ic, even if we have to look up some 
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of the words’. 40  To research Saturday ,  McEwan famously shadowed 
London neurosurgeon Neil Kitchen for two years, and this cooperat ion 
between a man of let ters and a man of medicine is reflected in the hybrid 
register of many passages. 41  The double voice of the narrat ion, deemed ‘a 
kind of Anglo-Lat in creole’ by Marek Kohn, allows for a double expert ise, in 
which a literary and a medical understanding can collaborate. 42
I n fact , though he harbours a deep appreciat ion for music, Perowne 
is a near philist ine when it  comes to literature.  Both his daughter and his 
father- in- law, the punningly named John Grammat icus, are successful 
poets, and yet  he has no concept  of met re, and even the word ‘stanza’ has 
him  reaching for a dict ionary (pp. 200, 136) .  This literary inept itude 
makes up a themat ic constant  in the novel, last ing from the opening scene 
through to the final page.  I t  is consistent  enough that  Banville suggests 
‘Perowne’s ignorance may be intended as a running gag’:  
  The 
separateness of these two voices is not  concealed by their 
complementarity, though, as Perowne’s more st rained figurat ions show.  
 
Are we really to believe that  an intelligent  and at tent ive man such 
as Henry Perowne, no mat ter how keen his scient ific bent , would 
have passed through the English educat ion system without  ever 
having heard of Mat thew Arnold, or that  any Englishman over fift y 
would have no acquaintance with the St . Crispin’s Day speech from 
Henry V, if only through Laurence Olivier ’s rant ing of it  in the 
wart ime propaganda film  of the play?43
 
 
                                          
40
 Wiegand, para. 9 of 14. 
41
 Kitchen is the first  of several specialists whom McEwan thanks in his 
acknowledgements sect ion (p. 282) . 
42
 Marek Kohn, ‘Saturday  by I an McEwan:  Grandeur of the Mind Over 
Mat ter’, I ndependent , 4 February 2005, p. 28. 
43
 Banville, p. 13.  The Henry V allusion to which Banville refers appears in 
Saturday  on p. 125;  the Arnold allusions are considered more fully below. 
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Banville’s remarks are made with undisguised contempt ;  he sees 
Perowne’s literary ignorance as a failure of craft  on McEwan’s part , a 
jarr ing inconsistency of tone. 44
For instance, Perowne’s unfam iliar it y with Mat thew Arnold, so 
vexing to Banville, is presented with deliberately com ic pacing.  After the 
climact ic scene in which Daisy recites ‘Dover Beach’, Perowne is under the 
illusion that  the poem was Daisy’s own composit ion.  Hearing 
Grammat icus refer to it  as the work of ‘Arnold’, he innocent ly enquires, 
‘Arnold who?’ (pp. 229-230) .  The same mechanism that  dr ives the novel’s 
suspense - -  a knowledge different ial - -  is here used for humorous effect , 
an effect  not  m issed by the fam ily poets, who both laugh.  But  the joke is 
not  finished;  after a beat  Perowne mut ters, ‘You know, I  didn’t  think it  was 
one of your best ’ (p. 230) .  This second punchline is delivered out  of the 
characters’ hearing, available only to the reader, who can laugh at  what  
has amused Daisy and Grammat icus, but  also at  what  they have m issed - -  
Perowne’s naive verdict  on the quality of Mat thew Arnold’s poet ry.  
McEwan deploys a sim ilar technique in an earlier scene.  Upon 
encountering ‘The Ballad of the Brain on my Shoe’, a poem Daisy wrote 
after observing his work in the operat ing room, Perowne is bemused.  With 
stunning literal-m indedness he protests to himself that  ‘his daughter was 
present  for a st raight forward MCA aneurysm.  No grey or white mat ter was 
lost ’ (p. 139) .  McEwan’s em inent  neurosurgeon here plays the part  of the 
obtuse, poorly-socialized boffin.  The omniscience of the narrator allows 
  Such may be the case, but  the joke (and it  
is certainly a joke)  has another effect  as well.   Because it  is made at  
Perowne’s expense, it  draws together the narrator and the reader, 
emphasizing their difference from Perowne and his steadfast ly left -brained 
sensibilit ies. 
                                          
44
 Banville adds to the passage quoted above the claim  that  the ‘gag’ ‘is 
the only instance of humor in the book, if humor is the word’ (p. 13) . 
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for a clear view of the disparity between Perowne’s scient ific 
percept iveness and his literary insensibilit y. 
From out  of this epistem ic divide, some amount  of flat tery is aimed 
at  the reader.  Here is a man - -  a r ich, successful, happy man - -  whose 
personal reflect ions often present  vocabulary that , as Kohn notes above, 
will require most  readers to seek out  a dict ionary.  Yet , these same 
readers, who it  can be assumed have at  least  a passing interest  in 
literature, can console themselves by remembering that  Perowne is also a 
man who must  look up words like ‘stanza’.  Beginning with an epigraph 
from Saul Bellow’s Herzog,  McEwan provides ample opportunity for 
readers to take note of their own literary cult ivat ion.  At  one point , for 
example, explaining his distaste for magical realism , Perowne relates 
examples of the sort  of fict ion that  has annoyed him .  He alludes to 
Salman Rushdie’s Midnight ’s Children and The Satanic Verses,  along with 
Günter Grass’ The Tin Drum  and McEwan’s own The Child in Tim e (pp. 67-
68) . 45
At  another point , when the text  presents some lines from Daisy’s 
poet ry, they are in large part  lifted from two published works by Craig 
Raine (p. 50) .
  He does so without  ment ioning any names or t it les, as if to provide 
a puzzle for the reader’s amusement . 
46
                                          
45
 This is one of several instances in which Perowne’s opinions indicate that  
he m ight  have a more sophist icated grasp of literature than he lets on.  
Other examples include his praise for William  James over Henry James (p. 
58) , his recall of a scene from Saul Bellow’s The Dean’s Decem ber  ( though 
he remembers only that  it  comes from an ‘American author’,  pp. 122-
123) , his observat ions on the temporality of poet ry reading (p. 129) , and 
his informed recall of squabbles relat ing to literary awards and the 
publishing community (p. 130) .  The Bellow allusion is noted in Zalewski 
(para. 61 of 116) . 
  Reviewer Mark Lawson comments on this intertextual 
flourish - -  ‘I t ’s a mat ter of debate whether it ’s the reader or the writer who 
is being too clever here’ - -  highlight ing, if a bit  disapprovingly, the way the 
text ’s overt  self- referent ialit y confederates the narrat ive voice and the 
46
 McEwan credits Raine in his Appendix (p. 282) . 
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reader. 47  Even the ment ion of a pub called the Jeremy Bentham can be 
read as an invitat ion to make vague intertextual connect ions, encouraging 
in the reader a self-congratulatory sense of dext rous erudit ion. 48
Perowne’s quasi-philist inism  fits into a larger scheme of gent ly 
ironic characterizat ion, which serves to underscore the lim itat ions of his 
understanding.  Upon seeing a council worker sweeping gut ters, he begins 
to ponder twent ieth-century changes in class-consciousness:  
  I f 
Perowne’s opaque technical jargon imposes an int im idat ing distance 
between reader and protagonist , McEwan uses literary allusion to maintain 
that  distance while reassuring readers that  they need not  feel bested by 
Perowne in every respect . 
 
How rest ful it  must  once have been, in another age, to be 
prosperous and believe that  an all- knowing supernatural force had 
allot ted people to their stat ions in life.  And not  see how the belief 
served your own prosperity - -  a form  of anosognosia, a useful 
psychiat r ic term  for a lack of awareness of one’s own condit ion. (p. 
74)  
 
McEwan situates these lines only a few paragraphs after the passage in 
which, with the unintended self-parody discussed above, Perowne berates 
the consumerist  mentality he detects among the protestors, their ‘cloying 
self- regard’ (p. 72) .  To heighten the parodic effect , his not ion of classist  
‘anosognosia’ occurs to him  as he approaches his privately garaged 
                                          
47
 Mark Lawson, ‘Against  the Flow’, Guardian, 22 January 2005, 
< ht tp: / / www.guardian.co.uk/ books/ 2005/ jan/ 22/ bookerprize2005.booker
prize>  [ accessed 17 November 2009]  (para. 12 of 13) . 
48
 Siegel, for example, considers it  significant  that  the pub bears the name 
of ‘the famous philosopher of self- interest ’ (para. 11 of 28) .  I t  should be 
noted, though, that  the Jeremy Bentham is a real London pub, located 
exact ly as in McEwan’s descript ion.  Mart in Am is ment ions the same pub in 
Experience (London:  Jonathan Cape, 2000) , p. 315. 
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Mercedes S500, recalling fondly the way he learned to enjoy the ‘vague 
sat isfact ion’ of dr iving it .   Again, McEwan tenders a punchline:  when 
Perowne climbs in, the car’s stereo greets him  with ‘sustained, respect ful 
applause’ (p. 76) .  Perowne himself is of course obliv ious to the irony, 
which only serves to reinforce this sly r ibbing from the narrator.  Only the 
reader and narrator are in on the joke, sharing something akin to the 
amused glances that  m ight  pass between guests at  a dinner party in which 
the host  has become foolish after a bit  too much wine. 49
I n such an atmosphere even incidental details can take on a 
sat ir ical t im bre.  Perowne’s sense of vision, for example, can seem to 
allegor ize his epistemological short -sightedness, as when, stepping out  of 
his house, Perowne sees that  ‘only one half of the square - -  his half - -  is in 
full sunlight ’ or when he notes that  the curtains in his windows ‘have a 
way of cleanly elim inat ing the square and the wint ry world beyond it ’ (pp. 
71, 181) .  I t  is clear that  narrator and reader are observing Perowne from 
a different  plane, an exclusive vantage from which they can see the 
shortcom ings and inconsistencies that  remain invisible to him . 
  Such amusement  
may be affect ionate, but  it  necessarily involves a t race of censure as well.  
Perowne’s lapse regarding Arnold is finally pushed to the verge of 
r idiculousness.  Even after ‘Henry learns the name of the poet , Mat thew 
Arnold, and that  his poem that  Daisy recited, “Dover Beach” , is in all the 
anthologies and used to be taught  in every school’,  he cont inues to suffer 
his mental block (pp. 231-232) .  McEwan writes on the last  page of the 
narrat ive that  ‘Henry has yet  to find out  whether this Arnold is famous or 
obscure’ (p. 279) .  I n the m idst  of an otherwise poignant  and meditat ive 
                                          
49
 As also occurs at  such dinners, some staid guest  insists on behaving as 
if nothing funny has happened:  The New Statesm an ’s Sophie Harr ison 
detects in Saturday  not  even ‘the t iniest  nod to the possibilit y of 
pretension’ (p. 49) . 
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dénouement , the narrator cannot  resist  this part ing wink at  the reader, 
one last  t ry for a conspiratorial chuckle. 
So how damnable of a hypocrite is Henry Perowne?  I n Saturday ,  
the vast  majority of the text  mediates the consciousness of the 
protagonist  as refracted through the aesthet icizing lens of the narrator.  
As such, it  reproduces not  only his sight  but  also his blindness, the lapses 
in his conscient ious awareness of his own subject ivity.  I t  is in part  this 
blindness that  those crit ics who find Perowne unsympathet ic interpret  as 
smug self-sat isfact ion or alienat ing privilege.  But  there are cracks in this 
façade, cr it ical footholds that  grant  access to a vantage from which these 
blind spots become visible and thus open to crit ique.  The largest  of these 
cracks, the gap between Perowne and the narrat ive voice, supports not  
only a cr it ical but  more specifically a humorous vision of Perowne’s 
lim itat ions, one which, because of it s good-naturedness, m ight  be seen to 
pardon Perowne in a way that  a more po- faced reading of his flaws ( like 
those offered by Banville and Sharp)  cannot . 
Perowne himself feels a sense of compassion at tached to this kind 
of distanced observat ion.  When he first  sees pedest r ians crossing the 
square beneath his window, it  is as if they are his charges;  he ‘watches 
over them, supervising their progress with the remote possessiveness of a 
god’ (p. 12) .  Observing the young addict  ment ioned above, he is moved 
to a compassionate sensibilit y by seeing just  what  she does not  - -  the 
physiological t ics of addict ion and poor health, the toxic relat ionship with 
her male companion.  With a paternalist ic impulse, he even considers 
‘going after her with a prescript ion’ (p. 65) .  For Perowne, one of the joys 
of his work is derived from knowing what  others are desperate to learn, as 
happens ‘when he comes down from the operat ing room like a god, an 
angel with the glad t idings’ for a worr ied fam ily (p. 23) .  I n such moments, 
his is an epistemologically-cent red goodwill.   His sense of pathos grows 
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out  of a perceived disparity of knowledge in which he feels his advantage 
as a sort  of divinity.  And yet , as has been discussed in earlier chapters, 
such im itat io Dei can be the stuff of t r ibute or t ravesty.  I n his early 
morning reflect ions, Perowne touches upon deit ies and dictators alike, 
comment ing, as he shifts from hoping for sex with Rosalind to pondering 
the childishness of Saddam Hussein, that  ‘even despot ic kings, even the 
ancient  gods, couldn’t  always dream the world to their convenience’ (p. 
38) .  Then, his desire for his wife fulfilled, he exults in a pleasure that , it  
seems to him , must  be ‘the envy of gods and despots’ (p. 50) .  Perowne 
knows of course that  he is neither of these, but  he does not  know - -  
indeed he cannot  know - -  just  where he falls in the spect rum between 
magnanim ity and hubris.   
The const itut ion of Perowne’s self-awareness, dependent  as it  is on 
the provisionality of his understanding, is both his indictment  and his 
defence.  I n his weekend wanderings, his domest ic interact ions, his 
polit ical rum inat ions, Perowne is able to explore his subject ivity, both in 
terms of the situatedness of his own understanding as well as his 
suscept ibilit y to cont ingency, while enjoying the luxury of inact ion.  
Perowne feels but  does not  answer the quest ion of culpabilit y.  He simply 
drifts, remaining - -  perhaps st rategically - -  part ially blind.  The possibilit y 
that  he wields his blindness inappropriately is announced by McEwan’s 
narrat ive technique, and those reviewers who condemn Perowne as a self-
serving hypocrite depend largely upon that  announcement  for their 
readings, even if they believe it  to be unintent ional.  
That  is only one possibilit y, however.  Cont rarily, one m ight  read 
the select ivity of Perowne’s mercy as the necessary condit ion of his being 
merciful at  all.   Those lapses in his self-cr it icism  m ight  seem forgivable 
when viewed from the cr it ical distance established by the narrat ive mode, 
because they result  from  his inescapable subject ivity.  Like Perowne as he 
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gazes down upon the dramas of Fitzroy Square, the reader m ight  feel the 
benevolence of superior vantage, sm iling sympathet ically on Perowne’s 
short falls as the narrator nudges and winks.  This is the posit ion assumed 
by cr it ics like Malachi O’Doherty and Yvonne Zipp, both of whom declare 
Perowne to be an overall ‘decent  man’, and by Ruth Scurr, who writes of 
McEwan in Saturday ,  ‘Art ist ically, morally and polit ically, he excels’. 50  Of 
course to presume that  Perowne must  be either good or bad is to set  up a 
false dichotomy.  Though Perowne cannot  know where he stands in the 
cline between these ext remes, the text  turns the quest ion to the reader, 
for whom Perowne is more t ransparent  than he is to himself.  To what  
extent  is he culpable - -  or helpless?  Having raised the quest ion, the text  
sets about  invit ing a judgement ;  as happens so often in McEwan’s oeuvre, 
the protagonist  faces a t raumat ic turning point . 51
Perowne’s t r ial occurs in two stages, with the first  in a public 
set t ing.  Driving to meet  a colleague for a squash match, he is involved in 
a m inor t raffic accident  with a small- t ime tough named Baxter.  Baxter 
and his two cronies at tempt  to extort  money from Perowne, and the 
  Perowne encounters a 
threat  much more immediate than war or terrorism  and thus more 
demanding.  He is put  on t r ial,  in a sense, by being forced to take act ion. 
                                          
50
 Malachi O’Doherty, ‘I t  Was the Brain that  Did I t ’, Fortnight , 434 (March 
2005) , 26.;  Yvonne Zipp, ‘One Wild Day in a Doctor’s Life’, Christ ian 
Science Monitor , 22 March 2005, 
< ht tp: / / ezorigin.csmonitor.com/ 2005/ 0322/ p15s01-bogn.htm l>  [ accessed 
08 December 2009]  (para. 5 of 15) ;  Scurr, (para. 10 of 10) . 
51
 For examples of the not ion that  McEwan’s plots rely on pivotal cr ises, 
see Lawson, (para. 7 of 13) ;  Cam inada, (para. 9 of 29) ;  Zalewski, (para. 
50 of 116) ;  and Bryan Appleyard, ‘The Ghost  in My Fam ily’,  Sunday Tim es,  
25 March 2007, 
< ht tp: / / entertainment .t imesonline.co.uk/ tol/ arts_and_entertainment / book
s/ art icle1563161.ece>  [ accessed 18 December 2009]  (para. 3 of 44) .  
Judith H. Dobrzynski ment ions a ‘bit  of somewhat  irr itat ing shorthand 
[ used]  to describe Mr. McEwan’s widely varied writ ing:  the not ion that  
each of his works hinges on a single moment  that  changes everything’.  
McEwan sim ilar ly dism isses this cr it ical t rope:  ‘All it  really says is that  in 
my novels something happens. [ …]  I t ’s a t ruism , really.  I t ’s t rue of any 
novel’;  see Dobrzynski, ‘He’s Not  “MacAbre”  Any Longer’, Wall St reet  




confrontat ion briefly becomes violent , but  when Perowne’s medical 
expert ise allows him  to make a hum iliat ing snap diagnosis of Baxter’s 
degenerat ive neurological disease - -  Hunt ington’s chorea - -  the ensuing 
confusion allows Perowne to escape.  Perowne reflects on the 
confrontat ion sporadically throughout  his day, but  he seems blissfully 
unaware of what  McEwan subt ly telegraphs to the reader:  Baxter is tailing 
Perowne, seeking revenge (pp. 140, 146, 152, 175) . 
The pursuit  unfolds in the generic idiom of the thr iller, with the 
reader’s more informed perspect ive providing suspense.  Significant ly, this 
knowledge different ial also cont r ibutes yet  another instance to McEwan’s 
ironic port rayals of Perowne.  Hours after the accident , with his chest  st ill 
sore from Baxter’s fist , Perowne catches a glim pse of what  appears to be 
Baxter’s BMW in his rear-view m irror.  I n a parody of a suspense film ’s 
look-behind-you moment , Perowne is almost  laughably unconcerned, idly 
musing that  ‘it ’s not  impossible that  it ’s Baxter, but  he feels no part icular 
anxiety about  seeing him  again.  I n fact , he wouldn’t  m ind talking to him ’.  
Then, apparent ly as dist ract ible as he is affable, Perowne immediately 
forgets what  he has seen when ‘his at tent ion is caught  by a television 
shop’ (p. 140) .  This scene supplies a clear link between the t rauma-as-
t r ial plot  and Perowne’s epistemological lim itat ion - -  a rem inder that  what  
McEwan offers to be judged is Perowne’s st ruggle at  the intersect ion of 
knowledge and responsibilit y.  Depending on the humour of the reader, 
Perowne’s nonchalance could read as either helplessness or culpabilit y - -  
Perowne as vulnerable innocent  or naive fool. 
The second stage of the t rauma unfolds when Baxter finally 
at tempts his revenge.  I t  happens in the evening, when the Perowne 
fam ily - -  including Daisy and Grammat icus, freshly arr ived from their 
respect ive haunts in France - -  have assembled for dinner.  With a toady 
called Nigel in tow, Baxter bursts into the scene of domest ic serenity 
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brandishing a knife.  Perowne’s thought ful ret icence, his propensity to 
choose postponement  over decision, is suddenly obsolete.  When Baxter 
breaks Grammat icus’s nose, Perowne feels a sense of awakening:  ‘Unt il 
now, Henry suddenly sees, he’s been in a fog’ (p. 209) .  His fatalist ic 
awareness of chance, previously a means of self-absolut ion, no longer 
works to insulate Perowne from responsibilit y.  He sees Baxter’s int rusion 
into his home as the culm inat ion of a long chain of influences, st retching 
from the m icroscopic vanishing point  of Baxter’s genotype and extending 
far enough to include, crucially, Perowne’s own act ions.  This lat ter 
realizat ion comes in no uncertain terms - -  ‘Perowne himself is also 
responsible’ (p. 210) :  
 
Why could he not  see that  it ’s dangerous to humble a man as 
emot ionally labile as Baxter?  To escape a beat ing and get  to his 
squash game.  He used or m isused his authority to avoid one crisis, 
and his act ions have steered him  into another, far worse. (p. 211)  
 
With the cr isis st ill taking place, Perowne berates himself specifically for 
failing to see, for at tempt ing in a demanding moment  to slink away into 
his habitual pleasures.  Such guilt iness could catalyse a t r iumph over 
ambivalence, but  it  is not  yet  enough for Perowne. 
Though he has begun to see a glim mer of personal responsibilit y, 
Perowne understands Baxter only as tangle of cont ingencies, an 
automaton of biological determ inism  gone haywire with the m isalignm ent  
of a t iny chromosomal cog.  As the ordeal cont inues, however, Baxter’s 
unpredictabilit y will test ify to his own agency, his personhood, even as it  
corresponds perfect ly with Perowne’s diagnosis.  Baxter makes as if to 
rape Daisy, forcing her to st r ip in front  of her terror ized fam ily.  Then, 
catching sight  of the publisher’s proof of her first  collect ion of poems, 
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Baxter inexplicably orders her to ‘read out  your best  poem’ (p. 219) .  
Daisy, in a poet ’s act  of defiance or defence, instead recites ‘Dover Beach’ 
from  memory. 52  I nt r igued and none the wiser to her act  of protect ive 
plagiar ism , Baxter demands a second reading, and after the increasingly 
confident  Daisy complies he is awest ruck:  ‘Baxter says eagerly, “How 
could you have thought  of that?  I  mean, you just  wrote it .”   And then he 
says it  again, several t imes over.  “You wrote it ! ” ’ (p. 223) .  Baxter’s init ial 
curiosity about , and then deep and innate love for, poet ry may seem 
improbable.  Banville certainly believes so, finding in this development  ‘a 
level of bathos that  is hard to credit ’. 53
Precisely because of it s improbabilit y, it  demonst rates Baxter’s 
agency.  Neither Perowne nor the reader could have foreseen Baxter’s 
sudden literary turn.  I ndeed, the reader, having been flat tered for his or 
her literary percept ion for over two hundred pages, is especially unlikely to 
expect  this same power of appreciat ion to become Baxter’s claim  to 
humanity, but  so it  does.  Baxter is up to this point  a rather two-
dimensional character, capable of project ing either menace or, because of 
his chronic disease and chronically disloyal henchmen, poorly concealed 
vulnerabilit y.  Yet  he has access to a kind of aesthet ic experience, a depth 
of consciousness, that  Perowne cannot  fathom.  As Siegel writes, ‘The 
moment  created by Arnold’s poem [ …]  proves the elusive existence in 
Baxter of an imaginat ive sympathy that  is even st ronger than Henry’s own 
  However, indelicate though it  
m ight  be as an authorial technique, Baxter’s literary sensit iv ity is a key 
component  of Perowne’s t r ial.  
                                          
52
 Arnold’s poem resonates with the themat ic content  of Saturday  
sufficient ly that  McEwan includes the full text  as an appendix (p. 281) . 
53
 Banville, p. 14.  Baxter’s poet ic suscept ibilit y m ight  also be behind 
Jennifer Reese’s complaint  that  ‘the violent  confrontat ion late in the 
narrat ive may be the silliest , most  overwrought  climax McEwan has ever 
cooked up’:  ‘Saturday’, Entertainment  Weekly , 6 April 2005, 
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Baxter’s wonder, that  mark of his tormented humanity, init iates his 
undoing.  Made opt im ist ic or at  least  credulous by a flash of literary 
t ranscendence, he turns his at tent ion back to Perowne, at tempt ing to 
extort  from  him  access to experimental t reatments for his Hunt ington’s 
disease.  (This is a fict ion Perowne has used to dist ract  Baxter since their 
first  encounter in the st reet .)   Only moments before, Baxter had dism issed 
Perowne’s insinuat ions, declaring, ‘I t  isn’t  possible.  I  know it  isn’t  
possible’ (p. 216) .  But  having been somehow swayed by the poem, he 
falters in his scept icism .  He marches Perowne upstairs to his office, 
declar ing, as much to himself as to Perowne, ‘I  know they’re keeping it  
quiet ’,  as if to wish away the hopelessness of his condit ion (p. 225) .  Left  
alone with the others, henchman Nigel loses his nerve and flees.  Theo 
and Perowne then manage together to ‘fling [ Baxter]  down the stairs’ (p. 
227) .  This sudden, violent  act  of self-defence could appear wholly 
unambivalent  - -  father and son act ing in concert  to disable their 
antagonist  - -  yet  even in this seem ingly resolute act , Perowne’s role is 
assigned to him , not  chosen.  He lures Baxter upstairs with no more fully-
formed mot ive than to draw him  away from the others.  I t  is Theo, in fact , 
who takes the lead in execut ing the crucial throw;  in the instant  that  
precedes it ,  ‘He makes an inart iculate shout , which sounds like a 
command’ (p. 227) .  Perowne is inst ructed to act  as he does;  he simply 
follows orders, behaving as circumstance and reflex dictate, dr ift ing on a 
current  of cont ingency.  And so his t r ial cont inues. 
  Baxter provides st r ik ing evidence that , though seriously 
damaged, he is more than mere surface, that  he is - -  and can see - -  more 
than is visible even to Perowne’s penet rat ing understanding.  He is 
determ ined to some extent  by his pathology, but  he is not  therefore 
devoid of personhood. 
                                          
54
 Siegel, para. 27 of 28. 
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Having helped to crack Baxter’s skull,  Perowne is later called in to 
the hospital to mend it .  As if to finally make the case that  Perowne can 
take a stand even when not  forced to do so by the point  of a knife or the 
command of his son, McEwan depicts him  resist ing his characterist ic 
ambivalence:  
 
There are other surgeons Jay can call on, and as a general rule, 
Perowne avoids operat ing on people he knows.  But  this is 
different .  And despite various shifts in his at t itude to Baxter, some 
clar ity, even some resolve, is beginning to form .  He thinks he 
knows what  it  is he wants to do. (p. 233)  
 
What  he wants is to save Baxter’s life, which he accomplishes in an 
operat ing- room set  piece, but  he also wants something more.  After the 
operat ion, in yet  another moment  of decision, Perowne’s charity extends 
even beyond the generous dispensat ion of his professional skills.  
Taking Baxter’s pulse after the operat ion, Perowne lingers for a 
moment  with his hand on Baxter’s wrist :  
 
Far more than a quarter of a m inute passes.  I n effect , he’s holding 
Baxter’s hand while he at tempts to sift  and order his thoughts and 
decide precisely what  should be done. (p. 263)  
 
I n the act  of taking a pulse, physical contact  is necessarily light  and 
superficial.  Yet  from this m inimal point  of contact  the pulse, ‘those soft  
foot falls’,  broadcasts the inmost  movements of Baxter’s vitalit y (p. 263) .  
The blood pulsing in his wrist  also suffuses his fatally flawed brain, the 
source of a cruelty and a sensit iv ity that  both outst r ip Perowne’s own 
understanding.  This moment  of touch signals an intellectual and moral 
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confrontat ion that  Perowne has heretofore successfully avoided.  Even with 
the gesture’s air of medical authority, and even as he stands conscious, 
rat ional, and compassionate over a man who is none of these, Perowne 
must  finally acquiesce to Baxter’s incomprehensible core, his sublime 
otherness.  Perowne’s intellectual r igour in this case offers him  a glim pse 
of Baxter as a kind of darkness visible.  I n the final pages of the novel, 
McEwan comes closest  to explaining Perowne’s rat ionale:  
 
No one can forgive him  the use of the knife.  But  Baxter heard 
what  Henry never has, and probably never will,  despite all Daisy’s 
at tempts to educate him .  Some nineteenth-century poet  [ …]  
touched off in Baxter a yearning he could barely begin to define.  
That  hunger is his claim  on life, on a mental existence, and 
because it  won’t  last  much longer, because the door of his 
consciousness is beginning to close, he shouldn’t  pursue his claim  
from a cell,  wait ing for the absurdity of his t r ial to begin. (pp. 278-
279)  
 
For Perowne, Baxter is ‘an unpickable knot  of afflict ion’, a vanishing point  
at  which individual knowledge and understanding give way to the sublime 
unknowabilit y of subject ive personhood (p. 272) .  Faced with this 
humbling blind spot , Perowne relinquishes Baxter’s fate to the cont ingency 
of disease;  he decides not  to press cr im inal charges. 
I n doing so he enacts yet  another of his principled abstent ions, but  
in this case he enjoys none of the insulat ing distance he felt  when 
witnessing an airborne accident  or considering the t r ibulat ions of terrorism  
and war.  Baxter’s violence has impinged direct ly into Perowne’s home, his 
personal sphere, imperilling his ent ire fam ily, and so Perowne has 
demonst rated that  he can wield his rat ionalist ic compassion even in close 
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quarters.  Moreover, because Perowne’s pardon of Baxter const itutes a 
surrender to cont ingency, it  is a declarat ion of hum ilit y.  I t  is an admission 
of ignorance - -  of not  knowing Baxter, of not  knowing what  he deserves, 
and ult imately of not  knowing the extent  to which Perowne’s choices led to 
Baxter’s cr ime:  
 
I s this forgiveness?  Probably not , he doesn’t  know, and he’s not  
the one to be grant ing it  anyway.  Or is he the one seeking 
forgiveness?  He’s responsible, after all;  twenty hours ago he drove 
across a road officially closed to t raffic, and set  in t rain a sequence 
of events. (p. 278)  
 
Perowne does not  decide to protect  Baxter from prosecut ion because he is 
certain such a course is r ight ;  rather, he does so because, not  knowing 
what  is r ight , he refuses to dictate a correct ive.  Perowne tells himself that  
this refusal is not  ‘weakness’ but  ‘realism ’ (p. 278) .  I n fact , since it  is 
act ive rather than passive - -  Perowne plans out  how best  to suggest  his 
decision to Rosalind and how he m ight  use his professional connect ions to 
ensure Baxter’s comfort  - -  Perowne’s decision is less a refusal than a 
recusal.  This is his moment  of decisiveness, such as it  is.  He direct ly and 
act ively acknowledges his own lim itat ion. 
Because Perowne’s previous moments of ambivalence allow him  a 
rather comfortable inert ia of conscience, it  seems to some reviewers 
ment ioned above that  he cult ivates his assumed ignorance as a protect ive 
self-pardon.  Yet  in the case of violent , pathet ic Baxter, when the easiest  
course of act ion, the one expected by the police, by his fam ily, and surely 
by society in general, would be prosecut ion, Perowne nevertheless 
perseveres in his uncertainty.  Because it  is the more consistent , his 
conscient ious ret icence m ight  be said to supersede his complacency.  
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Thus, Perowne’s encounter with the inscrutable otherness of Baxter, with 
the reality of his difference, allows Perowne to make a gesture of 
compassion that  to some extent  defends against  the charges of hypocrisy 
arising from his previous indecisiveness. 
The effect iveness of this defence, however, is indeterm inate.  
Perowne himself considers that  allowing Baxter to live out  his impending 
‘descent  into nightmare hallucinat ion’ in a hospital could be a kind of 
revenge.  His comments on forgiveness in the passage quoted above 
suggest  that  his apparent  compassion m ight  be more of his characterist ic 
self-protect ion - -  a way to avoid the guilt  of ‘whipping a man on his way to 
hell’ (p. 278) .  Perowne’s mot ives are obscure even to himself, and yet  if 
his t r ial is to come to a close, they must  be hypothesized.  Perowne’s 
uncertainty calls for an intervening act  of jur isprudence from an external 
agent , that  is, from  the reader. 
I f the reader is to make this judgement , if Perowne’s t r ial is not  to 
be after all a m ist r ial,  then there is an obstacle to be overcome:  namely, 
the incompleteness of the reader’s own understanding.  Andrew Bennet t  
writes that  ‘it  is no doubt  a t ruism  [ …]  to say that  we are, by definit ion, or 
that  we should be, ignorant  as we begin a poem or story’. 55  McEwan’s use 
of suspense is the most  prom inent  testament  to the importance of 
readerly ignorance in Saturday ,  but  it  is not  the only one.  One reads to 
discover what  happens next , but  also to get  to know diverse literary 
elem ents like characters, set t ing, and style.  The act ivity of reading begins 
with, in Bennet t ’s terms, a ‘search for enlightenment ’. 56
                                          
55
 Andrew Bennet t , I gnorance:  Literature and Agnoiology  (Manchester:  
Manchester University, 2009) , p. 35. 
  Ult imately, one 
reads because one wants to encounter in a text  something that  is not  
already present  in one’s own m ind.  Why else read?  To undertake the task 
56
 Bennet t , p. 36. 
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of reading is thus, at  some level, a confession of nescience, a confession 
that , in the case of Saturday , precedes any judgement . 
I n const ruct ing his protagonist , McEwan opens Perowne’s m ind to 
the reader, but  he does not  make visible the mot ives and values of 
Perowne’s decisions.  These remain as obscure to the reader as they are to 
Perowne himself.  Furthermore, the nature of Perowne’s capacity to not ice 
the lim itat ions of his own understanding, a faculty which Murdoch 
proposes is the prime mover of moral act ion, is never quite brought  to 
light .  He may be helpless to see more than he does;  he may be wilfully, 
culpably blind.  What  this finally means for the possibilit y of determ ining 
Perowne’s standing as a moral being, and what  is likely already clear 
enough from the diversity of opinion among those crit ics who have been 
tempted into passing judgements, is that  certainty is out  of reach.  The 
text  encourages many inferences, but  all conclusions are finally 
underdeterm ined. 
This obscurity makes for a paradoxical union:  in spite of their 
marked separat ion, Perowne and the reader are in fact  in a sim ilar 
predicament .  Confronted with a complex and incomplete data set , they 
are incited to decisive act ion by circumstance.  For Perowne, this state of 
affairs schemat izes several events of his experience well before the 
climact ic home invasion, among them the sight  of the burning plane, the 
various issues of terrorism  and war, his perpetual self-analysis - -  even the 
disconcert ing realit ies of seafood.  Likewise, the reader is confronted with 
a text  which creates the same sort  of problem it  depicts, providing 
provisional support  for mutually exclusive interpretat ions, then posing, in 
the form  of the plot ted t r ial,  an open interrogat ive:  which will it  be then? 
I ndeed, following Perowne’s example, one m ight  shift  perceptual 
scales and imagine the scene from a different  vantage.  From another 
degree of distance the conceit  of the t rauma-as- test  is it self only the 
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product  of certain ( rather unsubt le)  interpret ive choices among a vast  and 
indeterm inate mult iplicity of opt ions.  Consequent ly, the reader, focusing 
on some aspects of the text  at  the expense of others, choosing this or that  
reading because it  is somehow more rewarding, re-enacts a behaviour 
that , when performed by Perowne, m ight  be labelled hypocrisy (or 
pragmat ism , one hastens to add) .  Both Perowne and the reader, in their 
respect ive contexts, must  be select ively at tent ive, and therefore also 
sporadically blind, in order to navigate through what  they would 
understand.  They are thus helpless, incapable of at taining certainty, since 
there always remains more to be considered, other hypothet ical 
perspect ives from which to scan the details.  Yet  also they are culpable, 
because what  they perceive and understand, though perhaps delivered to 
them on a current  of cont ingency, has finally been adm it ted to their 
understanding through their select ive agency. 
This is not  to insist  that  no readerly judgement  is possible;  a 
cursory glance at  some newspaper reviews has already pre-empted such a 
content ion.  Rather, it  is to claim  that  a universal condit ion of all the many 
readings made available by the text  is that  they are uncertain.  They are 
quite literally inconclusive;  no single interpretat ion can be set  forth 
without  revealing what  Paul de Man has termed a ‘residue of 
indeterm inat ion’. 57
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 Paul de Man, ‘The Resistance to Theory’, in The Resistance to Theory ,  
ed. by Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota, 1986) , pp. 3-
20 (p. 15) . 
  Any reading of Perowne must  adm it , if perhaps 
covert ly, the possibilit y of rebut tal, revision, and complicat ion.  Navigat ing 
the aporet ic text , seeking a posit ion from which to pass judgement  on 
Perowne, the reader must  sift  out  from  the textual evidence only those 
elem ents that  support  a preferred conclusion.  The reader must  pract ise 
select ive at tent ion.  Hypocrit ically or for the sake of pragmat ism , out liers 
and except ions cannot  be given equal weight ;  they must  be relegated to 
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an interpret ive blind spot .  One must  m im ic Perowne in order to condemn 
or exonerate him . 
The hermeneut ic unfinalizabilit y of the text  makes it  into an 
analogue of the ‘unut terable part icularity ’ Murdoch locates in the m ind of 
the other. 58  Rather than the radical otherness of another human being, in 
Perowne the reader encounters a created image of this otherness, 
enhanced by and embedded within the interpret ive otherness of literary 
textuality.  The likeness to sublime human alter ity that  a created artefact  
m ight  bear does not  go unnot iced by Murdoch.  Art  offers, for Murdoch, 
the possibilit y of ‘the apprehension of something else, something 
part icular, as exist ing outside us’, an aesthet ic experience with a moral 
import . 59  Of the best  art  she writes that  ‘in it s genesis and its enjoyment  
it  is a thing totally opposed to selfish obsession’. 60  Murdoch explains that  
among other arts, literature is part icularly well equipped to create a kind 
of at tent ive openness.  She cites first  of all t ragedy but  also the novel as 
forms which bring about  ‘compassion, love:  the non-violent  apprehension 
of difference’. 61
Writ ing at  a t ime when Bakht in’s work was vir tually inaccessible to 
scholars in the West , Murdoch formulates her concept ion of ‘great  novels’ 
in terms of their representat ion of heterogeneous part icularit ies:  
 
 
There is in these novels a plurality of real persons more or less 
naturalist ically presented in a large social scene, and represent ing 
mutually independent  cent res of significance which are those of 
real individuals. 
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This kind of conscient ious realism  amounts to ‘a display of tolerance’:  
 
A great  novelist  is essent ially tolerant , that  is, displays a real 
apprehension of persons other than the author as having a r ight  to 
exist  and to have a separate mode of being which is important  and 
interest ing to themselves. 62
 
 
Murdoch finds this quality to be at  it s most  prom inent  in novels of the 
nineteenth century, typified in her opinion by Tolstoy.  She is careful, 
however, to detach this ‘greatness’ of the novel from  any part icular socio-
historical determ inant  while at  the same t ime preserving its generic 
affiliat ion.  I t  is, she writes, ‘a value which I  think belongs, or has 
belonged since at  least  the eighteenth century, to prose literature as 
such’. 63  Bennet t , like Murdoch, finds ethically- loaded images of a 
‘mult iplicity of subject ivit ies’ in the novel, a feature that  ‘seems to present  
us with a way of com ing to know the otherness of others, of knowing 
others as others, of knowing anyway the otherness of people in books’. 64
However, such a concept ion of the morality of the novel harbours a 
discernible tension between its components.  Murdoch describes the 
capacity to apprehend sublime otherness as inhering in ‘prose literature as 
   
The value Murdoch, and to a lesser extent  Bennet t , seeks to illum inate, 
then, is not  a formal feature per se, but  rather the moral consequence of 
an epistemological stance, one which is drawn from at tent iveness to the 
real via mult iplicity and subject ivity.  I t  is a consequence, in other words, 
of novelist ic understanding. 
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such’, yet  she also singles it  out  as the elusive at tainment  of only a 
handful of ‘great ’ novelists.  This presumably leaves a sizeable assortment  
of also- rans, novels which bear the potent ial for moral vision in their 
generic makeup and yet  fall short  of Murdoch’s novelist ic ideal.  The most  
successful works - -  those that  reveal in its profoundest  sense the t ruth 
‘that  other people exist ’ and so successfully realize ‘a vast  and varied 
reality outside ourselves’ in their t reatment  of human subject ivity - -  may 
nevertheless fall short  of their potent ial through no fault  of their own.  
Murdoch explains:  
 
I t  is the spectacle of this manifold, if we can actually apprehend it , 
which is not  easy, which brings the exhilarat ion and the power and 
rem inds us, to use Kant ’s words, of our supersensible dest iny. 65
 
 
Access to the sublime subject  comes only on the condit ion of Murdoch’s 
‘if ’.   I n order to fully exert  it s moral force, the work of art  must  manage 
not  only to body forth this subject ivity in its own content , but  also to 
weather the capricious subject ivity of the actual liv ing person who 
perceives the work from without . 
I n applying this vulnerabilit y to the case of the novel, a 
responsibilit y can be seen to fall on the shoulders of the reader, who must  
choose to seek out  a certain difficult  type of knowledge, must  remain 
cont inually open to otherness.  Considering the demands it  makes of 
whomever it  touches - -  the individuals it  port rays as well as the individuals 
who create and consume those port rayals - -  the moral apparatus of the 
novel would seem to be quite fragile, perhaps something of a fict ion in its 
own r ight .  What  bearing could this evanescent  value of the epitom ized 
novel have on real, flawed, individual novels? 
                                          
65
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The quest ion can be approached with a considerat ion of the not ion 
of Perowne’s helpless culpabilit y and the correspondence, noted above, 
between Perowne and the reader.  I n grasping for a more whole 
understanding of his world, Perowne uses his imaginat ive power as a 
means of stepping outside the lim itat ions of his own situatedness.  
However, because the power of selfless project ion always emanates from 
the foundat ion of the very subject ivity it  seeks to exceed, this grasping 
after understanding also enables, and perhaps even self-servingly 
validates, Perowne’s blindness and self-decept ion.  Of course some degree 
of pragmat ism  is indispensable, since no mat ter how extensive his 
compassionate vision m ight  be, final, absolute understanding is beyond his 
capabilit y.  For any and all individuals, the gesture of reaching outward 
toward certainty cannot  be completed.  The responsibilit y Perowne feels is 
essent ially the obligat ion to cont inue an incompletable task, and the 
morality he exemplifies exists, to the extent  that  it  does exist , by vir tue of 
it s ‘making do’, it s ongoingness and provisionality. 
I n his final confrontat ion with the helpless Baxter, Perowne gets his 
most  humbling glimpse of the fut ilit y of st r iv ing for certainty combined 
with a demonst rat ion of the importance of that  st r iv ing - -  and its 
inevitable short fall - -  for his humanity.  As Murdoch writes, ‘To understand 
other people is a task which does not  come to an end’. 66
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  For Perowne, 
Baxter, as sublime individual, stands as a sort  of object  lesson in 
epistemological and moral subject ivity.  Perowne does not  know, and so 
cannot  choose, what  is r ight .  Rather, he opts for what  seems, 
provisionally, subject ively, to be the best  available choice.  This is the 
paradoxical core of his well- intent ioned hypocrisy:  just  as it  is his 
consciousness of the lim itat ions of individual subject ivity that  allows for 
the moderat ion of those lim itat ions, it  is also his self-aware falling short  of 
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ideal morality that  const itutes his liv ing, pract icable morality, for bet ter or 
worse. 
As various reviewers of Saturday  demonst rate, evaluat ing this 
pragmat ic select ivity calls for a counterpart  subject ivity to that  of 
Perowne.  Any reading of a literary text , including those presented in this 
chapter, takes place against  a background of other possibilit ies.  This 
interpret ive plurality makes possible a sense of the personhood of 
characters, a sense substant ial enough that  Murdoch can speak of them as 
‘real indiv iduals’ when, it  need hardly be ment ioned, empir ically speaking 
they are not .  The image of subject ivity comes about  by means of 
hermeneut ic indeterm inacy, creat ing in an ideal character, or more 
broadly in an ideal text , an aesthet ic/ interpret ive asymptote, that  is, an 
artefact  that  cannot  be exhaust ively and finally comprehended. 
The clearest  connect ing route between novelist ic representat ion 
and an ethical stance, as described by Murdoch (along with the connect ion 
implied between subject ive understanding and ethics by McEwan in 
Saturday)  makes as its focus the alter ity of other thinking human beings.  
As Bennet t  writes, ‘The novel [ …]  is based on the possibilit y (and therefore 
on the problem, the difficulty)  of knowing others’. 67  Because of the 
duplicity of m imesis, a fict ional human being can funct ion in much the 
same way.  Dorothy J. Hale considers related arguments for the ethical 
import  of lit erary representat ions of subject ivity. 68
 
  She proposes that  
character is the locus of the ethical implicat ions of novelist ic 
representat ion:  
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The representat ion of character in the novel is never free of the 
threat  of inst rumentality, either from the subject ive source of 
narrat ion or from an object ificat ion posed by literary design.  
Fict ional characters are proposed as ‘human’ precisely by the 
perceived lim itat ion from both sources that  novelist ic form  places 
on their autonomy.  Fict ional characters can be felt  to be no 
different  from real human beings to the degree that  their funct ional 
posit ionality seems like a rest r ict ion of their subject ive 
potent ialit y. 69
 
 
Thus, again, the short fall that  inheres in m imet ic representat ion becomes 
the means to its representat ional efficacy.  A novelist ic character, 
necessarily const rained by the nature of literary representat ion, will 
funct ion because of this const raint  as an avatar of subject ive otherness 
(and so for Murdoch’s purposes is ‘real’ enough) .  The reader’s role, 
though it  unfolds on a different  scale or plane, is schemat ically analogous 
to Perowne’s:  the subject ive individual grasps for certainty and falls short .  
De Man exam ines a literary fall,  Keats’s The Fall of Hyperion,  and 
finds that  the ‘undecidabilit y ’ of the text , even that  of just  it s t it le, 
inst igates a readerly fall as well:  
 
Faced with the ineluctable necessity to come to a decision, no 
grammat ical or logical analysis can help us out .  Just  as Keats had 
to break off his narrat ive, the reader has to break off his 
understanding at  the very moment  when he is most  direct ly 
engaged and summoned by the text . 70
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I f reading is to take place, that  decision must  in some fashion st ill be 
made, though without  full and final understanding.  I n other words, the 
reader makes do, interpret ing the text  provisionally, producing a reading 
that  is part ial in two senses - -  it  is incomplete and it  is an expression of 
preference.  The reader is helpless to avoid this responsibilit y, but  the 
burden is also an opportunity.  For if,  as Murdoch proposes, the morality of 
the novel predicates itself on the sublime potent ial of represented reality, 
then some amount  of interpret ive failure or short fall is in fact  crucial to its 
funct ion.  I ndeed, Bennet t  presents this hermeneut ic inexhaust ibilit y or 
‘opacity’ as const itut ive of ‘what  we learn, or what  we can learn, from  
books’.  He proposes that  ‘epistemophilia’ - -  the readerly desire for 
‘enlightenment ’ ment ioned above - -  is ‘shadowed by its other, by what  we 
m ight  call anepistemophilia or even by epistemophobia, by the desire not  
to know - -  or by the desire to know, to take cognisance of, nescience’. 71
I f a work of art  is to make some gesture toward the supersensible, 
then a final, fut ile unreachableness must  inhere in the experience of that  
work.  When Perowne finally confronts the ult imate unknowableness of the 
other in the form  of Baxter, it  urges him  to an act  of compassionate 
recusal, a humble recognit ion of his own epistem ic lim itat ion.  His 
select iv ity of at tent ion and his blindness are all he can draw upon, and so 
he makes of them what  he can, choosing the provisional best .  A novel 
reader, experiencing characters and their world through act ive, 
imaginat ive project ion, can never project  so totally as to arr ive at  final, 
certain understanding, and it  is in this humbling short fall that  the moral 
potent ial of the novel rests.  The select ivity of at tent ion that  self-aware 
subject ivity requires is thus not  only an obstacle to moral vision, but  also 
 
                                          
71
 To support  this claim , Bennet t  specifically cites de Man’s ‘The Resistance 
to Theory’, along with T. S. Eliot  and Maurice Blanchot  (p. 36) . 
282 
  
it s foundat ion.  Murdoch describes the incompleteness of the work of art  in 
terms broad enough to include even the most  fully realized novel:  
 
Because of the muddle of human life and the ambiguity and 
playfulness of aesthet ic form , art  can at  best  only explain part ly, 
only reveal almost :  and of course any complex work contains 
impurit ies and accidents which we choose to ignore. 72
 
 
One should not  forget  that  art  is made by men and women as fallible as 
those who behold it .   I t  is this ‘mortal nature’ of the work, of it s ongoing 
life, that  allows it  to funct ion as powerfully as it  does. 73
I f,  as occurs with Perowne, the reader’s effort  toward 
understanding results at  t imes in delusion or indulgence, such is inevitably 
the nature of situated, human, moral life.  As Murdoch observes, neither 
part ialness nor part ialit y are ant ithet ical to moral growth:  
  I ndeed, it  phrases 
an equal and complementary t ruth to reconfigure Murdoch’s statement :  
art  is at  it s best  when it  only explains part ly, for without  some 
incompleteness, some gap into which a reader m ight  fall,  there would be 
very lit t le enduring value (and few values)  to the work. 
 
Schopenhauer, who thought  moral change was almost  impossible, 
said that  vir tue usually consisted of pr ide, t im idity, desire for 
advancement , fear of censure and fear of the gods.  Yet , so m ixed 
up are we, pride, fear of disgrace, and intelligent  (one m ight  even 
say well- intent ioned)  hypocrisy, can lead to genuine change. 74
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The reader must  approach a text  humbly in order to make sense of it , 
seeking certainty while set t ling for provisionalit y.  Precisely because of this 
recourse to expediency, there is a moral consequence to the novel.  To 
assume this epistemological stance amounts to a declarat ion of 
subject ivity, of being one among many, of disclaim ing the egot ism  of both 
solipsism  and authoritar ianism .  A novelist ic way of knowing, even if it  is 
confined to the act  of reading that  engenders it ,  even if it  is only 






I n a thesis in which the not ion of inconclusiveness is so pivotal, the 
absence of a conclusion is perhaps forgivable.  I n lieu of at tempt ing 
closure, I  would like to suggest  what  m ight  be the possible next  step for 
the arc I  have t raced up to this point .  I  have claim ed that  a special type 
of scept icism , the condit ion of epistemological provisionalit y, is integral to 
the novel, bound up in the m imet ic figurat ions that  make it  recognizable 
even as it  remains formally variable and dynam ic.  I  have at tempted to 
indicate the possibilit y of an ethical consequence to this provisionality, 
namely a posture of self-aware deference to alter ity that  results from the 
recognit ion of the incompleteness of one’s understanding.  I  believe this 
posture can be found to have a polit ical consequence as well.  
For the most  part , I  have drawn the ethical implicat ions of 
novelist ic understanding from the novel’s representat ion of otherness in 
human subject ivity, though I  have at tempted to indicate that  the novelist ic 
epistemological stance is rooted more deeply in the genre than in the 
figurat ion of character alone.  The novelist ic text  it self,  because of the 
heteroglot , dialogical nature of the genre, because of the nature of 
m imesis as a pharm akon,  and because of the variabilit y of literary reading, 
presents an epistemological horizon to the reader, and with the same 
consequences as those which arise from the representat ion of sublime 
human subject ivity.  The inevitable falling short  of representat ion from its 
object , the necessary lim itat ions of understanding that  are the condit ion of 
situatedness within mult iplicity - -  these challenges to posit iv ism  and to 
certainty would persist  even in a hypothet ical novel without  characters, 
narrated by a chorus of disembodied shades.  The novelist ic way of 
knowing derives from the conspicuous insufficiency of novelist ic 
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representat ion.  I t  must  gesture outside of it self,  toward alter ity, because 
it  is never quite enough.  Thus it  is ongoing, refusing finality or 
ossificat ion.  Thus also it  is t inged with the ironic;  because its last  word 
has never yet  been ut tered, all that  it  speaks is spoken in the shadow of a 
potent ial amendment  or reversal.  The most  serious, st raight forward novel 
is an im itat ion of seriousness.  I t  cannot  lay claim  to a final t ruth or 
prohibit  cont rary readings because even the gravest  mask is st ill a mask - -  
perhaps it  covers the face of a t r ickster.  This is why the novel can say so 
much.  What  the novel says, it  says provisionally, precariously, with a 
caveat , with an asterisk. 
 But  this statement  too must  be made without  certainty.  
Something like the provisionality that  I  have so far characterized as 
novelist ic can be t raced beyond the confines of the genre it  marks, into 
the larger realm  of the literary, and beyond that  to the aesthet ic in 
general.  Derek At t r idge’s not ion of literary singularity allows for a model 
of art ist ic product ion and recept ion in which the individual work arises out  
of but  exceeds its or iginat ing cultural contexts, so that  it  becomes a point , 
or rather a process, of engagement  with alter ity, ‘a peculiar nexus within 
the culture that  is perceived as resist ing or exceeding all pre-exist ing 
general determ inat ions’.  Singularity is ‘always open to contam inat ion, 
graft ing, accidents, reinterpretat ion, and recontextualizat ion’, and it  is 
‘em inent ly im itable’. 1
Because it  involves a confrontat ion with otherness, singularity 
points to an epistemological horizon.  I t  preserves within itself a reference 
to what  lies beyond it ;  it  harbours a kernel of the unknown.  At t r idge 
writes that  ‘at tempts to do just ice to a work’s singularity ’ require ‘showing 
that  even the fullest  explanat ion does not  exhaust  the work’s 
 
                                          
1




invent iveness, that  this type of reading necessarily fails’. 2  Both the 
product ion and the recept ion, therefore, of the singular work require 
‘at tent ion to and affirmat ion of otherness’, a responsive at t itude that  has 
an ethical correspondence:  ‘t reat ing literature as literature means being 
hospitable and generous’. 3
 
  The irrupt ion of alter ity enacted by the 
apprehension of singularity also has polit ical repercussions:  
The other exposes a reality or t ruth of which the culture and its 
subjects were unaware, and unaware for reasons that  are far from 
arbit rary.  This uncovered reality may be pleasant ;  it  may equally 
be unpalatable or even dangerous.  I ts occlusion is likely to be in 
the interests of those in power, and, as the history of censorship 
shows, it  may be polit ically unacceptable to state authorit ies. [ …]  
Yet  the revelat ion of the hidden costs of a culture’s stabilit y, the 
bringing to fruit fulness of seeds that  had lain dormant , the 
opening-up of possibilit ies that  had remained closed, is - -  however 
r isky - -  a good in itself,  part icularly when the process is a 
cont inuous one, allowing no permanent  set t ling of norms and 




The openness to the other that  At t r idge describes, which entails the ethical 
and polit ical effects ment ioned above, is founded on hum ilit y.  I t  involves 
a self-aware adm ission of epistem ic lim itat ion, an acknowledgement  of 
unknowing, and it  is ongoing, unfinalizable. 
                                          
2
 At t r idge, The Singularity of Literature,  p. 82. 
3
 At t r idge, The Singularity of Literature,  p. 126.  At t r idge clar ifies this 
correspondence:  ‘There is no necessary correlat ion between being a good 
reader [ …]  and being a good person’;  however, ‘some of the same values 
are at  work in both spheres’ (p. 130) . 
4
 At t r idge, The Singularity of Literature,  p. 137. 
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The singularity of literature rehearses an epistemological stance 
that  Lorenzo I nfant ino calls ‘gnoseological fallibilism ’.  Simply put , this is 
the recognit ion that  all is not  known.  Applied polit ically, though, this 
scept ical t ruism  ‘dest roys the myth of the “great  legislator” ’, because 
‘since rulers are ignorant  and fallible as are all men, they should have 
lim ited power’.  Human inst itut ions fall into the range of this scept icism  as 
well,  for if ‘no one knows how to solve all the problems of social life, 
society cannot  have a prescribed order’. 5  Order becomes an open-ended 
process of provisional improvements.  When the recognit ion of fallibilism  is 
st ifled, ‘t ruth is no longer the temporary and always part ial result  of a 
cont inual confrontat ion between “conjectures and refutat ions” , but  the 
uncontestable verdict  of a privileged source of knowledge’. 6
I f a case is to be made for the polit ical ram ificat ions of the novel as 
a genre, it  could be made in these terms.  Read against  the considerat ion 
of the novel that  has guided my discussion up to this point , At t r idge’s 
claims about  aesthet ic singularity and its polit ical significance indicate that  
novelist ic provisionality is one species of an epistemo-ethical potent ialit y 
that  pervades all literary discourse, even ‘all creat ive shapings of 
  Because it  
emphasizes the short fall between ad hoc st ructures of order and their 
Platonic ideals, the recept ivity of the responsible reader, when t ranslated 
into the polit ical sphere, opposes a unilateral, hierarchical ‘r ight ’.   The 
literary is inherent ly democrat ic because it  denies the finality of any claim  
upon the ‘last  word’.  I t  problemat izes human access to totalit y, and in 
doing so it  underm ines the totalitar ian illusion of access to the absolute. 
                                          
5
 Lorenzo I nfant ino, I gnorance and Liberty  (London:  Rout ledge, 2003) , p. 
5.  For a discussion of I nfant ino’s relevance to the cent ralit y of ignorance 
in literature, see Andrew Bennet t , I gnorance:  Literature and Agnoiology  
(Manchester:  Manchester University, 2009) , pp. 233-237. 
6
 I nfant ino, p. 129.  I nfant ino’s argument , in which he seeks to challenge 
the authoritar ianism  of Plato, draws upon the work of Friedrich von Hayek. 
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language’. 7  The generic mark of the novel is thus not  provisionality it self 
as an abst ract  ideal, but  the novel’s part icular means of both art iculat ing 
and instant iat ing that  provisionality, which it  does by staging problems of 
m imesis and subject ivity.  These problems are typified by, but  not  
rest r icted to, representat ions of the other as human individual.  They are 
in fact  the substance of the novel’s ident ity - -  ar ising from its self-
referent ial, scept ical m odes of representat ion independent ly of the content  
of any part icular novel - -  and so they allow the novel to reiterate the 
threat  that  any literary artefact  poses to totalitar ianism  in an especially 
deeply-ent renched formulat ion.  The very genesis of the genre was 
energized by an ant i-hierarchical appropriat ion of high and low, a 
relat iv izat ion of literary standards, and so, like the dubiously reformed 
Roderick Random, the novel has shown that  even the convent ions that  
perpetuate it  and grant  it  salience are mutable and impermanent .  As 
Marthe Robert  writes, ‘A novel’s conservat ism  may be expressed in its 
polit ical bias or it s ideology, but  it s democracy resides in the very 
movement  that  enables it  to exist ’. 8
I  do not  wish to impute a utopian magic to the novel, or to claim  
that  the cultures that  have developed and perpetuated novelist ic fict ion 
are privy to a special wisdom.  There are without  doubt  elements of the 
genre that  tend to monologism  and absolut ism .  ( I n a bit  of t r iv ia that  
  The novel is generically ant i-
totalitar ian. 
                                          
7
 At t r idge, The Singularity of Literature,  p. 130.  Like Bakht in’s dialogism , 
At t r idge’s concept ion of the disrupt iveness of literar iness can funct ion as a 
defining condit ion of a literary work or as a latent  capacity in language 
itself:  ‘Language that  is recognizably deviant , lexically, syntact ically, or 
stylist ically, does not  simply register a degree of distance from a norm  for 
art ist ic effect  but  raises quest ions about  the stabilit y of any possible 
norm ’;  see Derek At t r idge, Peculiar Language:  Literature as Difference 
from  the Renaissance to Jam es Joyce,  2nd edn (London:  Rout ledge, 2004) , 
p. 184. 
8
 Marthe Robert , ‘From Origins of the Novel’,  in Theory of the Novel:  A 
Historical Approach,  ed. by Michael McKeon (Balt imore, MD:  Johns Hopkins 
University, 2000) , pp. 57-69 (p. 69) . 
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Henry Perowne would surely relish, even Saddam Hussein fancied himself 
a novelist .) 9
                                          
9
 [ anon.] , ‘Saddam’s New Book:  “Begone, Accursed One! ” ’, The Middle 
East  Media Research I nst itute (30 May 2003)  
< ht tp: / / www.memri.org/ report / en/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 0/ 871.htm>  [ accessed 29 
August  2010]  
  Nevertheless, the various viewpoints amassed in this thesis 
at test  - -  provisionally - -  to the novel’s ant i- totalitar ian inclinat ion, the 
art iculat ion of which is available only as an ongoing project  of discovery, 
requir ing openness to provisionality.  As such, the novel and its 
theorizat ions provide a set  of tools that  can offer insight  into literary 
aesthet ics, but  also, by their very existence, can present  a challenge to 
st ructures of hegemony and dom inat ion.  This is a challenge that  deserves 
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